14 ms·

Boeing Weighs Cutting or Halting 737 Max Production

184 points by xoa 7y ago

freehunter 7y ago
Just an anecdote, but I'm a traveling consultant for a pretty big tech company, and the manager of the consulting group told us when the 737 Max issue started (but before it was grounded) that we did not have to fly on that plane and if we were put on that plane we could change flights and bill the change fee back to the company without any complaints. There's been no further guidance so far on what we'll do when the 737 Max is back in service, but the message was clear: the safety and comfort of the employee is worth a $200 change fee, compared to being forced onto a plane that the employee feels is unsafe. I've never heard that mentioned for any other plane. As much as air travel has sucked this summer with cancelations and delays caused by the grounding of this plane, I don't foresee that model having much luck if/when it's put into full service.
- pcurve 7y ago
  There have been plenty of design flaws in commercial jetliners and in most cases, reputation is recovered. But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one. but none quite like this one.
  - chx 7y ago
    Especially one that the FAA tried to pooh pooh as long as it could. It was amazing to watch the goodwill and trust accumulated over decades crumble to nothing in a few hours as the European countries one by one banned the airline from their airspace but did not ground them. It was the EASA telling the FAA to do the right thing. They didn't and then finally the EASA did ground the plane. I really can't remember any other time when the EASA and the FAA disagreed especially this big. https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/ https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/
    - FabHK 7y ago
      My perception is different. It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. It was also arguably appropriate for the FAA not to ground the fleet immediately after the second crash, but then after some time when it became apparent that the failure mode was sufficiently similar (as they did). However, what has emerged since then certainly damaged the reputation of the FAA. But it was not a matter of a few hours, it was a matter of careful investigation and evaluation over months.
      - markdown 7y ago
        > It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. Safety first. They ought to have grounded the plane immediately after the first crash and TBH it's my belief that they would have done so if it had been a US plane with US passengers. The fact that it happened to brown people on the other side of the world made it easy to ignore. Don't forget that the FAA had all the details of the plane showing that it had implemented the new MCAS system which in theory could have caused the crash.
        briandear 7y ago
        The FAA doesn’t control the worldwide skies. Indonesia didn’t ground the plane, nor did Ethiopia. Europe also didn’t ground it after the first crash either. The FAA’s jurisdiction is the United States: other countries could have grounded the plane quickly but didn’t.
        bdhess 7y ago
        As the United States is the country of origin, an airworthiness directive issued by the FAA is valid in all ICAO member states.
        georgeplusplus 7y ago
        Your safety first rhetoric doesn’t hold up against any sort of practicality. Should the 777 have been grounded immediately when Asiana crashed? What about the 777 after Malaysia or its second which we still don’t know the cause of? the right thing was done after the second crash (and eventually by the FAA after it’s arm was twisted enough) but to say it should’ve been immediately grounded is missing the picture entirely.
  - nexuist 7y ago
    Like a lot of tragedies, it's really hard to tell how much the side effects of something like this are attributed to the mistake itself and how much can be explained through modern communication networks (social media) amplifying everything. Is the Boeing mistake really that bad, or is it because this is the first such aviation design mistake to happen in our post-2010 everyone-is-online world? Remember that the tails on 737s used to just...fall off back in the '90s. For the record, I don't think the 737 MAX should have ever been cleared to fly with the current version of MCAS. But I can't help but believe that there had to be some boneheaded designs in the past that cost hundreds of lives that we just don't think about today. In any case, I hope Boeing has learned from this and revised its engineering processes to go back to its previous prestigious roots. I also hope against hope that we will finally see some executives go to prison for approving this.
    - ncmncm 7y ago
      Yes, it's really that bad. Not because of the flaw itself, but the culture that drove the flaw into the outside world. There have been plenty of others in the past that do not detract from the magnitude of this one.
    - rsynnott 7y ago
      It’s hard to be statistically sure given the small number of existing examples, but taken on face value, no recent large airliner has anything like this level of deaths per flight.
    - bcrosby95 7y ago
      Yes it is that bad. No it is not because of social media. Airline crashes have always been a huge deal. That's why airplanes are so safe
    - rootusrootus 7y ago
      The 737NG problems in the 90s were rudders deflecting suddenly and irrecoverably, tails did not fall off. Two crashes and a number of incidents before the problem was identified. Boeing also tried to squash that investigation, they actually swiped the servo from the first crashed plane so it could not be properly analyzed. Then the 737NG went on to have the best safety record of any plane ever. So while the MAX problem is pretty bad, and social media vastly complicates the PR angle, there is precedent for recovering from this. Certainly with as many MAXs as have been built there is enormous incentive to get it fixed. It's not realistic to expect them to scrap the planes.
  - deleted 7y ago
    [deleted]
  - OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
    Has software had its materials science moment? The pioneering DeHavilland Comet failed due to unexpected stress fractures. The aviation industry changed markedly because of it with years of testing preceding the introduction of any new material or process. Boeing took the lead, DeHavilland never recovered. My cynical view is that little will change in this era.
    - mrtksn 7y ago
      More like MBAs moment maybe? This issue doesn't seem to have anything to do with the difficulties or shortcomings of computer science but product management.
      - OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
        I am no fan of MBAs but in this case I am talking about what I perceive as cultural difference between hardware and software engineering. I come from the experimental/hardware world and I believe there isn't the incremental patch and release mindset for deliverable items. The testing cycles for mission critical hardware is rather brutal. The MBA piece of it is why I'm cynical. "Ho-ho-hold on one second. This installation has a substantial dollar value attached to it." --- C.J. Burke "Aliens"
        fiter 7y ago
        I think this is a systems engineering problem that may have been due to siloed hardware and software engineering teams. The hardware engineers knew they were making something inherently unstable that the software would have to compensate for. The software engineers believed they had working AoA hardware.
        joe_the_user 7y ago
        But that isn't the situation, it's really not. The context is airbus has an advanced and fuel-economic model that was eating Boeing market share. Boeing decided to produce one more version of the 737 model - it fit the category and as a fuel-efficinet "drop-in replacement", it was very competitive but was rather aerodynamically unstable. So Boeing added a software system to compensate but didn't tell anyone, didn't make it dependent on redundant sensors and basically produced a plane where, once the facts were all out, it became obvious it could never fly again - not because it could never be made safe but because making safe would involve admitting how flagrantly you initially skirted safety. No one flies on the "once this was utterly unsafe but now we've fixed it" plane if they really have fixed it. Everything about the plane was super advanced but cheap-as-could-be, including the software. But by that token, none of this seems the fault of "software culture", indeed, there's been no implication that the software was at fault in the crashes, just the total shitshow design package, which was indeed the fault of finance and management pushing this approach through.
  - mopsi 7y ago
    > But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one. The DC-10 cargo door issue is probably the closest thing. Took two accidents, 346 fatalities and a House of Representatives investigation to get the flawed design fixed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_door_problem_and_other_major_accidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_...
    - lmm 7y ago
      Notably that was another case that was widely seen as the FAA treating an American company especially gently.
    - philjohn 7y ago
      Also the DeHaviland Comet ... first passenger jetliner, but due to poorly understood metal fatigue science had several high-profile explosive disintegrations during flight and along with the lives of those on board, the hopes of the UK being a major aviation player looked bleak until Airbus.
  - briandear 7y ago
    The A330 in the crash of AF 447 certainly had a design flaw like that. Due to that flaw, they entered a high altitude stall and crashed into the ocean.
    - thombat 7y ago
      On AF447 all three of the airspeed probes iced up for 40 seconds, prompting the flight computers to disconnect autopilot and autothrottle and clearly announce to the crew that air data was unreliable and that the normal protection against stalling was suspended. The pilots immediately understood the problem, however for various reasons made a series of bad decisions which resulted in the crash. Tragically there was no need for the pilots to take any urgent action - by design the plane continued in stable flight when the air data was lost. On the 737MAX crashes the single angle of attack indicator being used as input to the MCAS malfunctioned and in response the system set about repeatedly forcing the plane into a dive with no clear indication of why this was happening. Compounding this was the utter lack of training on the MCAS system, which wasn't even mentioned in the pilot manual or IPad-based training that was also used by US airlines. There's a world of difference between these accidents.
  - elliekelly 7y ago
    There’s also clearly a serious design flaw in FAA regulations and how the certification process works. Like most rules, I’m sure they meant well when it was implemented but as the regulations/process has iterated it’s created a perverse incentive where Boeing wasn’t optimizing for safety in order to pass the safety certification. Boeing bears a lot of responsibility but taking Boeing to task without taking a look at the system in which it operates seems short-sighted.
- lucb1e 7y ago
  A bit tangential but I'm curious: if you fly that much, does your company compensate the CO2? From their statement about changing flights being no problem, it sounds like there would easily be budget for such a thing, but I have no idea if companies are starting to do this yet.
  - disordinary 7y ago
    You'd hope so, but I know from traveling for a large multinational that it was up to the individual to pay for their own offsetting and I think most are the same. I tend to just try and video conference with people to alleviate the exhaustion of traveling (I live in New Zealand, going to a workshop in Europe is a 30-40 hour endeavor) and the carbon that flying generates.
- fred_is_fred 7y ago
  I believe that several carriers (for sure United and I think others) will let you change for free on a Max. The issue for you is going to be the impact to your time, which is likely more valuable than the change fee to begin with. On the standard consultant route of Monday morning/Thursday afternoon there are many times not alternative flights for hours (or possibly days) later -- especially if a Max gets "subbed in" at the last minute and you cannot plan ahead. The change fee will be inconsequential compared to you not showing up on a client site for a day or at all.
- petilon 7y ago
  You may refuse to fly on 737 Max, but how do you feel about 737-8200? Boeing will likely not use the "Max" name when the plan is put back into service. See: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509
  - xiphias2 7y ago
    People are not stupid. They will know the new name of the MAX whatever it will be.
    - ethiclub 7y ago
      Devil's advocate: Common, successful marketing: If a brand is poisoned, distance yourself from the name & rebrand. At its extreme, it is used alongside phoenix company tactics. It works, although a (likely minority) customer portion will keep their finger on the pulse.
  - cloudwizard 7y ago
    The engines are visibly different. They are huge.
    - gizmo385 7y ago
      Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight?
      - mcny 7y ago
        > Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight? I am not an industry insider but my understanding is the vast majority of the flying public simply does not matter. We are flying on the cheapest possible ticket. The people who do matter imo are those who are flying on a corporate account or better yet those who control a corporate account. If wealthy people refuse to fly on this death trap, I think airlines will listen.
      - 7y ago
- nrau 7y ago
  An interesting part of the history of the 737 is that when it launched it originally had a serious rudder design flaw that contributed to several fatal crashes where a lot of folks lost their lives: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues However, Boeing did fix the problem, and the 737 went on to be one of the best selling airplanes in history. This MCAS issue is eerily similar in that it has also resulted in two fatal crashes. But if history is any guide, the problems will be fixed, and the memory of MCAS and MAX issues will likely fade from the public as well.
  - TrueDuality 7y ago
    A part of me joins you in this pessimistic view, but the other side of me recognizes that the rudder issues took place in 1991 and most likely the vast majority of the public was never made aware of those issues. I had never heard of it, though that doesn't mean much as a statistical sample. I know a lot of people are now aware of this particular design flaw and I would put money on it being more generally known now then then.
    - orisho 7y ago
      I also believe most people hadn't heard of it. For one, news gets around much faster and easier nowadays with the advent of the internet. Anecdotally, it appears as if anyone who flies would've had the right exposure to Western media to hear about it.
    - georgeplusplus 7y ago
      You can’t really compare the two. The 80s and 90s were loaded with severe accidents where the NTSB was really giving the taxpayers their money’s worth since there would be a major accident almost every month and the agency had to create a new division to handle all the cases. Most weren’t design issues like the MCAS and the 91’ rudder issue but faulty 3rd party parts, poor maintenance, unknown stresses on aging fleets, pilot issues, and on and on. We are in an unprecedented age of aviation safety and the MCAS issue is a huge blow to that record, thus you’re hearing about it in this level because it is fresh in the news. Accidents were common place back then, so common that I’d wager the 91 crash wasn’t on peoples radars since they just accepted that aircraft crash frequently and to be honest the general public doesn’t know what a rudder is in the first place.
- jubble 7y ago
  Same thing for me in a megacorp. Group manager said “no requirement to travel on a 737 Max” without higher approval... he said he’d just eat the cancellation fees from his own budget.
- laydn 7y ago
  With the amount of planes already ordered and in the production pipeline, it will be near impossible to not fly with a 737 MAX within a few years, if you are a heavy flier. The alternative for a given route may be a train, bus, or another aircraft with a schedule that won't meet yours.
- StreamBright 7y ago
  This is exactly why this is pretty bad for companies operating these flights. The alternatives are often within reach of the customers.
- jwr 7y ago
  Having looked carefully into what Boeing has been doing with the 737 Max, I have no intention of flying on one ever again, even if it gets rammed through FAA again. Though I am absolutely certain that all the sleazy airlines (or perhaps Boeing) will soon begin a rebranding project, changing the name to something that people will not immediately recognize.
  - retSava 7y ago
    Unless you boycott Boeing 737-max similar airplanes, you may fly with one without knowing it. The name is really badly burnt and the only plausible way out of it for Boeing is renaming it to something that doesn't ring the bell. IIRC I read that they've already done that for the airplanes that are being delivered since the grounding.
    - IAmEveryone 7y ago
      As far as I can tell, no planes have been delivered since the grounding. The airlines aren't willing to take delivery of a flawed product. It would just cost them money to park them, and may even have legal consequences, such as shifting the burden of proof in any legal disputes that may still arise.
      - alistairSH 7y ago
        You are correct about delivery. Boeing has parking lots full of new Max that are ready for delivery.[1] The OP is referring to several Max that had their paint changed to remove "737 MAX" and replace it with "737 8200" (see link to RyanAir example in sibling).[2] 1 - https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2&i=1406233054&w=780&fh=&fw=&ll=&pl=&sq=&r=2019-07-09T194009Z_12328_MRPRC18CF54C5E0_RTRMADP_0_BOEING-DELIVERIES https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2... 2 - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-max-ordered-by-ryanair-undergoes-name-change https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
        joezydeco 7y ago
Upvoter33 7y ago
"Unsafe despite software patch" - the modern day Corvair. I'll never fly on one of these, and neither should you. Boeing needs to get their act together...
- AmVess 7y ago
  The only way for that to happen is to purge the entire executive suite. Will that happen? No, thus a new(ish) and now chronic distrust of the company and the decision that it makes.
  - fallous 7y ago
    If it were merely the executives that made the fatal decisions regarding the 737 MAX then clearing out the top level of management may suffice, but it's fairly clear that it wasn't a C-level decision in this case. Once you have a bad culture established in an organization it's very hard to turn that around absent a rather drastic purging of employees at multiple levels combined with a very pro-active new management that not only talks about the necessary new culture but also actively implements the incentives required to enforce such a culture. Personally I've had to deal with cultural turn around efforts at companies in the past (albeit nowhere near the scale of Boeing) and over time I learned that the only reliable way to address such a situation is to purge with fire and bring in new people.
    - BOOSTERHIDROGEN 7y ago
      interesting situation, like in ben horowitz new book, you have to have a shock culture to changed.
- TylerE 7y ago
  There was never really anything wrong with the Corvair.
  - andbberger 7y ago
    Are we thinking of the same plane? The one with the square windows that caused stress fractures?
bookofjoe 7y ago
http://archive.is/gb3vM http://archive.is/gb3vM
- BurnGpuBurn 7y ago
  Thank you!
  - bookofjoe 7y ago
    You're most welcome. I try to do this for every HN story I'm interested in that's behind a paywall: I figure if I want to read it in its entirety, there must be other kindred spirits. Interestingly enough, sometimes my unblocked links get downvoted. I file those under "No good deed goes unpunished."
jdjdjjsjs 7y ago
I think what was ridiculously through this entire process was Boeing blaming someone else. That's pretty much been the issue right from when it surfaced. Initially it was the bad pilots, bad airlines, bad countries and lately it's been the bad software consultants. However, it's been evident from the beginning this is a fundamental design flaw that Boeing was trying to, inappropriately, use software to make work. Something no software would be capable of doing because software could not make up for the lack of necessary information in the case of certain sensors failing.
- Smoosh 7y ago
  Also, I have read many comments on previous articles placing the blame on changes to the Boeing corporate culture. Not accepting responsibility is surely another sign of that fault.
- ulfw 7y ago
  Certain sensors? Plural? They only checked ONE single sensor (which is a glitchy one at best) because their software infra didn’t support multiple checks. There should be three AoA sensors to check to see if one is faulty in flight (of course the grand old 737 only HAS two, so that’s yet another issue). Instead they checked just one and come what may sent the plane to hell based on that one sensor read-out.
  - ghshephard 7y ago
    You only need two sensors to determine if one is faulty. You need three if you need the correct measurement. For this application, all that is required is a warning that the AoA sensors aren’t providing correct information.
    - mantap 7y ago
      That's true but it puts the aircraft at a greater risk of stalling, because MCAS is supposed to be a safety feature to prevent stalls. Two sensors are sufficient to prevent false positives, but three or more are necessary to mitigate false negatives. If the MAX is really so easy to stall that it needs a computer system to prevent stalls, then that system should be robust enough to survive a sensor out.
forgingahead 7y ago
Any MAX production changes could carry significant implications for the U.S. economy. Boeing’s inability to deliver the aircraft during the prolonged grounding has already weighed on the nation’s trade deficit. The quoted statement is highly speculative, but it's a good indication of why supposedly reputable news outlets and others in positions of societal authority seem to be hand-waving away the seriousness of the entire issue. Planes have fallen out of the sky, and civilians were killed. These planes should never fly again, regardless of whatever random macro-economy professor says.
- chii 7y ago
  "What's a few lives when there's billions of profits at stake?"
  - seanmcdirmid 7y ago
    That and a bunch of jobs. The Seattle area isn’t as exposed to Boeing cut backs as it used to be, but I guess it would still be felt. Of course, they would have to replace this with something, either previous specced 737s, a new spec 737, or a new plane. While they are developing that market share will fly to Europe and possibly China.
- nknealk 7y ago
  WSJ also has some great reporting on the total contribution of the 737 MAX to US GDP: https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-737-max-is-too-big-to-fail-11556537499 https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-737-max-is-too-big-to-f... Not defending Boeing's behavior, just noting that the grounding of the MAX indeed materially affected GDP.
  - anticensor 7y ago
    It apparently affected GNC more than it affected GDP.
lapsley 7y ago
As a consumer, there are a lot of things a company can fail at and still get me to give them another try by saying, "We fixed it, you totally won't get burned this time." Chipotle and salmonella outbreaks being one example. It's a much harder sell when the product in question is an aircraft. If Chipotle is wrong, I get food poisoning. If Boeing is wrong, I get to learn what it feels like to be in a plane falling out of the sky. Killing off the 737 Max seems awfully expensive. For a more traditional business, I would guess that the failed product would be fixed, renamed, and then released as something brand new. I'm not sure if that's possible in the aerospace industry, but I'm curious to see what Boeing does here.
- ulfw 7y ago
  Exactly that. You will see the MAX naming go away with many carriers, to be replaced with some generic numbering.
  - deleted 7y ago
    [deleted]
- foobar_fighter 7y ago
  On the other hand, food poisoning kills many more people than plane accidents. Despite that, I have heard a lot more from the media about fatalities from plane accidents than from food poisoning. And I suppose that's simply because fear sells.
  - rossdavidh 7y ago
    If you get food poisoning, your chance of living is still pretty good. If your plane crashes, you might live, but your odds are much worse than if you get food poisoning. Many more people eat meals each day, than fly in a plane.
    - rootusrootus 7y ago
      Your odds of surviving a plane crash are also quite good, though I agree it's much more likely to kill you than food poisioning.
ncmncm 7y ago
Better than scrapping them all after they are built.
ncmncm 7y ago
There is nothing Boeing can do now to save the MAX short of firing the whole executive suite and the board. The longer they stall, the worse for the stockholders.
- holler 7y ago
  To me, the first concrete step they could take to regain trust would be to admit the mistake, scrap the max program including produced planes, and double down on a totally redesigned successor.
  - AmVess 7y ago
    Admitting the mistake and scrapping the Max program would likely mean the end of the company unless it got the mother of all bailouts from Uncle Sam.
    - rossdavidh 7y ago
      Which it would.
      - OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
        Nikki Haley, former South Carolina governor and recent Ambassador, joined their Board recently. https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-02-26-Boeing-Nominates-Nikki-Haley-for-Election-to-Board-of-Directors https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-02-26-Boeing-Nominates-Nik...
        ncmncm 7y ago
        So much for Boeing, then.
    - BOOSTERHIDROGEN 7y ago
      could you explain how scrapping the max program could bankrupt entire company ?
ulfw 7y ago
To protect their long-term reputation they should consider cutting the programme, taking the multi billion dollar loss and start anew with a narrowbody range that is actually from the 2000s not warmed up 1960s. But that would ‘never fly’. So we will get a software-upgraded, mandatory “training” aircraft where pilots will have to be on full-alert every second of the flight, it will somewhere crash again and pilots faulted for being “trained but not paying enough attention” and there’s that.
- metalliqaz 7y ago
  You're right, it would never fly, but probably not for the reason you think. A company like Boeing is good at writing off large losses, after all. However the problem is the customers. By the time they design and build an entirely new narrow body plane, the customers would have long since modernized their fleets with planes bought from other manufacturers like Airbus.
neonate 7y ago
http://archive.md/gb3vM http://archive.md/gb3vM
topspin 7y ago
Hopefully this is this beginning of the end to the entire 737 family. The MAX has revealed to me just how dated and obsolescent this aircraft is, in all its forms. It persists because it allows airlines to shamble on without investing in the changes necessary to adopt better designs. Perhaps they'll be forced to do so as the MAX and possibly the rest of the 737 family finally get phased out of first world passenger service, the latter if for no other reason as they are not competitive in their non-MAX form. The original 737 is a fine 60's design. It is long past time for the industry to break out the capital crowbar and pry some funds from the industry tuches to support some evolution. As the cost of that appears in ticket prices people will have to think harder before obligating themselves to bounce around the world. I care not.
- jacquesm 7y ago
  Interestingly, the MAX is a completely new aircraft. If Boeing had just admitted that and certified it as such that would have had significant effect on the required training and certification costs but it would have at least recognized the truth. The 737MAX is much less of a 737 than the NG.
  - apexalpha 7y ago
    I think that even though the engines are bigger a lot of things are still really old. I read that starting the plane requires 7 steps, where in Airbus you press a button and the computer does it for you. Also in Airbus the computer tells you what is wrong and in the 737-max you get an error code that you need to look up in a book. All to make sure pilots need as little additional training.
    - inferiorhuman 7y ago
      Also in Airbus the computer tells you what is wrong and in the 737-max you get an error code that you need to look up in a book. All to make sure pilots need as little additional training. Of interest the P-8 Poseidon has EICAS but none of the other 737s do.
  - 7y ago
rco8786 7y ago
At this point it’s about the negative name recognition more than anything.
the_duke 7y ago
Boeing PR has been pushing these "oh no Boeing will have to halt production", with supposedly dire consequences for the whole US economy, for months. I have seen them at least 3 times now. This is just another effort to pressure politicians and regulators to get the Max back in service. It also shows yet again the sad state of media. This almost reads as a Boeing press release, lacking any reflection or substantial commentary.
- liudoutang 7y ago
  I have the same feeling. as we know, Boeing is the one of the two biggest plane maker, and there is no hardware issue 737 Max, just a software issue. anyway, the politicians have to show a pose that they are careful about the monitor process than before.
  - goatinaboat 7y ago
    What do you mean by “no hardware issue”? The root cause is that the hardware is not a 737 but is pretending to be one!
    - behringer 7y ago
      Hardware can't pretend to be other hardware...
  - breakingcups 7y ago
    Isn't the issue a hardware issue that they tried to patch over with software?
- kjaftaedi 7y ago
  I've also had the same feeling about all of the articles referring to this as a "software problem". Regardless of how they're trying to address the issue, the whole idea of not installing redundant AoA sensors as the default base option was a manufacturing, engineering, and management problem in my book.
jimbob45 7y ago
Don't they already have deals in place? Unless they could fulfill those orders with 737s at mightily discounted rates, I would think it would really be up to the customers at this point.
tus88 7y ago
Build the 797 ASAP. It's not rocket science. (sorry)
trimbo 7y ago
I imagine it will be safe in the future, but doomed because of PR. Maybe they could help their PR if they made it actually comfortable to fly in. I was avoiding it before the grounding because it sounds like a sardine can they want to use for 5 hour flights like LAX-DCA. https://thepointsguy.com/news/cruel-and-unusual-aa-puts-panned-737-max-on-some-of-its-longest-domestic-routes/ https://thepointsguy.com/news/cruel-and-unusual-aa-puts-pann...
- 0xffff2 7y ago
  Doesn't Boeing basically deliver an empty tube to the airline? Boeing isn't picking the interior layout; the airline is.
ilaksh 7y ago
They probably will have to Galt production. But none of the executives are going to prison right? That's what should actually happen. They deliberately and systematically short-changed the engineering in order to make more money, to the point where hundreds of people died.
Havoc 7y ago
They need to whine less and display some introspection instead. Clearly Boeing has a company culture issue, not a 737 issue. Well both I suppose.
leowoo91 7y ago
Does anyone have a guess how much of a plane could be saved just by recycling? Assuming they would bring it back to factory by air.
- throwaheyy 7y ago
  That’s an interesting question. I wonder if they could be “re-specced” as NG 700/800/900 by re-engining them with NG engines and provably disabling MCAS? Likely there would be big penalties to be paid to the airlines though.
mscasts 7y ago
I don't fly that often, but I know I'll keep track of whatever they call this plane in the future to make sure I never board such a plane. If a company would book a ticket for me at one of these I would rather get fired or quit my job rather than board a MAX plane. Never ever, am I going to travel with this model and I will be highly suspicious for future models they produce.
KoftaBob 7y ago
Boeing executives willingly and knowingly put a plane in the skies that they knew pilots weren't properly trained to fly, and people died as a result. There should 100% be a prison sentence for the decision makers that OK'd that move. That's negligence to the highest degree.
TheBillyMania 7y ago
Thankfully none of us on this forum are in charge at Boeing. We would certainly do the wrong thing in response to the MCAS debacle. An observation is that the overall environment is relatively healthy but we must never let the MCAS incident be repeated. Identify why MCAS was so poorly coded and how it passed QC and I think you’ve solved the most pressing issue.
chmaynard 7y ago
It seems unlikely, at least to me, that Boeing will ever restart 737 Max production. The decision by Boeing executives to bet the company on this deeply flawed aircraft will have serious economic consequences for the employees, suppliers, and investors who trusted them. For the rest of us, no big deal. Airbus will happily take up the slack.

184 points by xoa 7y ago

Just an anecdote, but I'm a traveling consultant for a pretty big tech company, and the manager of the consulting group told us when the 737 Max issue started (but before it was grounded) that we did not have to fly on that plane and if we were put on that plane we could change flights and bill the change fee back to the company without any complaints. There's been no further guidance so far on what we'll do when the 737 Max is back in service, but the message was clear: the safety and comfort of the employee is worth a $200 change fee, compared to being forced onto a plane that the employee feels is unsafe. I've never heard that mentioned for any other plane. As much as air travel has sucked this summer with cancelations and delays caused by the grounding of this plane, I don't foresee that model having much luck if/when it's put into full service.

pcurve 7y ago
There have been plenty of design flaws in commercial jetliners and in most cases, reputation is recovered. But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one. but none quite like this one.
- chx 7y ago
  Especially one that the FAA tried to pooh pooh as long as it could. It was amazing to watch the goodwill and trust accumulated over decades crumble to nothing in a few hours as the European countries one by one banned the airline from their airspace but did not ground them. It was the EASA telling the FAA to do the right thing. They didn't and then finally the EASA did ground the plane. I really can't remember any other time when the EASA and the FAA disagreed especially this big. https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/ https://www.thejournal.ie/us-ireland-boeing-4538567-Mar2019/
  - FabHK 7y ago
    My perception is different. It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. It was also arguably appropriate for the FAA not to ground the fleet immediately after the second crash, but then after some time when it became apparent that the failure mode was sufficiently similar (as they did). However, what has emerged since then certainly damaged the reputation of the FAA. But it was not a matter of a few hours, it was a matter of careful investigation and evaluation over months.
    - markdown 7y ago
      > It was appropriate, I think, for the FAA not to ground the fleet after the first crash. Safety first. They ought to have grounded the plane immediately after the first crash and TBH it's my belief that they would have done so if it had been a US plane with US passengers. The fact that it happened to brown people on the other side of the world made it easy to ignore. Don't forget that the FAA had all the details of the plane showing that it had implemented the new MCAS system which in theory could have caused the crash.
      - briandear 7y ago
        The FAA doesn’t control the worldwide skies. Indonesia didn’t ground the plane, nor did Ethiopia. Europe also didn’t ground it after the first crash either. The FAA’s jurisdiction is the United States: other countries could have grounded the plane quickly but didn’t.
        bdhess 7y ago
        As the United States is the country of origin, an airworthiness directive issued by the FAA is valid in all ICAO member states.
      - georgeplusplus 7y ago
        Your safety first rhetoric doesn’t hold up against any sort of practicality. Should the 777 have been grounded immediately when Asiana crashed? What about the 777 after Malaysia or its second which we still don’t know the cause of? the right thing was done after the second crash (and eventually by the FAA after it’s arm was twisted enough) but to say it should’ve been immediately grounded is missing the picture entirely.
- nexuist 7y ago
  Like a lot of tragedies, it's really hard to tell how much the side effects of something like this are attributed to the mistake itself and how much can be explained through modern communication networks (social media) amplifying everything. Is the Boeing mistake really that bad, or is it because this is the first such aviation design mistake to happen in our post-2010 everyone-is-online world? Remember that the tails on 737s used to just...fall off back in the '90s. For the record, I don't think the 737 MAX should have ever been cleared to fly with the current version of MCAS. But I can't help but believe that there had to be some boneheaded designs in the past that cost hundreds of lives that we just don't think about today. In any case, I hope Boeing has learned from this and revised its engineering processes to go back to its previous prestigious roots. I also hope against hope that we will finally see some executives go to prison for approving this.
  - ncmncm 7y ago
    Yes, it's really that bad. Not because of the flaw itself, but the culture that drove the flaw into the outside world. There have been plenty of others in the past that do not detract from the magnitude of this one.
  - rsynnott 7y ago
    It’s hard to be statistically sure given the small number of existing examples, but taken on face value, no recent large airliner has anything like this level of deaths per flight.
  - bcrosby95 7y ago
    Yes it is that bad. No it is not because of social media. Airline crashes have always been a huge deal. That's why airplanes are so safe
  - rootusrootus 7y ago
    The 737NG problems in the 90s were rudders deflecting suddenly and irrecoverably, tails did not fall off. Two crashes and a number of incidents before the problem was identified. Boeing also tried to squash that investigation, they actually swiped the servo from the first crashed plane so it could not be properly analyzed. Then the 737NG went on to have the best safety record of any plane ever. So while the MAX problem is pretty bad, and social media vastly complicates the PR angle, there is precedent for recovering from this. Certainly with as many MAXs as have been built there is enormous incentive to get it fixed. It's not realistic to expect them to scrap the planes.
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
- OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
  Has software had its materials science moment? The pioneering DeHavilland Comet failed due to unexpected stress fractures. The aviation industry changed markedly because of it with years of testing preceding the introduction of any new material or process. Boeing took the lead, DeHavilland never recovered. My cynical view is that little will change in this era.
  - mrtksn 7y ago
    More like MBAs moment maybe? This issue doesn't seem to have anything to do with the difficulties or shortcomings of computer science but product management.
    - OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
      I am no fan of MBAs but in this case I am talking about what I perceive as cultural difference between hardware and software engineering. I come from the experimental/hardware world and I believe there isn't the incremental patch and release mindset for deliverable items. The testing cycles for mission critical hardware is rather brutal. The MBA piece of it is why I'm cynical. "Ho-ho-hold on one second. This installation has a substantial dollar value attached to it." --- C.J. Burke "Aliens"
      - fiter 7y ago
        I think this is a systems engineering problem that may have been due to siloed hardware and software engineering teams. The hardware engineers knew they were making something inherently unstable that the software would have to compensate for. The software engineers believed they had working AoA hardware.
      - joe_the_user 7y ago
        But that isn't the situation, it's really not. The context is airbus has an advanced and fuel-economic model that was eating Boeing market share. Boeing decided to produce one more version of the 737 model - it fit the category and as a fuel-efficinet "drop-in replacement", it was very competitive but was rather aerodynamically unstable. So Boeing added a software system to compensate but didn't tell anyone, didn't make it dependent on redundant sensors and basically produced a plane where, once the facts were all out, it became obvious it could never fly again - not because it could never be made safe but because making safe would involve admitting how flagrantly you initially skirted safety. No one flies on the "once this was utterly unsafe but now we've fixed it" plane if they really have fixed it. Everything about the plane was super advanced but cheap-as-could-be, including the software. But by that token, none of this seems the fault of "software culture", indeed, there's been no implication that the software was at fault in the crashes, just the total shitshow design package, which was indeed the fault of finance and management pushing this approach through.
- mopsi 7y ago
  > But there hasn't been design flaw quite like this one. The DC-10 cargo door issue is probably the closest thing. Took two accidents, 346 fatalities and a House of Representatives investigation to get the flawed design fixed: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_door_problem_and_other_major_accidents https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_DC-10#Cargo_...
  - lmm 7y ago
    Notably that was another case that was widely seen as the FAA treating an American company especially gently.
  - philjohn 7y ago
    Also the DeHaviland Comet ... first passenger jetliner, but due to poorly understood metal fatigue science had several high-profile explosive disintegrations during flight and along with the lives of those on board, the hopes of the UK being a major aviation player looked bleak until Airbus.
- briandear 7y ago
  The A330 in the crash of AF 447 certainly had a design flaw like that. Due to that flaw, they entered a high altitude stall and crashed into the ocean.
  - thombat 7y ago
    On AF447 all three of the airspeed probes iced up for 40 seconds, prompting the flight computers to disconnect autopilot and autothrottle and clearly announce to the crew that air data was unreliable and that the normal protection against stalling was suspended. The pilots immediately understood the problem, however for various reasons made a series of bad decisions which resulted in the crash. Tragically there was no need for the pilots to take any urgent action - by design the plane continued in stable flight when the air data was lost. On the 737MAX crashes the single angle of attack indicator being used as input to the MCAS malfunctioned and in response the system set about repeatedly forcing the plane into a dive with no clear indication of why this was happening. Compounding this was the utter lack of training on the MCAS system, which wasn't even mentioned in the pilot manual or IPad-based training that was also used by US airlines. There's a world of difference between these accidents.
- elliekelly 7y ago
  There’s also clearly a serious design flaw in FAA regulations and how the certification process works. Like most rules, I’m sure they meant well when it was implemented but as the regulations/process has iterated it’s created a perverse incentive where Boeing wasn’t optimizing for safety in order to pass the safety certification. Boeing bears a lot of responsibility but taking Boeing to task without taking a look at the system in which it operates seems short-sighted.
lucb1e 7y ago
A bit tangential but I'm curious: if you fly that much, does your company compensate the CO2? From their statement about changing flights being no problem, it sounds like there would easily be budget for such a thing, but I have no idea if companies are starting to do this yet.
- disordinary 7y ago
  You'd hope so, but I know from traveling for a large multinational that it was up to the individual to pay for their own offsetting and I think most are the same. I tend to just try and video conference with people to alleviate the exhaustion of traveling (I live in New Zealand, going to a workshop in Europe is a 30-40 hour endeavor) and the carbon that flying generates.
fred_is_fred 7y ago
I believe that several carriers (for sure United and I think others) will let you change for free on a Max. The issue for you is going to be the impact to your time, which is likely more valuable than the change fee to begin with. On the standard consultant route of Monday morning/Thursday afternoon there are many times not alternative flights for hours (or possibly days) later -- especially if a Max gets "subbed in" at the last minute and you cannot plan ahead. The change fee will be inconsequential compared to you not showing up on a client site for a day or at all.
petilon 7y ago
You may refuse to fly on 737 Max, but how do you feel about 737-8200? Boeing will likely not use the "Max" name when the plan is put back into service. See: https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509 https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48995509
- xiphias2 7y ago
  People are not stupid. They will know the new name of the MAX whatever it will be.
  - ethiclub 7y ago
    Devil's advocate: Common, successful marketing: If a brand is poisoned, distance yourself from the name & rebrand. At its extreme, it is used alongside phoenix company tactics. It works, although a (likely minority) customer portion will keep their finger on the pulse.
- cloudwizard 7y ago
  The engines are visibly different. They are huge.
  - gizmo385 7y ago
    Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight?
    - mcny 7y ago
      > Do you think the majority of consumers pay any attention to the size of the engine when boarding a flight? I am not an industry insider but my understanding is the vast majority of the flying public simply does not matter. We are flying on the cheapest possible ticket. The people who do matter imo are those who are flying on a corporate account or better yet those who control a corporate account. If wealthy people refuse to fly on this death trap, I think airlines will listen.
    - 7y ago
nrau 7y ago
An interesting part of the history of the 737 is that when it launched it originally had a serious rudder design flaw that contributed to several fatal crashes where a lot of folks lost their lives: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_737_rudder_issues However, Boeing did fix the problem, and the 737 went on to be one of the best selling airplanes in history. This MCAS issue is eerily similar in that it has also resulted in two fatal crashes. But if history is any guide, the problems will be fixed, and the memory of MCAS and MAX issues will likely fade from the public as well.
- TrueDuality 7y ago
  A part of me joins you in this pessimistic view, but the other side of me recognizes that the rudder issues took place in 1991 and most likely the vast majority of the public was never made aware of those issues. I had never heard of it, though that doesn't mean much as a statistical sample. I know a lot of people are now aware of this particular design flaw and I would put money on it being more generally known now then then.
  - orisho 7y ago
    I also believe most people hadn't heard of it. For one, news gets around much faster and easier nowadays with the advent of the internet. Anecdotally, it appears as if anyone who flies would've had the right exposure to Western media to hear about it.
  - georgeplusplus 7y ago
    You can’t really compare the two. The 80s and 90s were loaded with severe accidents where the NTSB was really giving the taxpayers their money’s worth since there would be a major accident almost every month and the agency had to create a new division to handle all the cases. Most weren’t design issues like the MCAS and the 91’ rudder issue but faulty 3rd party parts, poor maintenance, unknown stresses on aging fleets, pilot issues, and on and on. We are in an unprecedented age of aviation safety and the MCAS issue is a huge blow to that record, thus you’re hearing about it in this level because it is fresh in the news. Accidents were common place back then, so common that I’d wager the 91 crash wasn’t on peoples radars since they just accepted that aircraft crash frequently and to be honest the general public doesn’t know what a rudder is in the first place.
jubble 7y ago
Same thing for me in a megacorp. Group manager said “no requirement to travel on a 737 Max” without higher approval... he said he’d just eat the cancellation fees from his own budget.
laydn 7y ago
With the amount of planes already ordered and in the production pipeline, it will be near impossible to not fly with a 737 MAX within a few years, if you are a heavy flier. The alternative for a given route may be a train, bus, or another aircraft with a schedule that won't meet yours.
StreamBright 7y ago
This is exactly why this is pretty bad for companies operating these flights. The alternatives are often within reach of the customers.
jwr 7y ago
Having looked carefully into what Boeing has been doing with the 737 Max, I have no intention of flying on one ever again, even if it gets rammed through FAA again. Though I am absolutely certain that all the sleazy airlines (or perhaps Boeing) will soon begin a rebranding project, changing the name to something that people will not immediately recognize.
- retSava 7y ago
  Unless you boycott Boeing 737-max similar airplanes, you may fly with one without knowing it. The name is really badly burnt and the only plausible way out of it for Boeing is renaming it to something that doesn't ring the bell. IIRC I read that they've already done that for the airplanes that are being delivered since the grounding.
  - IAmEveryone 7y ago
    As far as I can tell, no planes have been delivered since the grounding. The airlines aren't willing to take delivery of a flawed product. It would just cost them money to park them, and may even have legal consequences, such as shifting the burden of proof in any legal disputes that may still arise.
    - alistairSH 7y ago
      You are correct about delivery. Boeing has parking lots full of new Max that are ready for delivery.[1] The OP is referring to several Max that had their paint changed to remove "737 MAX" and replace it with "737 8200" (see link to RyanAir example in sibling).[2] 1 - https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2&i=1406233054&w=780&fh=&fw=&ll=&pl=&sq=&r=2019-07-09T194009Z_12328_MRPRC18CF54C5E0_RTRMADP_0_BOEING-DELIVERIES https://s4.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&d=20190709&t=2... 2 - https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-max-ordered-by-ryanair-undergoes-name-change https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/jul/15/boeing-737-...
      - joezydeco 7y ago

Upvoter33 7y ago

"Unsafe despite software patch" - the modern day Corvair. I'll never fly on one of these, and neither should you. Boeing needs to get their act together...

AmVess 7y ago
The only way for that to happen is to purge the entire executive suite. Will that happen? No, thus a new(ish) and now chronic distrust of the company and the decision that it makes.
- fallous 7y ago
  If it were merely the executives that made the fatal decisions regarding the 737 MAX then clearing out the top level of management may suffice, but it's fairly clear that it wasn't a C-level decision in this case. Once you have a bad culture established in an organization it's very hard to turn that around absent a rather drastic purging of employees at multiple levels combined with a very pro-active new management that not only talks about the necessary new culture but also actively implements the incentives required to enforce such a culture. Personally I've had to deal with cultural turn around efforts at companies in the past (albeit nowhere near the scale of Boeing) and over time I learned that the only reliable way to address such a situation is to purge with fire and bring in new people.
  - BOOSTERHIDROGEN 7y ago
    interesting situation, like in ben horowitz new book, you have to have a shock culture to changed.
TylerE 7y ago
There was never really anything wrong with the Corvair.
- andbberger 7y ago
  Are we thinking of the same plane? The one with the square windows that caused stress fractures?

bookofjoe 7y ago

http://archive.is/gb3vM http://archive.is/gb3vM

BurnGpuBurn 7y ago
Thank you!
- bookofjoe 7y ago
  You're most welcome. I try to do this for every HN story I'm interested in that's behind a paywall: I figure if I want to read it in its entirety, there must be other kindred spirits. Interestingly enough, sometimes my unblocked links get downvoted. I file those under "No good deed goes unpunished."

jdjdjjsjs 7y ago

I think what was ridiculously through this entire process was Boeing blaming someone else. That's pretty much been the issue right from when it surfaced. Initially it was the bad pilots, bad airlines, bad countries and lately it's been the bad software consultants. However, it's been evident from the beginning this is a fundamental design flaw that Boeing was trying to, inappropriately, use software to make work. Something no software would be capable of doing because software could not make up for the lack of necessary information in the case of certain sensors failing.

Smoosh 7y ago
Also, I have read many comments on previous articles placing the blame on changes to the Boeing corporate culture. Not accepting responsibility is surely another sign of that fault.
ulfw 7y ago
Certain sensors? Plural? They only checked ONE single sensor (which is a glitchy one at best) because their software infra didn’t support multiple checks. There should be three AoA sensors to check to see if one is faulty in flight (of course the grand old 737 only HAS two, so that’s yet another issue). Instead they checked just one and come what may sent the plane to hell based on that one sensor read-out.
- ghshephard 7y ago
  You only need two sensors to determine if one is faulty. You need three if you need the correct measurement. For this application, all that is required is a warning that the AoA sensors aren’t providing correct information.
  - mantap 7y ago
    That's true but it puts the aircraft at a greater risk of stalling, because MCAS is supposed to be a safety feature to prevent stalls. Two sensors are sufficient to prevent false positives, but three or more are necessary to mitigate false negatives. If the MAX is really so easy to stall that it needs a computer system to prevent stalls, then that system should be robust enough to survive a sensor out.

forgingahead 7y ago

Any MAX production changes could carry significant implications for the U.S. economy. Boeing’s inability to deliver the aircraft during the prolonged grounding has already weighed on the nation’s trade deficit. The quoted statement is highly speculative, but it's a good indication of why supposedly reputable news outlets and others in positions of societal authority seem to be hand-waving away the seriousness of the entire issue. Planes have fallen out of the sky, and civilians were killed. These planes should never fly again, regardless of whatever random macro-economy professor says.

chii 7y ago
"What's a few lives when there's billions of profits at stake?"
- seanmcdirmid 7y ago
  That and a bunch of jobs. The Seattle area isn’t as exposed to Boeing cut backs as it used to be, but I guess it would still be felt. Of course, they would have to replace this with something, either previous specced 737s, a new spec 737, or a new plane. While they are developing that market share will fly to Europe and possibly China.
nknealk 7y ago
WSJ also has some great reporting on the total contribution of the 737 MAX to US GDP: https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-737-max-is-too-big-to-fail-11556537499 https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeings-737-max-is-too-big-to-f... Not defending Boeing's behavior, just noting that the grounding of the MAX indeed materially affected GDP.
- anticensor 7y ago
  It apparently affected GNC more than it affected GDP.

lapsley 7y ago

As a consumer, there are a lot of things a company can fail at and still get me to give them another try by saying, "We fixed it, you totally won't get burned this time." Chipotle and salmonella outbreaks being one example. It's a much harder sell when the product in question is an aircraft. If Chipotle is wrong, I get food poisoning. If Boeing is wrong, I get to learn what it feels like to be in a plane falling out of the sky. Killing off the 737 Max seems awfully expensive. For a more traditional business, I would guess that the failed product would be fixed, renamed, and then released as something brand new. I'm not sure if that's possible in the aerospace industry, but I'm curious to see what Boeing does here.

ulfw 7y ago
Exactly that. You will see the MAX naming go away with many carriers, to be replaced with some generic numbering.
- deleted 7y ago
  [deleted]
foobar_fighter 7y ago
On the other hand, food poisoning kills many more people than plane accidents. Despite that, I have heard a lot more from the media about fatalities from plane accidents than from food poisoning. And I suppose that's simply because fear sells.
- rossdavidh 7y ago
  If you get food poisoning, your chance of living is still pretty good. If your plane crashes, you might live, but your odds are much worse than if you get food poisoning. Many more people eat meals each day, than fly in a plane.
  - rootusrootus 7y ago
    Your odds of surviving a plane crash are also quite good, though I agree it's much more likely to kill you than food poisioning.

ncmncm 7y ago

Better than scrapping them all after they are built.

ncmncm 7y ago

There is nothing Boeing can do now to save the MAX short of firing the whole executive suite and the board. The longer they stall, the worse for the stockholders.

holler 7y ago
To me, the first concrete step they could take to regain trust would be to admit the mistake, scrap the max program including produced planes, and double down on a totally redesigned successor.
- AmVess 7y ago
  Admitting the mistake and scrapping the Max program would likely mean the end of the company unless it got the mother of all bailouts from Uncle Sam.
  - rossdavidh 7y ago
    Which it would.
    - OldGuyInTheClub 7y ago
      Nikki Haley, former South Carolina governor and recent Ambassador, joined their Board recently. https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-02-26-Boeing-Nominates-Nikki-Haley-for-Election-to-Board-of-Directors https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2019-02-26-Boeing-Nominates-Nik...
      - ncmncm 7y ago
        So much for Boeing, then.
  - BOOSTERHIDROGEN 7y ago
    could you explain how scrapping the max program could bankrupt entire company ?

ulfw 7y ago

To protect their long-term reputation they should consider cutting the programme, taking the multi billion dollar loss and start anew with a narrowbody range that is actually from the 2000s not warmed up 1960s. But that would ‘never fly’. So we will get a software-upgraded, mandatory “training” aircraft where pilots will have to be on full-alert every second of the flight, it will somewhere crash again and pilots faulted for being “trained but not paying enough attention” and there’s that.

metalliqaz 7y ago
You're right, it would never fly, but probably not for the reason you think. A company like Boeing is good at writing off large losses, after all. However the problem is the customers. By the time they design and build an entirely new narrow body plane, the customers would have long since modernized their fleets with planes bought from other manufacturers like Airbus.

neonate 7y ago

http://archive.md/gb3vM http://archive.md/gb3vM

topspin 7y ago

Hopefully this is this beginning of the end to the entire 737 family. The MAX has revealed to me just how dated and obsolescent this aircraft is, in all its forms. It persists because it allows airlines to shamble on without investing in the changes necessary to adopt better designs. Perhaps they'll be forced to do so as the MAX and possibly the rest of the 737 family finally get phased out of first world passenger service, the latter if for no other reason as they are not competitive in their non-MAX form. The original 737 is a fine 60's design. It is long past time for the industry to break out the capital crowbar and pry some funds from the industry tuches to support some evolution. As the cost of that appears in ticket prices people will have to think harder before obligating themselves to bounce around the world. I care not.

jacquesm 7y ago
Interestingly, the MAX is a completely new aircraft. If Boeing had just admitted that and certified it as such that would have had significant effect on the required training and certification costs but it would have at least recognized the truth. The 737MAX is much less of a 737 than the NG.
- apexalpha 7y ago
  I think that even though the engines are bigger a lot of things are still really old. I read that starting the plane requires 7 steps, where in Airbus you press a button and the computer does it for you. Also in Airbus the computer tells you what is wrong and in the 737-max you get an error code that you need to look up in a book. All to make sure pilots need as little additional training.
  - inferiorhuman 7y ago
    Also in Airbus the computer tells you what is wrong and in the 737-max you get an error code that you need to look up in a book. All to make sure pilots need as little additional training. Of interest the P-8 Poseidon has EICAS but none of the other 737s do.
- 7y ago

rco8786 7y ago

At this point it’s about the negative name recognition more than anything.

the_duke 7y ago

Boeing PR has been pushing these "oh no Boeing will have to halt production", with supposedly dire consequences for the whole US economy, for months. I have seen them at least 3 times now. This is just another effort to pressure politicians and regulators to get the Max back in service. It also shows yet again the sad state of media. This almost reads as a Boeing press release, lacking any reflection or substantial commentary.

liudoutang 7y ago
I have the same feeling. as we know, Boeing is the one of the two biggest plane maker, and there is no hardware issue 737 Max, just a software issue. anyway, the politicians have to show a pose that they are careful about the monitor process than before.
- goatinaboat 7y ago
  What do you mean by “no hardware issue”? The root cause is that the hardware is not a 737 but is pretending to be one!
  - behringer 7y ago
    Hardware can't pretend to be other hardware...
- breakingcups 7y ago
  Isn't the issue a hardware issue that they tried to patch over with software?
kjaftaedi 7y ago
I've also had the same feeling about all of the articles referring to this as a "software problem". Regardless of how they're trying to address the issue, the whole idea of not installing redundant AoA sensors as the default base option was a manufacturing, engineering, and management problem in my book.

jimbob45 7y ago

Don't they already have deals in place? Unless they could fulfill those orders with 737s at mightily discounted rates, I would think it would really be up to the customers at this point.

tus88 7y ago

Build the 797 ASAP. It's not rocket science. (sorry)

trimbo 7y ago

I imagine it will be safe in the future, but doomed because of PR. Maybe they could help their PR if they made it actually comfortable to fly in. I was avoiding it before the grounding because it sounds like a sardine can they want to use for 5 hour flights like LAX-DCA. https://thepointsguy.com/news/cruel-and-unusual-aa-puts-panned-737-max-on-some-of-its-longest-domestic-routes/ https://thepointsguy.com/news/cruel-and-unusual-aa-puts-pann...

0xffff2 7y ago
Doesn't Boeing basically deliver an empty tube to the airline? Boeing isn't picking the interior layout; the airline is.

ilaksh 7y ago

They probably will have to Galt production. But none of the executives are going to prison right? That's what should actually happen. They deliberately and systematically short-changed the engineering in order to make more money, to the point where hundreds of people died.

Havoc 7y ago

They need to whine less and display some introspection instead. Clearly Boeing has a company culture issue, not a 737 issue. Well both I suppose.

leowoo91 7y ago

Does anyone have a guess how much of a plane could be saved just by recycling? Assuming they would bring it back to factory by air.

throwaheyy 7y ago
That’s an interesting question. I wonder if they could be “re-specced” as NG 700/800/900 by re-engining them with NG engines and provably disabling MCAS? Likely there would be big penalties to be paid to the airlines though.

mscasts 7y ago

I don't fly that often, but I know I'll keep track of whatever they call this plane in the future to make sure I never board such a plane. If a company would book a ticket for me at one of these I would rather get fired or quit my job rather than board a MAX plane. Never ever, am I going to travel with this model and I will be highly suspicious for future models they produce.

KoftaBob 7y ago

Boeing executives willingly and knowingly put a plane in the skies that they knew pilots weren't properly trained to fly, and people died as a result. There should 100% be a prison sentence for the decision makers that OK'd that move. That's negligence to the highest degree.

TheBillyMania 7y ago

Thankfully none of us on this forum are in charge at Boeing. We would certainly do the wrong thing in response to the MCAS debacle. An observation is that the overall environment is relatively healthy but we must never let the MCAS incident be repeated. Identify why MCAS was so poorly coded and how it passed QC and I think you’ve solved the most pressing issue.

chmaynard 7y ago

It seems unlikely, at least to me, that Boeing will ever restart 737 Max production. The decision by Boeing executives to bet the company on this deeply flawed aircraft will have serious economic consequences for the employees, suppliers, and investors who trusted them. For the rest of us, no big deal. Airbus will happily take up the slack.