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Apple previews Lockdown Mode
- lwswl 4y agoHonestly, this is bad news, because it means Apple is no longer capable of offering both security and all features, but now needs to spit them into groups, presumably because they need to keep up with (the clearly less secure) Android...
- lekevicius 4y agoI see this as securing against "unknown unknowns". No software can ever be "100% bug free". If you can identify areas that are more likely to contain yet-undiscovered vulnerabilities and turn them off in advance, the device becomes more secure.
- capableweb 4y agoSecurity has never been "Secure or not" proposition, it's always a balance between convenience and safety against threats, threats that change depending on who you are, and who is targeting you. Some features are (understandably) almost impossible to make very safe. Take PDF viewing for example, the entire thing is so huge, that it's bound to be holes in any implementation, just like what the NSO proved some time ago with the iMessage exploit. I take this effort as something similar to the "Hardened Linux" effort. Just that it exists doesn't mean that Linux is "unsecure", it just means that if you really need to, there is more steps you can take to make it even more secure. Just like what Apple is doing here.
- vorpalhex 4y agoIf I could upvote you twice, I would. Security is always a tradeoff and there is no single answer. A feature for one person is another person's hell. An acquiantance just lost all their data because they had enabled "format on too many missed passcodes" and their kid was playing with their phone.. caused quite a few tears. On the other hand, that feature is invaluable to international travelers.
- lekevicius 4y agoWhat a strange implementation of "format on too many missed passcodes". Apple (on iOS and watchOS) implements this, but after some amount of failures, phone gets into progressively longer lockdowns. So maybe after 3 failed attempts you have to wait 2 minutes, after 4th 5 minutes, and before the final (formatting) attempt you have to wait something like 12 hours. This prevents "kid playing with the phone" problem.
- olliej 4y agoNo, this is a completely reasonable response. Security by reducing attack surface is a standard, and sensible response. What you are asking for is that Apple (or any company) be able to produce absolutely 100% bug free code, no matter the complexity or requirements. This feature is an acknowledgement that what you're asking for is an unreasonable demand for any company. So Apple has looked at the attack surface present by default, and then provided an option to that trades off removing presumably low use features in exchange for removing large attack surface. That is a trade off: for example any modern phone would be vastly more secure if all it could do is make phone calls, and everything - the browser, apps, etc - were disabled. But that end of the spectrum results in an impractically restricted device, in reality there's a middle ground, but for high profile targets the trade off is closer to "just a phone" than it is for normal users. An example is the RW^X region required to support JITting JS - the OS simply supporting such memory region at all was a huge addition of attack surface to the platform - prior to that every single executable page was protected by code signing, afterwards there was a region that by definition the OS could not verify, and it has been used by every attack since then. But disabling that simply disables the JIT, the JS interpreter runs, so the impact is only that some web content runs slower, but the functionality itself is still there. Similar for messages: receiving JPEGs is super common, receiving OpenEXR or whatever probably isn't, so removing everything other than JPEG by default again removes attack surface without realistically impacting the usability of messages.
- npteljes 4y agoSecurity and convenience _can_ coexist, but you can't transition into a more secure world without breaking convenient, insecure stuff that already exists and users expect it to just work. Later they can ramp this up.
- alwillis 4y agoHonestly, this is bad news, because it means Apple is no longer capable of offering both security and all features… Absolutely not true. There’s a difference between being secure and having all of the features and being secure against a state-level attacker. The vast majority of users are quite secure while enjoying all of the features of their iPhones. For those who are being targeted, potentially in a life or death situation, being able to send attachments in iMessage is trivial by comparison. Only a tiny percentage of iPhone users should ever have to enable this; it won’t impact the user experience of over 95% of iPhone users at all.
- newaccount2021 4y ago
- kraf 4y agoCool, is this like GrapheneOS just without being open and free?
- Nextgrid 4y agoMost of the features of this lockdown mode should be on by default.
- egberts1 4y agoESPECIALLY the disabling of JavaScript, because … malicious JacaScript.
- phoe-krk 4y agoThis does not seem to disable JS altogether, only JS JIT compilation. IIUC, JS will still be executed, although via an interpreter (which is safer) rather than via compiled machine code (which might be used to exploit memory safety bugs such as type confusion, somewhat frequent on the JS side).
- jimt1234 4y agoTotally agree. I'm also concerned about the fine print, what Apple is not announcing - like, "Oh, we also updated our EULA to reflect that metadata from phones with 'lockdown mode' enabled will be forwarded to the FBI", something like that.
- someguydave 4y agoThis lockdown mode looks like what ought to be default security behavior.
- andrewia 4y agoIt slightly degrades some experiences, so I see why it's disabled by default. Disabling JIT JavaScript is going to make web browsing more painful. And incoming friend requests are useful because it simplifies things when two people are adding each other to their phones - one sends a request and the other reciprocates.
- JCWasmx86 4y ago> Disabling JIT JavaScript With a bit of luck, this will cause site operators to reduce their usage of unnecessary JS, so maybe this has positive impacts :)
- jka 4y ago> It slightly degrades some experiences, so I see why it's disabled by default. My sense is that the functionality to provide those experiences resulted in a decrease in user security and privacy when they were introduced -- and that those risks were widely-discussed and well-understood. It's weird (although not unexpected) to see the reversal of them touted as a selling point.
- _the_inflator 4y ago"Web browsing: Certain complex web technologies, like just-in-time (JIT) JavaScript compilation, are disabled unless the user excludes a trusted site from Lockdown Mode." Highly interesting, that Apple is doing this. This is a thing. MS and Google are also taking steps to harden Chromium security against JIT compiler issues with JavaScript. https://www.zdnet.com/article/securing-microsoft-edge-switch-off-jit-compilers-or-sandbox/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/securing-microsoft-edge-switch...
- colechristensen 4y agoI just don't want most of the programming capabilities on the web, plain old hypertext with a bit of style is enough. There are plenty of other ways to run software on a computer than inside a web browser.
- simion314 4y agoI agree half way with you, we need the web split into 2 parts, webpages and apps. I seen some cool simulation, small apps, small games that I can just test online and not have to install them on my machine. Apple would love that we all got scared and only use installed apps from their store but the web is a decent deliver platform. If we could have a modern subset of html and css for news websited and blogs , and the rest of js for web apps then you can have the option to turn off teh advanced settings or we could have different browsers that could focus on different things, like a website reader browser that does not care about super fast JITed JS it would not support webgl,camera or microphone acccess, it would just focus on text layout and simple forms, and a web app browser that focuses on extreme optimizing for JS , canvas and webgl operations, camera and microphone access.
- capableweb 4y agoYou can already achieve all this. Either turn of JS in your browser, or use extensions such as NoScript.
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- wmf 4y agoDefense in depth is good. Apple is finally getting over their faith in their sandbox.
- fbanon 4y ago>Web browsing: Certain complex web technologies, like just-in-time (JIT) JavaScript compilation, are disabled unless the user excludes a trusted site from Lockdown Mode. This should be ON by default. It would force webdevs to write efficient websites.
- iasay 4y agoThey’d just work out how to write web apps entirely in CSS instead somehow.
- colechristensen 4y agoCan I turn these features on one by one by some other method? (self-managed MDM, or something else?)
- jackson1442 4y agoSelf-managed MDM is the way to go for most of them. I think the main one that can't be achieved thru MDM is the browser lockdown. MDM has a lot of other security policies available though.
- mcculley 4y agoThis is great but too big of a hammer for most use cases. What I really want is a per-application firewall. For example, say I would like to install a photo editing application. It would need access to my photos. That is fine, so long as it is not allowed to connect to the Internet (or any other network). There is currently no way to ensure this.
- imdsm 4y agoI use little snitch for this, but I agree, a big hammer, and likely more hoops for regular developers to jump through. Notarisation, signing, forced developer keys...
- post_break 4y agoLittle Snitch is great. Apple would never allow it on iOS which is ridiculous.
- CharlesW 4y agoIt's not the same, but have you used App Privacy Report to monitor what your iOS apps are doing? https://www.wired.com/story/ios-15-app-privacy-report/ https://www.wired.com/story/ios-15-app-privacy-report/
- mcculley 4y agoI use Little Snitch on macOS, but it is not available on iOS, so far as I know. Normal apps on iOS do not have enough visibility into the system for that.
- TheRealDunkirk 4y agoSounds like a plan to make iOS the default for highly-placed government employees. Maybe that's already the case, but I thought I remembered that Obama had to have 2 phones, and the "secure" one wasn't an iPhone. Anyone have any more knowledge about this?
- ceejayoz 4y agoThe secure one was a BlackBerry for a while. https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/11/11910306/obama-upgrades-from-blackberry https://www.theverge.com/2016/6/11/11910306/obama-upgrades-f...
- easton 4y agoI'm guessing it isn't, if only because this feature completely disables MDM (which you'd need in government or business to do things like remote wipes or passcode policies). It looks to be designed for people that are possible targets to use on their personal phone, which shouldn't have work data on it. (Of course, they could make some new MDM policies to individually turn these features on. You can already block external devices with MDM, and you can completely disable FaceTime/iMessage/iCloud. It wouldn't be much of a jump to add the more granular protections this has.)
- bad416f1f5a2 4y agoI think you’ve misread this announcement: it doesn’t appear that MDM is disabled. It merely looks like you cannot change MDM settings, including enrolling, while this feature is active.
- InitialLastName 4y agoAt least at the start of the Obama Administration, he was known to be hooked on his Blackberry [0], and I know RIM did a lot of work to provide secured devices to government officials. I don't know what government officials are using since RIM went under though. [0] https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna28780205 https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna28780205
- the_other 4y agoWith this announcement, Apple are saying "we will protect you from state actors", which is a role usually performed by states. Apple is saying "we operate at the same level as nation states; we are a nation-state level entity operating in the "digital world": It's a flag-raise. It's the first such flag-raise I've seen. Security researchers talk about protections from state actors all the time, and there are tools which support that... but this is the first public announcement, and tool, from a corporation with more spare, unrestricted capital than many countries. It comes at a time when multiple nation states are competing for energy and food security; and Apple are throwing up a flag for a security-security fight (or maybe data-security). This is not just handy tech, it's full-on cultural zeitgeist stuff. Amazing.
- ivraatiems 4y agoThe NSO Group, whom Apple specifically cites as an opponent that inspired this work, is a private corporation. They sell to governments, but so does Apple. The relationship between state and private industry has never been binary and has always had features like this. I don't think this is a "Jennifer Government" type scenario.
- thehappypm 4y agoNSO is pseudo-private, kind of like Raytheon.
- dfc 4y agoRaytheon (NYSE:RTX) is a publicly traded corporation.
- thehappypm 4y agoMy point is not public vs private structure, it’s that Raytheon is essentially a government entity at this point
- bsedlm 4y agoagreed, the rise of the corporation as the most powerful institution (above the nation-state) in this new budding global civilization is a long time coming. on the other hand, this is how democracy dies. what structures (systems) exist to prevent apple (and other comparable corporations) from being an oppresive force against human persons? moreover, what incentives do they have?
- galoisscobi 4y agoI wonder if this mode would be helpful to protect myself if US border control forces me to unlock my phone so they can make a copy of all of my phone contents.
- kube-system 4y agoIf someone has your unlocked phone, they can look at the screen.
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- nielsbot 4y agoCan you be forced to unlock your phone at the border? I thought you couldn't. (I don't actually know.) BTW bringing up the power off UI on iPhone (holding power and up buttons at the same time) disables FaceID/TouchID until a passcode is entered.
- andrewia 4y agoThey can search your phone at the US border. https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/10/22276183/us-appeals-court-first-circuit-border-phone-search-decision-fourth-amendment https://www.theverge.com/2021/2/10/22276183/us-appeals-court...
- kersplody 4y agoIf you are a US Citizen or Permanent Resident, Border Patrol cannot prevent you from entering the United States. They can, however, detain you for up to 72 hours and confiscate the locked device if they have "reasonable suspicion". The confiscated property will be returned eventually. https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inspection-electronic-devices-tearsheet.pdf https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inspection... If you are not a US citizen, refusal to unlock a phone and allow inspection, inclusive of allowing access to social media and corporate apps, will probably result in denied entry. They also have the right to detain you until indefinitely until you unlock the phone if they have "reasonable suspicion", but requires a court order within 72 hours. Most foreign counties have similar rules in place for residents and non-residents.
- newscracker 4y agoI hope Apple expands this quickly through minor updates to the OS rather than waiting for a next major release. This needs faster iteration than anything else. Quoting what’s in the first release: > At launch, Lockdown Mode includes the following protections: > Messages: Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Some features, like link previews, are disabled. > Web browsing: Certain complex web technologies, like just-in-time (JIT) JavaScript compilation, are disabled unless the user excludes a trusted site from Lockdown Mode. > Apple services: Incoming invitations and service requests, including FaceTime calls, are blocked if the user has not previously sent the initiator a call or request. > Wired connections with a computer or accessory are blocked when iPhone is locked. > Configuration profiles cannot be installed, and the device cannot enroll into mobile device management (MDM), while Lockdown Mode is turned on. I’m not a target (I think, and hopefully don’t get to be one), but nevertheless I’d feel safer with this turned on (I very rarely use FaceTime, so not accepting it is not a big deal). I’d also love more protections. Not allowing specific apps to connect to any network (WiFi included), Apple handling issue reports on apps with urgency (right now they seem to be ignored even when policy violations which are against the user’s interests are reported), etc.
- perardi 4y agoI think it's reasonable to think Apple will iterate quickly on this. Why? The iOS 15.x update history. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IOS_15 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IOS_15 Lots and lots of privacy stuff in the point releases. (And accessibility stuff, they’ve been on a tear there.) They’re still in a monolithic mindset when it comes to the “big” apps, but they’re iterating faster on these sorts of things as the release cycle goes along.
- alwillis 4y agoYou might have missed that Apple announced realtime security updates at WWDC [1]. [1]: https://techcrunch.com/2022/06/07/apple-introduces-real-time-security-updates-for-ios-and-macos/ https://techcrunch.com/2022/06/07/apple-introduces-real-time...
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- post_break 4y agoWhen reading through this list at each feature I can't help but go "why isn't this in regular iOS?"
- joshstrange 4y agoWhich is exactly why it's optional. Plenty of other people, myself included, look at that list and would not want them all or would like to pick and choose which subsets are locked down.
- post_break 4y agoYeah pick and choose makes sense for sure. Apple isn't exactly the king of choice unfortunately.
- olyjohn 4y agoThey should give you a list and the toggle should give you the option "SECURE" or "INSECURE" because that's basically what this is.
- nojito 4y agoHardened devices only work if it's an all or nothing proposition.
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- legalcorrection 4y agoI see they're running the reality distortion field at full power. This is a load of bullshit and marketing hype. They are letting you turn off features for security reasons, i.e. what basically every OS has let you do, and what every half-competent IT department has been doing, for decades. In fact, iOS was an outlier in how unconfigurable it was, and with the pitiful MDM options not letting you turn off many of these features that are constant sources of vulnerabilities and social engineering. Nothing that novel here other than the framing and cybersecurity marketing bullshit about Nation State Actors and "mercenaries."
- haswell 4y agoOf course Apple is going to put a marketing spin on everything they do - that is a given. Does that somehow invalidate the work itself? Why do you find it necessary to reframe the introduction of these features as a load of bullshit? Are you arguing that these features are bad or not useful? Or are you just saying that “it’s about time”? And if so, why not just focus on the part where Apple is doing a thing that needed to be done? The undertones in your comment feel a bit unnecessary.
- legalcorrection 4y agoBecause it's being made to sound like something it's not. The comments are full of people fawning over how innovative and groundbreaking this is. Just trying to offer a dose of bitter reality to bring people back down to earth.
- haswell 4y agoTo what end? What new insight is gained from such a reframing? I personally don’t think the individual features are as interesting as the overall framing and the fact that Apple is publicly announcing their intentions. The feature set will doubtless change over time - such is the nature of any software endeavor - but starting that journey is the interesting part. Getting stuck on “but it’s just xyz dumb feature…” or “but they should have done x long ago”, etc. just obscure the more interesting fact that they’re explicitly embarking on this path to begin with.
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- pluc 4y agoApple's been making it real difficult to pick Android lately. Only thing Android still has going for it is the ability to flash custom ROMs, eg CalyxOS or Graphene.
- ysleepy 4y agoOn Android I can use a firewall to block network access per app. on iOS that is not possible. My password manager app might be bought out and exfiltrate all my credentials, or any of the linked libraries it uses.
- idle_zealot 4y ago> My password manager app might be bought out and exfiltrate all my credentials This is less likely if you use Apple Keychain for your passwords. lock-in intensifies
- sneak 4y agoApple Keychain requires iCloud. Most of iCloud is not end to end encrypted.
- lordofgibbons 4y agoI explored installing a custom ROM on my android phone, but ended up questioning the utility of them. There appears to be many banking apps, random apps (McDonalds??) and others that will not work if the device is running a custom ROM. That makes my phone useless to me. Our only hope is a proper Linux phone with an Android emulation layer
- WmyEE0UsWAwC2i 4y agoBut should apple we liable when they, or any other organization making such claims, inevitably fail to protect their users? I think their should.
- KerrAvon 4y agoHow do you propose to do that without disincentivizing the addition of such features? Even NASA has software failures.
- matthewdgreen 4y agoLast year I wrote: "In the world I inhabit, I’m hoping that Ivan Krstić wakes up tomorrow and tells his bosses he wants to put NSO out of business. And I’m hoping that his bosses say 'great: here’s a blank check.' Maybe they’ll succeed and maybe they’ll fail, but I’ll bet they can at least make NSO’s life interesting." [1] Maybe this is the blank check :) [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27897975 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27897975
- c1sc0 4y agoAnd yet this feels like it’s too little too late. If I’m likely to be the target of the kind of state-sponsored malware “lockdown mode” supposedly protects me from I shouldn’t have been using Apple products in the first place. Which begs the question: what are current security best practices to protect from state-level hostile actors?
- savoytruffle 4y agoThe current best practice is to have already been using an Apple device, and this will enhance that.
- c1sc0 4y agoReally? Not something like Tails or Qubes? Am I too paranoid? I’m genuinely interested in learning about this. What am I supposed to use these days when I’m working on a project that would make me a target for state-level actors?
- duskwuff 4y agoTails and Qubes are desktop operating systems. You can't run them on a smartphone.
- egberts1 4y agoToo bad that Google does not offer this same “Lockdown Mode” as Apple does. Instead, they (Google Play Store) removed our ability to see what “app privileges” that an app would required BEFORE we do the installation step from the Google Play Store. What we got instead was an obfuscated “Data Security” section that is pretty much always “blank”. My flashlight app should not require GAZILLION app privilegeS nor hide that fact before I can determine whether I can safely install it, much like Apple App Store can do by doing the CRUCIAL pre-reveal of any needed app privilege(s) … for our leisure perusual and applying any applicable but personalize privacy requirement BEFORE we do the app install.
- andrewia 4y agoGoogle removed the install-time permissions dialog because they replaced it with runtime permissions. This makes sense - some users wants PayPal or WhatsApp to access their contact list, and others won't. It also fixes "permission blindness", where users blindly accept a long list of permissions because they need the app, or just stop caring because it's too much to comprehend all at once. Obviously, this isn't perfect, especially since Google removed the internet permission and allowed all apps to access it. Allowing advanced users like us to toggle off internet access in the "App info" permission page would be a good compromise, and I hope and Android team does so to match Apple on their security efforts.
- egberts1 4y agoFixes “permission blindness”? So, the current form of Google Play (app) Store “Data Security” section of each app being shown as “(blank)” is surely yet another form of “permission blindness”. Google Play Store being proactive in protecting these end-users from their own form of stupidity (or “permission blindness”, as you have eloquently pointed out) is just opening themselves to potential liability ramifications instead of deferring to end-user’s responsibility of maintaining their own privacy. I think that the term “permission blindess” is better referred to as an app having zero privilege. And “App Privileges” should have referred to runtime permissions and should have been displayed in the first place at the Google Play Store instead of install-time privileges.
- corytheboyd 4y agoIf Apple could somehow make phone and sms not useless due to spam that'd really save the average person. They must have the resources to throw at something like this. I'm not claiming to be an expert, I'm not saying I'm right, but phone spam is fucking awful.
- thothamon 4y agoPhone spam as in text messages? Your email is a whole other thing
- corytheboyd 4y agoYes indeed email is a whole other thing, that's why I didn't mention it :)
- ipsi 4y agoSurely that's the responsibility of the providers, though? Apple can improve the situation a bit, maybe, but you'd really need to get AT&T & co to crack down on it to have any chance of solving it for good. I know that I've had approximately zero spam on my German number (that I've had for ~2.5 years) - I'm sure why, whether I'm just lucky, or whether it's much more under control here. My UK number definitely had problems with spam, though. Maybe a couple of spam calls a week.
- corytheboyd 4y agoNice, glad to hear it's at least reasonable elsewhere, It's very, very bad in the US, at least for my partner and I. We started getting unsolicited calls days after starting the house buying process because the credit reporting companies sell you off immediately. Very frustrating.
- vorpalhex 4y agoThere are several redirection services that will pair your spam caller to a very chatty chatbot. Excellent way to make spammers pay.
- 2OEH8eoCRo0 4y ago> Wired connections with a computer or accessory are blocked when iPhone is locked. Android defaults to charging only.
- Aaronn 4y agoThe same is true on iOS (https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/10/17550316/apple-iphone-usb-restricted-mode-how-to-use-security https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/10/17550316/apple-iphone-usb...). Lockdown mode just prevents you from enabling it.
- 2OEH8eoCRo0 4y ago> USB Restricted Mode prevents USB accessories that plug into the Lightning port from making data connections with an iPhone, iPad, or iPod Touch if your iOS device has been locked for over an hour. Android asks every time for every device. There is no 1-hour grace period.
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- drexlspivey 4y agoDoes this offer any protection after you are already pwned? Is the expectation that you have it permanently on if you are a high value target or do you turn it on temporarily before clicking on a link for example?
- dustyharddrive 4y agoDon’t know enough about iOS to say for sure about persistence, but recent Pegasus (NSO Group spyware) versions don’t bother[1], instead repeatedly exploiting bugs starting with “features” like background Messages attachment parsing. Those are the kind of threats Lockdown Mode finally acknowledges — targets (well IMO everyone) would need it permanently enabled. Otherwise the temporary protection before clicking a link can be had today in other ways, like disabling Settings > Safari > Advanced > JavaScript. [1] Lack of persistence likely an attempt at making it harder to analyze: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-methodology-report-how-to-catch-nso-groups-pegasus/ https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2021/07/forensic-...
- olyjohn 4y agoIf you're going to run a crippled-ass phone to protect yourself, because the regular phone is so fucking insecure, why even bother with a smartphone? They'll just find an exploit in something that the "security mode" hasn't disabled.
- olliej 4y agoIf you have already been pwned, the OS is compromised so it clearly is not able to retroactively undo that - any checkbox, option or whatever can just be turned into a no op that lies.
- Nextgrid 4y agoIf you're already pwned to the point where they have kernel-level access and can bypass code signature enforcement, all bets are off. Even if lockdown mode interfered with their activity, at this point nothing prevents them from modifying the Settings app to not really enable lockdown mode even if you request it to.
- throw20220706 4y agoReminds me of a classic https://xkcd.com/538/ https://xkcd.com/538/. For the vast majority of users the most realistic threat is simply being ordered to unlock their phone under the threat of force (from a criminal, a cop, a CBP agent, etc). This is way, way more likely than being attacked through an unknown JIT compiler vulnerability. What would be really helpful is Apple implementing a way to have multiple iPhone profiles with plausible deniability (a la VeraCrypt) or some sort of compartmentalization (a la 1Password travel mode). Of course that would mean people can start sharing their phones instead of buying one per person from Apple, so I'm not holding my breath.
- einpoklum 4y agoApple cannot even in theory protect you from spyware, because Apple's OS and apps _are_ spyware - as Apple (routinely? occasionally?) collects your personal data for the US government's NSA and passes it to them (Snowden revelations: https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/snowden-nsa-files-surveillance-revelations-decoded#section/3 https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/nov/01/sn...)
- Nextgrid 4y agoThis might get downvoted but it's actually true. If you're logged into iCloud, even with all features disabled, things like your call history and email recipient history (regardless of whether you're using iCloud Mail) are uploaded for example.
- einpoklum 4y agoI'm rather baffled by how all of that can just go over people's heads, and they go back to debating whether Apple is mindful enough of their security and privacy or not.
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- ProAm 4y agoApple is not stopping state-sponsored anything. They do not have the expertise nor willing to invest enough to stop it. And they also turn everything over they can at a local-law enforcement request, because they have to.
- blintz 4y agoI am so excited about this news. I understand that some people are pessimistic, and view it as a "giving up" on complete security against nation-states. I think that's the wrong way to analyze the situation. The dream I have is someone making a phone that is purpose-built to be secure against state actors. Unfortunately, this makes very little economic sense, and probably won't happen (maybe if some rich person started a foundation or something?). The phone would need to have pretty restricted functionality and would not be generally appealing to mass market consumers. As it stands, securing a mass market modern smartphone, even from just remote attacks, is just intractable. We should not bury our heads in the sand and wishfully think that if they just spend a little more money, close a few more bugs, and make the sandboxing a little better, somehow iOS 16 or Android 13 will finally be completely secure against state actors. The set of features being shipped will grow fast enough that security mitigations will not someday 'catch up'. This is the next best thing! The more we can give users the freedom to lock down their devices, the more the vision of an actual solution comes into view. This is the first step towards perhaps our only hope of solving this someday - applying formal methods and lots of public scrutiny to a small 'trusted code base', and finally telling NSO group to fuck off. Even this dream may not pan out, but at least we can have hope.
- germandiago 4y agoThe potential a phone like that would have if you explained people how states can and do put their nose into their lives is quite big IMHO. It is just that people have no idea of how much they can take from your info through a phone.
- runnerup 4y agoMost people couldn’t grasp the important ramifications even if you walked them through it from first principles. I’m not sure I can despite being very interested in information entropy my whole life. A lot of people really don’t understand much at all about anything that they don’t constantly see and touch their whole lives. A lot of people truly just live in the moment constantly and use their higher order thinking for social navigation and sex.
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- Terretta 4y agoThis is great, but also clever. By offering users a more locked down option with clear tradeoffs, (a) users can make a choice between security and convenience, and (b) given user agency, negative press around hacks of not locked-down devices loses potency. Meanwhile, the choice seems straightforward on most of these... Lockdown Mode includes the following protections: - Messages: Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Some features, like link previews, are disabled. GREAT! - Web browsing: Certain complex web technologies, like just-in-time (JIT) JavaScript compilation, are disabled unless the user excludes a trusted site from Lockdown Mode. GREAT! - Apple services: Incoming invitations and service requests, including FaceTime calls, are blocked if the user has not previously sent the initiator a call or request. GREAT! - Wired connections with a computer or accessory are blocked when iPhone is locked. GREAT! (Used to have to do this yourself with Configurator if you wanted to be hostile border-crossing proof.) - Configuration profiles cannot be installed, and the device cannot enroll into mobile device management (MDM), while Lockdown Mode is turned on. HMM ... there are hardening settings only available through Configurator or MDM profiles. Will those be defaulted on as well?
- Infernal 4y ago>> - Configuration profiles cannot be installed, and the device cannot enroll into mobile device management (MDM), while Lockdown Mode is turned on. > HMM ... there are hardening settings only available through Configurator or MDM profiles. Will those be defaulted on as well? Reading between the lines here - on lockdown mode, you can't install a profile, or enroll in MDM. What it doesn't say, is that you can't enable lockdown mode with a profile installed, or if enrolled in MDM. I take this to mean, with lockdown turned on, I can't install profiles or enroll in MDM (but presumably could uninstall profiles or unenroll from MDM).
- sodality2 4y agoCorrect. Existing MDM profiles will be unaffected.
- derefr 4y agoI also take it to mean that most of these hardening features will be able to be enabled by configuration proflies / MDM anyway. Lockdown mode being essentially "Apple being the MDM for individual who don't otherwise have an MDM."
- duxup 4y agoI was wondering when a “hardened” option would come.
- midislack 4y ago
- kderbyma 4y agoonly $10m? hahaha they don't care
- freedom-fries 4y agoI'm guessing it will run afoul of the EU regulations. At the bare minimum there should be a way for level playfield - individual applications and third party application providers should have same access as Apple's apps! * If Safari and Messages is allowed then all other apps should be allowed and have complete access to the device even in the lockdown mode. * If apple gets access to any traffic from the device in the lockdown mode, then all other applications should have full access to advertising metrics and device data as well. At that point it's probably not much of a lockdown, but Apple can't have all the fun can it?
- saos 4y agoThis seems rather extreme. I like it!
- walrus01 4y agoputting rich media like images, GIFs, video etc embedded inline in chat applications presents a huge attack surface. i'm even suspicious that signal does it. if you really want to design a secure messaging system it needs to handle text ONLY.
- notriddle 4y agoText rendering is more complex than decoding a PNG.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- sk8terboi 4y ago
- brundolf 4y ago> Web browsing: Certain complex web technologies, like just-in-time (JIT) JavaScript compilation, are disabled unless the user excludes a trusted site from Lockdown Mode. That's very cool actually. You can keep JS enabled but choose to make it run more slowly in exchange for better sandboxing
- kylehotchkiss 4y agoI originally understood this to mean JS was disabled entirely in safari when enabled unless a site is allowlisted. Does this mean the web will run JS “normally” but slower? Does the speed of modern phones mean a slower style of JS processing might be less discernible?
- brundolf 4y agoThat's my interpretation. Modern JS engines have multiple tiers of optimization, which they apply in different ways based on how "hot" a piece of JavaScript is. JIT is the highest level of optimization, but also means generating and executing native code on the fly, which I assume leaves the door open for worse exploits if there's a bug in the engine. This is in contrast with bytecode interpretation, which is slower but available.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- lisper 4y agoExtreme? This sounds like the way I have my computing environment configured by default (to the extent that I'm able to do so with browser extensions and whatnot).
- ArrayBoundCheck 4y agoSame. Its too bad general browsing is nearly unusable with JS turned off.
- Tepix 4y agoThis isn't even turning off JS completely, merely certain JIT features.
- janandonly 4y agoIf Apple was really serious about this, they would add one more feature to Lockdown mode: To delete and scrub permanently and definitively all your iCloud data. You can close the proverbially "front door" by enabling "Lockdown mode" but if that same government sends a subpoena to Apple, then they will just give them a copy of all your iCloud private data.
- devnulll 4y agoNobody who is at risk for this is doing iCloud backups. That's something you can already turn off.
- sneak 4y agoTheir conversation partners are. iCloud Backup is a backdoor in iMessage's end to end encryption preserved explicitly at the behest of the FBI.
- sonofhans 4y agoI'd love to see evidence of this.
- sodality2 4y agoIt's not something that has evidence - what they mean is that even if you have iCloud backups disabled, everyone you talk to might not. The point of e2ee is that both ends must have it encrypted - not just you and the server, but more abstractly, the communication partners.
- warkdarrior 4y agoThat is a novel and quite broad interpretation of E2EE. In typical E2EE only endpoints of a (logical) communication channel can decrypt messages on that channel. But E2EE does not say anything about what an endpoint can do with those messages once they decrypted them -- they could print them at the public library and leave them there, they can forward them to the FBI, they can post them on reddit, etc. If you do not trust your communication partner to safeguard your messages, E2EE will not help you at all.
- yrgulation 4y agoWhat if there is a little device that acts like network firewall and router appliances but somehow the phone proxies all connectivity via it. Something to carry around that shows ingress and egress connections, calls and anything in between. You can either set an allowed or blocked list, detects cell connection mitm attacks and spikes in traffic (to detect leaks). Mobile phones are like desktop computers and will always have security issues. It only makes sense to firewall them.
- Nextgrid 4y agoTLS and certificate pinning makes this a problem. Technically certificates don't have to be pinned, but if they weren't then people would use this to defeat "growth & engagement" and block analytics, ads, etc (or worse, reverse-engineer the API to make a third-party client) and we obviously can't have that.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- jiveturkey 4y agoLike your own personal stingray
- yrgulation 4y agoHad to look it up. I guess the question is how to make sure it cant be abused by capturing data from random nearby phones. In that case we’d end up worse off.
- bistable 4y agoWhy not on the same device? Have a separate small simple SoC completely segregated from everything else, except shared battery, with 2 NICs and a physical switch to swap between using the firewall interface and the regular phone. Although this may make more sense for a regular computer plus router, with a cell phone there's multiple radios, not just a single simple IP connection...
- jasonhansel 4y agoDownside: if attackers can tell that you've enabled Lockdown Mode, then they know that you're likely a high-value target.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- tialaramex 4y ago> Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Who wants to bet that this reflects minimum requirements dictated for user experience, rather than reflecting what Apple are actually securing today ? The correct model here, the one that would actually defeat these adversaries, is to start with what you can actually secure and expand from there, prioritising customer needs. This delivers security improvements for all customers, but it makes the calculus simple for Lockdown customers, whatever Lockdown allows will be OK. Suppose today Apple has a working safe BMP reader, and a working safe WAV reader, but they're still using their ratty JPEG and MP3 implementations. As described, this feature says you can receive a JPEG attachment (which takes over your phone and results in your cousin who remains in the country being identified as a contact and imprisoned) but you can't listen to the WAV file an informant sent you because that's "dangerous"...
- S0und 4y agoI find is absolutely hilarious that they've kept the images in Messages while one of Pegasus attack vector was sending a PSD file as a *.gif, which crashed Messages parser. Apple is over confident in it ability. https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/09/apple-fixes-imessage-zero-day-exploited-by-pegasus-spyware/ https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2021/09/apple... People who need this have already a dumb phone, using this Lockdown mode is an unnecessary gamble on they part.
- kylehotchkiss 4y agoYeah, apple really should dumb down that parser to just “modern” jpg/png/webp for their entire application stack. bmps and gifs shouldn’t still be used. And photoshop is a bit proprietary for apple to be rendering their files within iMessage
- amelius 4y agoWhat they think will happen: users activate Lockdown Mode to protect themselves. What actually happens: criminals activate Lockdown Mode to evade law enforcement.
- Analemma_ 4y agoLockdown mode is for preventing 0-days. Law enforcement does not burn 0-days on common criminals, they get a warrant and get into the device that way.
- Animats 4y agoDoes lockdown mode prevent updates from Apple?
- camdenlock 4y agoThis is mostly great news. Then you scroll down a bit and see this eye-opening 2nd part: “Apple is also making a $10 million grant […] to the Dignity and Justice Fund established and advised by the Ford Foundation - a private foundation dedicated to advancing equity worldwide and designed to pool philanthropic resources to advance social justice globally.“ So Apple is releasing a great new hardened security mode in iOS, AND… they’re donating money to collectivist activism? What a bizarre combination. One step forward, two steps back.
- donkarma 4y agocould always just not use a smart phone
- xtat 4y agoTBH even 2m bounty on lockdown mode bypass seems really low
- O__________O 4y ago///// Re: Bounty From press release, “Bounties are doubled for qualifying findings in Lockdown Mode, up to a maximum of $2,000,000 — the highest maximum bounty payout in the industry.“ Appears Apple is not aware there was a $10 million bounty [1] paid out; unless when they say “by industry” they mean phones, not bug bounties. If Apple really believed it was secure, then even a $100 million bounty shouldn’t be a concern; 2 million, while clearly high, is no longer enough to pull in the best bounty hunters, in my opinion. ///// Re: Naming Name conflicts with existing terms both Apple and consumers use. Naming should be unique so it’s possible to Google the unique name for this feature and only get valid search results. ///// Re: iCloud While iMessage features are limited, it is neither blocked, nor is iCloud — and both are known to being vulnerable to nation state demands on Apple due to iCloud not being end-to-end encrypted. ///// Re: iCloud end-to-end encrypt If Apple was serious about the topic, they would have already rolled out end-to-end encrypt for iCloud years ago. ///// Re: Targeting If Apple is logging if this feature is on and sending it back to Apple, it will result in targeting from nation states even if this feature is “invincible” - which I have no reason it is; basically, nation states demand list of users subject to its jurisdiction. ///// Re: Off vs Locked “Wired connections with a computer or accessory are blocked when iPhone is locked.” — Why is this not the default with an opt-in? Further, at the point you’re turning on this features, when locking the phone it should explicitly tell the user of the risk of locking vs turning the phone off. Lastly, when you turn an iPhone off, it should really be off if set to this mode; if it is, and activity is detected, likely good sign something is going on. _______ [1] https://medium.com/immunefi/wormhole-uninitialized-proxy-bugfix-review-90250c41a43a https://medium.com/immunefi/wormhole-uninitialized-proxy-bug...
- barbarousbull 4y agoThe overlap of eth bug-bounty hunters and iOS bug-bounty hunters is 0.
- saagarjha 4y agoYou'd be surprised.
- clamprecht 4y agoThey should offer "US President mode". Didn't Obama have to have a special version of the Blackberry developed for him, while he was president?
- sedatk 4y agoYeah, in which Twitter is also locked down.
- stephc_int13 4y agoWhat does it even mean to be a state-level actor? For me this is the same kind of bullshit/PR language that is is used to sell so-called "military-grade" artefacts. This is nonsense. Security breaches can be discovered and used by anyone with the right knowledge and skills. Geohot was not sponsored by the CIA or the FSB.
- halJordan 4y agoState-level is a label for groups that have resources and persistence and perhaps the technical acumen that is available to states.
- stephc_int13 4y agoI know what the label is, but from a strictly technical point of view, a breach is a breach, an exploit is an exploit, this is not like AI research where you need server farms. From my own experience and from the postmortems I have had access to, most of the time this a work of patience and skills. In my opinion, this is a way of saying to the public that their devices is secure against everything but state actors, this is simply not true.
- WFHRenaissance 4y agoI think they're focusing on the notion of protecting against well-funded mercenary firms with the resources/time/ability/motivation to target specific individuals with specific exploits. I have a hard time believing that anyone would enable this Lockdown Mode _prior_ to being owned though.
- threeseed 4y ago> I have a hard time believing that anyone would enable this Lockdown Mode _prior_ to being owned though I can imagine many use cases where they would e.g. journalist enabling this before working on an article that was critical of a foreign government. Or any government contractor, NGO, embassy worker etc.
- threeseed 4y ago
- xyst 4y agoIs the apple bounty program still terrible in terms of payout and length of time to approval? I can’t see many people submitting bounty reports if it’s too much of hassle or not worth the effort. Since the apple ecosystem is mostly proprietary, it’s hard to gauge as individuals if this just provides a false sense of security or not against “state actors”.
- stephc_int13 4y agoComputer security is notoriously difficult, but at the same time, none of this is magical, this is meticulous hard work, and with enough time, skills and money I don't see how you can't plug all the holes. At least the remote attack surface does not seem to be that huge...
- tristor 4y agoThis feature is really fantastic, and it re-affirms my commitment to using Apple devices due to security in preference over Android. The only thing I could see that would be a superior alternative could perhaps be something like Graphene. Already today I locally set up a profile via Configurator in order to ensure that my phone can't be hijacked by some local attacks, the work that is happening Lockdown is even better and I'll be enabling this as soon as it becomes available to me.
- dannyw 4y agoHow do you reconcile that with their move into CSAM scanning?
- tristor 4y agoPersonally, one of the major things that lead me to start investigating Graphene and other alternatives was the on-device scanning. Fortunately, it seems Apple has backed away from this position (at least for now), and unfortunately we live in a world where if you need a mobile device there's a dichotomy. Given that, I think sticking to Apple is still the best choice for me right now, and aligns most strongly with my threat model. I travel internationally a lot (or did before the pandemic) and my primary concern is when crossing borders. I always power off my devices to prevent warm-boot attacks, and take other precautions, this lockdown mode would be a big win in this case. Even with the other protections Graphene offers over regular AOSP, I am concerned that Android doesn't really provide meaningful ways to prevent attacks where the adversary has physical access.
- TIPSIO 4y agoIf you are "a target" and going to take measures of basically disabling everything on your iPhone, wouldn't it just make sense to get a burner dumb phone? Hasn't this been happening for years (drug dealers, anonymous, etc..)?
- stu2b50 4y agoThink more about journalist. You need slack to talk to the rest of the team. You need WhatsApp to communicate with sources and locals in most of the world that’s not the US. Your iPhone is an important tool for your work in general - a dumb phone that can only make real phone calls and sms is not particularly close. Phone calls and sms are also completely unprotected as opposed to chat apps with e2e.
- yreg 4y agoWhat then? Use SMS?
- pizlonator 4y agoBut then you’ll want lockdown mode (or something like it) on whatever device you use to browse the web.
- numpad0 4y agoBut how secure are iDevices peripherals, and RAM? I guess it's a start of a journey, but I don't see this does anything yet.
- saagarjha 4y agoPeripherals are behind a DART.
- alwillis 4y agoLet's not let the perfect be the enemy of the good. This is a huge step forward for iPhone users. Look, I get it. From the typical HN perspective, this potentially looks like a lot of hype. But many of you aren't looking at from a high level. In the world we are now living in; even what's happening in the United States right now, being able to protect yourself from well-funded, determined attackers for the average person couldn't come at a better time. There's a huge gap between Fortune 500 executives, government officials, etc. and regular people in terms of the resources available to them to prevent state-sponsored attackers. It doesn't take much these days to go from a nobody to being on somebody's radar. If you're a woman seeking an abortion in a state where it's illegal or severely restricted, you could be the target of malware from your local or state government or law enforcement. In Texas, you can sue anyone who aids and abets a woman who attempts to get an abortion for $10,000, which is enough to get someone to trick someone into installing malware on a phone. No, it's not China or Russia coming for you but it doesn't take much to ruin someone's life. I don't think this is virtue signaling or marketing hype by Apple; if anything, this is right in alignment with the stance they've had on privacy for years. Even for a company the size of Apple, putting up $10 million to fund organizations that investigate, expose, and prevent highly targeted cyberattacks isn't pocket change. At the end of the day, this is all good news for user privacy and security going forward. I also suspect if I lockdown my iPhone, my other compatible devices using the same Apple ID will also lockdown. No IT department required.
- hk1337 4y agoI kind of want to turn it on and leave it on. I'm assuming since it's a "mode" that I can turn it off when I need to, do what I know is legit, then turn back on again.
- rmbyrro 4y agoMight not be as convenient. Probably requires restarting the phone.
- QuantumSeed 4y agoAs soon as you enable lockdown mode in iOS 16 Beta 3 it reboots the phone
- verdagon 4y agoVery cool! I wonder if this, combined with some sandboxing for apps' unsafe code, could make a more secure OS than any previous mainstream ones.
- toomim 4y ago> Messages: ... Some features, like link previews, are disabled. I've been wanting to disable link previews for YEARS!! Not for security, but to keep those corporate advertisements (aka previews) out of the conversations I have with my friends and family. It feels super disingenuous when I type out an articulate, heartfelt, personal message to my loved one, character by character, anticipate their reaction reading it, and then hit send — only to find the URLs expanded 400 pixels into corporate advertisements designed by the bonehead SEO jerks who care about clickbaiting over content.
- rootsudo 4y agoThat's the thing, if you think your device is compromised, don't use it. This is dangerous as it's a bandage and most likely allows surveillance that's "pre-approved" or is carrier based, probably even baseband modem based.
- mensetmanusman 4y agoWill this be available to Chinese residents? Huge if so.
- bombcar 4y agoEverything else to the side, this is excellent marketing on the level of Tesla's "bioweapons filtering mode".
- swayvil 4y agoInflation, pollution, censorship, global warming... Hey no, don't look at that, look over here instead. We're playing ratfuck with the abortion laws. Magicians call that "misdirection".
- m463 4y agoIf I could just firewall my phone like Little Snitch. But apple doesn't allow this.
- ignoramous 4y agoFirewalls like Little Snitch may not be enough against actors like NSO (that exploit unknown zero-days), tbh. The mechanisms to enhance protection does need to come from the vendor (Apple). This lockdown mode, for all its present shortcomings, is moving the needle in the right direction, imo.
- m463 4y agowith something like little snitch, you could just prevent or tune internet access on an app-by-app basis. including system apps. Apple - in a self-serving way - does not provide good permission for network access. I think it should say "allow this app to access the internet?" There is also deep linking, the ibeacon stuff, the find my, the wifi access point mapping, and more
- lizardactivist 4y agoIt's good I guess, but I will not convince myself that a button saying "Lockdown mode" will casually side-step the entire legal and surveillance machinery built up in the U.S.
- Veserv 4y agoI do not know why anybody would believe any claim by Apple with respect to security without overwhelming empirical evidence supporting their claims. The default assumption in commercial software security, supported by literal decades of abject failure by every player, is that commercial software security is atrocious. To claim anything more than trivial security is a extraordinary claim and thus demands extraordinary evidence before being accepted. Apple has demonstrated no such evidence. In fact, the opposite is the case. Despite decades of assurances that their systems provide meaningful security, every single year we see their security torn apart by individuals and small teams with budgets that do not even constitute rounding errors to a Fortune 500 company. There is exactly no reason to believe they have meaningfully superior technical expertise with respect to security relative to the default standard of the industry. However, this should be no surprise to anyone as the security certifications that Apple advertises for iOS [1][2] are only “applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious.” [3][4]. I mean, look at [4], the process used to certify their security is that their evaluators typed search terms into the internet and verified that every vulnerability that turned up was patched, that’s it. There is no requirement to even do a independent analysis that it protects against attackers with a basic attack potential, that is done at the next higher level of security that they could have chosen to certify against, but did not. To be fair, Apple has historically demonstrated the ability to certify against AVA_VAN.3 which demonstrates resistance to attackers with a enhanced-basic attack potential, but they have failed every time they have ever attempted to certify against AVA_VAN.4 which demonstrates resistance to attackers with a moderate attack potential. It should be no wonder that they can not protect against moderate attack potential threats such as individuals or small teams, let alone high attack potential threats such as large organized crime and nations. If Apple wants their security claims to be taken seriously, they should start by demonstrating their ability to protect against moderate attack potential threats via the internationally recognized security certification process they already use and advertise. Until then, the only thing we should trust is what they certify they can do (protect against script kiddies), not what they have failed to ever achieve in a auditable manner (protect against moderately skilled attackers). [1] https://support.apple.com/guide/sccc/security-certifications-for-ios-scccfa917cb49/web https://support.apple.com/guide/sccc/security-certifications... [2] https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Product/Compliant.cfm?PID=11146 https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Product/Compliant.cfm?PID=11146 [3] https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11146-aar.pdf#page218 https://www.niap-ccevs.org/MMO/Product/st_vid11146-aar.pdf#p... [4] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf#page33 https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3...
- GuB-42 4y agoSo Apple is saying that their "Lockdown Mode" protects against "highly targeted cyberattacks from private companies developing state-sponsored mercenary spyware". That's an interesting wording, because it claims to protect you against... nothing that matters. Notably, it doesn't protect you against: - The police. Don't get me wrong, I am all for letting the police do its job fighting crime, even if it means hacking iPhones, but even if you got the police attention for a noble cause, Lockdown Mode won't save you, at least, it doesn't claim to. - Foreign governments, as well as your own government. Notice how it mentions "private companies" specifically, as in, not public. And the cyberattacks themselves have to be performed by private companies, if the tools that these companies develop are used by government entities, it doesn't count. - Cybercriminals, the kind who are after your money. They are not "private companies", and they are usually not state-sponsored. - Terrorist organizations, mafias, drug cartels, etc... again, not "private companies", and while they may be backed by states, they typically work for themselves. The technical aspects have value, and I think giving the user the choice of wearing a tinfoil hat is great, but the claim they are making is deceivingly weak if you read carefully.
- ngetchell 4y agoThe NSO group used links and attachments in iMessage. These protections would mitigate those attacks.
- concinds 4y agoThey used an "invisible 0-click exploit"; where you don't even actually receive a text message or need to click any links or attachments. https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/the-great-ipwn-journalists-hacked-with-suspected-nso-group-imessage-zero-click-exploit/ https://citizenlab.ca/2020/12/the-great-ipwn-journalists-hac... Would Lockdown Mode prevent those? And what about the SMS equivalent? https://www.firstpoint-mg.com/blog/step-by-step-silent-sms-attacks/ https://www.firstpoint-mg.com/blog/step-by-step-silent-sms-a... Apparently the German authorities sent 440,000 "silent SMSs" for tracking purposes in 2010: https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Zoll-BKA-und-Verfassungsschutz-verschickten-2010-ueber-440-000-stille-SMS-1394593.html https://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/Zoll-BKA-und-Verfass...
- concinds 4y agoCould a security expert enlighten me: is Windows more secure today than macOS, if we purely take OS-level and hardware-level security measures and ignore subjective factors? (like marketshare, attractiveness of targets, etc.) Windows has all sorts of buzzwordy-sounding security features: Microsoft Defender Application Guard (Hyper-V for untrusted websites & Office files), kernel virtualization-based security (VBS), Code Integrity Guard, Arbitrary Code Guard, Control Flow Guard, and Hardware-enforced Stack Protection. It's extremely hard to compare the two on a deep technical level (beyond "modern OS's are safe, install updates, you'll be fine") without having deep security experience. Any professional insights?
- Veserv 4y agoThere is no meaningful difference if you are a modestly attractive target. The prevailing level of security is such that a single technically competent individual with a year of time can completely breach the commercial IT systems of any Fortune 500 company in the world and steal essentially all of their internal documents and IP and materially disrupt their operations. That is the maximum level of security in commercial IT systems. So, if you have nothing worth more than ~$1M and indefinite disruption of your systems is worth less than ~$1M, then there might be a meaningful difference. However, basically every business is beyond those levels, so quantifying the differences in a professional context is kind of like discussing whether a tshirt or a single piece of paper provides more protection against a gun.
- jacooper 4y agoI would say just use GrapheneOS, Ana actual security and privacy focused OS. And Qubes on PC.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- subtract-smiles 4y agoWow I guess apple was really peeved about Pegasus.
- masswerk 4y agoI think this is a great feature and a huge step in the right direction. However, will this comply with the new EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), which provides a general interoperability for messaging apps (for big players, with Apple and iMessage being certainly one of them)? Certainly, foreign services – or at least parts of their features and APIs – had to be disabled in lock-down mode. (Will it help to any degree that Apple is drastically limiting their own service?)
- ddjsn111 4y ago
- metadat 4y agoWhat is Google / Android doing to protect us from NSO group? Seems like a lot less than the care Apple is taking on behalf of vulnerable people.
- saagarjha 4y agoWell, Google happens to have teams that work to help shine a light on what the NSO is doing.
- metadat 4y agoIt's good to shine the light, and the Android platform still remains wide open.
- hu3 4y agoCitation needed. Android exploits are more expensive than iOS on Zerodium which hints otherwise.
- metadat 4y agoI didn't know that, I've perhaps wrongly been under the assumption that Android is inherently less secure than iOS. It certainly feels "cheap" by comparison, but admittedly this is a horrible and stupid way to assess anything. Play store doesn't seem to give much care about privacy compared to iOS.
- nykolasz 4y agoI would love to see a "child" lockdown mode. Maybe that will be a good option to make the iphone/ipad more young children safe?
- saagarjha 4y agoThis sounds like parental controls?
- lttlrck 4y agoOnly yesterday I was wishing there was a Valet Mode for when I hand a phone over to Apple for servicing. Hopefully they will accept this...
- dannyw 4y agoYou don't need to give them the PIN.
- halfsquatch 4y agoCongratulations Apple, you just invented BlackBerry.
- Terry_Roll 4y agoSo can I still be tracked using SS7?
- kylehotchkiss 4y agoYou could carry your phone in one of these if you’re worried about being tracked: https://slnt.com/products/faraday-cage-sleeves-for-phones https://slnt.com/products/faraday-cage-sleeves-for-phones But practically speaking your debit or credit card does a pretty good job keeping track of where you are if your phone isn’t transmitting
- Terry_Roll 4y agoWell the last phone I got, it was directing me to AirBnB's with masonic ties who liked to tell stories of violence. I had my first masonic lesson of keeping my mouth shout or be killed when I was at primary school, but I dont care now, life is overrated!
- motohagiography 4y agoIf Apple co-ordinated with Signal, Slack, and Symphony to release lockdown compliant modes for their products, this mode could be my daily driver.
- stephen_g 4y agoThis is great. Here in Australia, when you pass through the border, the goons can ask you for your phone, computer, devices etc. without a warrant. They’re not allowed to compel you to hand over passwords, PINs or have you unlock it for them (without a warrant) though, but apparently they’ll often imply that you have to, and if you don’t they can confiscate the devices for some time. This mode sounds excellent, because all they can do without a warrant is try and attack it with a Celebrite or Graykey device, so having the extra protection from physical connection and other attacks sounds awesome. I expect to always enable this while I’m doing international travel anywhere.
- dannyw 4y agoI was threatened with 10 years imprisonment if I did not hand over my passcode at SYD airport in July 2018. I asked to contact a lawyer and I was told I have no right to do so. I am an Australian citizen.
- WrtCdEvrydy 4y ago> Wired connections with a computer or accessory are blocked when iPhone is locked. Damn... if this was something that could be enabled by typing the pin in wrong, it would be the death of modern phone forensics. Actually, I would rather this be the default after a device is powered on... let me "restart in non-safe mode" when I need it.
- luispa 4y agoI think this is very huge for the infosec game, but I think the `unless the user excludes a trusted site from Lockdown Mode.` is still a bad take.
- khana 4y ago
- fartcannon 4y agoGreat, now give me the options to fully open it up.
- devwastaken 4y agoMarketing vaporware. The attacks used by NSO and other groups were exploits. You have two choices, either do not use the device with any external connection and not be exploited, or use the device with external services and be exploited. You cannot have it both ways. The underlying software will have to be written in a safe programming language, along with significant scrutiny on it's logic. We will never have this, because we are ever decreasing the quality of software development. Apple could do something about this, but that is a politically and financially expensive move for no extra financial gain. As always people will eat this up, and business will continue unaffected as usual.
- Tepix 4y agoIf it reduces the attack surface by a lot, why do you call it vaporware?
- throwaway787544 4y agoWeren't SMS messages used to root iPhones in one exploit? https://www.wired.com/story/imessage-interactionless-hacks-google-project-zero/ https://www.wired.com/story/imessage-interactionless-hacks-g... https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/researchers-attack-my-iphone-via-sms/ https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy/researchers-attack-my-ipho...
- Tepix 4y agoMost exploits are related to dealing with multimedia contents. By protecting against these exploits the attack surface gets a lot smaller.
- ece 4y agoHey look, sys-admining your phone, but it's Apple style sys-admining, so it's ok.
- 5350-uiop-1130 4y agosince it has been memory holed. apple is/was a part of prism (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants...) "An Apple spokesman said it had "never heard" of Prism."
- fareesh 4y agoI can't wait for people to turn this on and file bug reports and followed by "but I didn't enable that!"
- vivegi 4y agoThese two sound like good defaults for all iPhones. > Messages: Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Some features, like link previews, are disabled. > Apple services: Incoming invitations and service requests, including FaceTime calls, are blocked if the user has not previously sent the initiator a call or request.
- Labo333 4y agoWhat about E2EE backups? https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
- shp0ngle 4y agoIs there a reason why I wouldn’t use this as default? I hate most iMessage functionality and I will be happy to get rid of it for security. The rest also seems reasonable?
- highwaylights 4y agoThis seems to mimic, or at least rival, Google's Advanced Protection Program which has been running for a few years to offer similar protections to Google/Android users. My concern about enabling this would be that I'm unsure how much this puts barriers in place to prevent the owner of an account regaining access should it be stolen by a threat actor (i.e. could this backfire on the account owner?). It's still unclear to me how much Apple really protects against (for example) sim swaps to take over an iCloud account - and the documentation around when they'll truly insist on having something like a Recovery Key if it's enabled is sparse. It almost reads as if the right amount of begging will socially engineer access to a locked iCloud account by a threat actor with the right personal information to hand, which if coupled with Lockdown mode, seems pretty dangerous to the true account holder.
- twayt 4y agoThis definitively signals that Apple devices are no longer secure, terrible move.
- Tepix 4y agoIf you thought they had no holes before, you were mistaken.
- ngcc_hk 4y ago“Just when I needed you most.”
- yieldcrv 4y ago> Messages: Most message attachment types other than images are blocked. Some features, like link previews, are disabled. NSO Group's zero click exploit for iphones involved images. specifically using the PNG compression algorithm to use the logic gate sequence of the CPU to compile and execute a new process that allowed for escape If that's the level of sophistication this is to guard against, then it seems like it should include a block of images
- nnm 4y agoI just ordered a pixel 6. Really hope Android/Google will have the same mode.
- jbaviat 4y ago[Disclaimer: I worked in Apple Red Team] What if this isn’t a good news for 99% of Apple users? That’s obviously an amazing measure for the 1% high targets out there. But what about the other 99%? Does that create an incentive for Apple to strengthen Lockdown Mode security to the detriment of the regular mode (should we call it Unsafe Mode)? I’m afraid that this architecture will make it harder to prioritize security features or fixes for the 99% users. Developers bandwidth is limited, they can’t fix all bugs. Hence if you have to choose between one bug impacting the 1% most important users (from a security standpoint) versus one bug impacting the 99% others, which would you choose? Would such an architecture have led to the emergence of Blastdoor[1] - which attempts at mitigating iMessage attachement exploits, but is now useless in Lockdown mode? My hope here is that by reducing attack surface, Lockdown mode will make exploits much easier to fix (as they’ll target a limited area), allowing to strengthen the system core while freeing bandwidth to implement longer term, Blastdoor like mitigations. [1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/a-look-at-imessage-in-ios-14.html https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/01/a-look-at-ime...
- jgerrish 4y agoFirst, lets talk in the foggy dreamland of this article. I can't imagine the threats security researchers deal with every day. And their innovative solutions. Extracting live code from samples to inject in other malware. Wow, so cutting-edge. It's wonderful to talk about, no stress there, no drama. We don't want wear and tear on our machines. Like the article states, we're spending millions and billions on these problems. And lockdowns are an innovative approach. I've been thankful for device lockout in the field before. It's saved my bacon. Captures the favorite philosophy of strong regulatory control. Nice, has network effects for other political goals. Very cool. Better than Kevorkianing or Bricking a machine in the field. Oh God, Oh God, Oh God. Sorry for that narrative-scape shattering. Dementia is a serious issue. Ok, back to sanity. Some really fucking smart people showed me a study on evolutionary computation and diversity in investigator-guided processes. Hand-edited synthetic organisms may be less evolutionary successful than purely evolved ones. Like my storytelling, right? It's a fucking hot mess that isn't excersing my audiences mind as much as a more diverse author population. Oh God, there I am breaking down story-wise. Back to stability. We have political goals like reduction of 99% of security threats. And the perfect is the enemy of the good, right? I'm so sorry for my slips there, I know you lost time with loved ones and reading other comments talking about this in a more professional tone that captures the point. In closing, I'd like to thank the sponsors who kept me fed for years.
- nhoughto 4y agoironically if this is successful we likely won't know how deep the hardening goes, unless security researchers who have legit access release something? but i'd love to know the series of changes that goes into something like this if its not just hype, potentially unpicking a giant complex system from the bottom up to remove attack surface.. interesting challenge!