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Timeline of the xz open source attack
- goombacloud 3y agoThis might not be complete because this statement "More patches that seem (even in retrospect) to be fine follow." lacks some more backing facts. There were more patches before the SSH backdoor, e.g.: "Lasse Collin has already landed four of Jia Tan’s patches, marked by “Thanks to Jia Tan”" and the other stuff before and after the 5.4 release. So far I didn't see someone make a list of all patches and gather various opinions on whether the changes could be maliciously leveraged.
- goombacloud 3y agoIn https://archive.softwareheritage.org/browse/revision/e446ab7a18abfde18f8d1cf02a914df72b1370e3/?origin_url=https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz&snapshot=bcdaf33e1b3864c1c5f52dca8389a8f68d679e03#swh-revision-changes https://archive.softwareheritage.org/browse/revision/e446ab7... one can open the patches and then click the "Changes" sub-tab. Stuff like this looks like a perf improvement but who knows if a tricky bug is introduced that was aimed to be exploited https://archive.softwareheritage.org/browse/revision/e446ab7a18abfde18f8d1cf02a914df72b1370e3/?origin_url=https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz&snapshot=bcdaf33e1b3864c1c5f52dca8389a8f68d679e03#swh-revision-changes https://archive.softwareheritage.org/browse/revision/e446ab7... There are more patches to be vetted unless one would give up and say that 5.2 should be used as last "known-good".
- VonGallifrey 3y agoI get that there is a reason not to trust those Patches, but I would guess they don't contain anything malicious. This early part of the attack seems to only focus on installing Jia Tan as the maintainer, and they probably didn't want anything there that could tip Lasse Collin off that this "Jia" might be up to something.
- rsc 3y agoYes, exactly. I did look at many of them, and they are innocuous. This is all aimed at setting up Jia as a trusted contributor.
- dhx 3y agoI think this analysis is more interesting if you consider these two events in particular: 2024-02-29: On GitHub, @teknoraver sends pull request to stop linking liblzma into libsystemd.[1] (not in the article) 2024-03-20: The attacker is now a co-contributor for a patchset proposed to the Linux kernel, with the patchset adding the attacker as a maintainer and mirroring the attacker's activity with gaining the trust over the development of xz-utils. A theory is that the attacker saw the sshd/libsystemd/xz-utils vector as closing soon with libsystemd removing its hard dependency on xz-utils. When building a Linux kernel image, the resulting image is compressed by default with gzip [3], but can also be optionally compressed using xz-utils (amongst other compression utilities). There's a lot of distributions of Linux which have chosen xz-utils as the method used to compress kernel images, particularly embedded Linux distributions.[4] xz-utils is even the recommended mode of compression if a small kernel build image is desired.[5] If the attacker can execute code during the process of building a new kernel image, they can cause even more catastrophic impacts than targeting sshd. Targeting sshd was always going to be limited due to targets not exposing sshd over accessible networks, or implementing passive optical taps and real time behavioural analysis, or receiving real time alerts from servers indicative of unusual activity or data transfers. Targeting the Linux kernel would have far worse consequences possible, particularly if the attacker intended to target embedded systems (such as military transport vehicles [6]) where the chance of detection is reduced due to lack of eyeballs looking over it. [1] https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550 https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/31550 [2] https://lkml.org/lkml/2024/3/20/1004 https://lkml.org/lkml/2024/3/20/1004 [3] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/init/Kconfig#n258 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/lin... [4] https://github.com/search?q=CONFIG_KERNEL_XZ%3Dy&type=code https://github.com/search?q=CONFIG_KERNEL_XZ%3Dy&type=code [5] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/kernel/configs/tiny.config#n6 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/lin... [6] https://linuxdevices.org/large-military-truck-runs-embedded-linux-open-source-database/ https://linuxdevices.org/large-military-truck-runs-embedded-...
- daghamm 3y agoI don't understand how this could have worked. If you compile and build your own image, would that be able to trigger the backdoor? You can of course change an existing image to something that triggers the backdoor, but with that level of access you won't really need a backdoor, do you?
- mseepgood 3y agoNever allow yourself to be bullied or pressured into action. As a maintainer, the more a contributor or user nags, the less likely I am to oblige.
- resource_waste 3y agoThat sounds nice. I did an engineering/program manager role for 8 years and people pretty much always did what I asked if I showed up at their desk or bothered their boss. "Squeaky wheel gets the grease?" But I too like to think that I prioritize my children on merit rather than fuss level. For some reason they continue to cry despite me claiming I don't react to it.
- kenjackson 3y agoBut in this case he was getting hit by both someone willing to help and then multiple people complaining that things were taking too long. And when you yourself feel like things are taking too long then you’re probably more susceptible to all this.
- pixl97 3y agoThe issue here is the attackers will quickly move away from an individual attacking you to the group attacking you. The person writing the infected code will never be a jerk to you at all. You'll just suddenly see a huge portion of your mailing list move against you ever so slightly. We've complained about bots in social media for a long time, but how many people in open source discussions are shady manipulative entities?
- galleywest200 3y agoThese days you can even have these emails automatically taken in by an LLM and have the LLM argue with the maintainer for you, no humans needed!
- snerbles 3y agoMaintainers will need LLM sockpuppets of their own to automatically answer these automatic emails.
- XorNot 3y agoWhat stands out to me is this particular justification: > 2024-02-23: Jia Tan merges hidden backdoor binary code well hidden inside some binary test input files. The associated README claims “This directory contains bunch of files to test handling of .xz, .lzma (LZMA_Alone), and .lz (lzip) files in decoder implementations. Many of the files have been created by hand with a hex editor, thus there is no better "source code" than the files themselves.” This is, perhaps, the real thing we should think about fixing here because the justification is on the surface reasonable and the need is quite reasonable - corrupted test files to test corruption handling. But there has got to be some a way to express this which doesn't depend on, in essence, "trust me bro" since binary files don't appear in diffs (which is to say: I can think of a number of means of doing it, but there's definitely no conventions in the community I'm aware of).
- OJFord 3y agoAlso that when dynamically linking A against B, A apparently gets free reign to overwrite B. It sort of makes sense, since at the end of the day it could just be statically linked or implement B's behaviour itself and do whatever it wants, but it's not really what you expect is it.
- acdha 3y agoYeah, that part struck me as something we should be able to block - the number of times where you actually want that must be small enough to make it practical do something like write-protect pages with a small exception list.
- asvitkine 3y agoWell, test files shouldn't be affecting the actual production binary. But in practice that's not something that can be enforced for arbitrary projects without those projects having set something up specifically. For example, the project could track the effect on binary size of the production binary after every PR. But then it still requires a human (or I guess an AI bot?) to notice that the increase would be unexpected.
- 3y ago
- thrdbndndn 3y agoHow do you get "Jigar Kumar"'s email address? I can't seem to find it in the (web version of) the maillist. Another question: What is the typo exactly in this commit? I can't seem to find it. https://git.tukaani.org/?p=xz.git;a=commitdiff;h=a100f9111c8cc7f5b5f0e4a5e8af3de7161c7975 https://git.tukaani.org/?p=xz.git;a=commitdiff;h=a100f9111c8...
- cced 3y agoI think the period on the line above void my_sandbox.
- wufocaculura 3y agoThere's a single dot in a line between #include <sys/prcntl.h> and void my_sandbox(void). It is easy to miss, but makes the compile to fail, thus resulting in HAVE_LINUX_LANDLOCK to be never enabled.
- arrowsmith 3y agoCan someone explain to n00bs like me: what's "landlock" anyway and why is it significant here?
- Denvercoder9 3y agoIt's a Linux Security Module that allows to sandbox processes: https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- Thorrez 3y agoprctl, not prcntl
- swsieber 3y ago> How do you get "Jigar Kumar"'s email address? Hit reply
- progressof 3y agoI have found JiaT75 - Jia Tan mentioned in Microsoft C++, C, and Assembler as an community contributor ... https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/overview/whats-new-cpp-docs?view=msvc-170 https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/overview/whats-new-cpp... Also check this... https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/64.23.252.16 https://www.abuseipdb.com/check/64.23.252.16
- mseepgood 3y agoSo all binaries built with a Microsoft compiler must be considered compromised?
- progressof 3y agono
- jhoechtl 3y agoCare to enlighten how you come to such a knee-jerk reaction given a highly critivcal observation? What obvous are we missing?
- yuriks 3y agoIt's just a documentation change. Likely made to add reputation to the account.
- progressof 3y agoI didn't come to any conclusion... and I don't think you missed anything... I'm just posting links... you think it's better if I didn't post anything because this is stupid? if so then ok...
- logro 3y ago[flagged]
- winkelmann 3y agoCompletely benign documentation change to fix a typo: https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/cpp-docs/pull/4716 https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/cpp-docs/pull/4716 I have no idea what that IP address is supposed to be about...
- jhoechtl 3y ago> merges hidden backdoor binary code well hidden inside some binary test input files. [...] Many of the files have been created by hand with a hex editor, thus there is no better "source code" than the files themselves. So much for the folks advocating for binary (driver) blobs in OSS t support otherwise unsupported hardware. It's either in source form and reproducable or it's not there.
- mseepgood 3y agoNot just for hardware support: https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538 https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538
- cryptonector 3y ago!!
- pixl97 3y ago>It's either in source form and reproducable or it's not there. Wanna know how I know you haven't read into the discussion much? There are a whole lot of binary test cases in software. Especially when you're dealing with things like file formats and test cases that should specifically fail on bad data of particular types.
- TacticalCoder 3y ago> There are a whole lot of binary test cases in software. That's not how I read GP's point. If even binary blobs in test cases are a place where backdoors are, now as a matter of fact, hidden then, certainly, among the folks advocating for binary drivers in FOSS, there are some who are already --or planning to-- add backdoors there. Binary blobs are all terrible, terrible, terrible ideas. Builds should be 100% reproducible from source, bit for bit. At this point it's not open up for discussion anymore.
- pixl97 3y agoThen you figure out how to build a 'source' test case of a bad zip, or bad jpg, or word document or whatever else exists out there. Also figure out how to test that your bit4bit perfect binary isn't doing the wrong damned thing in your environment with actual real data.
- lukaslalinsky 3y agoThe social side of this is really haunting me over the last days. It's surprisingly easy to pressure people to giving up control. I've been there myself. I can't even imagine how devastating this must be to the original author of XZ, especially if he is dealing with other personal issues as well. I hope at least this will serve a strong example to other open source people, to never allow others to pressure them into something they are not comfortable with.
- tommiegannert 3y agoThe Jigar Kumar nudges are so incredibly rude. I would have banned the account, but perhaps they contributed something positive as well that isn't mentioned. I wonder if it would be possible to crowdsource FOSS mailing list moderation.
- goku12 3y agoThere is a good chance that everyone in that thread except the original maintainer is in on the act. It's likely that all those accounts are managed by a single person or group. Targeting just one account for rudeness isn't going to help, if that's true.
- lukaslalinsky 3y agoIt does help on the social/psychological side. If you, as an open source project maintainer, have a policy that such rudeness is not acceptable, you are much less likely to become a successful victim of a social attack like this.
- sigmar 3y agoThat would be true if you could ban the person from using new emails, but I don't think that's true when the thread if rife with sock puppet accounts. You ban the first rude email account, then there will be 2 new accounts complaining about both the lack of commits and the "heavy-handed mailing-list moderation" stifling differing views.
- kevindamm 3y agoSmall nit to pick, but in the introductory paragraph it reads "unauthenticated, targeted remote code execution." I recall that there was a special private/public key pair that made this exploit only reproducible by the author (or only possible after re-keying the binary). I believe this means it was unauthorized, not unauthenticated.
- rsc 3y ago"unauthenticated remote code execution" is a fairly standard term for this kind of access. (https://www.google.com/search?q=%22unauthenticated+remote+code+execution%22 https://www.google.com/search?q=%22unauthenticated+remote+co...)
- kevindamm 3y agoFairly standard term for a kind of access similar to this, but the distinction is important. Consider the impact if anybody else, not just this attacker, could have exploited it -- on the other hand, it may have been discovered sooner (had it also not been discovered by accident first).
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- mcpherrinm 3y agoI think it is unauthenticated from the point of view of SSH’s own authentication. The backdoor has its own credential, but the RCE is accessible if you don’t have an account on the system.
- kevindamm 3y agoThat's the basis for my preferring the term relating to authorization. The two terms have distinct and well-defined meanings in the domain. They're both critical aspects of security but for different reasons.
- vb-8448 3y agoI wonder if netflix will make a movie from this story, if you read the timeline it really sounds like a well written thriller.
- in3d 3y agoIt’s not compelling enough unless we find out who was behind it, which is probably unlikely.
- vb-8448 3y agoWell, the identity of who's behind it can be left to the imagination of the authors. I think it's reasonable to think that behind this attack there is a well organized intelligence agency of a big country, so the author can choose the one that they likes more. Or, even better, delay the issue to the season 2 :D
- publius_0xf3 3y agoIt does, but has there ever been a movie that successfully portrayed a compelling drama that takes place entirely on a computer monitor? It's hard to even imagine. It's why I think the novel is still relevant in our age because all the great stories that unfold on a screen can't be acted out on a sound stage.
- bckygldstn 3y agoSearching [0] gets you halfway there: its about a compelling drama which takes place mostly in real life, but is portrayed entirely on a computer monitor. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Searching_(film) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Searching_(film)
- vb-8448 3y agoI liked "How to Sell Drugs Online (Fast)", first season. Generally speaking, you can use the xz story as a background for every type of movie set in the present, an eg.: think about the God's Eye story from the Fast & Furious series. Theoretically, the xz rce can give you more or less the same power God's Eys gives you in the film.
- hk__2 3y agoSee also "Everything I Know About the XZ Backdoor" submitted 4 days ago but updated since then: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39868673 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39868673
- jrochkind1 3y agoThis seems very difficult to defend against. What is a project with a single burnt-out committer to do?
- rsc 3y agolcamtuf's two posts argue that this may simply not be an open-source maintainer's job to defend against. ("The maintainers of libcolorpicker.so can’t be the only thing that stands between your critical infrastructure and Russian or Chinese intelligence services. Spies are stopped by spies.") That doesn't mean we shouldn't try to help burnt out committers, but the problem seems very hard. As lcamtuf also says, many things don't need maintenance, and just paying people doesn't address what happens when they just don't want to do it anymore. In an alternate universe with different leadership, an organization like the FSF might use donated funds to pay a maintenance staff and an open-source maintainer might be able to lean on them. Of course, that still doesn't address the problem of Jia Tan getting a job with this organization. https://lcamtuf.substack.com/p/technologist-vs-spy-the-xz-backdoor https://lcamtuf.substack.com/p/technologist-vs-spy-the-xz-ba... https://lcamtuf.substack.com/p/oss-backdoors-the-allure-of-the-easy https://lcamtuf.substack.com/p/oss-backdoors-the-allure-of-t...
- uluyol 3y agoThere are efforts from industry to try to secure open source, e.g., https://cloud.google.com/security/products/assured-open-source-software https://cloud.google.com/security/products/assured-open-sour... I suspect some variant of this will grow so that some companies, MS/GitHub for example, audit large body of code and vet it for everyone else.
- intunderflow 3y agoWhy the assumption this is a Russian or Chinese intelligence service? Western governments aren't above this sort of conduct: https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12325.html https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg12...
- 3y ago
- exacube 3y agoIs the real identity of Jia Tan known, even by Lasse Collin? I would think a "real identity" should be required by linux distros for all /major/ open source projects/library committers which are included in the distro, so that we can hold folks legally accountable
- asvitkine 3y agoHow would that even work? Are distros expected to code their own alternative versions of open source libraries where they can't get the maintainers to send their IDs? Or what stops from forged IDs being used?
- gquere 3y agoThis will never be accepted by the community.
- rsc 3y agoOpen source fundamentally does not work that way. There are many important open source contributors who work pseudonymously. Google's Know, Prevent, Fix blog post floated the idea of stronger identity for open source in https://security.googleblog.com/2021/02/know-prevent-fix-framework-for-shifting.html https://security.googleblog.com/2021/02/know-prevent-fix-fra... and there was very significant pushback. We learned a lot from that. The fundamental problem with stronger identity is that spy agencies can create very convincing ones. How are distros going to detect those?
- kashyapc 3y agoWhile "open source" fundamentally doesn't work that way, the point here is about maintainers, not regular contributors. Identity of new maintainers must be vetted (via in-person meetups and whatever other mechanisms) by other "trusted" maintainers whose identities are "verified". I realize, it's a hard problem. (And, thanks for the link to the "Know, Prevent, Fix" post.) PS: FWIW, I "win my bread" by working for a company that "does" open source. Edit: Some projects I know use in-person GPG key signing, or maintainer summits (Linux kernel), etc. None of them are perfect, but raises the bar for motivated anonymous contributors with malicious intent, wanting to become maintainers.
- gawa 3y agoExcellent summary of the events, with all the links in one place. This is the perfect resource for anyone who want to catch up, and also to learn about how such things (especially social engineering) unfold in the wild, out in the open. One thing that could be added, for the sake of completeness: in the part "Attack begins", toward the end, when they are pushing for updating xz in the major distros, Ubuntu and Debian are mentioned but not Fedora. Looks like the social engineering/pressuring for Fedora started at least weeks before 2024 March 04, according to a comment by @rwmj on HN [1]. I also found this thread on Fedora's devel list [2], but didn't dig too much. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39866275 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39866275 [2] https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org/thread/ZAVLWJ7643VWZEWXGYBS2HYQMDDAD24O/#6CHEWRBCCRJCBZ7BIYYIAMMFQUDXVC6F https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fe...
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- sfjailbird 3y agoIt would be intetesting if Lasse Collin published his off-list interactions with 'Jia Tan' and any of the other pseudonyms, to get an even better angle on the social engineering parts. Apparently a large part of the campaign was via private channels to Lasse.
- jvanderbot 3y ago> It's also good to keep in mind that this is an unpaid hobby project. That's the root cause. At some point a corp/gov consortium needs to adopt key projects and hire out the maintainers and give them real power and flexibility, perhaps similar to the way a nation might nationalize key infrastructure. But this is against the core ethos at some level. Freedom and safety can be antagonistic.
- none_to_remain 3y agoAvoid compromise with one simple trick: surrender to the attackers
- jvanderbot 3y agoI don't understand how "Accept public money to work full time on key software" is surrender, but I think everyone misunderstood what I said, which usually means I didn't say what I meant.
- maerF0x0 3y ago> gov consortium Personally I wouldnt trust a govt to not backdoor everything.
- jvanderbot 3y agoA consortium is a great way to get money and power into those maintainers. Never said they should take the power from them or provide code. I think people are hearing their own mind here, not mine.
- tamimio 3y agoYou are implying that governments are more technically competent and more trustworthy than open source communities..
- jvanderbot 3y agoI said nothing of the sort. I'm implying they are richer.
- rwmj 3y agoMissing the whole Fedora timeline. I was emailed by "Jia Tan" between Feb 27 and Mar 27, in a partially successful attempt to get the new xz into Fedora 40 & 41. Edit: I emailed Russ with the details.
- itslennysfault 3y agoI wondered about this. I saw the note at the bottom "RedHat announces that the backdoored xz shipped in Fedora Rawhide and Fedora Linux 40 beta" but saw nothing in the timeline explaining when/how it made it into Fedora.
- rwmj 3y agoThese are the Fedora packages for xz that are vulnerable. If you click through the links you can see when they were added: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/BAO5S2VGTTWD6MHHCFHTAIAHZQFMOGAQ/ https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fe... (https://archive.ph/diGNB https://archive.ph/diGNB) This is the rough sequence of events in Fedora: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YTOGJVBNOSW7FSEE7B35GETS25KFPKBO/ https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fe... (https://archive.ph/e0SdX https://archive.ph/e0SdX)
- j1elo 3y agoA "good" side effect of this for OSS maintainers going on, is that now any time an entitled user starts being too pushy or too... well, entitled, they can be given a canned response: Are you trying to pull an xz attack on me?
- ceejayoz 3y agoAh, the old "undercover cops can't lie about not being a cop, just ask them" technique.
- Fnoord 3y agoIf you casually ask this while you can study (and preferably record!) the person's posture and they react in real-time then you can apply interrogation technique which CIA et al use.
- ceejayoz 3y agoSo becoming an open source maintainer will involve an in-person trip to an interrogation? The xz attack involves, in significant part, a maintainer burned out and happy to accept offered help. I don't think making it substantially harder to receive genuine help is likely to improve the situation.
- Fnoord 3y agoI just wanted to bring up that technique (it is not unique to CIA; LE also uses it). I never asserted the technique would've been useful in this very situation. However, in your framing you ignored the option of video conferencing. Also, you are forgetting bringing up 'are you trying to pull xz to me?' is a yellow flag towards the person who said it. It isn't definite, it just makes people raise up, it gathers the attention of watchful eyes. We should be careful not overdoing it though.
- j1elo 3y agoI made the original comment and must say that it was only meant as a joke. But, maybe some cases would merit using it. This is of course based on the fact of how the xz attack needed a couple of apparently innocent community members to start being too pushy, to the point of almost bullying the author and pointing fingers to their supposed passivity towards maintaining the project. To some levels of such behavior, after all that has happened, one could reasonably (even if just jokingly) wonder if it's not a similar attempt. IMO, being framed as a possible attacker would probably either calm the shit out of some too entitled users, or provoke them into even more whining. Now seriously, there is the thing about attitude that I wish was more popular among FOSS maintainers in order to have a mentally healthy relationship with their role: the ability to work on their own terms and not forget even for a split second that this is all a hobby activity. That FOSS licenses are explicitly written to allow A LOT of freedoms such as hiring 1st or 3rd party support services, forking, or whatever else but not to demand anything from the author.
- softwaredoug 3y agoOpen Source is a real tragedy of the commons. Everyone wants to consume it. Nobody wants to participate. People are upset when a company like Elastic or Mongo switches to a "non open" license. But at the same time, the market doesn't leave much choice. Companies won't be incentivized to contribute to projects when they can freeload. The market actually wants vendors, it doesn't want to participate in open source. But they don't want to _pay_ for vendors. So I think its entirely appropriate that anyone / any entity that creates "open source" to change their license, set limits, say "no", and let users be damed unless they're willing to make it financially appealing. It's literally "Without Warranty" for a reason. Letting your passion project becoming hijacked into determining your mental health is really depressing. F' the people who can't get on board with your boundaries, etc around it. They deserve the natural consequences of their lack of support.
- rwmj 3y agoYeah whatever. Closed source software is much easier to subvert, just have your agents join the company and they can push whatever they want without any external (or even internal) review.
- sebstefan 3y agoMaybe one of the outcomes of this could be a culture change in FOSS towards systematically banning rude consumers in Github issues, or, just in general, a heightened community awareness making us coming down on them way harder when we see it happen.
- Aurornis 3y agoThe attackers will leverage any culture that helps them accomplish their goals. If being rude and pushy doesn’t work, the next round will be kind and helpful. Don’t read too much into the cultural techniques used, because the cultural techniques will mirror the culture at the time.
- coldpie 3y agoEven if the security outcome is the same, I would still count people being kind and helpful online instead of rude as an improvement.
- saghm 3y agoAs always, there's an xkcd for that https://xkcd.com/810/ https://xkcd.com/810/
- cryptonector 3y agoThat's amazing.
- tamimio 3y agoSpot on. The counter should be sound regardless of any social or cultural context, a process where being polite or rude, pushy or not is irrelevant.
- advaith08 3y agoAgree. I think a more core issue here is that only 1 person needed to be convinced in order to push malware into xz
- edg5000 3y agoI wonder, once the attacker gained commit permissions, were they able to rewrite and force push existing commits? In that case rolling back to older commits may not be a solution. If my speculation is correct then the the exact date on which access was granted must then first be known, after that a trusted backup of the repo from before that date is needed. Ideally Lasse Collin would have a daily backup of the repo. Although perhaps the entire repo may have to be completely audited at this point.
- ajross 3y agoForce pushes tend to be noticed easily. All it takes is for one external developer to try to pull to see the failure. And it's actually hard to do because you need to comb through the tree to update all the tags that point to the old commits. On top of that it obviously breaks any external references to the commit IDs (e.g. in distro or build configurations), all the way up to cryptographic signatures that might have been made on releases. I think it's a pretty reasonable assumption that this didn't happen, though it would be nice to see a testimony to that effect from someone trustworthy (e.g. "I restored a xz checkout from a backup taken before 5.6.0 and all the commit IDs match").
- fl7305 3y ago> And it's actually hard to do because you need to comb through the tree to update all the tags that point to the old commits. Isn't this part just a few pages of code, if that? I agree that it will be blindingly obvious for the reasons you list.
- skykooler 3y agoOf course, that's only since the attack was caught early. Since it affected the machines that build packages, a next step could have been, say, to add code to Git to make it ignore certain commit IDs or mask them in some way. Maybe even modify Firefox, Chromium etc to not show those changes on github. With a backdoor like this and enough time undetected, you could control basically everything.
- sloowm 3y ago
- benob 3y agoWhat makes you think that the accounts were not compromised only recently?
- wasmitnetzen 3y agoNot OP, but the fact that they only appear in this context makes me believe that their are specifically set up for this task. No regular person has that good opsec just to push patches to a random library.
- sloowm 3y agoIf the account was compromised only recently the real co-maintainer would have done everything to warn the maintainer. If you're maintaining some core piece of infrastructure and your account gets compromised it would be trivial to let at least someone know you're not the one pushing these commits.
- nrawe 3y ago"It's also good to keep in mind that this is an unpaid hobby project." ~ Lasse Collin, 2022-06-08. As someone working in security, the fact that _foundational_ pieces of the computing/networking rely on motivated individuals and essentially goodwill is mind blowing. There are great aspects to the FOSS movement, but the risks – particularly the social engineering aspects as demonstrated here – and potential blast radius of supply chains like this... We take it all for granted and that is lining up to bite us hard, as an industry.
- zoeysmithe 3y agoSorta but flawed relevant xkcd: https://xkcd.com/2347/ https://xkcd.com/2347/ I don't see how this is any strongly different than some unappreciated skill worker in a corporation. Its interesting the double standard we have for FOSS. Meanwhile in the commercial world, supply chain attacks are commonplace and barely solicit headlines. Yes, FOSS needs to be able to address these kinds of attacks, but the world runs on the efforts of the low-level few, generally. The percent of people who work to build and maintain core infrastructure has always been small in any economic system. The world is held up by the unsung labor of the anonymous working class. Think of all the people working right now to make sure you have clean water, electricity, sanitation, etc. Its a tiny fraction of the people in your city. Conversely, why aren't all these corporations who depend on this contributing themselves? Or reaching out? There's a real parasitic aspect here that gets swept under the rug too. I'd even argue this isn't really a hobby for many, especially for higher profile projects. For many its done for social capital reasons to build up one's reputation which has all sorts of benefits, including corporate advancement, creating connections for startups, etc. Its career adjacent. And that's ignoring all the companies that contribute to FOSS explicitly with on-the-clock staff. So there are motivators more than just "I'm bored and need a hobby." Its a little dismissive to call FOSS development just a hobby. Is what Linus does a hobby? I don't think most people would think so. Things like this have important social and economic motivators. The hypothetical guy in the comic isn't some weirdo doing something irrationally, but has rational motivators. I'd also argue that its pretty harmful to FOSS adoption if the community takes on a "well, its a hobby don't expect quality, security, or professionalism." This is a great way to chase people away from FOSS. We can't just say "Oh FOSS is better than much closed software" when things are good, then immaturely reply "its just a dumb hobby, you're dumb for trusting me," when things go south. I think its pretty obvious there's a lot of defensiveness right now and people being protective over their social capital and projects, but I think this path is just the wrong way to go. Comms, PR, and image management in FOSS is usually bad (see Linus's rage, high profile flame wars, dramatic forkings, ideological battles, etc), so optics here aren't great, because optics is something FOSS struggles with. The community is at best, herding cats, with all manner of big personalities and egos, and its usually a bit of a controlled car crash on the best of days.
- userbinator 3y agoI think one of the good things to come out of this may be an increased sense of conservatism around upgrading. Far too many people, including developers, seem to just accept upgrades as always-good instead of carefully considering the risks and benefits. Raising the bar for accepting changes can also reduce the churn that makes so much software unstable.
- sebstefan 3y agoAll things considered I'm not sure that'd be such a good thing How many security issues spring from outdated packages vs packages updated too hastily?
- denimnerd42 3y agoand when you do get a security issue and you're using a 10 year old version the upgrade is going to be really really difficult vs incremental upgrades when they are available. or are you going to fork and assume responsibility for that library code too?
- Hackbraten 3y agoOn top of that: A newly-introduced security issue tends to have very limited exploitability, because it's valuable, not-yet well understood, and public exploits are yet to be developed. Compare to that a similar vulnerability in an older package: chances are that everything about it has been learned and is publicly known. Exploits have become a commodity and are now part of every offensive security distro on the planet. If you run that vulnerable version, there's a real risk that a non-targeted campaign will randomly bite you.
- maerF0x0 3y ago> valuable, not-yet well understood, and public exploits Except in the scenario that is this exact case: Supply chain attacks that are developed with the exploit in mind.
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- kashyapc 3y agoGiven this disaster, one or other "foundation" will now embrace the `xz` project, start paying a maintainer or two so that they don't accidentally end up dying from burnout. Rinse, repeat for all critical-path open source software. A bit like the OpenSSL "Heartbleed" disaster[1]. OpenSSL is now part of Linux Foundation's (they do a lot of great work) "Core Infrastructure Initiative". Many fat companies build their applications on these crucial low-level libraries, and leave the drudgery to a lone maintainer in Nebraska, chugging away in his basement[2]. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed [2] https://xkcd.com/2347/ https://xkcd.com/2347/
- chubot 3y agoSomething to add to the timeline: when did this avenue of attack become available? It only happened in the last 10 years apparently. Why do sshd and xz-utils share an address space? When was the sshd -> systemd dependency introduced? When was the systemd -> xz-utils dependency introduced? --- To me this ARCHITECTURE issue is actually bigger than the social engineering, the details of the shell script, and the details of the payload. I believe that for most of the life of xz-utils, it was a "harmless" command line tool. In the last 10 years, a dependency was silently introduced on some distros, like Debian and Fedora. Now maintainer Lasse Collin becomes a target of Jia Tan. If the dependency didn't exist, then I don't think anyone would be bothering Collin. --- I asked this same question here, and got some good answers: https://lobste.rs/s/uihyvs/backdoor_upstream_xz_liblzma_leading_ssh#c_wgmyzf https://lobste.rs/s/uihyvs/backdoor_upstream_xz_liblzma_lead... Probably around 2015? So it took ~9 years for attackers to find this avenue, develop an exploit, and create accounts for social engieering? If so, we should be proactively removing and locking down other dependencies, because it will likely be an effective and simple mitigation.
- duped 3y agoI don't think these questions are that interesting. SSHD shared an address space with xz-utils because xz utils provides a shared library, and that's how dynamic linking works. sshd uses libsystemd on platforms with systemd because systemd is the tool that manages daemons and services like sshd, and libsystemd is the bespoke way for daemons to talk to it (and more importantly, it is already there in the distro - so you're not "adding a million line dependency" so much as linking against a system library from the OS developers that you need). Linking against libsystemd on Debian is about as suspicious as linking against libsystem on MacOS. It's a userspace library that you can hypothetically avoid, but you shouldn't. As for why systemd links against xz, I don't know, and it's a bit surprising that an init system needs compression utils but not particularly surprising given the kitchen sink architecture of systemd.
- cesarb 3y ago> As for why systemd links against xz, I don't know, and it's a bit surprising that an init system needs compression utils It's for the journal. It can be optionally compressed with zlib, lzma, or zstd. That library had not only the sd_notify function which sshd needed, but also several functions to manipulate the journal.
- xyst 3y agoTimeline reads like a "pig butchering" or romance scam. Except the goal is not money, but control. Attackers find a vulnerable but critical library in the supply chain. Do a cross check on maintainers or owners of the code (reference social media and other sources to get more information). Execute social engineering attack. Talk to maintainer(s) "off list" to gain rapport. Submit a few non-consequential patches that are easy to grep to gain trust. Use history of repository or mailing list against victim to gaslight ("last release was X years ago!1", "you are letting project rOt!", "community is waiting for you!").
- BuildTheRobots 3y agoI'm amazed more people aren't talking about the "off list" part or asking Colin if he's willing to provide those emails/conversations.
- xyst 3y agoThat’s more of a LEO concern. Maybe attackers got sloppy and leaked info in email headers?
- DrammBA 3y ago> Timeline reads like a "pig butchering" To me this is the polar opposite of pig butchering. This was a targeted and unromantic attack, unrelated to investing or cryptocurrency, the original maintainer was not "fattened like a hog" in any way, if anything he was bullied and abused into submission.
- pluc 3y agoThe most interesting question I have with all this is: Do you think this was a planned effort or was it opportunistic? Did they know what they were doing and social engineered towards it, or did they figure out what to do based on the day-to-day context they discovered?
- mattxxx 3y agoA service that measured "credibility" or "activity" of a username/email could be really useful here. At least, it would be a leading indicator that something _might_ be up. In particular the aside here about the email addresses are suspect: https://research.swtch.com/xz-timeline#jia_tan_becomes_maintainer https://research.swtch.com/xz-timeline#jia_tan_becomes_maint... would be useful info for Lasse Collins before taking the pressure campaign seriously.
- iso8859-1 3y agoWhat about just using 'web of trust', for example with GPG? If the user's key is signed by people that met up with the actual person, it would be much harder to make fake identities.
- ptx 3y agoThere was an article from 2019 [0] that someone on HN linked recently about how "web of trust is dead", but it seems to concern scalability problems with the keyserver, which resulted in DoS attacks, which made them disable the feature by default. The concept should presumably still be good, assuming the issues specific to the GPG keyserver can be avoided. [0] https://inversegravity.net/2019/web-of-trust-dead/ https://inversegravity.net/2019/web-of-trust-dead/
- carols10cents 3y agoWhat would prevent the sock puppet accounts from signing each others' keys?
- iso8859-1 3y agoThey could do that, but you'd be able to see that nobody/few outside their cluster signed any of their keys. Let's say they have fake passports and physically appear at key signing parties. Now you're screwed because even your peers (that you thought know how to validate identities using passports) will get fooled. Read more on GPG's trust levels: https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/x334.html https://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/x334.html
- stockhorn 3y agoI feel like release tarballs shouldnt differ from the repo sources. And if they do, there should be a pipeline which generates and upload the release artifacts.... Can somebody write a script which diffs the release tarballs from the git sources for all debian packages and detects whether there are any differences apart from the files added by autotools :)?
- peter_d_sherman 3y agoMy takeaways: First from the article itself: >"At this point Lasse seems to have started working even more closely with Jia Tan. Evan Boehs observes that Jigar Kumar and Dennis Ens both had nameNNN@mailhost email addresses that never appeared elsewhere on the internet, nor again in xz-devel." That is an important observation! Takeaway: Most non-agenda driven actual people on the Internet, leave a trail -- an actual trail of social media and other posts (and connected friends) that could be independently verified by system/social media/website administrators via voice or video calls (as opposed to CAPTCHA or other computer-based "Is it a human?" tests, which can be gamed) for stronger confidences in the identity / trustworthiness of the remote individual at the other end of a given account... Next takeaway from the linked article: (https://boehs.org/node/everything-i-know-about-the-xz-backdoor https://boehs.org/node/everything-i-know-about-the-xz-backdo...): >"AndresFreundTec @AndresFreundTec@mastodon.social writes: Saw sshd processes were using a surprising amount of CPU, despite immediately failing because of wrong usernames etc. Profiled sshd, showing lots of cpu time in liblzma, with perf unable to attribute it to a symbol. Got suspicious. Recalled that I had seen an odd valgrind complaint in automated testing of postgres, a few weeks earlier, after package updates." Takeaway: We could always use more observability of where exactly CPU time is spent in given programs... Binaries without symbol tables (which is the majority of programs on computers today) make this task challenging, if not downright impossible, or at least very impractical -- too complex for the average user... Future OS designers should consider including symbol tables for all binaries they ship -- as this could open up the capability for flame graphs / detailed CPU usage profiling (and the subsequent ability to set system policies/logging around these) -- for mere mortal average users...
- psanford 3y agoOne big take away for me is that we should stop tolerating inscrutable code in our systems. M4 has got to go! Inscrutable shell script have got to go! Its time to stop accepting that the way we've done this in the past is the way we will continue doing it ad infinitum.
- kibwen 3y agoThat's a great first step, but ready your pitchforks for this next take, because the next step is to completely eliminate Turing-complete languages and arbitrary I/O access from standard build systems. 99.9% of all projects have the capability to be built with trivial declarative rulesets.
- azemetre 3y agoCan you explain more in-depth what you mean? I'm also unaware of how you could have declarative rulesets in a non turing-complete language. Sounds like it would be impossible but maybe my thinking is just enclosed and not free.
- ngruhn 3y agoHaven’t used it much but Dhall is a non Turing complete configuration language: https://dhall-lang.org/ https://dhall-lang.org/
- koito17 3y agoIn this case, I think the GP is absolutely right. If you look at the infamous patch with a "hidden" dot, you may think "any C linter should catch that syntax error and immediately draw suspicion." But the thing is, no linter at the moment exists for analyzing strings in a CMakeLists.txt file or M4 macro. Moreover, this isn't something one can reliably do runtime detection for, because there are plenty of legitimate reasons that program could fail to compile, but our tooling does not have a way to clearly communicate the syntax error being the reason for a compilation failure.
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- deathanatos 3y ago> Evan Boehs observes that Jigar Kumar and Dennis Ens both had nameNNN@mailhost email addresses This is the second time I've read this "observation", but this observation is just wrong? Jigar's email is "${name}${number}@${host}", yes, but Dennis's is just "${name}@${host}" — there's not a suffixed number. (There's a 3, but it's just a "leetcode" substitution for the E, i.e., it's semantically a letter.) (They could still both be sockpuppets, of course. This doesn't prove or disprove anything. But … let's check our facts?)
- __float 3y agoWhere are the email addresses visible? I've also seen this a few times, but never the actual addresses.
- matsur 3y agoeg "Hans Jansen" is <hansjansen162@outlook.com> https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1067708 https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1067708
- mmcwilliams 3y agoI'm maybe naive in assuming that there is some kind of investigation going on that isn't playing out in public, but I would assume that years of emails going through Microsoft servers might make the identities of the cohorts in this attack difficult to hide?
- rainbowzootsuit 3y agoWhen making sockpuppet email accounts use a plausible birth year as your numeric extension.
- glitchcrab 3y agoI couldn't spot email addresses directly in plaintext for those who weren't submitting patches (e.g. Jigar), however if you look at one of the links to his (?) responses then there's a mailto link with the text 'Reply via email'
- Solvency 3y agoWhy does it seem like so many open source developers suffer from chronic mental health issues? as shown here, in TempleOS, etc. It's a weird but sad pattern I see all of the time.
- dmitrygr 3y agoNot being paid for your work while others profit from it surely doesn’t help with one’s mental state.
- VerminOctopus1 3y agoChronic mental health issues are extremely common.
- dxxvi 3y agoI guess that Lasse Collin will have more mental health issues after all of this :-) Do we know who really is Jia Tan? Any photo of him? The email addresses he has been using? His location?
- phreeza 3y agoWhat makes you think they are an actual person?
- dxxvi 3y agoYou mean they are a group of people? or a computer program? 2022-06-08: Lasse Collin said that he had worked off-list a bit with Jia Tan. I think that "off-list" means not on the xz mailing list, maybe over the personal email/phone/voice app. That's why I thought that Jia Tan was a real person
- gregwebs 3y agoI think this can be made much more difficult by enforcing a policy of open builds for open source. It shouldn't be possible to inject build files from a local machine. All build assets should come from the source repository. Artifacts should come from Github Actions or some other tool that has a clear specification of where all inputs came from. Perhaps Github could play a role in helping to automate any inconveniences here.
- maclockard 3y agoI think that trust needs to be 'pushed deeper' than that so to speak. While this would be an improvement, what happens if there is a malicious actor at Github? This may be unlikely, but would be even harder to detect since so much of the pipeline would be proprietary. Ideally, we would have a mechanism to verify that a given build _matches_ the source for a release. Then it wouldn't matter where it was built, we would be able to independently verify nothing funky happened.
- gregwebs 3y agoVendor independent build providence is certainly the long-term goal. In the immediate-term moving away from mystery tarballs towards version control gets us a step closer. One of the best things about Golang is that packages are shared direct via source repositories (Github) rather than a package repository containing mystery tarballs. I understand the appeal of package repositories, but without proper security constraints it's a security disaster waiting to happen.
- dboreham 3y agoYes the whole "let's take a mystery meat tarball from a repo that isn't the project repo" seems suspect. Github+ even has a scheme for signing artifacts such that you have some level of trust they came from inside their Actions system, derived from some git commit. This would allow the benefits of a modular build for a large product like a distro, while preserving a chain of trust in its component parts. +Not advocating a dependency on Github per se -- the same sort of artifact attestation scheme could be implemented elsewhere.
- fizlebit 3y agoWhat are the chances this is the first such attack, not just the first one discovered. Presumably every library or service running as root is open to attack and maybe also some running in userspace. The attack surface is massive. Time for better sandboxing? Once attackers get into the build systems of Debian and others is it game over?
- 2OEH8eoCRo0 3y agoI wouldn't be surprised if there are others but this specific one seems special. It was caught because on connection it does an extra decryption operation and I'd assume there is no way around this extra work. They'd have to re-architect this to not require that decryption. I'm not a security expert though.
- dboreham 3y agoSomething I've wondered about wrt this debacle: presumably the smart part of xz was the compression algorithm. I'm guessing but that's probably less than 500 lines of code. The rest is plumbing to do with running the algorithm in a CLI utility, on various different OSes, on different architectures, as a library, and so on. All that stuff is at some level of abstraction the same for all things that do bulk processing on bytes of data. Therefore perhaps we should think about a scheme where the boilerplate-ish stuff is all in some framework that is well funded with people to ensure it doesn't have cutout maintainers injecting backdoors, and is re-used for hundreds of bulk-data-processing utilities; and the clever part would then be a few hundred lines of code that's easy to review, and actually probably never needs to change. Like...a separation of concerns.
- calvinmorrison 3y agowe were discussing this on the IRC. Imagine spinning up a thread, then running a bsd style pledge(2) on it to call liblzma. Kinda janky but it would work. Another option would be to just go out and call the xz util and not rely on a library to do so. That process can be locked down with pledge to only have stdin/stdout. That's all you need. So, like UNIX does have this plumbing, its just that reaching for libraries and tight integration has been the pursuit of Lennart Poopering and his clan for years.
- jbdigriz990 3y agoJoe Cooper's take on pressuring project maintainers: https://forum.virtualmin.com/t/dont-panic-ssh-exploit-in-bleeding-edge-code-you-shouldnt-run-on-a-server/125703/5 https://forum.virtualmin.com/t/dont-panic-ssh-exploit-in-ble... somewhat ironic, but I'd say effective.
- Longlius 3y agoI don't even think it's necessarily moderation so much as maintaining these high-traffic projects is now akin to a full-time job minus the pay. At a certain point, companies need to step up and provide funding or engineering work or they should just keep expecting to get owned.
- Vegenoid 3y agoIf there is a larger shift to companies paying for the software they rely on that is currently free, it's not going to be companies paying open-source maintainers, it's going to be companies paying other companies that they can sign contracts with and pass legal responsibility to.
- nmz 3y agoWhy would they when they can just... not?
- dekhn 3y agoWhy do I feel like this set of posts by Russ about supply chain security will end up with a proposal/concrete first implementation of a supply-chain-verified-build process that starts at chip making - simple enough to analyze and rebuild independently- to bootstrap a go runtime that provides an environment to do secure builds. Reflections on Trusting Trust becomes even more interesting if you consider photolithography machines being backdoored.
- RyanShook 3y agoI’m of the opinion that there are backdoors in most of our software and a lot of our hardware. xz just happened to be caught because it was hogging resources.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- maerF0x0 3y agoTwo points I'd be interested in discussing. 1. It seems a lot of people are assuming Jia Tian was compromised all along. I haven't seen a reason to believe this was a long play, but rather that they were compromised along the way (and selected for their access). Why play the long game of let's find a lone package, w/ a tired maintainer, and then try to get in good with them vs. Let's survey all packages w/ a tired maintainer, and compromise a new entrant (ie bribe/beat them). 2. IMO this also is a failing on behalf of many government agencies. NSA, NIST, FBI all should, IMO spend less time compromising their own citizenry, and more time focusing on shoring up the security risks Americans face.
- lmkg 3y agoRegarding point 1: The timeline in the linked article describes some communications as "pressure emails." I've heard the theory, but haven't seen solid evidence, that the pressure emails weren't just regular impatience from outside devs, but actually part of the attack. To convince the primary maintainer into granting access to another party.
- maerF0x0 3y agoOccams Razor and a variation on Hanlon's razor to me suggest that Jia actually wanted to solve the issues and work on code. They contributed some things to other repos too, correct? (I saw another thread about microsoft documentation, for eg). Here's the thing, if the maintainer was so tired and needed the help, the pressure is more risk than reward. The maintainer would be relieved to have help... But pressure risks estranging... To be clear I'm aware this is just my own musing though.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- nebulous1 3y agoCompletely conclusive proof? No, but it seems unlikely that there ever would be conclusive proof of such. They don't seem to exist outside of this incident and things related to this. There were multiple people who also don't seem to exist outside of their posts to the xz mailing list applying pressure for the original maintainer to bring Jia on board. This occurred around the time that Jia was first making contact with the project, not only recently. Apparently the IP addresses that were logged for Jia is a VPN based in Singapore They have vanished. Honestly, there's very little evidence that they weren't always intending this.
- klysm 3y agoWhat's crazy to me about how we've set up computers to do things, is that xz itself is a pure function, but somehow there's all of this shit that has to happen to just use a pure function! It's just bytes in and bytes out, but we have an astoundingly complex build system and runtime linking system which somehow allows this pure function to run arbitrary commands on a system.
- tamimio 3y agoThis attack doesn’t exploit a technical issue or bug, it exploits the open source philosophy, and unless the community will come up with a systematic process to counter it, expect more sophisticated attacks similar to it in the future. This time we got lucky that some smart nerd -I am a nerd too, this is a praise not to be taken in a bad way- noticed and notified the community in less than 20 days of the second backdoor implementation, next time the attack may undergoes more comprehensive “rehearsals” that it will make it impossible to detect.
- 1024core 3y agoWe should set up a GoFundMe to reward Andres Freund.
- 1024core 3y agoI am reminded of the infamous Sendmail worm from 1989(?). If this compromised OpenSSHd had become the default across millions of systems all over the world, could a worm-like thing have brought a major chunk of the Internet down? Imagine millions of servers suddenly stuck in a boot-loop, refusing to boot. And all because one owner of a library had some mental health issues. We should not have such SPOFs.
- dijit 3y ago> And all because one owner of a library had some mental health issues Wrong takeaway.
- juliusdavies 3y agoImpossible here because the exploit was carefully engineered to be unreplayable and NOBUS (nobody but us) so it couldn’t go viral. Even if you intercepted a complete tcp byte trace of the attack there was nothing you could do with that to attack other systems.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- mrbluecoat 3y agoBest overview of the xz saga: https://xkcd.com/2347/ https://xkcd.com/2347/
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- shp0ngle 3y agoDid the Jia Tan character actually committed something of value? Looking at the history, he had (there was some stuff with multithreaded compression/decompression); as he kept it in the original license, could it be used going forward?
- riston 3y agoxz most likely wasn't the only library that was targeted, there could be other similar projects as well which we haven't discovered yet. From the timeline you can see the social engineering part was quite big part. Just thinking out loud, would it possible to go over with LLM and analyse existing OSS mailing lists and issues to classify such sentiment from the users?
- rattray 3y agoSomething that I feel is missing – someone please let me know if I missed it – is how long this bug was materially present in packages? how many people likely were exposed to it?
- uvhug 3y agoMaybe worth adding a link to XZ Utils backdoor by Lasse Collin https://tukaani.org/xz-backdoor/ https://tukaani.org/xz-backdoor/ to the Further Reading section
- dep_b 3y agoMy god, Hans Jansen? You need to be 60 years old to have that name in The Netherlands, it's so stereotypical that it would definitely ring some alarm bells if I saw it. It's like seeing a "Bill Johnson, real American patriot" account on Twitter: would not believe it at face value.
- Brian_K_White 3y agoAdding a new label for closing github/gitlab issues right now: "JIATAN" Also works like Karen. "this project ...." "ok Jia"
- softwaredoug 3y agoIs there any law enforcement at all involved in tracking down the players and trying to understand their motivations (is who is Jia Tan, etc)?
- paxys 3y agoI would be very surprised if there wasn't a Federal-level investigation being planned (or already ongoing) into this. Of course it's always a possibility that the attack was, in fact, sponsored by these same agencies.
- denizens 3y agoIt's kind of funny that the attacker used a sockpuppet named "Dennis Ens." This could be "Denizens": - an inhabitant or occupant of a particular place. - a person admitted to residence in a foreign country especially : an alien admitted to rights of citizenship Good way to describe Jia Tan (singular or plural) and their sockpuppets.
- bicepjai 3y agoNYT article https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/03/technology/prevent-cyberattack-linux.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare&ugrp=c&pvid=7CFA9809-A4FD-4B48-840B-A837F058950C&sgrp=c-cb https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/03/technology/prevent-cybera...
- MVQ93 3y ago[flagged]
- cyberturtle 3y agoGreat summary, I also found this deep dive to be pretty helpful: https://fletch.ai/resources/xz-vulnerability-analysis https://fletch.ai/resources/xz-vulnerability-analysis
- cyberturtle2 3y ago[flagged]