10 ms·
Technical feasibility of decrypting https by replacing the computer's PRNG
- tptacek 13y agoOnce again, if you believe this is a real issue, you're logically enjoined from using practically any hardware cryptography, including the AES instructions or any HSM. Moreover, if you're serious about having a problem with rdrand, you really can't be doing crypto on the x86 platform (putting you between a rock and a hard place, owing to that HSM injunction) --- that's because you don't actually know what the microarchitecture of the x86 platform is. It's far more complicated than the instruction set, or even what's documented in the PRM. Aciicmez was able to recover keys from an Intel branch target buffer (the branch prediction cache). Did you know what the BTB was before I wrote this? Well, the BTB is public knowledge. How many microarchitectural features are there on the platform that aren't public knowledge? Probably lots. Not being a tinfoil hat type, I tend not to believe that any of these are malicious. But if you think rdrand is a plot by the NSA, you are a tinfoil hat type, and so let me help you be consistent: you need to stop using AWS right now, and stop using x86 platforms to run your encryption code. The NSA can pay $50 to get a VM on the same AWS box as runs your VMs, and then use local side channels to siphon out your secrets. (Actually, so can the Slovak Mafia, which is a reason to be leery of doing any crypto on AWS.) If you can't tell, I think this whole kerfluffle about Linux using rdrand is pretty silly.
- jevinskie 13y agoWhat can you trust then? License an ARM or MIPS IP core (in HDL form so it can be audited) and run it in an FPGA (or if you're rich, an ASIC)?
- crest 13y agoSome FPGAs are known to have backdoors (if you have JTAG access).
- ChuckMcM 13y agoThat is more like front door access but still.
- kryptiskt 13y ago> and run it in an FPGA (or if you're rich, an ASIC)? An FPGA contains way more junk than just the gate array these days. And I don't know why you would trust Xilinx or Altera (who are way more dependent on government orders than Intel) over Intel. Or any fab, for that matter. I think it's reasonable to be paranoid, but at some point one should do a cost-benefit analysis of the measures one is willing to indulge in. Because ultimately you will have to trust someone blindly, and that is true for both people and machines.
- jevinskie 13y agoThe back door would have to do some complicated pattern matching against the bitstream to identify potential "hook" or extraction points. Of course, built in crypto modules could not be trusted. I wouldn't trust much more than the LUTs! I could even see how a multiply block may be backdoored.
- jevinskie 13y agoOf course, I am ignoring the proprietary tool chains in all of this. But again that depends on being able to find interesting stuff in your IP to backdoor. I would recommend using vendor IP as little as possible. Don't use a vendor Ethernet module! I could see that as a great place to attach a scan-chain backdoor.
- mtgx 13y agoSpeaking of ARM, the 64 bit ARMv8 architecture is supposed to come with AES, SHA1 and SHA-256 hardware encryption.
- nawitus 13y agoI think the Chinese Loongson MIPS-based processor is 'open hardware', but I can't confirm that with a quick Google search.
- jevinskie 13y agoBut do you trust the fab to not insert a backdoor into the CPU? How could you know? An FPGA's generality complicates backdoors.
- DanielBMarkham 13y agoI believe the problem here is that you're dividing us into "tinfoil hat people" and normal people. This would be a useful designation if the world would remain static. However, we're clearly seeing that what used to be "tinfoil hat people" are right now just sensible people, so then you have to distinguish the really tinfoil hat people from the previous bunch, and so on. It's a moving target. The key problem from all of this is the injection of distrust into the entire stack caused by state security. I'm not getting into the BTB and pipelining, this article is just a symptom of the problem. The entire technology stack is up for grabs, and authors are going to get a lot of mileage out of taking it apart. So, to me, there are two questions here. 1) Can you demonstrate an attack that uses some weaknesses yet undetected by the average nerd? If so, that's news. 2) Can you speculate that with the resource of a nation-state, such an attack might be made? If so, to me that kind of qualifies as nerd gossip. It may turn out to be true, and it may just be a lot of hand-waving. Some people like this stuff. Some people don't. I never liked the hero-worship crap or the latest from famous author X, so if I had to choose from piles of crap I'd prefer this. For the average person, the only choice right now is to carry on or not. That does not make the situation acceptable or tolerable, that's just how it is. And I really like the word kerfuffle.
- DanBC 13y ago> However, we're clearly seeing that what used to be "tinfoil hat people" are right now just sensible people, so then you have to distinguish the really tinfoil hat people from the previous bunch, and so on. It's a moving target. Well, no. There's a difference between the people who said, for many years, that GCHQ / NSA are monitoring all communications and the people who said that GCHQ / NSA are monitoring all their communications. People deny this, but there is a big difference between "collecting the content" and "collecting the content then grepping it for your contributions to that content". > For the average person, the only choice right now is to carry on or not. I am genuinely baffled by the responses to the snowdon "revelations". i) They're not new ii) They've been included in routine risk assessment for years. What do you have that you want to protect, and who are you protecting it from? If you're protecting your teen-angst poetry from your classmates you can carry on as normal. If you're protecting a stash of images of child sexual abuse from law enforcement you need to continually assess your encryption and secrecy methods. If you're protecting plans to destroy America from a well funded government agency you need to worry about everything. But that's always been the case. There are so many other, easier, attacks than a weakened pool of entropy so it's a shame that people are being distracted by this. Don't get me wrong, I don't like RdRand and I'd prefer it if it was open and transparent, but there's so many other weak steps that people could be fixing before they get to RdRand.
- ekidd 13y agoOnce again, if you believe this is a real issue, you're logically enjoined from using practically any hardware cryptography, including the AES instructions or any HSM. Why is true? Let's assume that a chip has hardware AES support, and the team which designed the AES module is working for Eve (the standard generic attacker). What can Eve do to compromise the AES encryption without getting caught? She can't have the AES module encrypt the data with a known key, because then it won't decrypt correctly. She can't leak the key data, because we already know what size output we're expecting. Basically, AES is a well-understood function, and as long as we control the inputs, we can verify that the outputs are correct. It's not a 100% guarantee, but the risk to the attacker (and the chip vendor) are enormous. But a hardware RNG offers some especially nice features for attackers: 1) It's an essential part of many security algorithms. 2) If a weak random sequence is fed through a stream cipher, the output is indistinguishable from a very strong RNG. 3) It's possible to generate weak RNG sequences by "accident", which would allow the chip vendor to deny wrongdoing. It's like writing 'if (uid = 0)' instead of 'if (uid == 0)' in an obscure kernel security check—it looks accidental but leaves an enormous backdoor. So there are ways to deniably and almost-undetectably sabotage a hardware RNG, and by doing so, you could vastly reduce the keyspace of anything from cryptographic keys to SSL sessions to TCP sequence numbers. Personally, I use AWS all the time, but that's because I understand the threat model. If I can't accept the threat model of AWS, then I encrypt data on a local machine using keys generated from /dev/random. Different applications demand different threat models. Besides, the costs of feeding a hardware RNG through an entropy pool are relatively low. So why not do the professional thing, and in the process, protect against backdoored or buggy hardware RNGs? Now, if your chip vendor is willing to engage in high-risk attacks with no plausible deniability, then you're pretty much hosed.
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- JulianMorrison 13y agoYou are assuming the nominal output is the only output. This is a software perspective: output_block = aes(input block) This is a hardware perspective: output_block, cpu_state = aes(input block, cpu_state) …but the CPU only gives you the output_block. The cpu_state is a hidden global. Goodness knows what it's leaking.
- acqq 13y agoRe hardware AES such output can certainly be bit-by-bit compared with a pure software implementation, so we can be much more certain that it does exactly what it says. But I also think we shouldn't worry much about RdRand, see my other comment here.
- tptacek 13y agoSo what if you can bit-by-bit compare its outputs? How do you know it isn't leaking key information via a side channel? The argument that you can "bit-by-bit compare outputs" is an argument that AES cores can't be backdoored in any setting.
- acqq 13y agoAre we talking about attacks on the bits of the message or about the penetration? I'm just pointing to the different level of potential problems. If somebody would blindly trust RdRand and it is actually not random (it's just a thought experiment, I don't believe that myself, and I know that Linux doesn't blindly trust it!) he can produce encrypted bits which could be easier to decode as they are. There's no such chance for AES instructions, which are trivially certain to match software implementations.
- tptacek 13y agoSee Julian Morrison's comment upthread. If you don't trust Intel, don't kid yourself; you can't use their CPUs for crypto at all.
- acqq 13y agoSorry I don't see the relevance of CPU having any hidden global state in the thought experiment I've addressed. If all I give you is a PGP file made on the Intel CPU you simply don't have access to the global state of my CPU and I can be sure that I'd get exactly the same file up to the last bit using non-Intel CPU starting from the same inputs (including same 'seeds'). So I can actually be absolutely sure in AES instructions for any scenario where I only give you the results of encryption.
- sweis 13y agoI inadvertently spawned this discussion by pointing out that many open source security projects like Linux, OpenSSL, GnuTLS, libgcrypt, dm-crypt, etc. all depend on closed-source crypto implementations [1]. This was followed by one of the Linux guys saying he quit the project over RdRand [2]. Everyone seems to be missing the point: RdRand is the least of your worries. If you can't trust the CPU, you can't trust it to multiply correctly, much less perform crypto. If a CPU maker or OEM wanted to be evil, they wouldn't even need to bother backdooring the hardware. SMM or microcode updates would be much easier to compromise. [1] https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-July/009946.html https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-J... [2] https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-July/009969.html https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-J...
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- ig1 13y agoIt's about verifiability, you can verify if a CPU is multiplying incorrectly, there's no way of verifying if the random source is generating randomness correctly.
- tptacek 13y agoYou can verify that your CPU is multiply correctly at one moment in time.
- ig1 13y agoYes, but active attacks where a third-party can switch on-and-off features on your CPU are obviously vastly different from a passive attack such as a compromised random number source. The RNG attack suggested can pass verifiability while at the exact same time introduce a backdoor and thus constantly be on.
- pbsd 13y agoAre you ready to test all the 2^128 possible multiplications your CPU can do?
- __alexs 13y agoEven if RdRand is a plot by the NSA it seems quite illogical to think that this is the first time they've collaborated with Intel so why are these people still using Intel chips at all? It kind of sucks that RdRand is hard to verify as a user but it's no smoking gun either so it's not a great sell if you are trying to warn other people about the risks of backdoored hardware too.
- hannibal5 13y agoThe difference is that planted weakness in RdRand enables mass surveillance by weakening cryptographic algorithms. Other possible backdoors just make subject that are specially targeted weaker.
- captainmuon 13y agoWell, people use Intel chips because they don't really have a choice. I assume if Intel cooperates with the NSA, then so does AMD, and then you don't really have many more options. Yes, manufacturers could plant all sorts of backdoors in your CPU (and other hardware), and they probably have. Still, I can reasonably assume that if I buy consumer hardware in a regular store, run secure and open source software, and am careful about my network, I'll be reasonably safe. Now, Intel introduces RdRand as a black box RNG. I'm not saying there's anything wrong with it, but if the NSA or whoever wanted to plant an inconspicuous weakness on millions of computers, this would be a nice way. I guess they could also do it with only a handfull of engineers at Intel knowing about it, as opposed to some other attacks that involve the whole processor.
- unimpressive 13y ago>The NSA can pay $50 to get a VM on the same AWS box as runs your VMs, and then use local side channels to siphon out your secrets. Where can I go to read about these side channel attacks? I tried to find the articles about them but they were covered in a bunch of w3schools style spam.
- sweis 13y agoHere are a few for a start: - "Cross-VM Side Channels and Their Use to Extract Private Keys" http://www.cs.unc.edu/~reiter/papers/2012/CCS.pdf http://www.cs.unc.edu/~reiter/papers/2012/CCS.pdf - "Cache-timing attacks on AES" http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf - "Hey, You, Get Off of My Cloud: Exploring Information Leakage in Third-Party Compute Clouds" http://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs6460/2011sp/papers/cloudsec-ccs09.pdf http://www.cs.cornell.edu/courses/cs6460/2011sp/papers/cloud... - "System-Level Protection Against Cache-Based Side Channel Attacks in the Cloud" http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/~taesoo/pubs/2012/stealthmem/stealthmem-slides.pdf http://pdos.csail.mit.edu/~taesoo/pubs/2012/stealthmem/steal... In my mind, cache-timing attacks are fairly easily solved, but may be platform dependent. However, VM escapes in general are still a concern.
- e3pi 13y ago> - "Cache-timing attacks on AES" http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf http://cr.yp.to/antiforgery/cachetiming-20050414.pdf Sixteen years later.... "....These pages will eventually be open to the public. Right now they are inaccessible pending resolution of my court case." Re: MCS 494, Cryptography, Spring 1997 This is an online introduction to cryptography. It is based on the web pages that I wrote for my MCS 494 course at UIC. http://cr.yp.to/crypto.html http://cr.yp.to/crypto.html See: The main repository of information on Bernstein v. United States used to be http://www.eff.org/bernstein http://www.eff.org/bernstein, subsequently moved to https://www.eff.org/cases/bernstein-v-us-dept-justice https://www.eff.org/cases/bernstein-v-us-dept-justice. This page is now much more comprehensive; you should change your bookmark to point to http://export.cr.yp.to http://export.cr.yp.to. http://cr.yp.to/export.html http://cr.yp.to/export.html
- api 13y agoThere's also something fairly basic you can use to mitigate this: mix rdrand's output with some amount of entropy from other sources. Even if it were done just a little to minimize performance impact, this would greatly increase the difficulty of using such a backdoor if it did exist. And totally good point about cloud. Any cloud host can trivially observe everything you are doing, steal your keys, etc.
- nightcracker 13y agoIf you have other sources of good entropy then there's absolutely no point in using RdRand at all.
- Dylan16807 13y agoIt never hurts to mix in more random.
- ig1 13y agoI think the bigger concern is the nature of the patch Intel supplied. The kernel developers at Intel are smart people, even if they're not putting in malicious code they know there's a risk that there might be something wrong with their random number generation so the logical thing would be for them to add their random source to the pool to mitigate against that. The fact that they chose not to do that puts red flags all over the patch. Sure it could have been purely accidental, but any patch that "accidentally" weakens the security of a system deserves thorough analysis regardless of who submitted it. Assuming you were a malicious party who wanted to backdoor a system in such a way that you could gain access without creating a massive security vulnerability then the random number source would be ideal as we've got a pretty good idea of how you could do it. It'd be harder to do with other parts of the architecture (although presumably not impossible). It would also give you attacks against a much wider range of systems (i.e. ones with which you can't directly interact so can't do timing-based attacks on).
- willurd 13y agoUgh. In light of recent events you can't seriously be using the phrase "tinfoil hat" in good conscience. As to whether you're right or not, I don't know. But please figure out a less lazy way of getting your point across. The whole "tinfoil hat" argument is a fallacy used to marginalize people and shut them up without actually providing any evidence. And if you have evidence, then you don't need it.
- Karunamon 13y agoThat "if you have evidence" cuts both ways. You can't deny that Recent shenangians have pulled the paranoid delusionals out of the woodwork...
- willurd 13y agoHas it? Examples? (I'm not saying it hasn't; I don't know) I don't deny that some people do actually have paranoid delusions. But there's a big difference between a paranoid delusion and a (conspiracy) theory. The point I'm trying to make is that in light of recent conspiracies, we have to cut the conspiracy theorists some slack.
- Karunamon 13y agoI disagree. They are bound to the same burden of proof everyone else is.
- willurd 13y agoI agree, as I stated above in another comment. When asked whether the burden of proof is on them, I replied: "It is. That doesn't mean we have to marginalize people who have theories, even if they don't have any evidence to back them up. My approach is to entertain all possibilities until they are proven to me to be false. In that way I attempt to avoid tunnel vision."
- res0nat0r 13y agoBy recent events I'm assuming you are referring to the NSA. Note: What the NSA has been doing is well known and has been outlined in detail in the press all the way back to 2008. The country just hasn't cared enough to pay attention until the current exciting manhunt underway.
- venomsnake 13y agoDoes NSA really have to use side channels? They could just send NSL to amazon for full memory dump and hdd clones of the virtual machine in question. There are much easier ways to obtain data than subverting the crypto. This makes sense only for communications between secure endpoints. Like the Russian embassy sending data back home in Moscow. The security in this case comes from the fact that NSA cannot freely make intrusions without risking triggering a diplomatic incident/war - not that the Russian networks are secure in some absolute sense.
- rorrr2 13y ago> They could just send NSL to amazon for full memory dump and hdd clones of the virtual machine in question If everything is encrypted (disk, communications) and keys aren't stored in memory / CPU cache, then that won't work.
- yen223 13y ago"If"
- venomsnake 13y agoUnless amazon have homomorphic encryption services how exactly will you be able to do something with the vm without having the keys in memory? NSA just have to wait to fire it up.
- jlgreco 13y agoI've long assumed that there is enough competition in the CPU space that if somebody was doing something particularly naughty, they would be found out by one of their competitors soon after when the competitors put chip under an electron microscope. Is this a bad assumption?
- dlitz 13y agoIt's not just about AWS, though. What about hard disk encryption, PGP, Bitcoin, or any other process that doesn't immediately leak its timing information over the network? I imagine it would be difficult to covertly leak LUKS keys on a massive scale via a compromised AES-NI implementation. It's not like you can just modify the ciphertext output, and anything that uses a lot of silicon would attract attention. On the other hand, a compromised RNG can do this pretty easily. Hell, NIST already published an algorithm that can do this.
- joshuak 13y agoI'm guessing you don't work in cryptography research, and so posting on deep security issues seems pretty silly to me. The US government has endorsed demonstrably weak random number generating algorithms, and it is security professionals jobs to be very conservative. As was discussed in Bruce Schneier's article about Dual_EC_DRBG: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_st... (Edit: This article was just discussed on HN only two weeks ago. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5997483 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5997483)
- orr721 13y ago>(Actually, so can the Slovak Mafia, which is a reason to be leery of doing any crypto on AWS.) Hi there! Any specific reason you have chosen Slovak Mafia (any reference)? They do not seem to me to be that kind of sophisticated at all. If any I would bet on Russian mafia.. Best regards from Slovakia.
- DanBC 13y ago{snipped} EDIT: Thanks to lub1be for pointing out my error!!
- lucb1e 13y agoYou mean Thomas[1]? That's not Thomas Pornin[2]. [1] http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/9210/technical-feasibility-of-decrypting-https-by-replacing-the-computers-prng#comment17368_9212 http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/9210/technical-fea... [2] http://crypto.stackexchange.com/users/28/thomas-pornin http://crypto.stackexchange.com/users/28/thomas-pornin Edit: Guys there is no need to downvote him for making a simple mistake. I actually also assumed that at first before remembering that Thomas Pornin uses his full name as display name.
- acqq 13y agoNo, you shouldn't be worried about RdRand particularly, not more than about any other function, as long as you use it properly. If you don't use it yourself, others already did the right thing for you, so you don't have to worry: The present discussion here on HN showed that it is used properly on Linux. It's not the only source and there's a seed used separately: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6040912 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6040912
- nightcracker 13y agoIt's still used directly in Linux: https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-July/009969.html https://mailman.stanford.edu/pipermail/liberationtech/2013-J... Furthermore, if RdRand is insecure but not recognized as such it's a potential risk due to people building supposedly secure software using the instruction.
- acqq 13y agoAddress space randomization is not something you should worry about unless the attacker is already on your machine, that is, it's irrelevant for passive attacks.
- e3pi 13y agoThe Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) "...is a specification for the encryption of electronic data established by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 2001.[3] It is based on the Rijndael cipher[4] developed by two Belgian cryptographers, Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen, who submitted a proposal which was evaluated by the NIST during the AES selection process.[5] AES has been adopted by the U.S. government and is now used worldwide. It supersedes the Data Encryption Standard (DES),[6] which was published in 1977. The algorithm described by AES is a symmetric-key algorithm, meaning the same key is used for both encrypting and decrypting the data. AES is available in many different encryption packages, and is the first publicly accessible and open cipher approved by the National Security Agency (NSA) for top secret information when used in an NSA approved cryptographic module (see Security of AES, below)..." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard RdRand (also RDRAND) "...is an instruction for returning random numbers from an on-chip random number generator.[1] RdRand is available in Ivy Bridge processors[note 1] and is part of the Intel 64 and IA-32 instruction set architectures. Intel Secure Key, formerly known as Bull Mountain, is Intel's code name for both the RdRand instruction and the underlying random number generator (RNG) hardware implementation.[1] Intel calls their RNG a "digital random number generator". The generator uses an on-processor entropy source, which passes the randomly generated bits to an AES (in CBC-MAC mode) conditioner to distill the entropy into non-deterministic random numbers. A deterministic random-bit generator is seeded by the output from the conditioner, providing cryptographically secure random numbers to applications requesting them via the RdRand instruction..." http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDRAND http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RDRAND
- jokoon 13y agoAren't there ways to not use this rdrand thing ?
- hannibal5 13y agoYes there are and it would not hurt to use RdRand as part of the mix in entropy pool. The current flood of posts comes from the fact that Linux allows RdRand to bypass the entropy pool.
- Nrsolis 13y agoFor many years, I've been considering purchasing one of these: http://www.entropykey.co.uk/ http://www.entropykey.co.uk/ I honestly don't know why we're using anything other than provable randomness using discrete entropy sources in this day and age. IIRC, even the Raspberry Pi has an entropy generator on-board. I haven't verified this though.
- exceptione 13y agoFrom the website Please note that there is a very long waiting period for Entropy Keys at the moment. Likely more people got this idea.
- Nrsolis 13y agoNot exactly: On Tue, Jul 02, 2013 at 08:11:13AM -0500, Robert Lee wrote: > This is unfortunate. I do hope they are not going out of business. We've gone through a major crisis, but are still here... just. To say any more in public at this stage might be unwise from a legal standpoint. We currently have no manufacturing capability for ekeys but are working towards getting things up and running again. There's no timescale on that yet, I'm afraid. -- Paul Martin <pm at simtec.co.uk> Simtec Electronics http://www.simtec.co.uk/ http://www.simtec.co.uk/
- DanBC 13y agoLots of things I've seen show hardware random number generators to be flawed. That particular device looks much better than those older devices. (http://www.robertnz.net/hwrng.htm http://www.robertnz.net/hwrng.htm) (http://www.robertnz.net/true_rng.html http://www.robertnz.net/true_rng.html) EDIT: here are some more devices, but I have no idea if these are any good. (http://www.westphal-electronic.com/ http://www.westphal-electronic.com/) (http://www.trng98.se/shop/index.php http://www.trng98.se/shop/index.php) (http://www.comscire.com/ http://www.comscire.com/) (http://www.idquantique.com/random-number-generators/products.html http://www.idquantique.com/random-number-generators/products...) (http://www.letech.jpn.com/ http://www.letech.jpn.com/)
- thomasjames 13y agoIf this actually yields anything, could it mean the wider proliferation of HW random number generators?
- nos4A2 13y agoI am just curious, why can't there be an online service which does Random Number Generation, that should free up this dependency right? I understand there would be trust issues etc, but I am sure well defined contracts and code transparency coupled with open hardware can solve that?
- olalonde 13y ago1) It would be slow. 2) The trust issue would be even greater and it would introduce a single point of failure. 3) Online RNGs do actually exist. http://Random.org http://Random.org for example.
- bangbang 13y agoWouldn't a easier path for decrypting SSL be to go directly to Cert providers and hit them with a NSL?
- DenisM 13y agoCert provider does not have the secret key, so the only thing you can do is get a new cert and and then do man-in-the-middle. It's doable for an individual target, but not doable for a massive dragnet. If a compromised RNG can be used to decrypt data, it might be useful for wholesale decryption of all encrypted traffic on the web.
- fragmede 13y agoThe 'answer' is light on technical details, however. Given a 'random' number generator which always outputs the number 4, how can you attack ARIA, DES, 3DES, ARCFOUR, AES, Camellia, RC2, IDEA, SEED. That should be easy enough to show. Now take a random number generator that seems random when N values are graphed, when N is small. How do you exploit that? How about when N is large? How about when N is huge and you've got researchers writing programs looking for predictability?
- deleted 13y ago[deleted]
- wazoox 13y agoReminds me of this friend working at the DST (french counter-intelligence service) explaining how all the crypto hardware coming from Bull, Thales and other French companies need to be backdoored to get its proper government qualification. Furthermore, the French government happily provides this hardware for a very attractive price to "their friends", like Romanian, Lebanese, etc. security services.
- cmccabe 13y agoGuess what: none of this matters, because RdRand is only one source of entropy among many. For example, another source is the timing of TCP packets coming into the machine. The NSA can't predict that; nobody can. It's the butterfly effect in action. RdRand is kind of the "crocodiles in the sewer" of HN. A tall tale that somehow keeps getting passed around. Guys, they're just generating random bits from thermal noise, that's it! There's a million other more effective backdoors they could insert into the motherboard, CPU, or firmware.