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Apple introduces end-to-end encryption for backups

• robmccoll 4y ago
  (Not an iMessage user) Does iMessage actually have a way to display the raw public key(s) locally associated with a contact and your public key(s)? Wondering if you can verify keys out of band or if you have to trust Apple to be the authority.
  • Sirened 4y ago
    It's not surfaced in the UI but, as far as I recall, the information does actually reach the device already. Here's a paper [1] which dives into the cryptography used in iMessage (at least whatever was used at time of publication). [1] https://www.cs.umd.edu/~imiers/pdf/imessage.pdf https://www.cs.umd.edu/~imiers/pdf/imessage.pdf
• 3234682491 4y ago
  YEISON MENESES 3234682491
• 3234682491 4y ago
  YEISON
• dodgerdan 4y ago
  This is pretty big news. I wonder will there be an immediate push back by law enforcement and governments?
  • gjsman-1000 4y ago
    Remember the CSAM scanning debacle almost a year ago? I and others speculated that the reason Apple was trying to make the CSAM-scanning and Safety Vouchers client-side was so that they would be able to allow E2E encryption while having a plausible reason to shut down law enforcement's biggest argument against E2E.
    • nerdjon 4y ago
      I could have sworn apple even straight up said that was their goal? Maybe I am just misremembering since like you I figured that was the reason they were doing it, no other reason to do something like that if it was all going too sit there unencrypted.
      • gjsman-1000 4y ago
        No, they didn't say anything like that at the time, so I was even downvoted on HN and argued with for making the suggestion. Because Apple was definitely just being evil and had no bigger picture.
    • gigel82 4y ago
      That's a very optimistic point of view. On the other hand, I and others speculated that the reason Apple wants to introduce code on your device that scans local content on your device against a government mandated database of "wrong content" was to appease law enforcement's desire for more control.
      • schrodinger 4y ago
        I don't understand how your other hand argument is more pessimistic. Isn't your phone scanning locally for checksums better than requiring the data to be unencrypted and scannable server-side? Surely they couldn't just do _nothing_. edit: I take this back—"nothing" should be the right answer.
        • gigel82 4y ago
          _nothing_ is exactly what I expect them to do when it comes to my local files. We all like to vilify Microsoft (rightfully so for all the telemetry crap they pull) but imagine if Windows started scanning all your local disks for files matching certain checksums then notifying authorities when matches occur (thumbnails / other metadata uploaded with the reports) like Apple was planning. Sure, it'll be CSAM first. Then, domestic terrorism; then RIAA / MPAA would jump in on the action... and finally, opaque checksum databases from local governments ("wrong think", Winnie the Pooh memes, pictures from protests, etc.) ; if we don't stop it in its infancy we're quickly tumbling down the slippery slope.
• KindAndFriendly 4y ago
  >> ...For users who opt in, Security Keys strengthens Apple’s two-factor authentication by requiring a hardware security key... I hope they will support existing Yubi-Keys etc and not force users to get the dedicated Apple hardware key.
  • yakkityyak 4y ago
    > force users to get the dedicated Apple hardware key I don't think there is one?
    • ethanzh 4y ago
      I think your iPhone is the dedicated Apple hardware in this case
      • zaroth 4y ago
        You don’t have to guess the announcement actually tells you 3rd party keys can be used and NFC keys can be tapped on the iPhone.
    • frizlab 4y ago
      The iPhone and recent Macs are ones. But it would not make sense to you your iPhone to protect your iCloud I think.
      • yakkityyak 4y ago
        It was a rhetorical question :P The section of the announcement is emphatically about 3rd party security keys support, so the worry about lack of support of YubiKey over some push for some imaginary Apple Dedicated Key didn't make much sense to me. Also, security key (at least to me) implies a small, keychain sized device. I wouldn't think of calling my Mac Studio a security key. There is no device marketed as such, even though yes, the SEP can and has fulfilled these purposes.
  • frizlab 4y ago
    Given they already support standard WebAuthn (passkey or other), I think it’s a pretty safe guess to say they’ll support Yubikeys. I can’t find any written confirmation yet though.
• pettersolberg 4y ago
  Except in China and alike
  • atestu 4y ago
    According to WSJ it will include China: > The new encryption system, which will be tested by early users starting Wednesday, will roll out as an option in the U.S. by year’s end, and then worldwide including China in 2023, Mr. Federighi said. https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-plans-new-encryption-system-to-ward-off-hackers-and-protect-icloud-data-11670435635?mod=djemalertNEWS https://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-plans-new-encryption-syst...
    • busymom0 4y ago
      • sgjohnson 4y ago
        They seem to be abandoning China, they are planning to move some 40% of the total iPhone production to India within the next couple of years, so China might not have all that much leverage.
        • adam_arthur 4y ago
          More about consumer base than manufacturing for them. Doesn’t matter where they move production. Same reason they edit movies to appease chinese audiences
          • brookst 4y ago
            https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/08/media/hollywood-china-censors-box-office-intl-hnk/index.html https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/08/media/hollywood-china-censors...
        • three_seagrass 4y ago
          >They seem to be abandoning China Manufacturing, sure. Consumers? no. Apple traded it's privacy priority for profits back in 2017 when it gave backdoor access to all the iCloud backups - https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-censorship-data.html https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/17/technology/apple-china-ce...
• m463 4y ago
  Even better security would be to allow users into their own devices. This would mean that critical data just wouldn't leave the device via the network. (letting users into their own devices means the ability to access the entire device, examine what their device is doing, and firewall it if wanted)
  • frizlab 4y ago
    1. iMessage without internet would be tricky. 2. You don’t have to backup in iCloud. Just plug your phone on a Mac or Windows computer with iTunes installed and backup it locally.
    • lxgr 4y ago
      It‘s ridiculous that I can only backup my (iOS) device to either a computer via USB (what is this, 2005?) or to the cloud. Just let me use my local Time Machine backup server! Sadly, I am convinced I'll never see that feature – it would basically remove the need for any iCloud subscription for me and thereby undermine Apple's "service" efforts too much.
      • jaywalk 4y ago
        Don't they still offer local backup over Wi-Fi?
        • deleted 4y ago
          [deleted]
        • danaris 4y ago
          They do. Parent just wants to back up directly to a Time Machine backup, rather than backing up to computer, then backing that up to TM. A reasonable desire, but clearly niche enough that it's unlikely to come to pass. (Particularly since, given what little I've seen of how Time Machine works, it would likely require some quite significant dev work on Apple's end to enable.)
      • tgv 4y ago
• newZWhoDis 4y ago
  Wow, Apple enabling E2EE for backup is huge, since before they would bypass iMessage security by including your iMessage keys in the unencrypted cloud backup (so governments could request that copy then watch your messages in real time). I’m sure they’ll get pushback for closing this loophole
  • anxiously 4y ago
    Couldn’t they simply use an encryption algorithm that has two private keys and they control one?
    • CGamesPlay 4y ago
      Yes, but this would be apparent in the code, since the sender would have to encrypt against both public keys.
    • deleted 4y ago
      [deleted]
  • godelski 4y ago
    Do we know if they still continued with the data scanning? I'm all for E2EE backups, but not if it comes at the cost of scanning my data.
    • stalfosknight 4y ago
      Apple is abandoning its CSAM scanning plan: https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-communication-safety-messages/ https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-commun...
    • theshrike79 4y ago
      They planned to scan only the files that would end up in the cloud anyway. iCloud off -> no local CSAM scan. Local CSAM scan with multiple failsafes (+ actual person checking) + E2EE iCloud -> zero need to allow law enforcement access to iCloud servers. This would also mean that Apple cloud've encrypted them in such a way that even they can't access them.
• cglong 4y ago
  Now I get what dang was saying about press release verbiage... https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33886505 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33886505
  • dmitryminkovsky 4y ago
    Came to the comments to say this. Would appreciate a non-Apple source on this.
    • latexr 4y ago
      Daring Fireball highlights some bits and provides commentary: https://daringfireball.net/linked/2022/12/07/advanced-data-protection-for-icloud https://daringfireball.net/linked/2022/12/07/advanced-data-p...
  • baggy_trough 4y ago
    I don't really understand the objection. The press release is very well written.
    • haswell 4y ago
      But in some cases, that's the point. A well written press release will often gloss over potentially relevant/important details that a neutral source will not.
      • baggy_trough 4y ago
        That's what the HN comment thread is for!
        • haswell 4y ago
          The difference is that the HN comment thread will rarely have insights that a reporter can often provide after following up with their inside contacts. Edit: on reflection, I don’t agree with this and wrote this too hastily. I’d still prefer 3rd party by default and believe it’s often a better basis for a discussion.
• nerdjon 4y ago
  I have been waiting a long time for backups and photos to support this, and I am glad we are finally getting it. I don't feel like updating to a beta to get this feature (especially for the risks associated with it). But I am curious how the migration will work. Will this basically re-encrpt everything locally and then upload it or will what is already there stay unencrypted. Also does anyone know, how do features like this work for someone with a single apple device? I don't worry about loosing access to anything because if my phone dies I have... several other devices with keys. But what about someone who doesn't?
  • gjsman-1000 4y ago
    It shows in the screenshot the following: "Because Apple will not have the keys required to recover your data, you will be guided to set up an alternate recovery method in case you ever lose access to your account." I would assume a physical sheet of paper containing recovery codes is a suitable alternative recovery method.
    • xattt 4y ago
      This is the Bitlocker recovery way.
    • nerdjon 4y ago
      I should have looked closer at the screenshot, didn't really think it would tell me anything beneficial for an e2e system. Thanks for pointing that out! Honestly might not be a bad idea to have a backup somewhere else just in case. Like in the event of a fire or something have a backup sitting in a safe. It does bring up an interesting conversation, what levels do we go to make sure we can recover accounts in situations like this? Store a USB or a paper in a safety deposit box on the other side of the country? I tend to store all of my backups for my other accounts on my iCloud Drive so... loosing access to that would be catastrophic.
      • rodgerd 4y ago
        Essentially at that point you're on your own - you can't have Apple able to do recovery and be unable to access your data for other purposes.
• Etheryte 4y ago
  For everyone else who was hoping to enable E2EE for backups right away: > Advanced Data Protection for iCloud is available in the US today for members of the Apple Beta Software Program, and will be available to US users by the end of the year. The feature will start rolling out to the rest of the world in early 2023.
• Vt71fcAqt7 4y ago
  This all just seems like pandering while they continue to accept billions from Google in exchange for their user's privacy. If they really wanted to protect users' data that would be a simple starting point.
  • jaywalk 4y ago
    Safari has pretty good privacy protections, but you could also just... not use Google. I've never even had iOS reset my default search engine.
    • Vt71fcAqt7 4y ago
      Does it protect you from Google's tracking? No. And it isn't about me, I don't have Apple or Safari. It's about the fact the privacy shouldn't be "opt in." Claiming that safari has good privacy protections while it by default does the opposite becuase you can opt in to a less inavsive version which many don't even know about is, in my opinion, disingenuous. If Apple would just go ahead and say "we've extracted tens of billions of dollars from you indirectly by letting google do the dirty work, but here's some encryption that doesn't make up for what we've done and continue doing" that would be more accurate.
• AshamedCaptain 4y ago
  They can still simply push a software update that sends the victim's keys to the mothership and/or simply decrypts everything. Can even be pushed silently. The victim cannot do anything, not even detect when this has happened. Why would governments push back, when this hole which has already been used will _always_ be available?
  • arch-ninja 4y ago
    Hasn't the solution to this problem always been easy? Just encrypt before you type it into imessages; this applies to _all_ untrusted communication channels. Don't tell me base64-encoding/decoding is what's stopping you from having perfect security?
    • TillE 4y ago
      Exactly, if you're dealing with truly sensitive information where any leak is unacceptable, make your own encrypted blob. Don't trust any communication software to do it for you. The concern typically isn't backdoors, it's bugs. I've had plenty of terrible experiences with Enigmail.
    • joosters 4y ago
      'easy' and 'just' are doing a lot of work in your assertion here!
    • kube-system 4y ago
      That doesn't solve the problem of needing a trusted communication channel. You'd still need one to exchange keys.
  • mwint 4y ago
    The difference is in asking Apple for something they already have access to, vs. asking them to create something entirely new (a signed software update). That’s what the FBI case a few years back was about.
    • szundi 4y ago
• spa3thyb 4y ago
  I still disagree with the shift from PR to 3P, but in that spirit, this might be a better URL: https://9to5mac.com/2022/12/07/apple-advanced-data-protection-encryption-imessage-more/ https://9to5mac.com/2022/12/07/apple-advanced-data-protectio...
• aborsy 4y ago
  This is major news. Companies such as Apple and Dropbox are implementing end to end encryption, at least as an option. Was client side scanning implemented finally? Perhaps E2E paves the way to client side scanning? For the hardware key, Apple is a bit late though. All other cloud companies have that 2FA.
  • theshrike79 4y ago
    Client side scanning was scrapped because 80% of the internet couldn't understand how the implementation worked. Maybe they'll try it again after this.
    • sneak 4y ago
      > Client side scanning was scrapped Apple never said that it was scrapped. They did, however say that they intend to do it. EDIT: Follow the links from those articles. Apple never killed the plan! This is what Apple actually said: > Based on feedback from customers, advocacy groups, researchers and others, we have decided to take additional time over the coming months to collect input and make improvements before releasing these critically important child safety features. That's not killed. That's just delayed. It's also them reiterating their intention to ship these misfeatures. It was, as pointed out, widely misreported. Apple is very good at writing technically truthful things that say one thing that cause reporters to report a different thing (which is not factual). This becomes an "everybody knows" sort of thing where the narrative that is widely believed/accepted is not what Apple actually said. They exploit poor reading comprehension ability.
      • theshrike79 4y ago
        https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-communication-safety-messages/ https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-commun... "Apple Kills Its Plan to Scan Your Photos for CSAM. Here’s What’s Next" That's dead enough for me.
    • randyrand 4y ago
      Pretty much everyone understood that your phone would scan itself for illegal porn, which is accurate. No one wanted that, regardless of how the implementation worked.
• amarshall 4y ago
  The press release is a bit sparse, there is a bit more detail on “Advanced Data Protection for iCloud” in the support article https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303#advanced https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303#advanced
  • dang 4y ago
    Ok, I think we'll change the URL to that from https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-s.... Thanks! Is there a similar URL for the security key stuff? If so, we can factor that out of this thread, which is almost all about E2EE backups.
    • amarshall 4y ago
      Unfortunately I came up dry on the security keys. It’s possible they haven’t published docs on them yet since this is still all pre-release.
• keepquestioning 4y ago
  Can someone get ChatGPT to summarize this PR release?
  • alexfromapex 4y ago
    Apple has introduced three new security features to better protect users' data in the cloud. The new services will provide the company's highest-ever levels of data security for the iCloud. The services, called iMessage Contact Key Verification, Security Keys for Apple ID and Advanced Data Protection for iCloud, will be available for users to choose from. Apple is committed to providing users with the best data security in the world, said Craig Federighi, the company's senior VP of software engineering.
• dsign 4y ago
  iCloud was convenient and I was even paying for it, but when the "we will scan your photos and snitch on you" debacle I started backing up my photos at home and removed all my spreadsheets from iCloud (who knows what crappy software can interpret as CSAM). This will go a long way into restoring my trust on Apple. Yet, I can't help but notice that the "we will scan your photos and snitch on you" workflow they published then is still compatible with enhanced iCloud security. Hell, they can always send a command to the photo's app in your phone to upload all your photos straight to FBI's servers. So in this case technology is like 50% of the trust, the other 50% is sheer commitment to customers and that was tainted by that episode.
  • squeegee_scream 4y ago
    > In a second victory for privacy advocates, Apple said it was dropping a plan to scan user photos for child sex abuse images. The company had paused that plan shortly after its announcement last year, as security experts argued that it would intrude on user’s device privacy and be subject to abuse. https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/12/07/icloud-apple-encryption/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/12/07/icloud-...
  • infotogivenm 4y ago
    Sorry mate but you have no idea how anything works. Literally every photo hosting service on the internet will scan your photos against an abuse list and work with LE - otherwise they get to become the “cp-friendly” hoster. When apple released client-side scanning (which only ever applies to photos uploaded to iCloud Photos) the only thing that changed was now the scanning takes place on your device where you have transparency and ability to see what hashes are checked. The folks paying attention knew what this was - Apple redesigning a workflow to make LE cool with e2e encrypted photos. You read some false outrage articles and are now somehow still upset at a company doing work that is currently in your best interest. Baffling.
    • therealmarv 4y ago
      I'm baffled how people can be so okay with letting their whole device being scanned always. I don't want it to be scanned no matter what the intention is, it's not the phone or Apple's business. Device ownership and to decide for my own what the device is doing with MY data is my liberty. If you want your device to scan your data always is maybe cool with you. But not cool with me. I've read all the technical documentation too. However who says that the mechanism is implemented like intended forever? Maybe Apple or (local) law will change and voila: Your device scan report is reported to Apple and authorities because it is anyway already in place on your device.
• kitsunesoba 4y ago
  Excellent, I’ll be adding hardware keys right away. Their existing iCloud-connected-device 2FA is better than SMS but it’s always bugged me that I wasn’t able to use a hardware key. Now if we could just get banks on board… they’re probably the single biggest glaring hole in non-SMS 2FA. To my knowledge there’s only 2-3 US banks that even support TOTP, let alone hardware keys, which is insane given how important they are.
  • Melatonic 4y ago
    Yea super annoying - this is the one thing stopping me from getting a Yubikey. Whats the point if I cannot use it on the stuff I really want to use it for?
    • moonmaroon 4y ago
      While I agree it would be great if more sites like banks supported hardware keys, your reply reminds me of the saying "Don't let perfect be the enemy of good". There's plenty of services you can use a Yubikey with right now.
  • AlexandrB 4y ago
    AFAIK no Canadian banks even support TOTP - it's all SMS (or in one case a bank "app" that does TOTP, but frequently logs you out so you have to use SMS anyways). Maybe they'll catch up in a decade or so.
• knaik94 4y ago
  I wonder if they will push for client side scanning for CSAM material again, since photos are covered under end to end encryption based on this announcement. As a consumer, it feels like two different teams with two different ideas of what kind of consumer privacy should be protected are trying to guide Apple in opposite directions. Apple, the client side scan pushing and ad platform expanding company is now the same company that is releasing strengthened cloud data protection. Deduplication becomes impossible at any sort of scale and for safety Apple even turns off web access to iCloud when E2E cloud protection is turned on for the first time. Apple has stated it will cache thumbnails using standard protections when sharing files, using "anyone with a link" will expose the unencrypted data to Apple servers. I wonder if CSAM scanning can take place for those files only.
  • Shank 4y ago
    According to The Washington Post [0], "In a second victory for privacy advocates, Apple said it was dropping a plan to scan user photos for child sex abuse images. The company had paused that plan shortly after its announcement last year, as security experts argued that it would intrude on user’s device privacy and be subject to abuse." [0]: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/12/07/icloud-apple-encryption/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2022/12/07/icloud-...
    • knaik94 4y ago
      Thank you for the link, I had not come across that news. It seems like Apple is still scanning photos when NSFW photos are sent to phones belonging to minors. "When receiving this type of content, the photo will be blurred and the child will be warned, presented with helpful resources, and reassured it is okay if they do not want to view this photo. Similar protections are available if a child attempts to send photos that contain nudity. In both cases, children are given the option to message someone they trust for help if they choose. Messages analyzes image attachments and determines if a photo contains nudity, while maintaining the end-to-end encryption of the messages. The feature is designed so that no indication of the detection of nudity ever leaves the device. Apple does not get access to the messages, and no notifications are sent to the parent or anyone else." https://www.apple.com/child-safety/ https://www.apple.com/child-safety/
• ir77 4y ago
  this announcement is huge in multiple ways: 1) they just ate every other 3rd party "secure" backup services lunch just like they did to the Hi-Res music industry. 2) details of what they backup securely, besides photos (which is top priority for me): iCloud Drive: Includes Pages, Keynote, and Numbers documents, PDFs, Safari downloads, or any other files manually or automatically saved to iCloud Drive. 3)BUT, perhaps the BIGGEST news here is that Apple is making a backup statement to what they've been saying for years and what they've recently gotten negative attention on: They don't want your data. They're not Goodle/FB/Amazon. They're giving you 2TB+ of space and you can encrypt it to the point that you'll lose your data and they don't care -- they don't want to mine your data, they don't want to know what you store on there, the don't care to scan your pictures with AI 20 different ways, they don't want to monetize it, etc, etc., just pay them money for their service and transactionally they give you only thing that you want in return -- reliable, secure, private service. seriously, anyone at this point advocating for any other phone/os/service out there besides apple is really going out of their way to swim up river.
  • account-5 4y ago
    > seriously, anyone at this point advocating for any other phone/os/service out there besides apple is really going out of their way to swim up river. Count me in amongst the salmon then.
  • gigel82 4y ago
    It's good to be passionate, but blind devotion is dangerous, especially since we already know by now Apple is positioning itself to become a major player in the advertising space and - with a dwindling economy and an increased pressure to sustained growth from shareholders - that's going to continuously encroach on our privacy guarantees for monetization purposes. I'm advocating for an open and interoperable ecosystem of operating systems, services and applications, which is the only way to ensure sustainable customer freedom. Unfortunately that ecosystem doesn't exist yet so we're stuck with the duopoly of evil-doers (and while Google openly admits it is their business model to monetize you and your data, Apple has been caught with their hands in the cookie jar a bunch of times already and they're just developing a sweet tooth, so...). Full disclosure: I've been using only iPhones for 12 years and am still using one today.
• InTheArena 4y ago
  Great stuff. The question I have is what is Apple's position on scanning for contact on phones themselves? In the past they hinted that they would not enable e2e encryption unless that was in place.
• amatecha 4y ago
  A more thorough (or less PR-ish) explanation of the Advanced Data Protection and how it works can be found here: https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/security/sec973254c5f/web https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/security/sec973254c5f/...
  • dang 4y ago
    Ok, we've changed the URL to that from https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-s.... Thanks! (more at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33899699 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=33899699)
• novok 4y ago
  Now will they offer icloud tiers over 2tb next, like google does? Will icloud be actually usable for 3rd party apps outside of ios without constant reauth?
  • CharlesW 4y ago
    FWIW, there's a "product packaging hack"¹ that gives you 4TB if you pay for both Apple One Premium and iCloud+ at total cost of $40/mo. It's not a great value, but it's possible. I'd bet on them adding a 4TB plan in 2023. ¹ https://mashable.com/article/apple-icloud-plus-plans#:~:text=By%20signing%20up%20for,4%20times%20the%20price https://mashable.com/article/apple-icloud-plus-plans#:~:text....
    • novok 4y ago
      All I want is a roadmap to ever increasing tiers of storage, like google, so I know if I need to, I don't need to do a big migration once my life history gets too big. Good to know about the hack.
• deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
• explodingwaffle 4y ago
  Encrypted iCloud! Never thought I’d see the day- figured intelligence agencies wouldn’t be a big fan- I guess it’s only optional though. Still won’t be using iCloud on my iPhone, but I could at least consider it.
• Veserv 4y ago
  Okay, so when is Apple going to certify against any standards[1][2] higher than "Applies when you require confidence in a product's correct operation, but do not view threats as serious."[3] with a security standard, AVA_VAN.1, whose objective is: "A vulnerability survey of information available in the public domain is performed by the evaluator to ascertain potential vulnerabilities that may be easily found by an attacker. ... Penetration testing is performed by the valuator assuming an attack potential of Basic." [4][5]. On page 25 of [1], we can see the security auditing done as part of their only official security certification for the iOS was: "The evaluators searched for publicly known vulnerabilities applicable to iOS using the following sources... The search was performed on multiple occasions between... using the following search terms... The valuator's CVE search found no vulnerabilities apart from the ones listed in the developer's security content disclosure statements, all of which have been fixed in subsequent releases on iOS. The validators reviewed the work of the valuation team, and found that sufficient evidence and justification was provided by the valuation team to confirm that the evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of ..." tl;dr The evaluation process is that they do a web search of key words, check that all the publicly disclosed vulnerabilities have been patched, then call it a day. To put that into perspective, their are certifying against AVA_VAN.1. It is only at AVA_VAN.2 that the evaluator is required to do any independent vulnerability analysis as seen in [5] Page 155 AVA_VAN.2.3E (bold is changes from the previous level). At AVA_VAN.3 you need to evaluate against "Enhanced-Basic" attack potential. It is only at AVA_VAN.4 that you need to evaluate against attackers with a "Moderate" attack potential. At AVA_VAN.5 (the highest level) you need to evaluate against attackers with a "High" attack potential. Apple's only security certification, which in their own words "provide a measure of confidence—that is, security assurance—that the security needs of a system are being satisfied" and are "used by many organizations as a basis for performing security evaluations of IT product" is wholly three levels below "Moderate" and is effectively self-graded. Until they actually certify against a standard requiring moderate security, it is only prudent to take them at their word and assume that their products are only fit for systems that "do not view threats as serious". If they want their security to be taken more seriously they should prove it against internationally recognized standards assessed by independent third parties rather than issuing unsupported marketing fluff. [1] https://support.apple.com/guide/certifications/ios-security-certifications-apc3fa917cb49/1/web/1.0 https://support.apple.com/guide/certifications/ios-security-... [2] https://support.apple.com/library/APPLE/APPLECARE_ALLGEOS/CERTS/st_vid11146-vr.pdf https://support.apple.com/library/APPLE/APPLECARE_ALLGEOS/CE... [3] https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/best-practices/requirements-engineering/the-common-criteria https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/bsi/articles/best-practices/requ... EAL1: Functionally Tested [4] https://commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp_md_v3.1.pdf https://commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ppfiles/pp_md_v3.1.pd... Page 136 Section 5.2.6 AVA_VAN.1 [5] https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CC2022PART3R1.pdf https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CC2022PAR... Page 154 Section 14.3.3
• Andrew_nenakhov 4y ago
  One must understand that E2EE is used when you don't trust your service provider to handle your data. In other words, the adversary in your threat model is the service provider - and in this case, Apple. And what good is that encryption, if Apple obviously can do almost anything with your device? They can remotely wipe apps. They can force-install apps and force updates. It is not too far-fetched to think that they can just remotely copy anything stored on your device to their servers. So, with an adversary that capable, I'm not sure encrypted backups provide a meaningful improvement to security and privacy.
  • voxic11 4y ago
    I think it mostly matters in the context of US case law, specifically the third party doctrine. > The third-party doctrine is a United States legal doctrine that holds that people who voluntarily give information to third parties—such as banks, phone companies, internet service providers (ISPs), and e-mail servers—have "no reasonable expectation of privacy" in that information. A lack of privacy protection allows the United States government to obtain information from third parties without a legal warrant and without otherwise complying with the Fourth Amendment prohibition against search and seizure without probable cause and a judicial search warrant. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-party_doctrine https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third-party_doctrine
  • supertrope 4y ago
    In theory it adds a speed bump. Apple as the cloud service provider can respond to the legal order by saying they don't have the key. And then the police can ask for a booby trapped update for just your phone which may or may not happen. Or they can lobby the legislature for an encryption backdoor for all devices which will force them to show their hand in terms of "lawful intercept" capability. If you want maximum security use an air gapped computer. But that won't let you send messages on the go.
    • Andrew_nenakhov 4y ago
      If you want maximum security then just obviously don't use Apple services, or any other provider that has a capability to fetch your data under any circumstances.
• lxgr 4y ago
  This is a great step, but I really hope Apple also change their position on no longer allowing users to provide a high-entropy passphrase to unlock all of this end-to-end encrypted data. As it is, my iPhone unlock PIN is everything that's needed to decrypt the data server-side [1], and I'm not changing to an alphanumeric password on my phone only because of that. [1] https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204915 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204915 ("You might also be asked to enter the passcode of one of your devices to access any end-to-end encrypted content stored in iCloud.")
  • Analemma_ 4y ago
    This comment is baffling. You say you want Apple to allow the option of a high-entropy passphrase, which they do, but you refuse to use it?
    • lxgr 4y ago
      I want to use a low-entropy PIN on my phone, because I enter it dozens of times per day, shoulder-surfing is a concern as big as hacking in many scenarios, and because I trust Apple's hardware to be capable of efficiently limiting local PIN attempts and wiping high-entropy keys if required. At the same time, I log in to new iOS devices with my Apple ID about once per year. I would love to be able to use a high-entropy key in that scenario. (As a point of reference, WhatsApp allows exactly that for encrypted backups!) If that's still baffling to you, I'm glad I could introduce you to a very different viewpoint :)
      • yunwal 4y ago
        You can use a high entropy passcode for iCloud. You just can’t stay signed in when you’re not using it. I don’t understand the issue here
        • Dylan16807 4y ago
          They want to use it to get signed in but not to stay signed in. It makes sense to me.
• deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
• tsunamifury 4y ago
  • jackson1442 4y ago
    Do you have a source for the iMessage story? Surprised I haven’t heard about it before.
    • Erikun 4y ago
      I would guess its this story https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/us/politics/justice-department-leaks-trump-administration.html https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/10/us/politics/justice-depar... But that doesn't match OP's description very well. It was a grand jury subpoena and only for metadata. "As the Justice Department investigated who was behind leaks of classified information early in the Trump administration, it took a highly unusual step: Prosecutors subpoenaed Apple for data from the accounts of at least two Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee, aides and family members. One was a minor." "Apple turned over only metadata and account information, not photos, emails or other content, according to the person familiar with the inquiry."
      • tsunamifury 4y ago
        So they turned over the conversations but not emails. How does that not match? Meta data is widely used political a euphemism for this.
        • Erikun 4y ago
          I'm not sure what you mean by conversations, if you mean the content of messages then no that is not metadata, if you mean who talked to whom, then yes that is metadata.
• YokoSix 4y ago
  “Dates and times when a file or object was modified are used to sort a user’s information, and checksums of file and photo data are used to help Apple de-duplicate and optimize the user’s iCloud and device storage—all without having access to the files and photos themselves.” https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-protection-for-icloud-sec973254c5f/web https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-prote... So Apple only encrypts the files but not the metadata? If that's true the encryption is basically worthless because Apple is still able to "see" what files you upload and scan them for CSAM, copyright infringement or videos of 1989 Tiananmen Square.
• joshstrange 4y ago
  The number of people in the comments complaining or finding new places to move the goalposts to is astounding. > what good is that encryption, if Apple obviously can do almost anything with your device? > They can still simply push a software update that sends the victim's keys to the mothership and/or simply decrypts everything > This all just seems like pandering while they continue to accept billions from Google in exchange for their user's privacy. > Couldn’t they simply use an encryption algorithm that has two private keys and they control one? Apple could say they are going to cease operations tomorrow, close down the company, and people would comment "Yeah but they could always create a new company". I guess for those people nothing is ever enough. This is a huge step forward (specifically iCloud E2EE) that I'm super excited about and people are busy coming up with threat models that 99% of us have zero use for and pretending as if this doesn't matter. It's disappointing.
  • smoldesu 4y ago
    > It's disappointing. What's disappointing is that Apple has zero accountability for any of these services. Nobody would be so critical of iCloud if it wasn't your only sync option on iPhone, but they force everything to go through them. Apple says 'trust us ;)' and gives the user no way to confirm that they're not decrypting your data as soon as it hits their servers. The argument is the same as it's ever been. Apple took away too much of the user's control; if the iPhone were a more open platform, nobody would be squabbling over our only sync option. Edit: Background Sync has apparently been available as an API since iOS 13, but that doesn't change Apple's lack of accountability wrt security practices.
    • julkali 4y ago
      FWIW, you can sync files with Nextcloud on IOS and it works fine. Also automatically syncs photos which makes it a viable alternative for cloud storage on iPhone. What it doesn't sync are things like settings, though.
      • teekert 4y ago
        Did your photo's also recently got synced to JPEG (by NC), whereas at first the heic's were uploaded? Heic works poorly in browser on other platform so JPEG is ok, would prefer heic to work everywhere though...
• layer8 4y ago
  Unfortunately, it seems that this requires all connected devices to be on the latest OS versions (iOS 16.2, macOS 13.1, etc.), which means you can’t use it as long as you have older devices connected to your Apple ID. It also doesn’t work for Shared Albums, and for other “Shared” features it requires all participants to have ADP enabled.
  • 0897655432 4y ago
  • ezfe 4y ago
    It's not particularly surprising that all your devices need to be updated, how else would it work? The whole point of E2E is that the ends are your devices.
    • layer8 4y ago
      Right, but it may be unexpected that a single device can prevent using a new feature on your other devices. This is just a heads up. And conceivably Apple could provide updates for older OS versions, as they sometimes do for security fixes.
      • acdha 4y ago
        This has been the case for other iCloud features and they've historically done a good job communicating this to the user at the time they upgrade the service and when they attempt to access it from an old device. I would expect that to follow the same process here either refusing to enable it until your devices are updated or having the old device kicked out until it's updated.
        • layer8 4y ago
          Yes, they are refusing to enable it if you have older devices signed in to your Apple ID.
  • yreg 4y ago
• jdiez17 4y ago
  To be honest, end to end encrypted cloud backups and the upcoming forced-by-EU opening of the platform to third party developers without going through the App Store are the two killer features I was hoping to see on iOS.
• WhackyIdeas 4y ago
  This reminds me of a hacker exploiting a victim’s system, patching the vulnerability and installing a keylogger. Yeah it’s nice you are taking the security seriously so others can’t get in easily, but you (Apple) are still siphoning off my data for profit after I spent an arm and a leg on your equipment… It just feel like protecting your investment more than my data security.
• accrual 4y ago
  The physical security key is interesting as it shows a lightning port in the image. Maybe a sign that a portless iPhone isn't necessarily in the immediate future? I also wonder if there's another copy of the image showing a USB-C port, since it's assumed the iPhone 15 will be USB-C to comply with the EU's standard port requirements.
  • smith7018 4y ago
    Yeah, Apple is a ways away from the rumored portless iPhone. I think a prime example of their stalled efforts is the iPhone's Magsafe charging speed. It's remained at 15w since 2020 whereas Lightning can charge at roughly 30W. Apple's not going to remove the Lightning port, force people to buy new charging pucks, and then tell them their device won't charge as fast. Conversely, switching to USB-C means they can use USB PD to boost charging to around 45W.
  • fmajid 4y ago
    The Yubikey 5C NFC is a U2F key that works over NFC, no Lightning port required (although they also make a USB-C + Lightning key)
  • dang 4y ago
    This comment was posted when the linked URL was https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-s..., which contains the physical security key announcement as well as the E2EE stuff. If there's a better URL for the security key announcement, we can factor this topic into its own thread, since it's a minority topic in this one and mostly getting overlooked.
• modeless 4y ago
  I have often criticized Apple for marketing iMessage as end-to-end encrypted while the vast majority of encryption keys still reside on their servers and are routinely used to decrypt messages for law enforcement on demand. This is a long overdue step forward. However, for most people their messages will still not be end-to-end encrypted because their contacts will mostly not have this optional feature enabled. To be truly effective, this feature would have to ensure that Apple does not strip the end-to-end encryption from your messages when they are sent to other people using iMessage. In my opinion it is still fraudulent to market iMessage as an end-to-end encrypted system until this is fixed.
  • xoa 4y ago
    >However, for most people their messages will still not be end-to-end encrypted because their contacts will mostly not have this optional feature enabled. To be truly effective, this feature would have to ensure that Apple does not strip the end-to-end encryption from your messages when they are sent to other people using iMessage. In my opinion it is still fraudulent to market iMessage as an end-to-end encrypted system until this is fixed. I think your opinion is mistaken in conflating separate problem spaces/threat models. E2EE deals exclusively with the transit and reading of data between trusted ends, that's the point. It deals with the threat posed by middle observers. What happens to the data after it reaches and gets stored on one end or the other is out of scope. Certainly important, but still has nothing to do with whether something is E2EE. Communications between people necessarily means no one person is fully in charge. The person on the other side could perfectly well have their PIN be "1234", that wouldn't suddenly mean Signal/iMessage/SSH/whatever are no longer E2EE. This is definitely an unambiguously significant improvement, and it will help more people stay secure more easily while still making use of wireless services (vs backing up with a cable to a system like I have always done and still do with iOS devices). However, while technology is helpful it's not a total substitute for opsec either. And I think it's a mistake to mush together different domains. iMessage going full E2EE was a good all by itself and its own specific thing, even if Apple was wrong to not deploy the same thing everywhere and also wrong (and still wrong!) not to allow 3rd party options for backups. There was nothing fraudulent about saying it was E2EE.
• gonehome 4y ago
  It seemed clear they were making moves in this direction back when their announcement about on device hash checking for CSAM prior to iCloud photos backup was made. That announcement only made sense in a world where they wanted to enable end to end encryption for photos. It's cool to see them do this, and see them also extend it to Messages too (surprising imo). -- > The apple policy was likely about coming up with a way to enable encrypted photos on iCloud while still having some privacy preserving form of CSAM detection. Since it was only enabled when iCloud photos was enabled it was better for privacy on net than the status quo (unencrypted iCloud photos that are accessible to apple and scanned anyway). https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30297272 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30297272
  • gonehome 4y ago
    Looks like they dropped the plans for the hash check anyway: https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-communication-safety-messages/ https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-commun...
• Despegar 4y ago
  This was the point of their plan to introduce CSAM detection on-device. Unfortunately the reaction to that was histrionic and couldn't see the writing on the wall. Governments will eventually pass legislation targeting E2E and CSAM was the one issue where Apple's method would have defanged support for that kind of law. But one good thing about making those plans public is that any proposed legislation will likely land on Apple's method as being a good compromise. Better for Apple to wait until they're forced by governments to do it.
  • commoner 4y ago
    It's a good thing that the "histrionic" privacy advocates succcessfully pressured Apple to back down from introducing a vulnerability in the product before releasing this feature.
    • Despegar 4y ago
      It was definitely a win in a narrow and politically naïve sense.
  • brookst 4y ago
    Yep. Their CSAM implementation guaranteed that E2EE for photos was coming. I thought the death of that CSAM approach meant they just wouldn't ship E2EE photos. I guess you're right, they know governments will mandate it and they at least have an approach that's compatible with E2EE.
  • dmix 4y ago
    I'd rather fight that battle when it comes rather than compromise early on and trust they won't be back next week with a new policy move.
• zhrvoj 4y ago
  If there is a need for new security measures...new security recommendations - Chrome is bugging me, every day, not very different from Apple. What a world is that? So then, someone is working against my security every day! Looks like a war my friends...
• lostmsu 4y ago
  Isn't Android backup end-to-end encrypted since 2018 or something? Why are so many people commenting like something revolutionary is happening?
  • brookst 4y ago
    Sometimes news is about market developments, not technical innovation. Android backups are E2EE but I don't think Google photos is. Photos aren't included in the phone backup, I think. Would welcome correction if that's wrong.
  • DrBenCarson 4y ago
    This is more than just the backup, this is all user data--files, photos, etc. Google Drive and Photos are not E2EE
    • three_seagrass 4y ago
      Except for metadata and file hashing - iCloud is still using those on files and photos.
    • koyote 4y ago
      Google Drive does have E2EE (https://support.google.com/docs/answer/10519333 https://support.google.com/docs/answer/10519333) but it might (?) require a corporate account. It severely affects collaboration and sharing which is probably why it's a bit of a niche feature.
• dopu 4y ago
  It is becoming increasingly difficult to not just recommend an iPhone to the average person with privacy/security concerns. Sure, you can tell them to go the GrapheneOS route, but I don't think you can trust the average user not to just go and install Google Maps/Google Photos/etc as soon as the alternative FOSS option inconveniences them. I've certainly struggled with this. Then they're arguably worse off than if they'd just stuck with the Apple equivalents.
  • therealmarv 4y ago
    The marketing is strong with Apple.
    • hackmiester 4y ago
      Also the products, though.
    • DrBenCarson 4y ago
      If by marketing you mean product development and putting their money where their mouth is, yeah, it's pretty strong. There isn't another mainstream product that offers that.
      • therealmarv 4y ago
        People seem to forget fast (this is only 2 weeks ago) https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-privacy-dsid-analytics-personal-data-test-1849807619 https://gizmodo.com/apple-iphone-privacy-dsid-analytics-pers...
        • faet 4y ago
          This was tied to an action in the App Store. Not sure how you purchase apps without tying it to your Apple ID. It is also laid out in the ToS "We use information about your browsing, purchases, searches, and downloads. These records are stored with IP address, a random unique identifier (where that arises), and Apple ID" No one (or even the author) has been able to replicate it or find the Apple ID in any other logs calls.
• counttheforks 4y ago
  Great, now let me run my own web browser instead of a safari webview.
• lapcat 4y ago
  > Some metadata and usage information stored in iCloud remains under standard data protection, even when Advanced Data Protection is enabled. For example, dates and times when a file or object was modified are used to sort your information, and checksums of file and photo data are used to help Apple de-duplicate and optimize your iCloud and device storage — all without having access to the files and photos themselves. > • iCloud Drive The raw byte checksums of the file content and the file name > • Photos The raw byte checksum of the photo or video https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303 https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202303
  • rollulus 4y ago
    That means that you’re not safe to store known files your local dictator doesn’t like, isn’t it? Wouldn’t a sort of per-user salt allow the same functionality and give more confidentially?
    • AdamJacobMuller 4y ago
      It wouldn't allow them to deduplicate across users, which they are likely doing. When you send your group iMessage of 30 people the same photo, apple is not storing 30 copies of it, but, one.
      • madeofpalk 4y ago
        Is that actually true? My understanding of how E2E encrypted iMessage works is that in group chats it does indeed send 30 copies of your messages, individual encrypted for each recipient in the group. https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec70e68c949/web https://support.apple.com/en-gb/guide/security/sec70e68c949/... > For group conversations, this process is repeated for each recipient and their devices.
        • judge2020 4y ago
          Perhaps they're doing multi-recipient encryption, ie. the data is wrapped with one key, and that private key is then encrypted with the public key of each recipient, so everyone ends up using the same private key to decrypt the file data itself. This means the actual file data isn't sent 20+ times (although the data is indeed stored in everyone's Messages backups separately; if Apple is doing de-dupe based on file data+filename, they're probably benefiting from deduping group message images).
• lizardactivist 4y ago
  "E2EE" is probably more like it. I have no doubts there will be a data, picture, movie or some-such leak eventually that proves that the encryption keys were in the hands of Apple all along.
• dang 4y ago
  We changed the URL from https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-s... to the link that several users pointed out has the meatier details. A small number of comments here are not about E2EE backups but rather the security key announcement. If there's a more detailed URL for that part of the story, we can factor it into its own thread.
  • sidcool 4y ago
    Thanks Dang.
• tiffanyh 4y ago
  > Starting with iOS 16.2, iPadOS 16.2 and macOS 13.1, you can choose to enable Advanced Data Protection to protect the vast majority of your iCloud data, even in the case of a data breach in the cloud. Interesting, so this is an opt-in (not default secure).
  • deleted 4y ago
    [deleted]
  • theshrike79 4y ago
    For now, they'll make it opt-out when a large enough user base is at those OS versions.
    • deleted 4y ago
      [deleted]
    • tiffanyh 4y ago
      I don't understand. This is an opt-in, not opt-out.
      • theshrike79 4y ago
        It's currently opt-in, because a significant percentage of the user base is not running an OS version that can support the E2EE features. When that percentage is high enough (a few years), I don't see why Apple wouldn't make it opt-out. (Default it to encrypted, you need to specifically disable it if you don't want it).
        • tiffanyh 4y ago
          Wouldn't the easier option just be to make it actually enabled for all devices that can support it. Why does what % of the user base who's running the support OS versions make any difference?
          • netheril96 4y ago
• volleygman180 4y ago
  I honestly never thought this day would come - THANK YOU APPLE!!
• Arubis 4y ago
  And, just like that, I can finally turn on iCloud backups on all my devices.
• upofadown 4y ago
  >Conversations between users who have enabled iMessage Contact Key Verification receive automatic alerts if an exceptionally advanced adversary, such as a state-sponsored attacker, were ever to succeed breaching cloud servers and inserting their own device to eavesdrop on these encrypted communications. Generally the biggest threat that end to end encryption (E2EE) addresses is the people that actually run the servers "inserting their own device to eavesdrop". So Apple in this instance. We would normally have to assume that Apple would do this on a request from state level entities as part of the threat model. Apple has to provide some sort of E2EE identity verification if they want to claim that they are providing E2EE messaging. I note that they have been making such a claim for some time now. After this, all that will remain is the issue of control of the software. We will still have to trust Apple to not subvert the clients in some way. So nothing has substantially changed yet. From the little we know about the usability of this new feature I note that the warning about new/changed devices is in small grey text. So very easy to overlook. hopefully Apple will provide enough context to allow the user to do something meaningful in response to such a warning.
• pradn 4y ago
  They word their announcement carefully. > For users who opt in, Advanced Data Protection keeps most iCloud data protected even in the case of a data breach in the cloud. Here, "cloud" is treated generically - as if Apple doesn't have to do with it. I suppose they don't want to spell it out. A more honest, but still easy-to-understand statement would be: > For users who opt in, Advanced Data Protection keeps most iCloud data protected even in if someone hacks Apple's iCloud servers.
  • boringg 4y ago
    I don't think that's them being dishonest. I'm pretty sure the way I read the first sentence and your re-write is the same thing. I guess the only difference is maybe the layman might not gather that. That said the layman probably isn't going to care about end to end encryption either. Nice to hold the corporates accountable but I don't find this to be slimy or anything - maybe just me though.
• AtNightWeCode 4y ago
  Great! This is not the common attack vector for data in iCloud though.
  • Sirened 4y ago
    What is the common vector? Who is the common adversary even? I suspect governments compromise more accounts with warrants than hackers ever do with stolen creds
• AlexandrB 4y ago
  It's interesting that this announcement was being predicted after Apple unveiled their on-device CSAM scanning feature. Perhaps this was indeed the plan all along, but they lost control of the narrative. Whatever did happen to the on-device CSAM scanning? Is it still coming to iOS?
  • loaph 4y ago
    According to https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2022/12/apple-adds-end-to-end-encryption-to-icloud-device-backups-and-more/ https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2022/12/apple-adds-end-to-en... the CSAM scanning plans have been abandoned.
    • AlexandrB 4y ago
      Another interesting tidbit from that article: > First, iCloud users may now take advantage of hardware security keys like YubiKeys. Both NFC keys and plug-in keys are supported. This is great news! I wonder if this is able to replace Apple's bespoke 2FA system or it's strictly in addition to that. Edit: From Apple's announcement: > Now with Security Keys, users will have the choice to make use of third-party hardware security keys to enhance this protection. This feature is designed for users who, often due to their public profile, face concerted threats to their online accounts, such as celebrities, journalists, and members of government. For users who opt in, Security Keys strengthens Apple’s two-factor authentication by requiring a hardware security key as one of the two factors. If I read that right, it sounds like it's in addition to Apple's 2FA? I'd love to replace Apple's weird 2FA mechanisms, but this is still nice.
      • drak0n1c 4y ago
        Here’s more info directly from Apple on their hardware key plans: https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-security-with-powerful-new-data-protections/ https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-advances-user-s...
    • sneak 4y ago
      Nothing Apple has ever said has indicated that they reversed position on their announced plan to roll out clientside scanning. Read the Apple statements carefully. On macOS photoanalysisd phones home even when not using iCloud at all, fwiw. Who knows what it is doing?
• insane_dreamer 4y ago
  Fun anectdote. Many years ago, I had all my photos and other personal documents encrypted in a PGP Disk on a RW-DVD, and did not store the password in any digital form, because that was the most secure thing to do. Some time later I forgot the password, could not find where I had written it down, and to this day have never recovered them. (Don't have a DVD reader anymore either, though I could still get one of those.) Lesson: don't forget your encryption key.
  • pjot 4y ago
    My freshman year of high school we had a project where we created a “Time Machine” for us to open when we graduated. Everything was stored on a floppy disk. Finding a working 3.5A: drive has been quite difficult…
    • deleted 4y ago
      [deleted]
    • mariojv 4y ago
      Apparently they are still manufactured: https://www.amazon.com/External-Floppy-Portable-Windows-Required/dp/B00RXEWOAA https://www.amazon.com/External-Floppy-Portable-Windows-Requ...
      • insane_dreamer 4y ago
        I remember reading something recently about there only being one small biz making floppies remaining.
• 404mm 4y ago
  Anyone else noticed that they mentioned MacOS for iCloud backups? As of now, there is no backing up your Mac to iCloud. There is iCloud Drive and all the individual services but TimeMachine is local storage only (shared drive or the legacy TimeCapsule). Does this mean we’re finally getting TM backups to cloud?
  • jxdxbx 4y ago
    Somehow I don't think Apple will like backing up my 16 TB media drive the same way that Backblaze does.
• fitblipper 4y ago
  "Some metadata and usage information stored in iCloud remains under standard data protection, even when Advanced Data Protection is enabled. For example, dates and times when a file or object was modified are used to sort your information, and checksums of file and photo data are used to help Apple de-duplicate and optimize your iCloud and device storage..." Photo checksums can't be e2e encrypted huh? They reported today they abandoned their plans to do CSAM scanning on people's devices[1] and connecting the dots it seems like they wont need to since they can just do it in the cloud. [1] https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-communication-safety-messages/ https://www.wired.com/story/apple-photo-scanning-csam-commun...
  • Spivak 4y ago
    "People rioted when we scanned for CSAM in a privacy-preserving manner but don't give a shit when we do the same thing when it's not privacy preserving so I guess just do that."
    • noduerme 4y ago
      This looks like a win for the people who rioted ... what part of the new E2EE without file scanning is not privacy-preserving?
      • trompetenaccoun 4y ago
        How is this a win? Either is bad, who wants them to keep a database of their image hashes? In some ways this is arguably even worse. If they keep this data online leaks and/or third party access are almost guaranteed. At the very least by authorities with a perma warrant looking for "CP" or "terrorist" material.
        • barsonme 4y ago
          > At the very least by authorities with a perma warrant looking for "CP" or "terrorist" material. I mean, unlike perceptive hashing, cryptographic hashes do not lie.
• vengefulduck 4y ago
  Looking into the details it seems like they're using Convergent Encryption [1][2] in order to enable deduplication in iCloud drive and photos. Which would imply it is possible for an attacker to determine if your account is storing a file for which they know the plaintext. It's still a lot better than the status quo but that's a pretty big asterisk in my mind. [1]https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/security/sec973254c5f/web#:~:text=convergent%20encryption https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/security/sec973254c5f/... [2] https://smarx.com/posts/2020/09/convergent-encryption-and-why-no-one-uses-it/ https://smarx.com/posts/2020/09/convergent-encryption-and-wh...
• steelframe 4y ago
  Just as they did for CSAM scanning, they will push any code that mines your data for the purposes of targeted advertising down into the phone itself.
  • yreg 4y ago
    CSAM scanning on device never happened. The plan was abandoned.
    • neop1x 4y ago
      Proof? Their keynote or their press release?
      • yreg 4y ago
        Burden of proof lies with the one who claims something happened. Not with the one who says it doesn't exist.
    • steelframe 4y ago
      > CSAM scanning on device never happened. The plan was abandoned. Barely, and only after massive backlash. The code was actually pushed to everyones' phones, and Apple's last-minute decision to disclose its existence before turning it on is the only thing that stopped it. Maybe the "lesson" Apple learned was to not disclose that sort of thing. Apple abandoned CSAM scanning on phones because people were vociferously against Apple reporting them to the government when an image on the citizen's phone matched something in the government's own "bad images" database. Whether the scanning was on the phone or in the Cloud was largely immaterial to most people. Some of the more hardcore privacy advocates weren't happy with the on-device scanning, but that wasn't really the thing the majority of people didn't like. What we learned from all that is that Apple can and will push whatever suits their agenda down onto the phones themselves. If the majority of users are acclimated to being tracked and profiled for the purpose of targeted ads, we won't hear the same outrage that we did for CSAM. Especially if Apple decides we simply don't need to be informed about it.
• BiteCode_dev 4y ago
  I hope this is true, but since their entire stack is proprietary, we have no way to know if there is not a backdoor to get the key from you. Since Apple was part of the PRISM program, I'm going to assume there is at least one for the 3 letters agency, which mean it's available for Apple, who designed it, as well. But it does mean that they can mass scan easily the data, and have to target people personnally, which is already a huge improvement, and cover most people threat model.
• yyyk 4y ago
  I didn't expect Apple to actually do this. Kudos. During the client-side scanning debacle I noted they'd have to implement server-side scanning anyway, so they might as well abandon client-side scanning. The wording still allows for server-side scanning ("raw byte checksum" is vague enough be a image hash or merely a CRC-32; I strongly suspect it's the former) - and I'm perfectly fine with Apple choosing this. Their server their rules. It's also the better technical choice IMHO.
  • yamtaddle 4y ago
    > ("raw byte checksum" is vague enough be a image hash or merely a CRC-32; I strongly suspect it's the former) 1) The image fingerprinting they were talking about before is really different from a "raw byte checksum", since it could recognize photos that had been resized or cropped. 2) AFAIK the plan was always to generate the fingerprint on the device, but to check it server-side, possibly as a pre-flight check before sending the actual file. The thing that upset people was the device generating a too-good fingerprint [EDIT: To be fair, people were also concerned Apple would expand the fingerprint-generating-and-uploading to photos that weren't bound for iCloud—the concern would have been pretty silly otherwise, since of course unencrypted photos sent to iCloud are CSAM-scanned, same as everywhere else). Pretty sure they were gonna keep the naughty-list server-side all along. So, if this is the same thing (I doubt it, see #1) then checking the fingerprints(/hashes) server-side isn't a change in plans.
    • yyyk 4y ago
      1) I'm aware of the difference. However, I think the Apple phrase is sufficiently ambiguous to legally cover an image hash as well. An image hash is technically a checksum and is made of raw bytes that cannot be converted back to the image. If Apple is indeed using an image hash, I don't have a problem with this - it's their servers. 2) The fingerprint check was supposed to be done client-side based on a server supplied list so that Apple would not get the image and image hash unless there was a match (I'm simplifying this, there was a rather complex procedure involved with thresholds and manual review). My main concern was that normalizing and making possible client-side scanning would lead to other things being scanned. e.g. China adding images of Winnie the Pooh to scan list, and then sending every Chinese suspect to dissident-ville in the sky. The Apple plan here was insufficient: it wanted to rely on multi-country lists, this had both legal and practical problems - e.g. China has sufficient sway with friendly countries to add its choice of images to the list.
• hilyen 4y ago
  If they're still hashing files, its not end to end. An anecdote, an activist had a document in their Google Drive. It was not something people high up wanted being distributed. It was deleted not just from their account, but platform wide. Guess how they did that? Its hash.
  • BudaDude 4y ago
    You are correct, but how could Apple solve this issue without hashing? Syncing files alone without E2E is tricky. I can't imagine a way to sync files between devices without having some sort of hash or id.
    • n3t 4y ago
      You encrypt a file first, then you calculate hash of the encrypted file.
      • juniperplant 4y ago
        That would prevent file de-duplication.
        • Obscurity4340 4y ago
          Big...deal...? That wouldn't be a "you" problem. That would be an Apple problem. If you pay for cloud service (say 100GB), Apple has no business "optimizing" or de-duplicating anyways. If you want it as an option, sure. But let's not pretend this isn't a subtle backdoor that can invalidate the entire "E2E" implementation. I believe that in the US, having the filename and/or hash/checksum is most of what is necessary to trigger the Foregone conclusion doctrine and force the person to lose their 5th amendment protection and be compelled to decrypt their data to be used against themselves. I'd like if someone with legal knowledge could comment if my understanding is correct.
  • brundolf 4y ago
    Activists could always salt their own files by adding some junk content to the end (or cropping images by one pixel, cropping video clips by a fraction of a second, etc)
• pifm_guy 4y ago
  WhatsApp recently added e2e backups (as an option) too. I always thought the reason they didn't encrypt backups was as a way to remove pressure from security services to weaken the encryption. Better to let the security services go after Google/apple as the backup provider. And have an option to turn off backups for the security paranoid users. I wonder why they changed stance...
• yarg 4y ago
  End to end? Isn't that only required if the guy on the otherside needs to decrypt?
• mark_l_watson 4y ago
  I really enjoy the automatically generated iPhoto “experiences” that include background music and photo/video effects that appear sometimes, more often after I took vacation pictures. Hopefully those can be generated on my device and I won’t have to give those up to get encryption at rest.
  • yreg 4y ago
    Those have always been generated on device (and uploaded if you use iCloud).
• NoImmatureAdHom 4y ago
  This is trash and Apple is trash. 1) They explicitly state that they're going to keep an eye on the hashes of your files, allowing them to nuke anything they don't like from orbit system-wide. They still know what you have in cases where someone else has it and they know the plaintext. They're definitely going to scan what you keep in their cloud. It will start with kiddie porn, but then it'll be that plus terrorist documents (and who decides what that is???), and then illegal music and movies, and then... 2) It's all implemented with closed-source mysteryware. Who the fuck knows what it's doing? You've got to trust their pinky-swear, and you shouldn't. It probably works as it is described until it receives the special wink from Apple's servers, and then it sends along your private keys (possibly using an exploit they put there on purpose). If it's not verifiable (open-source and reproducible builds), it's a pinky swear. 3) This is your reminder that your iMessage isn't actually E2EE, they have a lot of the keys on their own servers. These are all things they could fix, but don't. And they won't fix them because they don't actually give a damn about your privacy and security. We should all demand open-source, reproducibly-built encryption software.
• tuxone 4y ago
  > You must also update all your Apple devices to a software version that supports this feature. Didn’t want to upgrade my perfectly functioning MBP 15 2015 for Shared Photo Library alone. They found out another way to force the upgrade.
• fraXis 4y ago
  Why does Apple enable a big new feature like end to end encryption in the RC build only? We are only going to be able to test this feature one week before it’s released? I would hope a large feature like this would have had a lot more public user testing/refinement behind it than just one RC build release!
  • Gigachad 4y ago
    Because this isn't Linux. Apple has already tested it and you can be pretty certain it's going to work on day one.
    • smoldesu 4y ago
      Like their iCloud for Windows client? https://www.macrumors.com/2022/11/21/icloud-for-windows-corrupt-video-bug/ https://www.macrumors.com/2022/11/21/icloud-for-windows-corr... Incidents like these make me wish Apple's software was Linux quality...
• qwertyuiop_ 4y ago
  What about turning off Airdrop in China when the people need it most ?
• amadeuspagel 4y ago
  Android has had encrypted backups for years.
  • kccqzy 4y ago
    And in case anybody is interested in the gory technical details, Google let a third party review their implementation of encrypted backups that included visiting their data center because it used their custom Titan hardware. Fascinating read https://research.nccgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/NCC_Group_Google_EncryptedBackup_2018-10-10_v1.0.pdf https://research.nccgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/NCC...
• unshavedyak 4y ago
  Is there a way to use this for non-Apple devices? I am "in" Apple's ecosystem, but i work on Linux and play on Windows.. it would be nice to have Dropbox/storage on an E2E Backup solution i already pay for (1TB+ family plan for iPhone mainly)
  • Gigachad 4y ago
    Not sure about E2E but for standard icloud you basically only get the clunky web ui. No way last I checked to mount icloud like you can other providers.
• sneak 4y ago
  This opt-in, because of sneak's law ("users can not and will not securely manage{generate, backup, authenticate} key material")[1]. Apple knows that enabling this by default would be a disaster. This means most people will not ever even know the feature exists, and few will turn it on. This means that iMessage as a platform is still backdoored, because most people you iMessage with will be escrowing their endpoint iMessage keys to Apple in their effectively unencrypted iCloud Backups. Apple (and the FBI/DHS/CIA/NSA soup bois without a warrant) will still be able to read everyone's iMessages in real-time. Everyone wins. Spies keep spying, Apple gets to trot out the e2ee marketing flag. Meanwhile, there is nothing to indicate that they don't intend to continue the rollout of their clientside photo scanning software that they previously announced. [1]: https://youtu.be/9k4GP3Evh9c https://youtu.be/9k4GP3Evh9c
• martin_drapeau 4y ago
  Apple is extending the data privacy/security you have on your phone for images, videos, files (content) to the cloud. Bluring the lines between physical device and the cloud. This makes perfect business sense - people will want to buy extra storage. Lock-in is deeper.
• richard___ 4y ago
  But Apple must be able to still access all your encrypted data using your stored icloud password somehow right? Otherwise how are they able to show all your files in a web browser, from an arbitrary computer, after you've logged in
  • Operyl 4y ago
    You’ll lose access to that by default, with the ability to temporarily opt in according to what they’ve said.
    • richard___ 4y ago
      What does temporarily opt in mean? Like everytime you want to use icloud on a browser, you use your devices to upload the key temporarily, then after you don't want to use icloud, apple deletes your key?
      • Operyl 4y ago
        Would appear so according to their news room post.
      • judge2020 4y ago
        It hasn't been released yet, but I can see two scenarios - A. Apple could create a tunnel from your browser to your devices, they could have key exchange via the web after you scan a QR code shown on your web browser with your iPhone, with some sort of "verify these words are the same" scheme. B. Apple does the typical OTP/2fa scheme where you enter a x-digit code from your device, and in doing so your Device furnishes a key to Apple to be temporarily used to access your files from the web. But in both of these scenarios, Apple compromising you via malicious javascript is ever-present, so you're right in that you'd be trusting Apple even more to not store your temporary key for too long or at the request of a NSL.
      • jdiez17 4y ago
        > Every time a service key is uploaded, it is encrypted using an ephemeral key bound to the web session that the user authorized, and a notification is displayed on the user’s device, showing the iCloud service whose data is temporarily being made available to Apple servers.
• worldsavior 4y ago
  What's the government think about it? I remember they had problems with them before trying to enable end to end encryption.
• advael 4y ago
  Maybe this is just a matter of the buzzword doesn't precisely convey the technical implementation, but I don't want "end-to-end" encrypted backups, I want backups that are stored encrypted on the server and that only I can decrypt
  • reilly3000 4y ago
    Yep that is the plan. There is a good table in the article that shows the implementation for each service and rationale for it. Most of the iCloud services are now able to enable an optional feature where the user’s devices are the only ones that have keys.
• jdthedisciple 4y ago
  It's only for backups, that means my live files on the iCloud are still plainly available to Apple, correct?
  • froggertoaster 4y ago
    It very clearly states it's more than backups. I would advise you click the link and start reading.
  • M4v3R 4y ago
    It's not only for backup, the article literally lists all categories of data that is end-to-end encrypted: iCloud Backup, iCloud Drive, Photos, Notes, Reminders, Safari Bookmarks, Voice Memos, Wallet passes, Health data, Home data and more.
    • Gigachad 4y ago
      So tempting to replace Google Drive/Photos with icloud. Only thing holding me back now is GDrive can easily be mounted on Linux.
• asymmetric 4y ago
  Does this apply to all jurisdictions? I somehow have a hard time imagining China would allow them to do this for their citizen’s data.
• manchmalscott 4y ago
  iMessage backup encryption is HUGE, this was the main asterisk in the “iMessage is totally end to end encrypted” messaging.
  • ulimn 4y ago
    But if the other person in the chat doesn't have this encryption, they will backup your messages unencrypted on their icloud, right?
• richard___ 4y ago
  Wait what is the point of using icloud if you use this e2ee thing? If you lose your phone, all your data is useless because the key is on your phone. So using icloud with e2ee is basically using a phone with no icloud backup a all.
  • dev_tty01 4y ago
    That's why you keep a copy of the key somewhere else.
  • antipaul 4y ago
    Options: * you can have more than one device * you can have a trusted contact to get you the keys * you can have recovery codes
• Nifty3929 4y ago
  What is the chance that there is a law-enforcement backdoor? Honest question! Could be anything from "no chance" to "pretty likely" and I don't know enough to hazard a guess. But I believe the answer is important and I'd love to hear what the HN crew has to say about it.
  • Obscurity4340 4y ago
    The metadata for files (checksum, filename) is not e2ee so they can access that info and be compelled to provide it when served with a warrant. This is quite a clever twist on a previous theme. The filename and/or checksum might be all it takes to incriminate.
• coffeeblack 4y ago
  iCloud backups aren’t e2e encrypted?!
• zaps 4y ago
  THE NUMBER 23
• jacksnipe 4y ago
  WOW. I can’t help but feel this dovetails with the CSAM-scanning work that Apple canned last year. I was always under the impression that ultimately they were doing that work because they needed some mitigations for the fact that iPhoto backups meant people were storing CSAM on Apple’s servers. If they were serious about privacy, that would be a big big problem for them —- hard to say no when the government comes knocking with a legitimate warrant, so they needed a solution that would let them preempt that scenario. This is a much better solution.
  • deleted 4y ago
    [deleted]
  • brokenmachine 4y ago
    Now they are storing hashes for every file, so they no longer need to do on-device scanning. If they were serious about E2E, of course everything would be encrypted. There is no reason why they shouldn't store only hashes of the encrypted data, or, in fact, not store hashes at all, except - 1) data deduplication, which only saves Apple money 2) storing hashes and thus enabling govt and LE intrusion by mass scanning of content through matching hashes Neither of these options is good for consumer privacy, and I would expect better from a company that is supposedly about privacy. I would also be interested to know if they are still doing the perceptual hashing, because that would actually still fit in with their language about storing hashes, because AFAIK they didn't specify what kind of hashes they are storing.
    • jacksnipe 4y ago
      Apparently they’re not doing the perceptual hashing at all anymore, according to Wired.
      • brokenmachine 4y ago
        I would prefer to see a press release saying that by Apple themselves.
• s-xyz 4y ago
  Sorry one thing I did not get. Isn’t data by default encrypted when stored? Or is this specifically to the type of encryption (end-to-end)?
  • pgalvin 4y ago
    Data has always been encrypted by a key, which Apple held in a HSM (hardware security module, a special “black box” for encryption keys in this case). Previously Apple could take those keys, decrypt your data, and hand it to law enforcement. A hacker, too, could sign into your account and access everything if they found a vulnerability. Now, if you opt-in to this, the key will be deleted from the HSM and stored on your devices only. New keys will be used for newly added data, but the old data will be encrypted with the same key (imagine the computational load of suddenly re-encrypting all those files, not to mention that you’d need to temporarily give Apple the new key or re-do it all locally). You will always need your Apple ID password (or a recovery key/“contact”) to decrypt your data now, and Apple won’t have the key to decrypt your data and give to law enforcement, nor will hackers be able to access it if they find a vulnerability in iCloud. If you trust Apple not to implement a backdoor, you no longer need to trust them in any other regard to keep this data private. Exit: upon further reading, it seems the encryption key is stored on your device, and you’ll need one of the recovery methods if you lose all your devices. This is much better as it means a weak iCloud password cannot be used to compromise your key.
• thefounder 4y ago
  What gives us assurances this is not backdoored for the U.S government like it was before(i.e PRISM) ? Are people that naive?
  • lvass 4y ago
    Nothing. Yes.
• afrcnc 4y ago
  This will create a ton of friction with law enforcement. Expect Washington and London to freak the f out.
  • fargle 4y ago
    not if it's backdoored. end-to-end doesn't mean it's actually secure. there's 0% chance that there isn't some apple-owned backdoor, key escrow system, or other scheme. "end-to-end" means nobody has the keys and nobody can read the data except for the end user. And of course apple (via super-duper security backup key, non acknowledged). And the 5 eye's TLAs. And so on. I wouldn't trust any of these guys for a millisecond.
• Animats 4y ago
  Does Apple contractually guarantee that they have no access to the decryption keys? If not, this is probably yet another fake crypto scheme.
• tr33house 4y ago
  I think I'll stick to trusting duplicati. I love apple but it's already simple enough to use duplicati, an open source client, to incrementally backup to multiple destinations at pre-defined intervals. Plus you can't always trust such a huge business 100%. What'll happen when you're locked out of your apple account? Yeah, no backup!
• NaturalPhallacy 4y ago
  As someone who uses SpiderOak One for e2ee backups on my gaming/media/windows box, this is really cool of them. This should be a default, basic feature of any service today offering storage of personal information. It's not like we haven't had the technology for decades. It's win-win, too: The company can't be held responsible for the contents because they can't read them, and the user gets privacy. Which in America is legally protected from the government. That means that if the company can't peer into the data, there's no point in even wasting their time with a warrant. If the keys on the device are generated at the user's behest with some input of theirs, it's out of Apple (e2ee vendor)'s hands, logically, logistically, legally, and ethically.
• brynjolf 4y ago
  Wish they worked on the clients on other platforms though. I have PC, iPad, Mac and Android. I want to use one storage solution for all platforms. Apple still is dragging their feet on making feature rich platforms for anything but Apple
• deafpolygon 4y ago
  Well, for the Apple fans celebrating this "win" - pay attention: all of the metadata is still visible to Apple and that can reveal a lot more information than you'd think. You can build advertising off this data. Mail/Contact/Calendar is also still not secured, and that can contain a lot of information (as Google can attest). I think, on top of all that, it's still an overall "win" for consumers. But don't treat Apple like the white knight it purports to be. Beware the 'nice guys'. Remember, they say nothing of what happens when they receive the data for the first time. It may be enough that they scan and store this information upon the initial ingestion, then leave you with the keys.
• fargle 4y ago
  but then how does the AI scan your private images without permission to detect real CSAM, AI imagined CSAM such as medical images, and random pictures of cantaloupes and the like? perhaps they just mean "end-to-end encryption*" where the * represents the back door that only apple and various three-letter-agencies have access to.
• aquir 4y ago
  Unfortunately it’s not available in the UK yet…
• RonnieOwnsLexus 4y ago
  Where can i find the google one equivalent of this document ? I tried googling it and seeing the google one privacy but could not find out.
• mlindner 4y ago
  Note this detail at the bottom of the page as things not covered under end to end encryption on photos: > The raw byte checksum of the photo or video This means they could still technically scan photos, but they'd have to rely on simplistic checksum matching.
• w-hn 4y ago
  - On one hand - excellent development. This will also push others. - On the other hand - excellent way to deprive many not-so-old Apple devices from such a critical feature by interlocking it with latest OS versions. - And yeah, Apple, about time.
• j4nek 4y ago
  what could be the reason that first rollout will be only fur US users?
• codedokode 4y ago
  Please don't be fooled. If you look at the table in the article, you'll see that there are several categories of data that are not end-to-end encrypted, like Contants, and the reason for that is probably because US government and courts want to have them, even for non-US citizens. Otherwise why not encrypt them too? It would be fair if Apple gave a warning about US governments and courts before enabling sync to iCloud, but I guess they don't want users to know about it. Also this is a closed source system, so we can't know whether Apple can remotely extract encryption keys or not. Also as I understand, Apple now demands a phone number to sign up for Apple ID, so it means that now all users and their contacts are non-anonymous for Apple.
  • willis936 4y ago
    They don't E2EE contacts, mail, and calendar because those are services they provide. Contact authenticity is part of the iMessage service.
• Eumenes 4y ago
  That's cool but still avoiding cloud storage. Big win for the average user. I'll keep my shit on local storage, with no internet access.
• deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
• Simplicitas 4y ago
  Why is no one calling this "zero-knowledge" service or zero- knowledge encryption? Did the term fall out of fashion? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_service https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zero-knowledge_service
  • Obscurity4340 4y ago
    Because its not. They have all the filenames and checksums/hashes, access/modification dates, and also take "temporary" custody of the key when using icloud.com. Zero-knowledge does not have any of these things. The problem is that any of that information is obtainable by a warrant because Apple retains possession of such data. The whole point of this exercise is to eliminate that possibillity.
• AJRF 4y ago
  Good news. Wish iCloud Drive worked as reliably as Dropbox so I could make use of this, but Apple + Internet Services are a match made in hell.
• ReAzem 4y ago
  What about icloud.com? Will I still be able to view photos and browse files from it?
  • ReAzem 4y ago
    Ah. The link answers to this question under "Advanced Data Protection and iCloud.com web access" > When a user first turns on Advanced Data Protection, web access to their data at iCloud.com is automatically turned off. This is because iCloud web servers no longer have access to the keys required to decrypt and display the user’s data. The user can choose to turn on web access again, and use the participation of their trusted device to access their encrypted iCloud data on the web. Then they explain that if you turn it on again, your devices will send your keys to Apple's servers for the duration of the web session. Technically this leaks your keys to Apple forever, but they promise that they keep it for the duration of the session.
• kernal 4y ago
  Do these end-to-end encrypted iCloud backups also apply to users in China?
• Trias11 4y ago
  What about Apple scanning photos for "nefarious" content? Suddenly they're not doing that?
• korben5 4y ago
  I have a MacBook from 2015 and an iPhone 7 that I've been avoiding upgrading because I wasn't sure if I wanted to remain in Apple's walled garden. This issue was a huge sticking point for me, and it's an incredible relief they're closing the loop. Guess I'll be giving them a bunch more money in the near future!
• netheril96 4y ago
  I wonder whether this will ever come to China.