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Vercel April 2026 security incident
https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-incident https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-in...
- deleted 6mo ago[deleted]
- OsrsNeedsf2P 6mo agoThe lack of details makes me wonder how large this "subset" of users really is
- bossyTeacher 6mo agoThe lack of details itself is telling enough. Whatever comes out will be no doubt PR sanitised and some bigger clumps of truth won't make it through the PR process.
- gib444 6mo agoI remember working support and being told "always say 'subset' unless you absolutely know it's exactly 100% of customers" lol
- jofzar 6mo agoSame, there was always very specific wording we had to use unless legal approved an exact number or scope.
- MattIPv4 6mo agoRelated: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47824426 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47824426 https://x.com/theo/status/2045862972342313374 https://x.com/theo/status/2045862972342313374 > I have reason to believe this is credible. https://x.com/theo/status/2045870216555499636 https://x.com/theo/status/2045870216555499636 > Env vars marked as sensitive are safe. Ones NOT marked as sensitive should be rolled out of precaution https://x.com/theo/status/2045871215705747965 https://x.com/theo/status/2045871215705747965 > Everything I know about this hack suggests it could happen to any host https://x.com/DiffeKey/status/2045813085408051670 https://x.com/DiffeKey/status/2045813085408051670 > Vercel has reportedly been breached by ShinyHunters.
- otterley 6mo agoWho is this “theo” person and why are multiple people quoting him? He seems to have little to say that’s substantive at this point.
- MikeNotThePope 6mo agoTheo Browne is a reasonably well known YouTuber & YC founder. https://t3.gg/ https://t3.gg/
- gordonhart 6mo agoHe’s a tech influencer, probably getting quoted here because he has the biggest reach of people covering this so far.
- deleted 6mo ago[deleted]
- reactordev 6mo agoYT tech vlogger
- nothinkjustai 6mo agoHe is a paid Vercel shill (literally, he does sponsored content for them on his YouTube channel)
- TiredOfLife 6mo agoHe literally doesn't. https://x.com/theo/status/1832228209573949947 https://x.com/theo/status/1832228209573949947
- djeastm 6mo agoNot in a few years.
- Aurornis 6mo agoHe’s a streamer who talks about tech. Previously had a sponsorship relationship with Vercel so is theoretically more well connected than average on the topic. He’s also very divisive because he does a lot of ragebait, grievance reporting, and contrarian takes but famously has blind spots for a few companies and technologies that he’s favored in past videos or been sponsored by. I have friends who watch a lot of his videos but I’ve never been able to get into it.
- jccx70 6mo ago[dead]
- ofabioroma 6mo agoTime to ipo
- neom 6mo agohttps://x.com/theo/status/2045871215705747965 https://x.com/theo/status/2045871215705747965 - "Everything I know about this hack suggests it could happen to any host" He also suggests in another post that Linear and GitHub could also be pwned? Either way, hugops to all the SRE/DevOps out there, seems like it's going to be a busy Sunday for many.
- techpression 6mo ago”Any host” of what? That’s such a non-descriptive statement and clearly not true at face value.
- embedding-shape 6mo agoBased on what, "feels like it"? Claiming that Cloudflare is affected by the same hack has to come from somewhere, but where is that coming from?
- gruez 6mo agofrom his "sources". > Here’s what I’ve managed to get from my sources: >3. The method of compromise was likely used to hit multiple companies other than Vercel. https://x.com/theo/status/2045870216555499636 https://x.com/theo/status/2045870216555499636 To be fair journalists often do this too, eg. "[company] was breached, people within the company claim"
- eddythompson80 6mo agoIsn’t he a Vercel evangelist though?
- troupo 6mo agoHe is "whatever gives me short-term boost in popularity". Including doing 180 turns on whatever he's evangelizing or bashing.
- 6mo ago
- jtreminio 6mo agoI'm on a macbook pro, Google Chrome 147.0.7727.56. Clicking the Vercel logo at the top left of the page hard crashes my Chrome app. Like, immediate crash. What an interesting bug.
- farnulfo 6mo agoSame hard crash on Chrome Windows 11
- itaintmagic 6mo agoDo you have a chrome://crashes/ entry ?
- rapfaria 6mo agoit did add an entry - windows 11, chrome
- burnte 6mo agoI'm running 147.0.7727.57 and this doesn't happen. Macbook Air M5. VERY interesting.
- embedding-shape 6mo agoHuh, curiously; I'm on Arch Linux, crash happens in Google Chrome (147.0.7727.101) for me too, but not in Firefox (149.0.2) nor even in Chromium (147.0.7727.101). I find it fun we're all reading a story how Vercel likely is compromised somehow, and managed to reproduce a crash on their webpage, so now we all give it a try. Surely could never backfire :)
- nozzlegear 6mo agoWorks in Safari too. Sounds like a Google Chrome thing.
- LtWorf 6mo agoA crash can mean corrupt file exploiting bug and executing code…
- rvz 6mo agoThere is no serious reason to use Vercel, other than for those being locked into the NextJs ecosystem and demo projects.
- allthetime 6mo agoI recently got hit by a car on my bike. While I was starting the claim filing process the web portal for ICBC (British Columbia insurance) was acting a little funky / stalling / and then gave me a weird access error. Down at the bottom of the error page was a little grey underlined link that said “vercel”. I’m not exactly surprised, but it seems like the unserious, ill-informed and lazy are taking over. There is absolutely zero reason why a large, essential public service should be overspending and running on an unnecessary managed service like vercel… yet, here we are.
- gneray 6mo agoOy vey: https://x.com/theo/status/2045862972342313374?s=46 https://x.com/theo/status/2045862972342313374?s=46
- rubiquity 6mo agoHe doesn't work at Vercel but he is the type to never pass up any opportunity to chase clout.
- threecheese 6mo agoAlmost like that’s his job. Hey, I’m with you - I think social media needs to die specifically for this reason. I’m reminded of the term “snake oil” - it’s like the dawn of newspapers again.
- TiredOfLife 6mo agoMedia as a whole needs to die
- hoppyhoppy2 6mo agoIncluding books and the internet?
- dankwizard 6mo agoHe is affiliated with Vercel though
- 0xy 6mo agoThis is why you pay a real provider for serious business needs, not an AWS reseller. Next.js is a fundamentally insecure framework, as server components are an anti-pattern full of magic leading to stuff like the below. Given their standards for framework security, it's not hard to believe their business' control plane is just as insecure (and probably built using the same insecure framework). Next.js is the new PHP, but worse, since unlike PHP you don't really know what's server side and what's client side anymore. It's all just commingled and handled magically. https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/rss/aws-2025-030/ https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/rss/aws-2...
- embedding-shape 6mo ago> Next.js is the new PHP, but worse, since unlike PHP you don't really know what's server side and what's client side anymore. It's all just commingled and handled magically. Wasn't unheard of back in the day, that you leaked things via PHP templates, like serializing and adding the whole user object including private details in a Twig template or whatever, it just happened the other way around kind of. This was before "fat frontend, thin backend" was the prevalent architecture, many built their "frontends" from templates with just sprinkles of JavaScript back then.
- sbarre 6mo agoPeople say "Next.js is the new PHP" because it's the most popular and prominent tooling out there, and so by sheer number of available targets it's the one that comes up the most when things go wrong like this. But there are more people trying to secure this framework and the underlying tools than there would be on some obscure framework or something the average company built themselves. Also "pay a real provider", what does that mean? Are you again implying that the average company should be responsible for _more_ of their own security in their hosting stack, not less? Most companies have _zero_ security engineers.. Using a vertically-integrated hosting company like Vercel (or other similar companies, perhaps with different tech stacks - this opinion has nothing to do with Next or Node) is very likely their best and most secure option based on what they are able to invest in that area.
- bakugo 6mo ago
- mikert89 6mo agoMuch as I want to rip on vercel, its clear that ai is going to lead to mass security breaches. The attack surface is so large, and ai agents are working around the clock. This is a new normal. Open source software is going to change, companies wont be running random repos off github anymore
- lijok 6mo agoShinyHunters are a phishing group. What does this have to do with AI agents?
- mikert89 6mo agoRun ai agents around the clock to do hyper targeted fishing
- cj 6mo agoI feel like humans would be better at hyper targeting. AI agents have the benefit of working at scale, probably "better" used for mass targeting.
- freedomben 6mo agoI disagree. Many humans are phishing in a different language than their native tongue, and LLMs are way better at sounding legit/professional than many of them. The best spear-phishing will still be humans, but AI definitely raises the bar.
- mikert89 6mo agothis like is saying email marketing is done better if you hand write every email. Thats true, but the hit rate is so low, that you are better off generating 1 million hyper personalized emails and firing them off into the ether
- mcmcmc 6mo agoAs someone who did the former for a couple years, “better off” is subjective and dependent on your business model, particularly for B2B. It’s a trade off like anything else. You may get more leads, but they may convert at a lower rate. Sending at that scale also increases your risk of email deliverability problems. Trashing your domain has more impacts than you’d think. In smaller, targeted markets it even can damage your business reputation and hurt future sales if done poorly; word gets around.
- adithyasrin 6mo agoThe original link posted in the post has almost same content: https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-incident https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-in...
- adithyasrin 6mo agoWe run on Vercel and I wonder if / how long before we're alerted about a leak. Quick look online suggests environment variables marked as sensitive are ok, but to which extent I wonder.
- sreekanth850 6mo ago[flagged]
- steve1977 6mo agoWhile I would agree, unfortunately with JavaScript vibecoding is not even necessary to run into issues.
- LunaSea 6mo agoBecause Flash apps were so safe.
- scrollaway 6mo agoWindows 95 was peak security. (/s)
- Bridged7756 6mo agoIn C we don't have those issues.
- deleted 6mo ago[deleted]
- swingboy 6mo agoIs this one of those situations where _a lot_ of customers are affected and the “subset” are just the bigger ones they can’t afford to lose?
- toddmorey 6mo agoConjecture, but the wording "limited subset" rarely turns out to be good news. Usually a provider will say "less than 1% of our users" or some specific number when they can to ease concerns. My guess is they don't have the visibility or they don't like the number. I feel for the team; security incidents suck. I know they are working hard, I hope they start to communicate more openly and transparently.
- loloquwowndueo 6mo ago“Less than 1% of our users” means 10k affected users if you have 1 million users. 10k victims is a lot! Imagine “air travel is safe, only a subset of 1% of travellers die”
- nryoo 6mo ago[dead]
- toddmorey 6mo agoI've been part of a response team on a security incident and I really feel for them. However, this initial communication is terrible. Something happened, we won't say what, but it was severe enough to notify law enforcement. What floors me is the only actionable advice is to "review environment variables". What should a customer even do with that advice? Make sure the variable are still there? How would you know if any of them were exposed or leaked? The advice should be to IMMEDIATELY rotate all passwords, access tokens, and any sensitive information shared with Vercel. And then begin to audit access logs, customer data, etc, for unusual activity. The only reason to dramatically overpay for the hosting resources they provide is because you expect them to expertly manage security and stability. I know there is a huge fog of uncertainly in the early stages of an incident, but it spooks me how intentionally vague they seem to be here about what happened and who has been impacted.
- 0xmattf 6mo ago> The only reason to dramatically overpay for the hosting resources they provide is because you expect them to expertly manage security and stability. This and because it's so convenient to click some buttons and have your application running. I've stopped being lazy, though. Moved everything from Render to linode. I was paying render $50+/month. Now I'm paying $3-5. I would never use one of those hosting providers again.
- deleted 6mo ago[deleted]
- nightski 6mo agoLooking at linode, those prices get you an instance with 1Gb of ram and a mediocre CPU. So you are running all of your applications on that?
- 0xmattf 6mo agoPersonal projects/MVPs/small projects? Absolutely. For what I'm running, there's no reason to need anything beyond that. The point is, I used to just throw everything up on a PaaS. Heroku/Render, etc. and pay way more than I needed to, even if I had 0 users, lol.
- nike-17 6mo agoIncidents like this are a good reminder of how concentrated our single points of failure have become in the modern web ecosystem. I appreciate the transparency in their disclosure so far, but it definitely makes you re-evaluate the risk profile of leaning entirely on fully managed PaaS solutions.
- jtokoph 6mo agoThis announcement in its current form is quite useless and not actionable. As least people won’t be able to say “why didn’t you say something sooner?” They said _something_
- arabsson 6mo agoSo, the Vercel post says a number of customers were impacted, but not everyone, and they will contact the people that were impacted. I wasn't contacted so does that mean I'm safe?
- zuzululu 6mo agoWhat is the rationale for using vercel ? I'm getting a lot of value out of cloudflare with the $5/month plan lately but my bare metal box with triple digit ram has seen zero downtime since 2015.
- gjsman-1000 6mo ago0.82% of homes are burglarized every year. Meaning since 2015, you’ve got an 8.2% chance of having someone walk out with that box. Hopefully there’s nothing precious on it.
- burnte 6mo agoIf they have good backuos, no worries. Mine is in a locked colo cage in a datacenter, so I'm not worried either.
- FreePalestine1 6mo agoThey didn't imply the box was at their home and that probability is off
- jimberlage 6mo agoAssuming that all homes are at equal risk of being burglarized. In practice the neighborhoods I’ve seen are either at much higher risk or much lower risk.
- 0123456789ABCDE 6mo agoand burglarized homes have higher prob. of being burglarized again, and probabilities don't accumulate but compound, and is the server even in a house?
- 0123456789ABCDE 6mo agoyes, this is indeed how probability works. thanks.
- 6mo ago
- _puk 6mo agoHmmm, the dashboard 404 I got 6 hours ago now makes a bit more sense..
- nothinkjustai 6mo agoLooks like their rampant vibe coding is starting to catch up to them. Expect to see many pre vulns like this in the future.
- jheitzeb 6mo agoMissing from Glasswing
- ksajadi 6mo ago[flagged]
- nikcub 6mo agohe's completely ripped that post from the person who originally found it on breach forums. absolutely shameless. https://x.com/DiffeKey/status/2045813085408051670 https://x.com/DiffeKey/status/2045813085408051670
- ArcherL 6mo ago[dead]
- nikcub 6mo agoClaude Code defaulting to a certain set of recommended providers[0] and frameworks is making the web more homogenous and that lack of diversity is increasing the blast radius of incidents [0] https://amplifying.ai/research/claude-code-picks/report https://amplifying.ai/research/claude-code-picks/report
- nightski 6mo agoIt's a good point, but I don't think the problem here is Claude. It's how you use it. We need to be guiding developers to not let Claude make decisions for them. It can help guide decisions, but ultimately one must perform the critical thinking to make sure it is the right choice. This is no different than working with any other teammate for that matter.
- dennisy 6mo agoI think most people would agree. However it is less clear on how to do this, people mostly take the easiest path.
- fintler 6mo agoIts an eternal september moment. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternal_September https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eternal_September
- userbinator 6mo agoEternal Sloptember
- deleted 6mo ago[deleted]
- operatingthetan 6mo agoI guess engineers can differentiate their vibecoded projects by selecting an eccentric stack.
- jimmydoe 6mo agowhat's the cause of the breach?
- leetrout 6mo agoPorter also had a breach recently. I assume it is as tightly scoped as they say to not have publicized it.
- eieiyo 6mo agohttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45416353 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=45416353
- _jab 6mo ago> Vercel did not specify which of its systems were compromised I’m no security engineer, but this is flatly unacceptable, right? This feels like Vercel is covering its own ass in favor of helping its customers understand the impact of this incident.
- hyperadvanced 6mo agoI dunno. If I work on GitHub and I say “obscure subsystem X” has been breached, it’s no more useful than the level of specificity that Vercel has already given (“some customer environments have been compromised”)
- OsamaJaber 6mo agoThat's why infra needs stricter internal walls than normal SaaS
- landl0rd 6mo agoWow, maybe Cloudflare can help them secure their systems? I hear they have a pretty good WAF.
- Izmaki 6mo agoA "limited subset of customers" could be 99% of them and the phrase would still be technically true.
- eviks 6mo agoNot when limited to human communication
- oxag3n 6mo ago> incident response provider So they use third-party for incident management? They are de-risking by spending more, which is a loose-loose for the customers.
- staticassertion 6mo agoIt's very typical to have a retainer / insurance to bring in "emergency" incident responders beyond your existing team. Not saying that's the case here but it wouldn't be surprising.
- nettlin 6mo agoThey just added more details: > Indicators of compromise (IOCs) > Our investigation has revealed that the incident originated from a third-party AI tool whose Google Workspace OAuth app was the subject of a broader compromise, potentially affecting hundreds of its users across many organizations. > We are publishing the following IOC to support the wider community in the investigation and vetting of potential malicious activity in their environments. We recommend that Google Workspace Administrators and Google Account owners check for usage of this app immediately. > OAuth App: 110671459871-30f1spbu0hptbs60cb4vsmv79i7bbvqj.apps.googleusercontent.com https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-incident#indicators-of-compromise-iocs https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-in...
- loloquwowndueo 6mo agoThe actual app name would be good to have. Understandable they don’t want to throw them under the bus but it’s just delaying taking action by not revealing what app/service this was.
- progbits 6mo agoI was trying to look it up (basically https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/javascript-implicit-flow#redirecting https://developers.google.com/identity/protocols/oauth2/java... -- the consent screen shows the app name) but it now says "Error 401: invalid_client; The OAuth client was not found." so it was probably deleted by the oauth client owner.
- tom1337 6mo agoIt indeed was deleted as this URL shows: https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth?client_id=110671459871-30f1spbu0hptbs60cb4vsmv79i7bbvqj.apps.googleusercontent.com&redirect_uri=urn:ietf:wg:oauth:2.0:oob&response_type=code&scope=openid%20email%20profile https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth?client_id=11067...
- deleted 6mo ago
- nettlin 6mo agoThey just added more details: > Indicators of compromise (IOCs) > Our investigation has revealed that the incident originated from a third-party AI tool whose Google Workspace OAuth app was the subject of a broader compromise, potentially affecting hundreds of its users across many organizations. > We are publishing the following IOC to support the wider community in the investigation and vetting of potential malicious activity in their environments. We recommend that Google Workspace Administrators and Google Account owners check for usage of this app immediately. > OAuth App: 110671459871-30f1spbu0hptbs60cb4vsmv79i7bbvqj.apps.googleusercontent.com https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-incident#indicators-of-compromise-iocs https://vercel.com/kb/bulletin/vercel-april-2026-security-in...
- dev360 6mo agoI wonder which tool that is
- philip1209 6mo agoWe proactively rotated keys. Even if you haven’t received an official email, expect customers to inquire about this tomorrow morning.
- ebbi 6mo agoAhhh...another product I'm boycotting, and now doubly glad I'm boycotting.
- renan_warmling 6mo ago[dead]
- james-clef 6mo agoThe point I am taking away here is to never use Vercel's environment variables to store secrets.
- jamesfisher 6mo ago[flagged]
- raw_anon_1111 6mo agoWhy does anyone running a third party tool have access to all of their clients’ accounts? I can’t imagine something this stupid happening with a real service provider. I see Vercel is hosted on AWS? Are they hosting every one on a single AWS account with no tenant isolating? Something this dumb could never happen on a real AWS account. Yes I know the internal controls that AWS has (former employee). Anyone who is hosting a real business on Vercel should have known better. I have used v0 to build a few admin sites. But I downloaded the artifacts, put in a Docker container and hosted everything in Lambda myself where I controlled the tenant isolation via separate AWS accounts, secrets in Secret Manager and tightly scoped IAM roles, etc.
- eddythompson80 6mo agoIs AWS security boundary the AWS account? Are you expecting Vercel to provision and manage an AWS account per user? That doesn’t make any sense man, though makes sense if you’re a former AWS employee.
- raw_anon_1111 6mo agoYes the security boundary is the AWS account. It doesn’t make sense for a random employee who mistakenly uses a third party app to compromise all of its users it’s a poor security architecture. It’s about as insecure as having one Apache Server serving multiple customer’s accounts. No one who is concerned about security should ever use Vercel.
- eddythompson80 6mo ago> It’s about as insecure as having one Apache Server serving multiple customer’s accounts. You really have no clue what you’re talking about don’t you? Were you a sales guy at AWS or something?
- raw_anon_1111 6mo agoWell, I know that you have never heard of someone using a third party SaaS product at any major cloud provider compromising all of their customers accounts. Are you really defending Vercel as a hosting platform that anyone should take seriously?
- monirmamoun 6mo ago[flagged]
- jeromegv 6mo agoI knew from that moment never to use any Vercel product. If your leadership is that compromised, you know the rest of the ship is heading into a wall.
- hansmayer 6mo ago[flagged]
- rrmdp 6mo agoUse VPS, nowadays with the help of AI it's a lot easier to set everything up, you don't need Versel at all. And of course way cheaper
- Yash16 6mo ago[dead]
- victor9000 6mo ago[dead]
- jngiam1 6mo agoI don't get why everything is not marked as sensitive in env vars by default instead.
- ItsClo688 6mo ago[dead]
- tamimio 6mo agoAnother win for self-hosters, I host my own vercel (coolify) and it works well, all under my control and only expose what I want.
- deleted 6mo ago[deleted]
- Vates 6mo agoWhen one OAuth token can compromise dev tools, CI pipeline, secrets and deployment simultaneously, something architectural has gone wrong. Vercel have had React2Shell (CVSS 10), the middleware bypass (CVSS 9.1), and now this, all within 12 months. At what point do we start asking questions about the concentration of trust in the web ecosystem? It's funny that at the engineering level we are continuously grilled in interviews about the single responsibility principle, meanwhile the industry's business model is to undermine the entirety of web standards and consolidate the web stack into a CLI.
- nnurmanov 6mo agoYou have no idea how indifferent security officers can be-even when you point out critical issues. The other day, we flagged that a customer’s database had users with excessive privileges. Their only question: “Can this be exploited from the outside?” No, but most breaches today come from compromised internal accounts that are then used to break everything.
- Foobar8568 6mo agoWhat's the problem to have local API connected in HTTP? We are within the enterprise network. And that's how I passed for a annoying "PM". With half of the program management complaining that I was slowing down things until 6m later, the head of risk management told them to get lost.
- ethbr1 6mo ago> the head of risk management told them to get lost That's why it's important to org-chart engineer for security, if a company is really serious.
- anal_reactor 6mo agoThe problem with security is that often it's cheaper to deal with the bad outcome than to prevent it. Actually getting security right is very expensive because it requires virtually every engineer to have some security awareness, and engineers who can be trusted with that tend to be difficult to find. Meanwhile if you have a security incident you say "sorry", maybe you pay a small fine, and a month later everyone had already moved on.
- willamhou 6mo ago[dead]
- agent-kay 6mo ago[flagged]
- mrzhangbo 6mo ago[dead]
- mrzhangbo 6mo ago[dead]
- usr1106 6mo agoNot very familiar with Vercel. Discovered them only recently when a business my brother is a customer of fell victim of a phishing attack. The "Login to Microsoft" page hosted on Vercel was still online many days later when I heard of the case.
- sergiotapia 6mo agoIs the calculus breaking for these cloud providers? They are vibe coding at unsustainable speeds and shit is just breaking left and right. Has anyone made the move to self hosting on their own servers again?
- yogigan 6mo ago[flagged]
- Nathanba 6mo agogood point, we think of these OAuth logins as so safe and yet they may be the exact opposite because it's more like logging in with your master password. I think these oauth providers like Microsoft and Google need to start mandating 2FA for every company login, it's just too dangerous otherwise.
- maxboone 6mo agoHow would 2FA help here, you'd still create the compromised OAuth credential with 2FA?
- steve1977 6mo agoI'm not super savvy with OAuth, but shouldn't scopes prevent issues like this? https://oauth.net/2/scope/ https://oauth.net/2/scope/
- highphive 6mo agoThey can mitigate it, if the user refuses to oauth into something that asks for too much scope. Most users just click "accept" (this claim based on no data at all).
- Maxious 6mo ago> at least one Vercel employee signed up for the AI Office Suite using their Vercel enterprise account and granted “Allow All” permissions. Vercel’s internal OAuth configurations appear to have allowed this action to grant these broad permissions in Vercel’s enterprise Google Workspace. https://context.ai/security-update https://context.ai/security-update
- steve1977 6mo ago
- tomaskafka 6mo agoVercel, a deployment shell script turned billion dollar company, turned global liability. A story older than time.
- eddythompson80 6mo agoAm I reading this[1] correctly that they basically had that "compromised OAuth token" for a month now and it was only detected now when the attackers posted about it in a forum? [1] https://context.ai/security-update https://context.ai/security-update
- Maxious 6mo agoAnd that they engaged Crowdstrike for incident response... who missed OAuth tokens in the clear?
- eddythompson80 6mo agolol, yeah that Crowdstrike part was a funny CYA name drop
- newdee 6mo ago> Vercel’s internal OAuth configurations appear to have allowed this action to grant these broad permissions in Vercel’s enterprise Google Workspace. This was an interesting tidbit too. If true, this means that Vercel’s IT/Infosec maybe didn’t bother enabling the allowlist and request/review features for OAuth apps in their Google Workspace. On top of that, they almost certainly didn’t enable the scope limits for unchecked OAuth apps (e.g limiting it to sign-on/basic profile scopes).
- pier25 6mo agoA month? If true this is insane.
- gistscience 6mo agoIt is crazy that one google workspace plugin can cause this much damage!
- saadn92 6mo agoha, if anyone is interested, I wrote about how I migrated away from Vercel. good timing: https://saadnaveed.com/writing/vercel-to-hetzner/ https://saadnaveed.com/writing/vercel-to-hetzner/
- fragmede 6mo agoFinally got an email from Vercel saying that my account probably isn't compromised. 7:57 AM Monday, April 20, 2026 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC)
- kyle787 6mo agoContext AI published a statement https://context.ai/security-update https://context.ai/security-update > Last month, we identified and stopped a security incident involving unauthorized access to our AWS environment. > Today, based on information provided by Vercel and some additional internal investigation, we learned that, during the incident last month, the unauthorized actor also likely compromised OAuth tokens for some of our consumer users.
- ivansenic 6mo agoThere are 3 main questions here: 1) Vercel rolled out sensitive secrets on February 1, 2024, why were not all existing env vars transitioned to sensitive type? Why was there any assumption that any secret added as env var before that date was still OK to be left as "non-sensitive". 2) How was actually the Google workspace account was compromised? If context.ai was the originating issue, what actually led to the takeover? Were there too many access privileges given to the Google Workspace token context.ai had, or was there actually a workstation takeover here? 3) And finally why the hack a compromised Google Workspace account lead to someone having access to bunch of customer projects? Were is the connection? I don't get this..
- tetrakai 6mo agoI can't comment about 1, but my read of 2 and 3 is that the chain was something like this: 1. One or more Vercel employees - likely engineers - grant OAuth access to context.ai. They presumably did this for office-suite style features, but the OAuth request included a GCP grant for some reason, maybe laziness on context.ai's part or planned future features? Either way, Google's OAuth flow has little differentiation between "office suite" scopes and "cloud platform" scopes, so this may not have been particularly obvious to those at Vercel 2. context.ai's AWS account was compromised (unspecified how), and the Google OAuth tokens they had for customer accounts, including those for at least one Vercel employee, were taken 3. Those OAuth token(s) were used to authenticate to the GCP APIs as those Vercel employees, then allowing access to Vercel's DBs, and therefore access to customer data and secrets
- ethbr1 6mo agoTaking this at face value: https://www.infostealers.com/article/breaking-vercel-breach-linked-to-infostealer-infection-at-context-ai/ https://www.infostealers.com/article/breaking-vercel-breach-... Context.ai employee searches for Roblox exploits on web -> Context.ai support access breached by malware -> Vercel privileged employee account who uses Context.ai breached -> Vercel customer secrets breached Tl;dr - insufficient endpoint protection and activity detection at Context.ai (big surprise!) + insufficient privileged account isolation at Vercel
- deleted 6mo ago
- jsomau 6mo agoNeon, the Vercel recommended database storage integration, doesn't use the sensitive option for the environment variables it manages including the database connection string/password and need to be rotated then deleted and manually set up as sensitive.
- strimoza 6mo agoThis is why I moved my video streaming app (strimoza.com) to signed URLs with short expiry times for every single request. Extra complexity but at least if something leaks, the damage is contained. Curious how many people actually audit their CDN token policies before an incident forces them to.
- ctmnt 6mo agoAn email from Vercel came to my company at 10:47am UTC. It contained little information, and said: > At this time, we do not have reason to believe that your Vercel credentials or personal data have been compromised. Which is not very reassuring without actual information, since presumably they would have said the same thing on Saturday, if asked.
- senaevren 6mo ago[dead]
- michaelksaleme 6mo ago[dead]
- BrianneLee011 6mo agoThe real story isn't Vercel. It's that a Context.ai employee got infostealer'd in February and four months later that single compromise propagated through an 'Allow All' Google Workspace OAuth grant into Vercel's env vars. This is less a Vercel incident and more the chronic OAuth-supply-chain problem finally surfacing somewhere visible.
- pier25 6mo agoHow do you go from a Google Workspace to production env vars without Vercel doing something wrong?
- ctmnt 6mo agoNot just into Vercel's env vars, but into Vercel's customer's env vars.
- ctmnt 6mo agoWhere did you see that a Context employee had credentials stolen in February? I haven't run into that particular data point.
- brazukadev 6mo agoThe real story is Vercel letting users with access to their infrastructure install random apps not vetted by any security system.
- waldopat 6mo agoWhile everyone is revoking OAuth apps, rotating API keys, and deleting Vercel accounts, this is a good reminder that the scary part is how short the path was from OAuth token to employee account to internal systems to customer secrets. Many folks here likely have some stack that looks like: Google Workspace, GitHub, Vercel/Railway/Render/etc. where env vars or secrets are hosted. These are all loosely coupled but transitively trusted. So compromising any one of them becomes a threat vector. In other words, if System A trusts System B, and System B trusts System C, then System A trusts System C. This is also why OpenClaw is frightening from a security perspective. Also, this is a good reminder to run audits. Run `npm audit` on a typical Next.js project and you’ll probably see DoS vulnerabilities, ReDoS issues, Prototype pollution, code injection paths, handlebars etc. I'm sure you'll find something unexpected if you don't have routine code hygiene checks.
- beyondscaletech 6mo ago[dead]
- ethicalhackai 6mo ago[dead]
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- nextlsj 6mo ago[flagged]
- PEGHIN 6mo ago[dead]