28 ms·

Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?

• throwawaaarrgh 4y ago
  Nobody cares enough about me to target me, and I don't run Windows. That excludes like 99.99% of possibilities. Android, on the other hand... I have installed apps I didn't know much about, and that store is full of malware, so I have no idea.
• PaulAJ 4y ago
  I keep a few £ in bitcoin stashed on it. If it ever disappears, I'll know.
• treebeard901 4y ago
  You should assume all devices are compromised
  • baobabKoodaa 4y ago
    Not helpful
    • twaw 4y ago
      Why not? It still possible to communicate securely using compromised devices and networks.
      • sweetjuly 4y ago
        Could you expand on this? How would I securely communicate from a device that, say, has a kernel level implant? This is one of those cases where SGX/TrustZone would be immensely helpful but nobody has built a messenger that actually somehow fully lives in an enclave. If you assume every device you use is compromised, how can you possibly use any encryption?
    • numpad0 4y ago
      Truths has to be helpful.
  • wadayano 4y ago
    *compromisable
    • tete 4y ago
      I don't think so. While I am not sure about what "devices" means it's common practice for example to assume your root password is always compromised. The consequence here is that you don't allow remote, password-authenticated root. On a similar note services and networks should be treated as compromised as well, meaning you must use encryption, authentication and in general make sure to limit attack surface. And all of that boils down that you should make sure you should not rely on services, users, etc. don't for example access personal information they are not supposed to access. After all the problem with things like Ransomware is exactly that this isn't assumed.
• h2odragon 4y ago
  You really can't, anymore. You can watch traffic and hope that anything nasty isn't communicating with the outside world, but then there's all sorts of side channels that you may not know to watch. At some point you just have to admit there's limits to privacy and work with them. You paper journal could be stolen and read / rewritten too, yaknow? It's not a new problem, its just in a new context.
• codetrotter 4y ago
  Noone has drained my crypto from my wallets yet. So either my personal machine is not compromised, or they think the amount of crypto in the wallets is too low. Jokes on them though, cause I am moving my crypto to a hardware wallet eventually
  • tluyben2 4y ago
    Quite an interesting honeypot really.
    • mimimi31 4y ago
      More like a canary I think.
  • progval 4y ago
    Joke's on you, you just told them they should hurry up before you do ;)
  • pcthrowaway 4y ago
    Of course, a nation state is unlikely to 'tip their hand' so to speak. If the U.S. has backdoors on every PC, they're not going to bother draining the wallets of "small fish"; they need to keep these things secret so they can go after terrorists
• lifthrasiir 4y ago
  I'm reasonably sure that my personal machine is less compromised than the average, but I can't and will never be able to ensure that it is not compromised because I have no way to know everything the machine trying to do. This remains true even when you have an entirely free and directly inspectable hardware; you simply have no knowledge and time to verify everything. Just keep a reasonable amount of precaution and skepticism.
• PaulHoule 4y ago
  Reminds me of the time I was watching a creepypasta horror movie about some guy who gets strange phone calls and my phone rang. I think this guy had gotten my phone number from my HN profile and he thought I might be able to help him. He thought his android phone was infected by malware and he knew who did it. I told him the people who repair cell phones at the mall could do a system reset on his phone…. Unless he was dealing with state-level actors in which case it might be an advanced persistent threat and it might be permanent.
• gnfargbl 4y ago
  Here's a short, fairly practical guide that you might find helpful: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-for-Infrastructure-v3-0-January-2022.pdf https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Cyber-Essentials-Requirements-.... It is aimed mostly at small businesses, but I find a lot of the guidance to be pretty relevant to my personal IT. My even shorter (and incomplete) summary of the document would be: configure your router and firewall; remove default passwords and crapware from your devices; use a lock screen; don't run as root; use a password manager and decent passwords; enable 2FA everywhere you can; enable anti-malware if your OS has it built it; don't run software from untrusted sources; patch regularly. There are also other controls that you can choose to impose on yourself. For example, I require full-disk encryption, and I will only use mobile devices which get regular updates. Would be interested in hearing other things that HN'ers do to limit risk.
  • amelius 4y ago
    Do you lock your computer every time you leave your desk? And do you always check for keylogger thumbdrives and such?
    • greggyb 4y ago
      Yes. Why wouldn't you?
      • paulcole 4y ago
        Because you assess the risk as being low and don’t care that much about low risk things.
        • AnIdiotOnTheNet 4y ago
          Sure, but it is also a very low effort thing with little friction involved.
      • amelius 4y ago
        I have to physically go under my desk to see if my computer has been tampered with.
• jl6 4y ago
  I don’t have ultimate trust in any software or hardware, but I get to “good enough” by deciding which providers I trust: * Software: Canonical, Google, Microsoft, Valve, Oracle, Dropbox. I install software from their official repos and keep it up to date. Anything 3rd-party/unofficial/experimental/GitHub goes in a VM. * Hardware: I built my main PC from mainstream commodity components. I have no way of knowing if there are secret backdoors but I consider it unlikely. I use a password manager, I enable 2FA, I turn off things I don't use, and generally have a low-risk hygienic approach to computing. I’m also privileged enough to not be a “person of interest” so don’t feel the need to take any extraordinary precautions. Yes, I’m aware of VM escapes. Yes, I’ve read Reflections on Trusting Trust. I choose to trust regardless because life’s too short for paranoia. As Frank Drebin said: “You take a chance getting up in the morning, crossing the street, or sticking your face in a fan.”
  • rhn_mk1 4y ago
    What about publicly known backdoors in your hardware? https://www.techrepublic.com/article/is-the-intel-management-engine-a-backdoor/ https://www.techrepublic.com/article/is-the-intel-management... There is hardware that doesn't contain those at least, but it doesn't break power records.
    • jl6 4y ago
      I don't consider it practical to take any countermeasures to the possibility of this threat. I think there's a ~10% chance it's a backdoor, and if it is, there's a 98% chance it would be at the behest of a branch of the US government, and I'm not currently an adversary of theirs. (This is not an argument for mass surveillance, it's just a practical assessment of the risk).
      • rhn_mk1 4y ago
        Just to be clear, the question of whether it's a backdoor or not doesn't matter for whether bad actors use it. The capabilities are rather well known. Its vulnerabilities aren't, but vulnrabilities do not a backdoor make.
  • 4y ago
• adg001 4y ago
  The reality is that you cannot trust that your machines are not compromised. The only option we are left with is to operate under the assumption that, indeed, our machines are permanently compromised.
• adriancr 4y ago
  Just some generic things that should help avoid or clean up after a compromise. - clean reinstall every month, just pick a new flavor of Linux to try out. (also helps ensure I have proper backups and scripts for setting up environment) - Dev work I usually do in docker containers, easy to set up/nuke environments. - Open source router with open source bios (apu2), firewall on it, usually reinstall once in a while. - Spin up VMs via scripts for anything else. (games - windows VM with passthrough GPU for example) - automatic updates everywhere.
  • 867-5309 4y ago
    >Spin up VMs via scripts for .. games this is not sustainable. you do this once and then pray nothing breaks!
    • adriancr 4y ago
      I just have a clone of a clean windows VM. If something breaks or I get bored, nuke the active one and start clone, update it and make another backup, then reinstall games again. On the other hand, gpu pass-through breaks once in a while and is annoying to fix.
      • 867-5309 4y ago
        so more like an OOBE snapshot? would be annoying to initiate and wait for all the windows updates, drivers and game installations every time also runs the risk of reusing the hwid (which e.g. Epic and Ubisoft are cottoning on to and permabanning) gpu passthrough is a menstrual headache hence the set, forget, pray attitude
• cube2222 4y ago
  I try to follow what others already mentioned, but still, for any personal high-security stuff I use a device whose OS puts strong limits on apps, like an iPad.
• crims0n 4y ago
  Keep it air gapped, only way to be sure! Only half kidding, unfortunately.
  • andromaton 4y ago
    You can get data out of an air gapped machine several published ways (ultrasound, hard drive light, monitor flicker, emf, etc)
    • fIREpOK 4y ago
      Requires proximity and someone very determined though...
• NikolaNovak 4y ago
  Great question. I don't anymore. Decades ago when I had a 286 and knew what each file did and what all the software was, and threats were limited and crude, I had good confidence of controlling my machine. Today, when my laptop has millions of files and each website - even hacker news - could inject something malicious and my surface is so broad (browsers applications extensions libraries everything) and virtually anything I do involves network connections... I just don't have the confidence. FWIW, I try to segregate my machines for different categories of behaviour - this laptop is for work, this one is for photos and personal documents, this one is for porn, this one is if I want to try something. But even still my trust in e. G. software vlan on my router and access controls on my NAS etc are limited in this day and age. I feel today it's not about striving for zero risk (for 99.99 of people) , but picking the ratio of overhead and risk you're ok with. And backups. (bonus question - how to make backups safe in age of encrypting ransom ware).
  • jl6 4y ago
    On the backup question, this is one reason why I have a set of backups that are physically disconnected and not automated.
    • BLKNSLVR 4y ago
      I have a backup NAS that's normally powered off, but it's scheduled to turn on, perform backup, shut down. It doesn't wake on LAN and there should be no way of knowing it exists outside of checking DHCP static addresses reservations - and now that I mention it, maybe I should remove it from there too. This minimises the size of the window, and network-snoopable information, required to compromise this set of backups.
      • jl6 4y ago
        If your main computer has had all its files encrypted by ransomware, will the backup NAS know not to replace the good backup with a bad one? i.e. hopefully it's not doing something like `rsync --delete`.
• albntomat0 4y ago
  The biggest thing is being deliberate about your threat model. Who would want to get onto your systems, and how much do they care about you in particular? From there, take appropriate actions. For the vast, vast majority of us, that means using good passwords, updating software, and not running weird things from the internet. If you’re worried about 0 click RCE in Chrome/Windows/iOS, you either should be getting better advice from folks outside of HN, or are being unrealistic about who is coming after you.
• rekrsiv 4y ago
  You don't. Treat your personal machine(s) as compromised by default and take it from there.
• ramraj07 4y ago
  There are two levels here: compromised by some national agency vs. compromised by anyone else. For the former, I don’t assume anything especially since I’m not an American citizen. I still believe with some certainty that my iPhone is safe from the government but not 100%
• omgmajk 4y ago
  I don't. I am real picky with downloading software for my personal machine and I sometimes explore with process explorer and I run sketchy stuff in a sandbox but I don't trust that my personal machine is not compromised.
• checkyoursudo 4y ago
  Bios? I'm not sure I can ever be certain. For the rest, I run a pretty esoteric setup (compiled-from-source custom configured linux kernel with no binary blobs; all software compiled from source, with no exceptions; aggressive, burdonsome-to-me privilege separation; chroots and VMs for various degrees of potential threat; etc). I have no illusions that it is perfectly safe. What I am comfortable with is that, in order to compromise me, you would have to know a lot about what I run and how I run it. I believe that I would have to be nearly individually targeted to extract any useful data from my machine, and that I am not nearly a valuable enough target for anyone to do so. I think you would have to be a state-level actor or someone with similar capabilities to compromise me, and none of them would care enough. My security paranoia stems from extremely sensitive work I did as a lawyer long ago, but I am now so used to it that I carry on as a scientist, even though my current work is not nearly so sensitive (if at all). I give up a lot of convenience and some functionality to operate this way, so it is not for everyone. I am not an adversary to anyone, so outside state actors surely don't care about me. And my own government can just get a warrant and knock on my door, so they don't care about me either. Embedded device firmware besides the bios is probably my main vulnerability, but if you're successfully getting at me through my hard drives or mouse, then I was surely an incidental rather than actual target.
  • ulimn 4y ago
    I'm genuinely curious: Do you check/audit the code you compile and run on your machine? Going with the assumption of "no": How is it then different than downloading a prebuilt version from an official source?
    • luma 4y ago
      It feels like a cargo cult approach to the problem. "I'm safe because I compile from source" is an absurd statement when a million LoC is involved.
      • kube-system 4y ago
        The linux kernel is much more than a million LoC. Closer to 30 million.
• rvillanueva 4y ago
  Like others here are saying, you can never be 100% sure. But that doesn’t mean there’s nothing you can do. If you’re worried about the impact to your broader organization (which is what most of the sophisticated threats tend to target), you should think about risk mitigation through the Swiss Cheese defense model. Each system is inevitably going to have holes, but layering them on top of one another will incrementally improve your coverage. For instance: - Your team should be trained about phishing attacks. But inevitably some will get through, so… - You should implement 2FA in case a password is compromised. But a threat actor may be able to capture a 2FA-passed SSO session token, so… - Production access should be limited to a small number of individuals. But even they might get compromised, so… - You should programmatically rotate credentials to make old leaked credentials useless. But a newer one might be captured, so… - Data should be sufficiently encrypted at rest and in transit, and… - Your team should have an incident management system and culture in place to quickly respond to customer reported incidents and escalate it to the right level and… - Audit logs should be tracked to understand the blast radius in case of compromise - and so forth When you look at incidents like CircleCI and LastPass, a good security organization will understand that there was more than just one point of failure and should talk in detail about how they are shoring up each level.
  • cm_silva 4y ago
    Exactly this. Security is more about about defense-in-depth, incident response and recovery planning. Personally, I assume the hardware is already compromised and plan for recovery accordingly, starting with the worse case scenario. Then, I ask myself "If this thing isn't compromised yet, how can I help it stay so?", starting probably with the network access, through firmware, all the way to the browser.
• jeroenhd 4y ago
  BIOS/Firmware: I just do, if I am compromised then I won't find out anyway. OS/app level: occasional AV scans, though I don't trust clamav as much as I trust Windows antivirus. I should really properly set up secure boot on my desktop to make rootkits harder to install, but Linux and secure boot are just too much of a kludge.
• transpute 4y ago
  Some OS mitigations: All: patch, encrypt, backup, track power, isolate workflow by device/VM Network: router with OSS firmware, workflow segmentation, reduce wireless iOS: (>A12 SoC) Lockdown mode, Brave w/o JS, daily reboot iOS: periodic reinstall from DFU mode, Apple Configurator / MDM policy macOS: hardening script based on workflow, outbound firewall Windows: Secured Core device + SystemGuard + App Guard VM isolation Windows: HP device + SureStart (f/w check) + SureClick (browser VMs) Linux: vPro device + QubesOS with Anti-Evil-Maid Linux: generic device + non-persistent LiveCD OS image
  • landemva 4y ago
    For MS Windows, may also want to enable core isolation / memory integrity. Sadly, vendors typically don't enable it from the factory. https://www.infotechnotes.com/2021/07/microsoft-windows-core-memory-integrity.html https://www.infotechnotes.com/2021/07/microsoft-windows-core...
• ihusasmiiu 4y ago
  I always assume my personal machine is compromised.
• sweetjuly 4y ago
  I run the latest betas of macOS and iOS which means I get exploit breaking changes as soon as possible. I keep all the security mitigations on my mac enabled (SIP, secure boot, etc.) which helps makes a variety of exploit flows and persistent compromise difficult. But random malicious code in user space? Well, I really just hope for the best :)
  • saagarjha 4y ago
    Note that betas sometimes fall behind public releases when it comes to security patches.
    • sweetjuly 4y ago
      Ugh, I suppose you're right. They do seem to skip the beta pipeline for ITWs. I wonder if this has changed now that they're leaning on "rapid security response" patches for critical vulnerabilities, which betas do get, and so hopefully there's parity now. I should dig into this, pretty sure there were a few RSRs recently and it'd be neat to verify that a) betas got the same bugs patched and b) the RSR went out to beta and release at the same time.
• alkonaut 4y ago
  I don’t. Not sure why I’d do that. I find the risk acceptably low that it is. But more importantly, I don’t have any reason to fear that it is. So I trust that regular caution and OS security reduces the risk to an acceptable level but mostly I don’t fear anyone reading or destroying my data because I have backups and it’s not sensitive. Sure it would be scary from an integrity perspective, but not in any other sense. Even constant access to my machine and everything I do wouldn’t be a big risk. So if I’m affected by a ransom Trojan (most likely scenario), I’m happy to just wipe my machine.
• fattybob 4y ago
  I’ve been fairly comfortable since I moved to Mac’s - maybe I shouldn’t be so comfortable but I do mind what I click and open
• fattybob 4y ago
  Hmm, actually, my aging Mac always asks me to install something whenever I connect my newer iPhone - I don’t like that at all, it’s not at all what I’d expect from an apple device, but I always am coming to realise that apple devices really aren’t what they used to be - quite sad
• Havoc 4y ago
  Short of building your own and coding your own you never fully can. Very much a best effort cost/benefit thing
• denton-scratch 4y ago
  I don't trust that my machines are not compromised. All I can do is to start with a machine I believe to be "clean", and take measures to keep it that way (others have suggested suitable measures). But even a brand-new machine might have a compromised BIOS, or compromised firmware in some peripheral processor like the Wifi adaptor. I don't know how to guarantee that a machine is "clean" to begin with, and I doubt anyone else does.
• deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
• mejutoco 4y ago
  You could use something booted from a read only medium like knoppix (if your computer has a cd reader!). At the BIOS level all bets are off though. https://www.knopper.net/knoppix/index-en.html https://www.knopper.net/knoppix/index-en.html
• wiz21c 4y ago
  I protect my machine from as many commercial interests as I can. This removes a whole class of issues. For the rest, the thing is so complicated nowadays I can't really say anymore. I spent my youth on 8 bit machines. At that time I was 100% certain there was no compromise. But nowadays,...
• krn 4y ago
  > "Compromised" meaning that malware hasn't been installed or that it's not being accessed by malicious third parties. This could be at the BIOS, firmware, OS, app or any other other level. I don't believe there is a way to be 100% certain, but if I had to go to a store and pick a new device with the lowest likelihood of being compromised, it would be a desktop, a laptop, or a tablet running ChromeOS[1]. [1] https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/security-overview/ https://www.chromium.org/chromium-os/chromiumos-design-docs/...
  • gkbrk 4y ago
    Many would consider a ChromeOS device compromised from day one.
    • krn 4y ago
      From the privacy perspective, ChromeOS is no different than Windows and MacOS. From the security perspective, it's much better, because every single app is running in a sandbox. I don't even use Chrome for web browsing on ChromeOS, since Firefox works just fine with flatpak[1]. [1] https://support.google.com/chromebook/answer/9145439?hl=en https://support.google.com/chromebook/answer/9145439?hl=en
      • account42 4y ago
        > From the privacy perspective, ChromeOS is no different than Windows and MacOS. And being stabbed is not that different from being shot. I'd rather not be subject to either. At least with operating systems we do still have better choices for privacy than the three you mentioned.
• NKosmatos 4y ago
  Read the following short story… Disclaimer: I’m not responsible for any paranoia, computer fear or conspiracy thoughts that might arise after reading it: https://www.teamten.com/lawrence/writings/coding-machines/ https://www.teamten.com/lawrence/writings/coding-machines/
  • drivebycomment 4y ago
    Lol. That was a fun read. Thanks for that.
• Helmut10001 4y ago
  Separation of concerns is a good idea. Don't run everything together, e.g. multiple boot Os, or nested OS (windows with several WSL setups for different work, test untrusted windows apps first in windows development VM etc.). If you have a server, run dedicated VMs and work on those via remote, these days you can even stream your games from your dedicated VM. In case a game is compromised, it will at maximum compromise other games on the VM, but not your important work on another VM.
  • amelius 4y ago
    A workflow that involves multiple VMs is usually very cumbersome. I feel that our OSes should solve this problem. Unix was built with the mindset that other users cannot be trusted, but they forgot that applications can also be malicious. There is a huge opportunity here for better OSes.
    • transpute 4y ago
      Untrusted officeapps/browser has been solved on Windows for ~10 years by Bromium (now HP SureStart) and ~5 years by Microsoft cloning Bromium as Application Guard. For example, every tab of the browser runs in an isolated VM, seamlessly composited into the main desktop, with no special action needed by the user.
    • tigrezno 4y ago
      Isn't that the effort done on jails like snap/flatpak lately??
      • amelius 4y ago
        Ergonomics is part of the equation and Snap is definitely not there yet, and in fact its poor quality may be driving users to other solutions. Snap has no GUI, where clearly a solution that provides a general sandbox should. When you open an app and click "Open File", the sandbox GUI should intervene and ask the user where the app is allowed to look. Also, the idea of "security bolted on top" of an existing OS doesn't seem very trustworthy.
• windex 4y ago
  Any way to actually monitor traffic at the PC or network level for an individual user? I see a lot of odd behavior by TVs, IOT devices, connected bulbs and such. None of them seem necessary to me. I feel windows could do a lot better with reporting or allowing users to clearly see what is communicating across the network currently.
• vHMtsdf 4y ago
  On my and my families windows machines, I try to follow the advice from Taylor Swift who seems to know what she is doing... https://decentsecurity.com/#/securing-your-computer/ https://decentsecurity.com/#/securing-your-computer/ In short: 1) secure bootup by locking up BIOS and encrypting your drive 2) set User Access Controls to the highest level 3) install up to date browser with appropriate addons (ublock)
  • Alifatisk 4y ago
    I would wait with getting the latest Windows updates, If I don't see anything in the news after a month, that's when I update.
    • jonstewart 4y ago
      Would very much recommend updating Windows ASAP.
      • f4c39012 4y ago
        There's nothing as secure as a brick, not getting any data out of that
    • ThePowerOfFuet 4y ago
      That month is the highest-risk time, as patches are quickly reversed to find exploits. Up to a week might be prudent to avoid patches which blow up, but not longer.
• thinking001001 4y ago
  You don't. Welcome to industry! "There is no way to really know if a computer is compromised" - Joanna Rutkowska
• Alifatisk 4y ago
  I view the traffic being sent from my devices, there is plenty of good tools for that. If I see any anomalies, then that's a hint. Note, you should not fully rely on this but rather as a starting point.
• tucnak 4y ago
  Surprised not to see a mention of Talos II system based on IBM POWER9 technology that is open spec and otherwise a very competent build with fully open hardware FPGA mainboard and stuff like physical trip jumper protection, and potential for customised security measures via the BMC, Arctic Tern, et cetera. IBM is notoriously good at virtualisation, and POWER9 is very competent for machine learning workloads, the 2U and 4U systems they offer can go up something ridiculous like 176 threads in a two-socket configuration and there's plenty of lanes. You can reprogram the firmware, too; it's all out there in the open and you normally wouldn't need special hardware. You can get one for not less than $5,500. https://www.raptorcs.com/content/TLSDS3/intro.html https://www.raptorcs.com/content/TLSDS3/intro.html
  • jart 4y ago
    This is like the third time I'm hearing about these raptors in the past month and I want one. I want the $10,000 one. Your comment is the most constructive one in this thread, because it sounds like the solution for all the concerns expressed above has finally arrived. Who here is willing to put their money where their values are?
    • tucnak 4y ago
      In reality none of the "privacy freaks" will ever purchase one, I've recommended these to various privacy-minded people I know and the majority either (1) can't see past the fact that it's IBM hardware (not hip), or (2) make up excuses the like of "DO YOU REALLY believe IBM would do a system without a backdoor? A system with a starting price of $5,500— it must be a rip-off, not good enough a deal for me!" I know there's plenty of nice and horrible people in everything but honestly if I got two bob a piece for every FOSS cheapskate I've encountered is too similar to one another for me _not_ to attribute this to cheapskate mindset. People who are saying things like "Mac is a rip-off!!! bad deal, Intel better performance" all the while being clueless on power consumption, for example. It's much cheaper to just say something seemingly profound like "There is no true privacy, we're all pwned by NSA!!" than to purchase and actively integrate an expensive RISC ISA system based on free hardware into your workflow... A the end of the day, we only have ourselves to blame.
• breck 4y ago
  "Assume breach" was the phrase they taught us at Microsoft (at least in 2016). I assume everything is compromised. So I make public and distribute/decentralize as much as possible. I #BuildInPublic as much as possible on GitHub and GitLab and dedicate everything to public domain (http://pledge.pub/ http://pledge.pub/). I have a number of computers and can be up and running on a new Macbook in under an hour. I run multiple mirrored web sites. I distribute crypto keys across ledgers and safety deposit boxes in multiple states. Most importantly: I don't pay for insurance (except for mandated auto and homeowners). Instead, everyday I go out there and try to deliver as much good to as many people as possible, knowing that the best insurance when bad luck strikes isn't some check from some corporation, but the helping hands from your fellow neighbors.
  • tete 4y ago
    > "Assume breach" was the phrase they taught us at Microsoft (at least in 2016) security(7) man pages on FreeBSD and DragonFly, I think originally written by Matt Dillon also tells you to assume breach for example for the root password, which is why you shouldn't allow password based logins over SSH, etc. This is the earliest I could find, and it already contains assuming breach in 1998. https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/commit/f063d76ae36ca42484455bf5275782b00543ce20#diff-871514060890c6597efd2bf37271654b1f056ef51290df75ecdde2b67978baf2R90-R91 https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd-src/commit/f063d76ae36ca4... Does anyone have an idea on how to see the file and its history from where it was moved? I checked 4.4 BSD, because the copyright mentions Berkley, bit I failed to find anything in the man1 directory.
• INTPenis 4y ago
  I have several layers of security, including an infosec mindset that comes naturally, but at the end of the day I don't really know. I have faith that if I were to be infected statistically it would be by some malware that would give itself away by mining crypto or doing something else very loud and disruptive. Fun story but my laptop was actually hacked remotely once, without me knowing. It was almost 20 years ago, some would call me a script kiddie. Just trying to be bad ass, trying to live the movie Hackers. Had a stolen laptop running FreeBSD, with a wicked bootsplash just like the kids in the movie. So you can imagine I was moving with the wrong crowds online, having little defacing wars with other groups and shit like that. Caught the wrong kind of attention. I say that infosec comes naturally to me now but pobody's nerfect and back then I had re-used a password in a weakly encrypted service database, someone hacked this service, found my password, found my ssh logins to the servers, and traced backwards to my laptop. I don't remember the details but somehow working back from one server, perhaps to another jumpserver, they were able to get the IP for my laptop and actually login to it. Fortunately for me they didn't do anything but gather data, they posted this on a wall of shame saying "another hacker down". I say fortunately for me because I had thousands of customer's data on that laptop, including CC#'s for the business I was running at the time. They missed all this, and the very next day I reinstalled my laptop and reset all passwords on pure coincidence. I had no idea I had been hacked, I just felt like reinstalling for some other reason. Found their wall of shame posting later and felt very much ashamed. This thread has inspired me to setup a tripwire for my workstation. It's something I used to use many years ago but I think it's a good setup to have some sort of alerting if files start changing.
  • lloydatkinson 4y ago
    > This thread has inspired me to setup a tripwire for my workstation. It's something I used to use many years ago but I think it's a good setup to have some sort of alerting if files start changing. Can you explain what you setup?
    • INTPenis 4y ago
      I'm looking at current options, this[1] for example is packaged for Fedora, which is my daily driver. But then I got to thinking, if I'm going to do a clean Fedora install for the tripwire (it's best practice) I might as well try Fedora Silverblue[2]. Silverblue is an immutable system so it kinda makes a tripwire less useful because no one can change any system files. Only files in your home directory and /etc can be modified statefully. 1. https://github.com/Tripwire/tripwire-open-source/ https://github.com/Tripwire/tripwire-open-source/ 2. https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/ https://silverblue.fedoraproject.org/
• neoromantique 4y ago
  I use locked down apple devices and wireguard to a remote server to do work, so all my actually sensitive data resides on the remote server that is reasonably hardened, and I believe I would hear if iPadOS was compromised to an extent that I need to worry about it farily quickly, I hope so at least.
• graderjs 4y ago
  You can play with this in that situation. I assume all my cloud and local data is and just keep that in mind. But I also assume there's layers of access... so not everyone who can access it, has access to every part of it. One group maybe can access DNS queries; one group can access cellphone metadata and SMS; one group maybe can access unencrypted iCloud/Google/OneDrive data; one group needs warrants to access and creates lies to fraudulently obtain/fake-justify those; some other group doesn't need warrants and just has access, either through agreement or covert access. Once Advanced Data Protection switches on globally "in early 2023" I'll have another compartment. But I assume that someone can access basically everything. You can have fun with it. I also think what's happening on my devices is some of the least interesting parts of life, so, yeah, there's that, too. :)
• AnIdiotOnTheNet 4y ago
  The same way you can't be sure that when you drive to work today you are not going to die, you can't be sure that your machine isn't compromised somewhere. That's just how reality is: safety is an illusion. Like with driving, make an effort to lower the probability to wherever makes you comfortable, then just accept that there's a non-zero chance it wasn't good enough.
• phkahler 4y ago
  A combination of good practices and a lot of rationalization!
• jaxn 4y ago
  I believe my most vulnerable environment is the development environment. 3rd party code being updated almost constantly combined with fairly standardized cli to cloud environments (kubectl, az/aws/Heroku, gh, etc. And I don’t just have to be vigilant about what I do, but also about what my team has done. It terrifies me, and it’s a sad reality that my personal risk is reduced by the fact that if I fall victim, countless other teams will as well.
  • mark_l_watson 4y ago
    I think you are correct. The latest news of unsafe PyPy packages worried me. Not always, but often I prefer development on remote VPS’s. For anything deep learning I pay Google a little bit of money every month for Colab notebooks, save a ton of my own time, and don’t worry about trying random 3rd party libraries. I don’t have this use case anymore, but I used to use very large memory VPS’s with SBCL Common Lisp and Emacs to work on an old project that required lot’s of data in memory - VPS’s are really cheap if you turn them off when not in use. In the 1980s and a bit into the 1990s, I did most things in X Windows - I have thought about how good that would be for secure remote development, but text with tmux, Emacs, etc. is so much less hassle.
• amelius 4y ago
  Waiting for HackGPT to become a thing, so I can use it as a pentester. Any ways in which AI can already help?
• _Algernon_ 4y ago
  I use adblock to prevent (malicious) ads from running. Browser malicious downloads warnings are enabled. Configured to show a full screen warning if http is used instead of https. Opening links from email requires manually copy pasting, forcing an extra look at links. Generally I don't install random software outside the official repos or AUR, but I do blindly trust those repos to not be compromised. That being said, I don't think I could 100% trust a modern computing device to not be compromised, but since that isn't possible I also don't see it as actionable information.
• morphle 4y ago
  Never allow a company or government to install known and unknown software that spies on you. This means Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Apple, etc.
• bitexploder 4y ago
  Run Linux. Install only trusted software. Don’t do sketchy (from a security perspective) things like look at porn or use torrent sites on your main computer. Backup often. Reinstall OS annually. Don’t run Windows. Don’t worry too much. Be happy.
  • account42 4y ago
    Don't assume that the regular web is safer than porn or torrent sites.
• microtonal 4y ago
  I only have limited trust. Between 3D printing slicers from Chinese companies, many packages from PyPI and Rust crates, there is always a danger that something is compromised somewhere. I try to limit attack surface in the following ways: - I only use M1 Macs as desktops. This reduces attack service in various ways. M1 Macs do not have anything like UEFI firmware, it all starts from the iBoot ROM and the whole chain is verified with signatures. The OS is on a sealed system Volume that is read-only and signed. Altogether, this limit firmware/OS attacks. - I use a U2F key and/or the Secure Enclave of the Mac for credentials (SSH keys, 2FA). They are set up to require user confirmation. - When possible, I will install applications from the Mac App Store, since they are sandboxed by default. - I use separate work and private Macs. - I clean and factory restore my Macs every few months. - I use some tools like Knock Knock to see if there is anything suspicious. Compromise is obviously possible, but I try to push it into 'mostly state actor' territory, because I am not interesting to most state actors.
• morphle 4y ago
  Can You Trust Your Computer? https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.en.html https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.en.html Eben Moglen: The alternate net we need, and how we can build it ourselves: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gORNmfpD0ak&t=2s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gORNmfpD0ak&t=2s
• ignoramous 4y ago
  ex-AOSP dev here Android and ChromiumOS are likely the most trustable computing platforms out there; doubly so for Android running on Pixels. If you don't prefer the ROM Google ships with, you can flash GrapheneOS or CalyxOS and relock the bootloader. Pixels have several protections in place: - Hardware root of trust: This is the anchor on which the entire TCB (trusted computing base) is built. - Cryptographic verification (verified boot) of all the bootloaders (IPL, SPL), the kernels (Linux and LittleKernel), and the device tree. - Integrity verification (dm-verity) of the contents of the ROM (/system partition which contains privileged OEM software). - File-based Encryption (fscrypt) of user data (/data partition where installed apps and data go) and adopted external storage (/sdcard); decrypted only with user credentials. - Running blobs traditionally run in higher exception levels (like ARM EL2) in a restricted, mutually untrusted VM. - Continued modularization of core ROM components so that they could be updated just like any other Android app, ie without having to update the entire OS. - Heavily sandboxed userspace, where each app has very limited view of the rest of the system, typically gated by Android-enforced permissions, seccomp filters, selinux policies, posix ACLs, and linux capabilities. - Private Compute Core for PII (personally identifiable information) workloads. And Trusty Execution Environment for high-trust workloads. This is not to say Android is without exploits, but it seems it is most further ahead of the mainstream OSes. This is not a particularly high bar because of closed-source firmware and baseband, but this ties in generally with the need to trust the hardware vendors themselves (see point #1).
  • BLKNSLVR 4y ago
    Does LineageOS have a place alongside GrapheneOS and CalyxOS? Asking because I base hardware purchases on whether LineageOS is available for the device and wondering whether I should restrict further to GrapheneOS or CalyxOS.
    • ignoramous 4y ago
      There's overlap between CalyxOS and LineageOS. CalyxOS (privacy-focused ROM, currently Fairphone and Pixel-only) has different goals to LineageOS (Android ROMs for as many phones as possible); while GrapheneOS is a security-focused distribution. DivestOS is another credible alternative.
• devmor 4y ago
  I dont! In fact I assume it has been to some extent and that I would be unable to detect this. Going from that assumption, I take care to keep encrypted backups of all of my important files both locally on another machine and remotely. I also use two-factor authentication wherever possible, because I find it unlikely that the same attacker would gain access to both my PC and phone. Additionally, I have a second phone with no SIM card that I use for some TOTP 2 factor accounts that I wish to remain especially secure. Operating at the assumption that you have already been compromised allows you to prepare for the worst should you truly be.
• doubled112 4y ago
  I don't know, really. I have a ton of "personal machines" when it gets right down to it, but I'll think client wise. I distro hop chronically on most of my machines. Sometimes multiple OS reinstalls across machines per week. Some installs have lasted a few months but it's rare. I try to stick to official repos when I do reinstall, so I'm outsourcing that trust to the distro maintainers. If it's on the disk, it's gone except for a few important files I keep in a self-hosted Nextcloud sync folder. I use LUKS encryption to ensure leaving the laptop on the bus is a non-event. If it was ever in somebody's possession for very long (border, police, lost and found) I'd just put it in the garage and never touch it again. Firmware malware is pretty uncommon, still, so I'm just hoping for the best there.
• anonym29 4y ago
  I assume it is, per Intel ME / AMD PSP's ability to read everything - memory, CPU registers, disk, inspect all network traffic, directly utilize onboard GbE for bidirectional communication. For adversaries below the level of the US intelligence agencies, I run everything virtualized and compartmentalized with Qubes, the installation image for which I verified the dev-provided cryptographic signature matches. I try to rigorously avoid any software operated by Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, disable all JS by default in my LibreWolf browser, refuse to connect directly websites protected by cloudflare, audit source code for almost everything I run in userland, etc etc etc. This is all for my personal machine. For work devices, I assume they're pwned even worse and I do nothing but actual work on them. On the mobile side, GrapheneOS on a Pixel for my first phone, and a linux phone with hardware killswitches for bt/wifi, cam/mic, and baseband for my second phone. All of this in addition to solid fundamentals like network traffic monitoring, very restrictive firewall, offline encrypted hardware password manager with no password reuse, etc.
  • friendlyHornet 4y ago
    > refuse to connect directly websites protected by cloudflare What do you do in case you want to use a website protected by cloudflare?
    • anonym29 4y ago
      There are many ways to do this, most utilizing some kind of proxy-like architecture for all requests, or just to retrieve cookies. My personal favorite for retrieving cookies is FlareSolverr. For strictly reading public webpages, public paywall bypass tools and archive sites work pretty well.
      • friendlyHornet 4y ago
        Thank you!
    • Spooky23 4y ago
      Since this is a ridiculous troll, so generally speaking the only way to address this to visit the site from a local library, then immolate the computer with thermite and explode the remainder with TNT.
• deleted 4y ago
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• throwaway2214 4y ago
  i used to care great deal about this, but recently i gave up why do you even care? most of your files are either on apple's computers or google's computers
• nvln 4y ago
  I used this a while back when I was worried something weird was going on: https://github.com/mvt-project/mvt https://github.com/mvt-project/mvt. (Nothing was going on).
• LinuxBender 4y ago
  My TL;DR Summary With time I have moved further and further away from using the computer for important things and believe that tech has long since exceeded George Orwell's wildest fever dreams I assume a freshly installed OS is compromised [1] and the hardware it is on is also compromised in the BIOS and firmware at very least by state actors but then I also assume those state actors have poorly vetted contractors that may also be compromised by other nations i.e. who pays the most gets access. I would not be surprised for a moment if they have competing backdoors that try to block one another. Since I can not control any of this I just imagine the national actors of the world are watching my screen and yawning. More likely the latest iteration of ECHELON AI is yawning. I instead focus on securing important externalities making bank accounts read-only from the web, not all banks will do this. I also diversify where my assets are stored and make a best effort to require physical access. Beyond that layer I do all the usual hardening practices but that only goes so far as every browser likely also has intentional weaknesses in them. Even FireJail and SELinux/AppArmor will likely just happily relay malicious instructions. Addons may raise the bar keeping some script-kiddies off my machine but I never for a moment assume that it stops government contractors from relaying instructions to the backdoors in the hardware and/or OS and ultimately to the hidden CPU instructions that likely take multiple layers of obfuscated instructions to tickle meaning SandSifter will never find them. The above is for PC's. For cell phones I assume FAANG are interactively on my phone and since most of them were initially funded by the government. I do not use it for anything sensitive. I also assume that all cell phones have backdoors added by their manufacturer. Each one does seem to dial home to different places and make unique DNS requests. Putting phones into developer/debug mode does seem to quiet them down which is the opposite than I would have expected so maybe they know someone may be watching. i.e. malware knows it's in a sandbox Wi-Fi Access Points are a story in and of themselves. Why should I care about state actors? That one's easy. The best contractors will have leaks in their OpsSec and for-profit companies will acquire the weaknesses and use them to do illegal and unethical things to citizens for a price and political, economic and a myriad of other motivations. I would not be surprised if some government actors sell off access and end up working for said companies. [1] - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34388990 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=34388990 [and hundreds of other threads]
  • 4y ago
• etna_ramequin 4y ago
  From a more security security research point-of-view, the paper “Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers”[1] is a very good overview. Although it would necessitate a bit of an update for more recent developments with e.g. dm-verity etc. [1] PDF: https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/bparno/papers/bootstrapping-sok.pdf https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/bparno/papers/bootstrapping-...
• CraigJPerry 4y ago
  I daily drive an m1 mac. I cant even change the initial boot screen wallpaper because it’s on a sealed partition. The previous intel/T2 approach of modifying then blessing the modified partition doesn’t work on m1. When i dug into the depths of this simple problem (changing boot screen wallpaper before login) i came away impressed. So I feel fairly confident about the machine firmware & OS. Less so about my keyboard for example. Also because i opt out of a lot of the securities (e.g. i download from homebrew rather than using app store apps), I can’t be sure i’m not being compromised.
• timbit42 4y ago
  Try not to use apps written in unsafe languages like C and C++, etc.
• lrvick 4y ago
  I run QubesOS which compartmentalizes your usb ports, network card, and all your various application workflows into separate virtual machines. It is literally designed to protect you even if part of your system is compromised. https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/ https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/ For details on how I use Qubes specifically see: https://github.com/hashbang/book/blob/master/content/docs/security/Production_Engineering.md https://github.com/hashbang/book/blob/master/content/docs/se...
  • ThePowerOfFuet 4y ago
    > For details on how I use Qubes specifically see: https://github.com/hashbang/book/blob/master/content/docs/security/Production_Engineering.md https://github.com/hashbang/book/blob/master/content/docs/se... How is this not a contradiction? >6. Manual PRIVILEGED SYSTEM mutations MUST be approved, witnessed, and recorded >7. PRIVILEGED SYSTEM mutatations MUST be automated and repeatable via code
• bo1024 4y ago
  The Librem 14 has a neutered Intel chip (no ME) among other things. My favorite privacy/freedom-respecting laptop. https://shop.puri.sm/shop/librem-14/ https://shop.puri.sm/shop/librem-14/
  • mark_l_watson 4y ago
    That looks nice enough. Is it custom built, or a 3rd party laptop that is modified?
    • lrvick 4y ago
      Custom laptop hardware made in China then ME neutered and flashed with open firmware in the US.
• mark_l_watson 4y ago
  I actually don’t really trust my Linux and macOS laptops. I put no sensitive information in them, just what I need to write software or build models. I do trust iOS and iPadOS in Lockdown Mode, and I avoid installing apps, usually preferring web apps. I have a Chromebook and I also trust that. In all cases, I don’t wait to install available system updates - that might not be the best strategy, but that is how I do it.
• naveen99 4y ago
  third parties is a broad term. Especially when the list of potential 2nd parties includes most of those 3rd parties.
• rmkrmk 4y ago
  Are there any somewhat easy-to-use solutions to isolate a development environment? Preventing or at least decreasing the damage malicious packages could do? Like deleting files or uploading a private ssh key/keychain to a 3rd party server? I was looking into things like GitHub Codespaces, I believe they're isolated per repository and integrated into VS Code, but I'd like something I could run on my machine or a server of mine.
  • jacooper 4y ago
    Docker containers?
    • rmkrmk 4y ago
      Just found out that there's an extension to use Docker/Podman within VSCode which works on a local or remote machine. https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/devcontainers/containers https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/devcontainers/containers
  • jart 4y ago
    Faraday cage? It's a turnkey solution.
  • kccqzy 4y ago
    Seriously, but make multiple user accounts on your computer. That's the traditional UNIX way of enforcing isolation, and it goes back to the days of hundreds of people sharing one single UNIX machine. And don't give any software root access.
• luxuryballs 4y ago
  I never trust a computer to not be compromised, if there’s any information so critical that it must be secured at all costs then I simply never let it near a digital device.
• greggarious 4y ago
  I don't. That is... I don't trust my machine. I take reasonable precautions, but at a certain point you have to just live your life and deal with people who violate your boundaries in meatspace.
• deleted 4y ago
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• trenchgun 4y ago
  Simple: I don't. It is most likely compromised and I behave accordingly.
• nixpulvis 4y ago
  TLDR; you don't. Best advice I have, for what it's worth is to wipe and reformat from a known clean image regularly. If you haven't been hacked yet, stands to reason you wont be hacked going forward. That said, I often install packages I don't fully vet, and grant permissions I probably shouldn't, either in the name of curiosity (how else do we learn and experiment), or necessity.
• kovac 4y ago
  Assuming that you have no other option but to use a computer, there's some good advice here[1] for securing a Linux system. Then you can run regular scans using security tools like the ones listed here[2]. [1]: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/security https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/security [2]: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/List_of_applications/Security https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/List_of_applications/Securi...
• RGamma 4y ago
  knocks on wood Until the day we get sandboxing, well-defined interfacing with user data and stuff in desktop computing... Imagine the desktop's security model, if you can call it that, on mobile. It would be madness.
• QuiEgo 4y ago
  The real question here: does it even matter? As far as I know I did everything right, and someone called my bank with info we both believe they got from stealing from my paper mail and got access because they convinced some human at a bank's call center they were me. Don't make it easy for people (rng passwords + password manager, 2fa, don't run as su, whole disk encryption, don't leave you computer unlocked, don't log into your bank on rando computers you don't control, don't use untrusted wifi). However, assume you already are compromised and will have to deal with it some day. Once you think that way, you don't need to stress that much about getting the perfect hardware solution or being super paranoid - buy a device you like, and enjoy you digital life. Stuff happens sometimes and if it does you can deal with it ¯\_(ツ)_/¯.
• elorant 4y ago
  I monitor all outgoing traffic.
• varelse 4y ago
  [dead]
• IAmNotAnAnt 4y ago
  I am a distrohopper and don't use phone for calling and some messaging apps.
• Jabrov 4y ago
  That’s the neat thing: I don’t!
• jrm4 4y ago
  My personal machine? I use Linux with lots of distributed sync and backups with e.g. Syncthing (plus copies of stuff NOT on sync thing) Now, I'm aware many reading this are going to nerd out hard (like how the top comment now is "Android/Chromium" which I'm skeptical of but haven't done much homework on? Maybe?) But because you said "personal machine"-- I'm thinking about my own threat model and my years of experience. Thus, not going to much worry about, say, some obscure Linux-Stuxnet-thing, which not only is overwhelmingly unlikely, but also something I can't much do anything about beyond the solutions I mentioned above. More likely, I can avoid stupid Windows and stupid Mac,and often stupid Web mess by what I'm doing now.
• 2000UltraDeluxe 4y ago
  First, take a deep breath. Second, unless you're in a situation where you've pissed off/threatened some rather large actors, you should be fine assuming you follow best practices for backup, software, update and password management and you avoid using things like cheap IoT devices to connect to your cloud services. Third, when disaster strikes, keep calm, rely on backups, change affected passwords and notify others who might get affected.
• intrasight 4y ago
  Perhaps it's because I have a cold right now, but I interpreted "personal machine" to mean my body. And what is meant by "trust?" The word is really synonymous with "faith". That's why the correct phrase is "trust and verify". I understand that my "personal machine" - my body - is always compromised. I also have faith that no heinous actors are likely to try to compromise my body. But that is only because I am a nobody and have the good fortune to live in a safe place. As for computers, I think the same logic applies. I have faith that no nefarious actors are striving to compromise my own machine specifically. But for many high-value targets, this would be a bad assumption. Witness the crypto thefts that have occurred by hacking individual's computers. I am no expert in counter ciber espionage, but my understanding is that it boils down to a) reducing attach surface, b) using trusted hardware, and c) using ephemeral "machines".
• nilespotter 4y ago
  Compromised by whom? We've all heard of IME and PRISM I assume...
• voytec 4y ago
  I use a OS from a vendor not obsessed with usage monetization nor any kind of "phone home" functionality. I consider internet browsers to be a be a major backdoor risk and thus have none installed on my host OS. I only browse interwebs from VMs. I don't trust my home network the same as I wouldn't trust an open public WiFi. I don't assume everything is as secure as it could be and am taking redundant steps to ensure certain stuff.
• lamontcg 4y ago
  If you're just a rando who isn't likely to get specific attention from someone like the NSA or other state-backed threat agents, then the answer is that if everything is behaving normally that you're not compromised. For the bulk of people if someone breaks into your personal device they're going to start using it for something. You'll see unusual utilization, your proxy settings on your browser will get changed, you'll just be hit by a ransomware attack and your drive will be encrypted and you'll be locked out, etc. They're after the bulk of the users out there and they don't need to be particularly stealthy about anything. Of course if you have large quantities of BTC or something then the answer is to get it off of your personal machine and setup a cold wallet that cannot be hacked, and stop installing clever looking crypto shit on your machine.
• modeless 4y ago
  For some excellent advice on security and privacy based on thoroughly researched technical concerns rather than speculation or blind trust in any particular organization (e.g. Apple or Google or Mozilla), see here: https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/ https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/ I found the Android and Firefox/Chromium evaluations particularly interesting.
• SnowHill9902 4y ago
  You generally don’t. It all depends on your attack hypothesis. Are you a Mossad target or a non-Mossad target? The best you can do if you are a non-Mossad target is to anonymously/pseudonymously periodically purchase new hardware and do a fresh OS install. Be minimalistic. If you can’t trust your wifi-enabled printer, disable its wifi connectivity and use it only over USB. If you still can’t trust it, don’t use printers to begin with.
• lormayna 4y ago
  Before defining any strategy, you need to define an appropriate threat model. Which kind of information are you storing on your device and who can target you? If you are a standard person and not doing any illegal, the information that you need to protect are mostly related to financial and personal standpoint. So you need to protect you bank/credit card/cryptowallet with encryption and/or MFA. For financial information, use the same criteria, according also to level of continentality that you want to achieve: it's stupid to encrypt your cat pictures, it may be worth to encrypt cipher your son pictures, it's mandatory to protect your health related files also with MFA. This is just to have an idea, you should make this exercise frequently (let's say every 6 months) and verify if the security controls are in place and have to be updated. For my own devices, I am using this approach: * Infrastructure: I am using a password manager with MFA for all my accounts and where is possible I have enabled MFA. I have Cloudflare ZT on my home network, so I am a bit protected against web threat. Moreover, I have a script that everyday download phishing and malicious feeds and update my router's ACLs. I am not exposing anything on public, all the services inside my house are accessible through VPN. My Chinese camera are heavy firewalled in a different VLAN and reachable only from specific host. Every device is upgraded to last version and no default passwords. * Main laptop: is running Linux, so I am feeling a bit more safer during the web surfing. Anyway, I have an encrypted backup for important data over cloud, just to be ensure disaster recovery. * Secondary laptop: is running Windows, I am keeping it regularly updated with scheduled MS Defender scans. My wife is mainly using it, but she is not installing anything without my approval (I am the admin of the laptop). * Phone: Storage encrypted, access protected by strong PIN and no biometric. Applications are installed only from official stores and using a DNS blacklist. My phone has a native feature to reduce and auditing app permissions on a schedule and I am doing it by myself as well sometimes. In case I have to connect to an unencrypted public network, I am using a Wireguard VPN client. Just my 2 cents, I hope to did not forget anything and be helpful.
• EVa5I7bHFq9mnYK 4y ago
  Security is at odds with usability, so you can't run critical apps on your personal machine. For me, stuff that needs to be secure, runs on a separate machine that has nothing else installed.
• deleted 4y ago
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• nromiun 4y ago
  You can try to "snoop" on the virus. For example, collecting all the internet packets, see if some ports are opened that is not needed. Collect logs on which apps are eating up the battery. These steps are not perfect by any means, but you can catch some noisy virus with this. If your virus is very stealthy you can only hope your passwords show up in haveibeenpwned. This is also why using an open source OS is so important. At least you can investigate why something is happening in the OS. Without the source you can only guess at what is happening.
  • javajosh 4y ago
    Open-source is de facto closed source if you don't build your own stuff (and know how to debug it). That's the status most OSS users are in, I suspect. I run Linux but I've never compiled a kernel and I've never run a native debugger. It's nice that I could, but this is just a platitude.
    • nromiun 4y ago
      But anyone this paranoid will obviously build from source? Most OSS users don't build from source because they don't care to look in their internet packets for viruses. BTW, it is not that hard either. You can even have multiple Linux kernels installed at the same time. Same with Android ROMs, just checkout the code, build it and flash using ADB. It is about as difficult as dual booting Windows and Ubuntu.
• eightysixfour 4y ago
  I don’t. I assume all devices are potentially compromised and I shift my risk to others as much as possible - credit card fraud protection, etc.
• SpeedilyDamage 4y ago
  As with anything, there needs to be some evidence to believe something, and if there’s evidence, you can follow that to figure out if it’s real or just anomalous. Generally, it’s a bad idea to believe things without evidence, so I guess you can trust your computer isn’t compromised the same way you can trust no unicorns exist; there’s not any credible evidence to suggest it.
• deleted 4y ago
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• H4ZB7 4y ago
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• ChicagoDave 4y ago
  I’m kind of hoping Malwarebytes is good at it’s job.
• andix 4y ago
  Hopes and prayers? I think its completely impossible to make sure your machine is not compromised. You can just take the best effort to keep it clean. Try to use 2FA as much as possible. And try to shield the 2nd factor as good as possible from any connection to your other devices.
  • landemva 4y ago
    USA banks seem to have found the 2fa powerpoint presentation and are forcing accounts to use SMS 2fa, with no ability to use something like authenticator app. Nothing about SMS is secure, so their IT is taking a step backward.
    • andix 4y ago
      SMS is still better than no 2FA, but yes, it’s not secure at all. What really bugs me, that some systems rely only on the 2nd factor, which replaces the password completely. Some even did that with SMS. So you put in you user name and then the SMS code. That’s really bad. Also a lot of Services disguise this method in the „I forgot my password“ function, where you can reset the password just with a sms code.
      • account42 4y ago
        > SMS is still better than no 2FA Not if it can be social engineered into a 1FA password reset. Better not to give companies your phone number at all.
        • andix 4y ago
          Yes, that’s true. It should really only be used as second factor and not as a single factor for password resets. I’ve seen this too, and it’s awful. If sms is used for password resets, there should be at least an email notification and a waiting period of a few days.
• cma 4y ago
  Store a $300 eth wallet private key on the machine in plain text. Have some other service notify you if that wallet address ever makes a transaction.
• giantg2 4y ago
  "How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?" You don't. They are all likely "compromised" to some extent. The vast majority likely have asymptomatic/latent state-sponsored vulnerabilities, if not on the machine itself, then in the network infrastructure it uses. For the most part, people might not consider them "malicious third parties".
• yshklarov 4y ago
  In the words of Robert Morris, 40 years ago: "The three golden rules to ensure computer security are: do not own a computer; do not power it on; and do not use it."
• khana 4y ago
  [dead]
• puma_ambit 4y ago
  Keep your essential files synced with an online service and regularly format and wipe your machine at least once a year. This is what I do.
• labarilem 4y ago
  Don't think I can find a practical way to be 100% sure of that. I'm happy to be at 95% though.
• epolanski 4y ago
  By default I think I am, thus I minimize the amount of sensitive info I put into any device.
• jhoelzel 4y ago
  I use 2fa where i can and accept the fact that if im not already compromised, i could be at any moment. Thats also why 2fa is the first thing i configure after setting up a kubernetes cluster too.
• 988747 4y ago
  You simply cannot. Unless you want to go Richard Stallman path, and work on a laptop from 2008, with only open source software, unable to use Netflix, banking site, etc.
• karmakaze 4y ago
  For malware that was downloaded through activity, even if it required no clicks, they usually present themselves as slower performance or other quirks. Maybe one has eluded discovery but I'd never know. I'm much more wary of systemic malware at lower levels that I don't have an opportunity to detect. There's not so much I can do about that other than try to use devices from vendors I trust (or distrust less) that have the least preinstalled software. Lobbying for open firmware or hardware is the long-term strategy. I also use multiple machines: work, personal, gaming, and utility (Surface Go). E.g. I use the mouse configuration software on the Surface Go and only the mouse hardware with its configured profile on the other machines. Ultimately I can't know I'm not compromised but don't lose sleep over something I don't have more control over.
• rejectfinite 4y ago
  Windows 10, Firefox, ublock origin and Windows Defender Dont install weird exe or MSIs Thats kinda it.
• thot_experiment 4y ago
  I worry so much more about the dumb hardware locks and secure enclaves, OS features etc. I find the risk of a compromised machine to be so much less of an impact on my life than my computer telling me I am not allowed to do something. This is my computer, let me tell it what to do. I hate how much of my time is wasted by all this security stuff. Infinitely more so than had been wasted by actual malware over the last decade or so. I don't want to have to spend 10hrs figuring out how to hide root from Android pay every time something upgrades. Please just let me have root on devices I own. Ever since I started doing a lot of work in C where all the foot guns are intentionally left in I've had my eyes opened to how beautiful and fun computers can be when they aren't your fucking adversary. "Security" that can't be disabled by the device owner is tyranny.
  • hsbauauvhabzb 4y ago
    Root detection is about reducing risk to companies, presumably sideloading results in substantially increased risk. It’s not about you, it’s about their bottom line, but it can also help prevent grandma from losing their life savings. I’m a security engineer and know what I’m doing and agree there’s some level of security theatre, but it you’re not worried about losing Crown Jewels from a compromise you’re most probably uneducated or arrogant.
    • thot_experiment 4y ago
      Of course I'm worried, I just attempt to understand my threat model, my vulnerability surface and act accordingly. I understand why security exists. I just want to be able to turn it off without having to resort to hours of research of security tech in order to control the devices I own. Obviously I wouldn't give access to an account with my life savings to my rooted phone. It is about their bottom line, but largely not to protect me or grandma, it's about justifying control and divorcing people from the power of the supercomputer in their pocket. There's more money in making it hard for me to edit my hosts file etc. than there is in preventing the potential loss of my money/data through these restrictions.
• jnurmine 4y ago
  For my part, after considering this very question in the past, the answer is that the question is wrong. The question is: is there some reason to trust, and the answer is: no. In my opinion, any and all general computing devices sold to the mass consumer market are already compromised in some shape or form as they roll out from the factories -- otherwise such things would simply not be sold in large quantities.
• aliqot 4y ago
  I trust that it is compromised since I don't have a chip fab in the back yard.
• Yizahi 4y ago
  My threat profile doesn't include Mossad or NKVD, if they are out to get me then I accept that they will. Especially at the BIOS/firmware/other levels.
• 1vuio0pswjnm7 4y ago
  "Ask HN: How do you trust that your personal machine is not compromised?" The pivotal word in this question is "you". If you allow a third party, e.g., Google, Apple, Microsoft, a "Certificate Authority", etc., to decide "trust" on your behalf, then it is the third party that controls "trust", not "you". A third party can tell "you" that "your personal machine" has or has not been "compromised". The third party can decide who to trust. However, this is quite different than you deciding who to trust. Under the trust models promoted by "tech" companies like the ones mentioned above, ultimately "you" are not supposed to be the one deciding trust. They want to do this for you. Unfortunately, "tech" companies are themselves third parties and they may have commercial interests counter to yours.
• AussieWog93 4y ago
  The same way I trust that my wife isn't fucking other men behind my back. You'll never know for sure but you just have to put your faith in them.
  • deleted 4y ago
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• ouraf 4y ago
  I don't. Every now and then I access gross stuff online to make uncle FBI or cousins Hacker man puke their meals and lose the will to snoop on my boring Facebook account. And since the video card is old and internet is spotty, brother Bitcoin miner and ransomware delivery man won't have much to win either. The rest of automated attacks have to go through basic PC os protection (firewall, antivirus, hardware locks for unwanted code execution, etc). It's the digital equivalent of "in god we trust"
• ramtatatam 4y ago
  I can't tell if my hardware was not compromised (most likely it was not), but for the data I store on my SSD - I keep it fully encrypted with boot stored on hardware aes-256-encrypted USB drive. Laptop won't boot without the USB plugged in, and USB won't unlock unless correct key is provided. Not too sophisticated but enough for my humble needs (that is I'm the only one who can boot the laptop, and I know my data will be safely forgotten if my flat gets robbed or if I forget my laptop on the train etc.).
• deleted 4y ago
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• CrazyPyroLinux 4y ago
  A still-relevant classic: Reflections on trusting trust, Ken Thompson, 1984 https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_ReflectionsonTrustingTrust.pdf https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rdriley/487/papers/Thompson_1984_Ref...
• lofaszvanitt 4y ago
  Security is like: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFAbTLWiK20 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFAbTLWiK20
• mouse_ 4y ago
  put $10 in a crypto wallet and keep the seed phrase on your desktop check that it's still there from time to time; any automated malware will slurp it up
• deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
• r3ctilinear 4y ago
  Keep a modest Bitcoin wallet canary on the computer and run an activity alert from elsewhere. If I'm compromised one of the first things they'll do is steal that money. It's not perfect but it's a data point that gives me some confidence I haven't been compromised by a petty thief.
• fexecve 4y ago
  Law of averages. If I am hacked, then likely millions of other people are hacked, and I haven't heard about millions of people being hacked. QED.
• mr_woozy 4y ago
  [dead]
• mihaigalos 4y ago
  I've taken steps to secure my Linux: * Using Yubikey PAM always as a 2FA for ssh,sudo (also on every Linux in my home network). * Always require authentication on each sudo command (prevents escalating once and then reusing privileges). * Only running Docker with sudo as recommended (requires 2FA now). * Closing all traffic other than services I need with nftables. Regularly look at the journalctl for suspicious activity.
  • mihaigalos 4y ago
    Also, I have a Google Authenticator as a fall-back in case the 1st Yubikey PAM fails or I have no access to the internet to contact the Yubico servers for token validation. Perhaps somebody can confirm if it's a good idea or not, but I like to generate only 1 emergency code for Authenticator (the least) and then delete that line in ~/.google-authenticator. Also, permissions of 400. In case interested, check it out in code here: https://github.com/mihaigalos/config/blob/main/services/pam/Justfile#L40 https://github.com/mihaigalos/config/blob/main/services/pam/...
• chinabot 4y ago
  Run Windows 95 and Internet explorer, there's probably nobody targeting them these days :-)
• throwaway_89 4y ago
  Eveybody in this thread talks about good security practices and prevention tips, while the question of OP is basically: "how can you confirm that your machine is not compromised" => "how can you check if your machine is already compromised?"
• cheri9 4y ago
  [dead]
• arcastroe 4y ago
  I use Windows as my main OS. In Windows 10 and 11, there is a feature called Unified Write Filter that essentially resets your computer after every reboot. When I first got my laptop, I installed a fresh copy of Windows 10, installed all my commonly used applications, configured all my settings, and then enabled UWF. On every reboot, it goes back to this clean snapshot, no matter what I do - And reboots are quick too (~10 seconds). I'm never worried about making changes to my laptop to try them out (installing a new program, configuring obscure settings, etc). If I don't like it, I can get back to my clean state with a simple reboot. Still vulnerable to BIOS-level malware though, I suppose. (Note: I repeated most of this from a previous hackernews comment of mine) https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29374928 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=29374928