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damarquis
searching PlanetScale…
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1.
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by
damarquis
12y ago
I like the design. However, save draft button is not working for me.
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by
damarquis
12y ago
A fast algorithm for parity would be interesting. There is currently no better way to compute parity than factoring N. There is a well known hand wavy-argument that computing any function on the prime factors of arbitrary integers should be
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damarquis
13y ago
"..that many people suspect of being compromisable by NSA etc." If it was a backdoor you certainly can't count it among the NSAs successes. It is never used.
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damarquis
13y ago
I agree this is a good idea but I think using the words "encrypt" and "decrypt" confuses the goal a little bit as this idea is still useful even if the message aren't required to be confidential form anyone. I think
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by
damarquis
13y ago
"So post a PGP key and say, if you really want anonymity, use this." PGP only provides confidentiality, not anonymity. To get anonymity as well would require TOR.
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by
damarquis
13y ago
The only reason to use one-time pads is an extraordinary level of paranoia. If you are paranoid enough to need a one-time pad then it makes little sense for you as a private citizen to trust that hardware you take into public places hasn&#x
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by
damarquis
13y ago
I think it is mainly a logistical issue. The problem is that encryption keys are a single point of failure. IT practices at most businesses would have to be very rigorous before a design with a single point of failure for any significant pa
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by
damarquis
13y ago
Nitpick: RSA isn't known to be backed by factoring. More precisely, there is no proof that if textbook-RSA encrypted messages could be decrypted quickly that integer factorization could also be done quickly. (Of course if you can facto
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damarquis
13y ago
The author's argument is that the probability of impact on ECC of this line of research is less than probability of an impact on factoring. Post-quantum cryptography has to avoid ECC since the elliptic curve discrete log problem is eas
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damarquis
13y ago
It makes no sense to argue that a non-existent product is vulnerable to a current exploit without a precise definition or specification of that product. Its an obvious mistake but not so obvious that the author can't get away with choo
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damarquis
13y ago
Don't forget that when decrypted the result must match the operation performed on the corresponding plaintexts.
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damarquis
13y ago
I don't see a reason this argument would apply to simulated rape but not simulated murder. A large number of people enjoy watching realistic simulated murder in movies, in TV, and in video games. Your argument predicts that murder rate
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damarquis
13y ago
Of course anyone can follow you in public, the alternative would be impossible to enforce. The problem is that the cost of getting that data could be made unacceptably low. For example, I think most people would object having their govern
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damarquis
13y ago
You are comfortable relying on stalkers not being persistent enough to search a list, save some metadata, and use google maps?
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damarquis
13y ago
"you don't need scientific evidence to know" "but it seems as intuitive" Knowledge can come only from reasoning based upon observations. You cannot know anything by intuition. You can believe your intuitions and fee
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damarquis
13y ago
I love some of the SO sites but they have a lot of communities that have been lingering in beta limbo for ages. I would be interested in more detail on how they reached the conclusion that pump priming is not useful. Do you have a link?
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damarquis
13y ago
It is not clear that's what it is being said.
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damarquis
13y ago
I'm not arguing that there aren't situations where then spreading the belief that their capabilities are less than actual would be a good thing. If the goal is to break a specific subset of all encrypted messages then this is exac
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damarquis
13y ago
Cryptography software is usually critical but I think unlike the code for planes and nuclear power plants it doesn't necessarily have to be. Typically cryptography software is advertised as secure against an adversary has unlimited r
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damarquis
13y ago
Anonymous sources might be supplying real information but they could also be trying to manage beliefs. Undoubtedly the NSA is ahead of everyone else in cryptanalysis but I think it is also advantageous for the NSA to have foreign government
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damarquis
13y ago
"it's just a matter of time before RSA offers zero security" This is not the only possible outcome. Scalable quantum computing could turn out to be impractical due to cost. Or new physics could be found that rules out scalabl
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damarquis
13y ago
So either the NSA wanted a backdoor, in which case we learn that even the NSA can't build a backdoor that academic cryptographers can't detect. Or, much more likely I think, it was just a project that some NSA employees had sittin
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damarquis
13y ago
I agree that if the game is fun people will play it. The problem is getting them to try the game for long enough to know if it is fun. Popularity is obviously a factor in achieving that since lots of people associate mass marketed products
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damarquis
13y ago
The camp of people are both feminists and who care about making arguments based on good science called to say they want you to stop pretending they don't exist.
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damarquis
13y ago
AES yes, PGP no. Anything based on the difficulty of discrete logs is done for. There are 2 types that remain secure, schemes based on the difficulty of solving problems in lattices and problems in coding theory. Lattice based cryptography
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damarquis
13y ago
I believe it has even been proved that for most computational problems quantum computers cannot give an exponential speedup.
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damarquis
13y ago
The a video of the talk those slides are from is online http://vimeo.com/18417770 Worth watching even if you don't care much about DNSSEC, Bernstein is a good speaker.
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by
damarquis
13y ago
Cryptographers seem to have a thing for misleading names. A big one is "provable security" which really means "is at least as hard as another more old and famous problem that we are all guessing is hard to solve efficiently.&
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damarquis
13y ago
I agree that all the short term updates don't have relevance to larger issues. However, if discovering the truth about what the government is doing does matter to you then Snowden's long term fate should be important. There are li
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by
damarquis
13y ago
I would love if all filenames were human readable but it seems like too many people have a great desire to use bad scripts that can't handle spaces.
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