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US says it can prove Huawei has backdoor access to mobile-phone networks
- sudoaza 7y agoProof or GTFO
- CameronNemo 7y agoBut can they prove it without revealing their own backdoors?
- donclark 7y agoOr explaining why they allow those backdoors exist in the first place?
- apocalyptic0n3 7y agoPretty sure it's legally required by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act[1] from 1994. I'm not 100% sure, however. 1: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_Law_Enforcement_Act https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communications_Assistance_for_...
- kitteh 7y agoBack in the day calea compliance meant you had to provide network connectivity and a signaling mechanism to specify what you wanted to be replicated to you. That meant voice calls and in some cases defining a network acl for packets (I knew folks who had to implement at router manufacturers - it was a hack that reused some of their multicast code base). The key part was an operator couldn't login to a device to see a calea intercept in progress or who was targeted. However due to the nature of how the replication/intercept was implemented you could see the results of it. High cpu, traffic leaving the box that didn't make sense, etc. I know one vendor who actually provided the trigger to the govt in the form of a snmpv3 query (and the communtiy string was hard coded in the os/binary...).
- pmlnr 7y agoThis is one of those "if X has access, so does everyone else" and rule makers still don't seem to grasp it.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- blattimwind 7y ago"Because I can log into my sshd, so can everyone else"...? We are not talking about weak crypto here (though AFAIK 5G crypto is designed to be decidedly not E2E), but rather access to the data processed by these systems. There is no particular reason why granting e.g. the NSA access to a stream of CDRs would immediately give others access.
- pgeorgi 7y agoWhy would the UK or Germany be interested in granting the NSA access? Those are some of the places where the US government is spending lots of effort to keep Huawei out. So yes, any intervention like that seems to me to be less about "the Chinese can snoop" and more about "we can't".
- Fnoord 7y agoIf you're able to retrieve the private key, then yes, you're able to generate a working public key. If they even use a (pre-generated) private key. Often, passwords are even hard-coded in "firmware".
- franga2000 7y agoI don't think anyone is saying immediately, but these are long-lived fairly static systems. I'm going to assume that you probably update your server's SSHd at least semi-regularly and that if SSH turns out to be broken 20 years down the line, you will probably be switching to something better either manually or when you eventually replace your hardware and reinstall the OS. This kind of infrastructure is meant to last for decades. Imagine if the original GSM contained a backdoor with the state-of-the-art crypto of the time. Would it still hold up today? Hell, you don't have to imagine - a mid-range smartphone these days can crack a lot of GSM traffic. Besides that, there's also the problem that not only are these things usually not done with state-of-the-art tech, but leaks happen all the time and it only takes one mistake* for the privkeys to become known.
- gruez 7y agojust so we're clear, are we talking about lawful intercept (ie. capabilities built into the system so the telecom can comply with warrants), or dragnet or otherwise warantless surveillance? I'm not against "backdoors" for the former, but am against "backdoors" for the latter.
- aliceryhl 7y agoI mean, now you're just talking about intent, and thus have to trust that the intent is as claimed. Crypto doesn't discriminate on whether you have a warrant or not.
- gruez 7y ago>Crypto doesn't discriminate on whether you have a warrant or not. Okay, let's say the telecom equipment doesn't have a backdoor for lawful intercept. What happens if the telecom is served with a warrant? Are you expecting that the telecoms will refuse to cooperate with the authorities?
- feanaro 7y agoThey shouldn't refuse, but they should be allowed to be unable to cooperate.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- count 7y agoNo, if there's no lawful intercept, they can cooperate fully, but it won't matter because there's nothing to get.
- aliceryhl 7y agoI'm not really making a statement about that. All I'm saying is that if you have a backdoor that can do the former, it must necessarily also be a backdoor that can do the latter.
- tsukurimashou 7y agoterrorists and pedophiles duh :^)
- jariel 7y ago"Or explaining why they allow those backdoors exist in the first place?" Nobody that matters needs to be convinced of the value 'back doors'. Only a minority of the American public and privacy types are very concerned. Certainly the other government agencies i.e. UK/Germany would take it as a given in terms of 'why' such back doors are there. There's a reference above to the WaPo article yesterday revealing the longest-running and best surveillance program by the US. It was run out of Germany. The Germans were wary of using it too broadly, but they were otherwise fully behind it, and their intel agencies balked at closing it down. It's not really even very political: certainly, Democrats would be 'mostly' onboard - there isn't really much of a political base against it other than perhaps the Libertarian crowd. I should add, some major US industrialists like Apple and Google probably do care a lot, and they do matter and do have influence. But probably not enough. So while many of us may disagree, it's not at the end of the day as controversial as we may think it is.
- snarf21 7y agoPedophiles. It is always because of pedophiles.
- sumedh 7y ago> why they allow those backdoors exist in the first place? To catch bad guys and protect the children.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- ChrisSD 7y agoReminder: US intelligence lies. They are not unique in this but it's worth repeating. They might be right about Huawei or they might not, either way saying "we totally have proof!" without providing proof is effectively meaningless.
- ASalazarMX 7y agoIf they had proof they would have showed it already. Nothing would help their rhetoric more than cold hard facts. If they haven't done it, it means: a) there isn't any backdoor, or b) exposing their backdoors would expose their own backdoors. I'm betting on b.
- ApolloFortyNine 7y agoc. They have sources saying as such but have not discovered the backdoor itself. d. Admitting how they found the backdoor would reveal other issues (a source in the pipeline, or their own backdoor in something Huawei made use of). And probably e-z too.
- LoveKebab 7y agoYeah exactly - providing proof publicly could in fact burn the sources/methods used to get that proof.
- pbhjpbhj 7y agoHey, I like this game .... e. they know Huawei have backdoor(s) because their mole put them in, so the USA could use them. They've not succeeded in getting a backdoor in 5G infrastructure, so they're ready to burn the old backdoor, to discredit Huawei (and win big on the markets) and to get countries to take USA based products on which there are backdoors in! What we can be pretty sure of, as Trump's involved in pressuring countries to stop using Huawei, it's corrupt and there's a private financial win for Trump if he succeeds.
- throwaway17_17 7y ago
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- thdrdt 7y agoFrom yesterday: How the CIA used Crypto AG encryption devices to spy on countries for decades https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22297963 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22297963
- mech1234 7y agoA question to Europeans reading this- If you had to assume that U.S. 5G equipment manufacturers would provide backdoors to U.S. officials, and Chinese 5G equipment manufacturers would provide backdoors to Chinese officials, and Europeans had to use one or the other, which would you choose?
- adventured 7y agoHow about a more realistic scenario instead. As an American, I choose European / EU 5G equipment in all scenarios over Chinese 5G equipment. I don't care what the cost is. Europe, broadly (other than Russia primarily), is aligned with the US in all the ways that matter and will continue to be. China is not in almost any regard. The sole things the US and China have in common is trade and that the next century will be defined by persistent US-China superpower tension all around the world and in most all respects.
- pc86 7y agoFor most Americans "I don't care what the cost is" immediately makes it an unrealistic scenario. And if history is any indication, for the vast majority of Americans choosing a privacy-focused solution is usually an accident. Price is the determining factor almost always.
- thefounder 7y agoI think the answer would be none or both.
- aliceryhl 7y agoBetween US and China? US, definitely. I don't exactly love the US, and would never want to live there, but China seems way more malicious than the US to me.
- kube-system 7y agoThe answer is you choose the one which is the closer ally. Which, given the lack of US 5G manufacturers, is exactly the choice the US has already made.
- inviromentalist 7y agoShouldn't moments like this be death blows? I had totally thought after Apple and Microsoft were caught working on PRISM Americans and corporations would be doing drastic steps to avoid their communication being intercepted. But for some reason that never happened.
- draw_down 7y agoI agree, there is probably a reason for that.
- AdmiralAsshat 7y ago> Telecom-equipment makers who sell products to carriers "are required by law to build into their hardware ways for authorities to access the networks for lawful purposes," but they "are also required to build equipment in such a way that the manufacturer can't get access without the consent of the network operator," the Journal wrote. I love this quote. The US is essentially complaining that Huawei has access to the backdoor channels that only the US government was supposed to have.
- gruez 7y ago>The US is essentially complaining that Huawei has access to the backdoor channels that only the US government was supposed to have. How is surprising? The defining characteristic of a nation state is that it has a monopoly on violence within its borders. Having a monopoly on intercepting telecom traffic is a logical consequence of that. For other countries though, yeah I'd prefer if neither China nor US have backdoor access.
- ancorevard 7y ago"I'd prefer if neither China nor US have backdoor access." So would I, but having lived in both countries, one of the two governments is decidedly more evil than the other.
- crankylinuxuser 7y agoWell, you could think about it this way: its better to possibly leak data to a foreign interest if they don't work well with your country. Sure, they may have some data, but they wont share it.
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- sam_lowry_ 7y agoJudging by the number of wars it started in the last century... it's definitely the American.
- eqvinox 7y agoLet's see that proof. Then we can talk.
- crmrc114 7y agoNSA: Yeah, their spyware install totally broke our spyware install!!1! Joking, but I honestly wonder- If the software is compiled in California... and the hardware is made in China. You could have two implants in the same gear. Now that's Thinking Green! Twice the government implants in one product.
- SAI_Peregrinus 7y ago"US says it can prove Huawei has lawful intercept access to mobile-phone networks" would be a better headline.
- blattimwind 7y agoBecause Huawei is a global law-enforcement agency and hence can claim lawful interception on all equipment it sells? Doesn't make any sense.
- dependenttypes 7y agoIs NSA a global law-enforcement agency? https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory-show-cisco-router-getting-implant/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa...
- geggam 7y agoCompletely depends on the abilities of the military which enforce the rule. Violence tends to be the way nations define rules outside their own borders.
- ieS7rpVU 7y agoInside their own borders as well. States are creatures of violence. They are created by violence and require continuous violence to remain in existence.
- SAI_Peregrinus 7y ago
- awinter-py 7y agoI don't hate that someone is investing in tools & research in this. I'd certainly pay a 20% premium on my hardware for verifiable protection from phone-home. I'd probably pay that premium for the manufacturer to claim that the device doesn't phone home. Obv different situation for infrastructure hardware where the end-user (me) isn't the same as the buyer (german telecoms, apparently). But I suspect some of the verification / testing tools will be similar. I'm happy these topics are getting press, whoever the players are.
- ngngngng 7y agoWhile we're on the subject, is Signal still the best way for me to communicate privately? I've got all the people I communicate with daily using it now, and I feel relatively confident that the communications are private. Are they?
- spsful 7y agoOpen Whisper Systems has one of the most secure messaging services on the planet. The US military is rumored to have been telling operatives to use it instead of text on their government phones[1]. Edit: a word [1] https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/23/deployed-82nd-airborne-unit-told-to-use-these-encrypted-messaging-apps-on-government-cellphones/ https://www.militarytimes.com/flashpoints/2020/01/23/deploye...
- crankylinuxuser 7y agoGiven their demand to your phone number, along with social graph (phone list and communication targets) I do not trust it to be secure and private. It's probably secure against phone company snooping. But I wouldn't trust it much past that.
- walterbell 7y agoWire.com E2E encryption does not require phone number or social graph. They are also working to standardize the wire protocol via IETF MLS, with cryptographers from multiple companies. https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mls/about/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/mls/about/
- crankylinuxuser 7y agoIndeed. I haven't gotten around to using Wire. But when I've needed secure, private, and semianonymous messaging, I've used Tox.
- smush 7y agoOWS is working on foundations to allow people to use usernames and link them with FCM / push notifications without the central signal server being any wiser than currently with just phone numbers. My hope is to be able to add ephemeral user ids so to my work folks I'm JustMe but family folks I'm FamilyMe and internet blog readers I'm MyProfessionalMe
- DoctorOetker 7y agoif the US (a tax payer funded operation) has proof it should simply share it, not posture about it.
- hatenberg 7y agoEnd to end encryption would be a good fix. Oh wait...
- SubiculumCode 7y agoI'm usually impressed with HN comments, but this thread is currently dominated by insubstantiated conspiratorial mongering against American institutions.
- alasdair_ 7y agoThe problem is of those institutions own making. Many Americans lost their lives hunting for Saddam’s WMDs - something that was fabricated by said institutions. “Trust us” is no longer something we can blindly accept.
- SubiculumCode 7y agoTo be clear, I was not commenting on skepticism, but on making accusations of lying without evidence.
- pbhjpbhj 7y agoThey started it! Perhaps if they presented some substance people would have more to go on. Do you think anything about USA appears trustable at the moment to those outside?
- pinkfoot 7y agoMy guess is the proof the Germans were shown was a plan to tax their cars at 40%.
- syshum 7y agoIs that proof "conflicted with NSA backdoor"
- zyang 7y agoIs it Telnet? https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/04/30/huawei_enterprise_router_backdoor_is_telnet/ https://www.theregister.co.uk/2019/04/30/huawei_enterprise_r...
- dustfinger 7y agoNote: The following might be considered off-topic. On the otherhand, there might be something nefarious in the SMS network. I found something strange that affects SMS in Canada. You can send the lower case text "secure communication", but it will never be recieved by the recipient. I am not sure if this behavior is reproducible outside of Canada. It might be a software defect, or perhaps there is something capturing the text and trying to interpret it as a command. The issue is more difficult to reproduce if both the sender and recipient devices are iphone's due to the default behavior of sending via iText. I originally posted about this late last year [1]. I intend to investigate this issue more deeply, but my time has been consumed by another more pressing matter. The original HN post links to my blog post [2]. Originally I jumped to the conclusion that it was a case of censorship, but I backtracked on that because the issue is case sensitive. I would love confirmation if this is reproducible in other countries. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21593276 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=21593276 [2] https://bloggerbust.ca/post/text-messages-are-being-censored-in-canada/ https://bloggerbust.ca/post/text-messages-are-being-censored...
- dwild 7y agoI just tried that in Quebec from Virgin Mobile (Bell) to Vidéotron using a Samsung S10 and a Samsung A8, it's working fine for me. I can't verify it is send over SMS or MMS though. In theory there's no reason for my cellphone to send it over MMS. The exact word used: secure communication
- dustfinger 7y agoTurn off your data and disconnect from wifi, then try again. I believe that will force it to send via SMS. You might need to go through your client's app settings. The Google Android client is nice because it displays what protocol it is sending over. It is important to confirm that it is sent over SMS. Also, it is important that the words "secure communication" are sent in all lower case which I see that you did. Thank you for taking the time to test this. If you are sure it is being sent over SMS then I will add your entry as an example where it can be both sent and received
- 99_00 7y agoChina's intelligence law requires people or companies to spy when asked. >“request relevant organs, organisations, and citizens provide necessary support, assistance, and cooperation”. According to Article 16, intelligence officials “may enter relevant restricted areas and venues; may learn from and question relevant institutions, organisations, and individuals; and may read or collect relevant files, materials or items” https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/publications/china-and-the-age-of-strategic-rivalry/chinas-intelligence-law-and-the-countrys-future-intelligence-competitions.html https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corpo...
- dependenttypes 7y agoIsn't this also pretty much the case with American companies? The only difference is that they need a warrant (which should be pretty easy to get). Anyway, there is a new bill trying to kill e2ee in America https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22202110 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22202110
- kelnos 7y agoYes and no. There are some specific carve-outs for telecom companies that their networks must have the ability to tap into specific traffic when a government agency comes knocking with a warrant. But, as you point out, backdoor-free e2e encryption is not yet illegal, and the US gov't can't force e.g. Apple to put a backdoor in iMessage or in iOS's device encryption. I expect that this is not the case in China; if the CCP tells a company to do something, anything, to allow them to spy on their users, they do it, or they get destroyed. Bills like the EARN IT Act scare the hell out of me, but at least there's a process by which it becomes law, and we can affect that process and (hopefully) kill it. That's just not possible in China.
- dependenttypes 7y ago> and we can affect that process In theory, in the same sense that one could influence what CCP does by becoming a member of it and rising through the ranks.
- joelbondurant 7y agoPot, kettle, black. Huawei doesnt drop 5 bombs per hour.
- blackrock 7y agoWasn’t that Apple “goto fail;” technically a zero-day back door as well? You had to initiate some specific knock sequence to trigger it. Did they find something like this in their source code?
- Wheaties466 7y agoI like to post this whenever huawei backdoor gets mentioned. RDG is the author of masscan https://blog.erratasec.com/2014/03/we-may-have-witnessed-nsa-shotgiant-tao.html https://blog.erratasec.com/2014/03/we-may-have-witnessed-nsa... tl;dr they watched someone login with a huawei tech support account from mainland china.
- avocado4 7y agoSays the new account with a bunch of digits in the name.
- ETHisso2017 7y agoAssume good faith
- aaron695 7y agoI love the delusions here that spy craft is worth more than commerce. China risks one of their largest companies, knowing they will eventually get caught, over one department in the US just puts out a statement they are 'spying' and everyone believes it without proof. We don't actually live in a Hollywood movie. "US officials said they have been aware of Huawei's backdoor access "since observing it in 2009 in early 4G equipment," the Journal wrote." So the USA admits it's allowed all these counties, many allies, be spied on? Really? We are excepted to believe that? I'm sure there's a technical 'thing' here. But whether they have fked up on the USA side or the Chine side we can only know from the US actually saying what this is. But then the US might lose it's 'Huawei is spying' attack on Chinese commerce.
- aussieguy1234 7y agoThe US probably does want to reveal the backdoor because its likely they are exploiting it themselves. If they reveal the backdoor and Huawei closes or replaces it, they'll be locked out
- zmmmmm 7y ago> required by law to build into their hardware ways for authorities to access the networks for lawful purposes A bit of a tangent but ... How I hate this term "lawful purposes". It's a non-sequitor / dark pattern deployed to confuse consumers into not understanding that they mean "spy on you". "Lawful" just means compliant with the law. In other words, they are are NOT saying "necessary to enforce the law" which is what they want you to think. They are only saying, hey, we won't break the law when we use this feature, aren't we great? Like breaking the law would ever be OK and as if this disclaimer somehow adds any sort of reassurance. The implied logic is "normally we would just break the law to access your data but in this special case we'll follow it. /tangent
- sillysaurusx 7y agoAre you sure you’d want to live in a society that was incapable of spying on you when they decided it was necessary? (This argument hinges on that pesky word “necessary”. But it’s worth thinking about which conditions you’d be ok with the state surveilling others, and who exactly “others” refers to.)
- godelski 7y ago> who exactly “others” refers to Historically, people of color and political dissidents.
- A4ET8a8uTh0 7y agoSadly, that is exactly how ideas like that promulgate. It won't affect me. It will only affect the others, the undesirables, the trouble makers, and misc. whippersnappers. I know it will not affect me and people like me, because implemented rules will ensure that. My parents lived in a society you seem to yearn for. Hard pass.
- zmmmmm 7y agoI think that's a perfectly reasonable debate to have. However that's exactly why I think they should not use deceptive language to confuse people. People need to understand exactly what is being done to have trust in it and to debate it so they can form reasonable opinions - not be deceived into thinking one thing is happening when actually something much more intrusive is going on.
- bookAlot 7y agoIt cannot prove it bc it does not.
- DaniloDias 7y ago1 thought for all MNOs and their vulnerability management programs: Most of your infrastructure has multiple interfaces. Bearer. OAM, Backup, etc. If your vulnerability scanning program only scans Bearer interfaces, you are fucking up. You can spin up vulnerable services on only one interface. If you don't scan ALL interfaces, you don't know all your entry points. If you work for an MNO and are reading this, you should take action after reading this content.
- guug 7y agoPeople will still continue to use Huawei gear unless tangible evidence is presented. The US government has been caught far too many times with its pants down to be trusted.
- justlexi93 7y agoThis isn't necessarily about access to the calls themselves. It could be about being about to retrieve network configuration information, call history, maintenance logs, and being able to alter the configuration of the network. The article isn't specific enough. In other words, do they just want to intercept calls, or steal customer information, or crash the network?
- fulldecent2 7y agoOriginal source. Will somebody with access to WSJ please corroborate this quote in OP which is attributed to WSJ? > Telecom-equipment makers who sell products to carriers "are required by law to build into their hardware ways for authorities to access the networks for lawful purposes," but they "are also required to build equipment in such a way that the manufacturer can't get access without the consent of the network operator," the Journal wrote.
- bcrl 7y agoIt Would Be Nice(tm) if SS7 was removed from the PSTN... Who needs backdoors into networks when SS7 peers are trusted implicitly.