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faulTPM: Exposing AMD fTPMs' Deepest Secrets
- gen3 4y ago"security properties of the TPM - like Bitlocker's TPM- only protector - can be defeated by an attacker with 2-3 hours of physical access to the target device" So I take this is more of a data exfiltration type of attack? Edit: here is the POC https://github.com/PSPReverse/ftpm_attack https://github.com/PSPReverse/ftpm_attack
- aceazzameen 4y agoIt says any TPM can be defeated in 2-3 hrs with physical access. Is the AMD one different? Can it be defeated over networks? And is this something I should be concerned about since I just bought a new AMD machine?
- smarx007 4y agoYes, relevant in case of a lost device: "Motivated by Windows 11’s push to use the TPM for even more applications, we apply the vulnerability to Microsoft BitLocker and show the first fTPM-based attack against the popular Full Disk Encryption solution. BitLocker’s default TPM-only strategy manages – without any changes to the user experience – to swiftly step up a user’s security in the face of a lost or stolen device. However, as our work complements the established at- tacks against dTPMs with an even more potent attack against AMD fTPMs, a TPM-only configuration lulls a non-technical user with high protection needs into a false sense of security." "Users who fear a physical attacker with reasonable resources should opt for a TPM and PIN configuration. When BitLocker identifies that the underlying TPM is an fTPM, users should be urged to turn their PIN into a passphrase."
- goolz 4y agoDoes this line imply then it is mostly a concern for Windows users? I don't mind only using Linux, it is Best in Slot for most tasks anyways.
- creshal 4y agoChromeOS also heavily relies on TPM for disk encryption, and unlike Windows doesn't even give you the option of adding a passphrase or pin on top of it. And there's probably some large enterprises that use regular Linux desktops with LUKS/Btrfs/ZFS encryption in TPM only mode, to match their Windows setups. Systemd e.g. added systemd-cryptenroll with ergonomics comparable to Windows' Bitlocker enrollment.
- dfox 4y agoTypical Linux installation will not rely on TPM in any way. But if you use systemd-cryptenroll to provide BitLocker-like UX for FDE then the concerns are mostly same.
- dhx 4y agoIt could also be a concern for Linux users if they have configured their system to use systemd-cryptenroll (even with --tpm2-with-pin=yes or --fido2-with-client-pin=yes). The user is not asked for a secure passphrase in addition to having a TPM present. The user is just asked for a short PIN that is provided to the TPM2 or FIDO2 device and the device is not meant to return the secret without a valid PIN being provided.
- hnj2 4y agoThere is actually an interesting point regarding TPM+PIN and systemd-cryptenroll: The data sealed in the TPM can directly be used to decrypt the disk (it is base64 encoded and used as a passphrase for a luks key slot). The PIN is only used to authenticate the TPM's unsealing of the data. In contrast, the unsealed BitLocker data still needs to be decrypted with the pin to get to the VMK. When our attack is successfully executed on a target, this means that TPM+PIN is broken on systemd-cryptenroll, and as secure as PIN-only with the same PIN on BitLocker.
- dathinab 4y agoif Linux full disk encryption would have a more user friendly UX a lot of Linux users would probably use that too its a very convenient feature through is not convenient to setup and a lot of Linux users never trusted it to be secure, i. e. a lot of people expected an attack like this sooner or later
- goolz 4y agoI am wondering the same, considering the proliferation of AMD in the last few years I would be devastated to have to go back to Intel. Just when the Framework came out with their AMD versions too.
- cwerling 4y agoOne of the authors here. This attack is relevant if your machine is physically exposed to attacks, e.g., in an office environment or while traveling, and if you don't use any additional pre-boot passphrase to protect the disk (but rely solely on AMD's fTPM). When TPMs became popular, dedicated TPMs were mainly used, being a separate chip on the mainboard connected via the SPI or LPC bus. These were prone to (relatively primitive) bus sniffing attacks, where you would hook up a Logic Analyzer to the bus, watch a regular boot procedure grab the disk key, and then use software like Dislocker to extract all data from a USB Live Linux or alike. Nowadays, most modern CPUs (both on Intel and AMD) ship firmware TPMs that are "included" with CPU die, making them safe against the bus sniffing attacks. However, they can still be prone to more sophisticated attacks like ours.
- bo1024 4y agoThis is important because one purpose of TPMs is to prevent the owner of the machine from doing certain things (as in Digital Rights Management). And the owner of the machine presumably has physical access.
- dathinab 4y agono they are for boot chain security which is an essential featur for any laptop TPM by itself never prevents anyone from doing anything but it's used with features like secure boot, but as long as they fully implement the spec they don't prevent you from doing with your laptop what you want as long as you don't install software which does so secure enclave and similar used for DRM isn't directly a TPM feature but more an extension using TPM and other CPU features and yes it can be used to security store keys in your hardware. Any keys! A feature any user understanding security would appreciate.
- labcomputer 4y agoErm… yes, actually. For DRM to work, it has to be running in a trusted environment where the user can’t just load up a debugger as superuser and read the keys from memory. The way you do that is by using secure boot to ensure that you are running a trusted kernel that enforces appropriate access controls… which requires TPM. One of the main selling points of TPM is that you have chain of trust to ensure the boot process wasn’t tampered by a rogue boot loader that modified your code. And, yes, that has security benefits as well, but don’t for a second think that DRM wasn’t a major consideration.
- daneel_w 4y agoAccess/privileges to execute on the host is required. I, personally, would not feel concerned unless I was a TPM user and knew I was a specific target.
- dathinab 4y agoyou also need to connect (cheap) hardware to your motherboard this makes it very very unlikely to be usable in a virus or remote attack but if you lose your arm laptop and didn't use a encryption password you might want to consider your data leaked also I would treat Intel cpus the same, Intel having a similar vulnerability is not unlikely
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- jhoelzel 4y agoHonestly TPM is probably creating more bad than good at this point. Every time I think about the millions of computers that will be declared worthless this year, it makes me a little bit more angrier.
- judge2020 4y ago> Every time I think about the millions of computers that will be declared worthless this year, it makes me a little bit more angrier. What is this a reference to? Every computer I've found will let you boot into the bios and disable secure boot or add new keys to the trust store.
- r2_pilot 4y agoMicrosoft is edging closer and closer to dropping support for Windows 10(even a computer I built in 2017 that's still running perfectly fine can't upgrade). But for many users, changing to another OS besides Windows is tantamount to not functioning, so planned obsolescence continues apace.
- babypuncher 4y agoThat's not happening until 2025, GP said "this year".
- Workaccount2 4y agoI wish there was a linux distro made by people who love windows, not linux.
- goolz 4y agoTo anyone with a bit more breadth on this topic: is this as terrible as it sounds or more just in the realm of academia and nation-states?
- dist-epoch 4y ago> Bitlocker's TPM- only protector - can be defeated by an attacker with 2-3 hours of physical access to the target device That sounds pretty practical.
- goolz 4y agoIndeed it does, and this is just done by a team of researchers. Imagine what the NSA and their goons could get up to with 1000x more resources.
- Eisenstein 4y agoThis is why you need to evaluate your threat model. Is the NSA out to get you? If so, I hope you aren't relying on HN for your security strategy. Are you worried about theft? Add a passphrase to your encrypted volume and don't rely on TPM. Worried about your coworker or family snooping on your computer and seeing your emails to your mistress? TPM is fine.
- goolz 4y agoWell, considering I am 008, my threat model is quite high indeed! But ya, I was being hyperbolic. And HN has provided plenty of worthwhile info on the topic of OpSec over the years, do not be quick to discount. I would be a fool to reveal too much about my threat model but the reality is there exist many people who have reason to fear the NSA. Am I one of them? Nice try, NSA!
- altairprime 4y agoThe popularity of hyperbole in HN discussions makes it easier for people to discount HN, both in drowning out useful information and in weakening discourse. Please reconsider in the future.
- FeistySkink 4y agoDoes this affect OPAL 2.0 in any way? I tried to search through the spec [1] but didn't find immediate clues. [1]: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_Storage-Opal_SSC_v2.01_rev1.00.pdf https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_Sto...
- cwerling 4y agoThanks for the pointer, we haven't checked out OPAL yet. It seems to be the most popular standard when it comes to "Self Encrypting Drives" (SED). Looking into it shortly, I've found a paper from 2019 from Meijer et al. ([1]) finding several flaws with OPAL-compliant drives. They further find that BitLocker entirely depends on SSD-based encryption if the hardware advertises it. This finding's nature is very similar to ours in that BitLocker's Disk Encryption is insecure/unreliable in particular hardware configurations. [1] https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8835339 https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8835339
- FeistySkink 4y agoThanks for the hint. From the paper it seems it's highly implementation-dependent which drives can be compromised and there's no immediate way to tell. Still it seems OPAL 2.0 is good enough to deter data leaks in case of theft (excluding targeted attacks).
- dist-epoch 4y agoPassword-less TPMs will always be fundamentally vulnerable. The only question is what is the price to break them. It can be very high (as seen in the Xbox).
- 0x_rs 4y ago>Our attacks have shown that an fTPM cannot sufficiently protect its internal state against firmware or physical attacks. In such a scenario, a passphrase-only key protector of reasonable length provides better security than a TPM-only protector with a numeric PIN (5.3.1). This is in stark contrast to Microsoft’s claim that “BitLocker provides the most protection when used with a Trusted Platform Module” [29] (see also in 2.3). In fact, of all available protectors (seen in Figure 1), TPM-only is arguably the weakest protection strategy. This might not be surprising to some, despite Windows hiding the GUI passphrase functionality behind some group policy settings, both "Require additional authentication at startup" and "Enhanced PIN", which isn't perhaps the most intuitive and a normal user might not even realize unless they notice the "normal" PIN is numerical-only. In any case, for the average person that might have their devices stolen, this is likely not to be a threat, but I think a passphrase should always be preferable, BitLocker doesn't support any better option.
- CircleSpokes 4y agoNot only do they hide it under a group policy even when you enable an "Enhanced PIN" there is a maximum length of 20.
- cma 4y agoWhy do they do this, Samsung does the same tiny length limit for Secure Folder. Is it law enforcement requested?
- bflesch 4y agoyes
- copper-float 4y agoSource? That would be very shocking.
- wyager 4y ago
- taraharris 4y agoWhy not simply abandon TPM and focus on making simple, trustable, massively parallel general-purpose hardware without backdoors for spy agencies and corporations? Whose computer is this, anyway?
- jeroenhd 4y agoMine, and I like it to stay that way. A TPM can be a valuable tool for protecting my data, making it difficult if not impossible for anyone to decrypt my drives. TPM+PIN is hard to beat.
- taraharris 4y agoTPM's true owner is the NSA, not you or I. https://www.stat.rice.edu/~dobelman/kstorm.txt https://www.stat.rice.edu/~dobelman/kstorm.txt https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6337282 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6337282 https://www.militaryaerospace.com/computers/article/16711478/nsa-teams-with-trusted-computing-group-on-software-could-help-secure-the-supply-chain https://www.militaryaerospace.com/computers/article/16711478... https://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-german-government-warns-key-entities-not-to-use-windows-8--links-the-nsa-2013-8 https://www.businessinsider.com/leaked-german-government-war... https://supplychaindigital.com/technology/nsa-trusted-computing-group-and-intel-collaborate-standardise-supply-chain-risk-management https://supplychaindigital.com/technology/nsa-trusted-comput... https://redmondmag.com/articles/2013/08/22/windows-8-security-issues?m=1 https://redmondmag.com/articles/2013/08/22/windows-8-securit... https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/security/2015/07/29/on-the-trust-of-trusted-computing-in-the-post-snowden-age/ https://blogs.ncl.ac.uk/security/2015/07/29/on-the-trust-of-...
- charcircuit 4y agoProtecting American's, American businesses', and the American government's security is in the interest of the NSA.
- BlueTemplar 4y ago
- 1827163 4y agoYet one more reason the Platform Security Processor is a nightmare and should be removed completely from future processors.
- anthk 4y agoAnd IntelME.
- Sunspark 4y agoI sometimes wonder if it'll be a selling point of Chinese CPUs in the future, "our CPU might not be the fastest, but it's the only one running at any given time!". People don't need "flagship" CPUs for every single purpose. There is no reason why one cannot have a slower more private system for specific purposes, say general purpose computing, and the faster one with the autonomous network-aware CPU and OS be used for games only or something.
- BlueTemplar 4y agoIssue here is that I trust the Chinese even less to not have something like this hidden in the hardware.
- officeplant 4y agoif my Starfive RISC-V boards start dialing home they won't get much out of me other than second hand frustration with learning a new platform.
- 1827163 4y agoInteresting it is the Chinese processors (e.g. Allwinner, T-Head, Rockchip) that happen to be free of this secure boot garbage by default. If you want to you can blow an efuse (with power applied to the VPP pin) and enable secure boot. But otherwise it's off. I am waiting for a high performance ARM or RISC-V chip that's on par with AMD and Intel performance. One without secure boot. The moment that comes out, my Ryzen system is going in the bin immediately.
- patrakov 4y agoThe most important sentences of the article: "Our attack utilizes the AMD-SP’s vulnerability to voltage fault injection attacks [14] to extract a chip-unique secret from the targeted CPU." "The attack requires access to the motherboard of the target system (4.1), particularly its SPI bus and voltage regulators." In other words, it is required to open the laptop and connect custom (but cheap) hardware to the motherboard to disrupt its normal operation.
- Arrath 4y ago> voltage fault injection attacks What's old is new again!
- moring 4y agoAmateur-me thinks that it would not be too hard to prevent such an attack: Have a voltage fault detection circuit at all (TPM-relevant) supply pins that hard-locks the chip until it gets power cycled, and have those circuits be powered by on-chip capacitors that survive just a little longer than their time-to-trigger. Would that be feasible?
- cwerling 4y agoYour idea roughly goes into the direction of what the industry has started implementing: Tunable Replica Circuits: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/newsroom/news/the-story-behind-new-intel-security-feature.html https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/newsroom/news/the-st...
- Tuna-Fish 4y agoThis mitigation helps until the attackers stop confining themselves to the supply pins. You can do voltage fault injection through any exposed metal (or metal that can be made exposed), and the attacker can be entirely happy with attacks where they don't actually pull the voltage plane down, but instead just make some specific circuit a bit iffy by injecting an opposite voltage at some specific point and with low enough current that it's undetectable when looking at the chip as whole. Approaches such as yours do make the attack require a lot more skill to accomplish.
- jeroenhd 4y agoGnarly, especially because these vulnerabilities seem unpatchable. Luckily, it seems TPM+PIN should remain safe if your PIN is difficult enough to brute-force, though. As this includes an attack against the secure processor, does this also pose risks to any DRM keys?
- bootsmann 4y agoPIN needs to be quite long (and most certainly alphanumeric) for this to work, see the table in 5.3.1
- dschuetz 4y agoWait isn't that the fancy MS Pluton thing AMD decided to add to their processors to make the systems more "secure"?
- dathinab 4y agono, TPM ist somthing different wether pluton features contributed to allowing this attack I can't tell from the abstract
- dist-epoch 4y agoPluton is next gen TPM, fixing many of the current TPM vulnerabilities.
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- temptemptemp111 4y ago[dead]
- sampa 4y agoshows that people shouldn't trust closed HW crypto (HW SSD passwords - same) trust only open-source software crypto
- moonchrome 4y agoYes, it's an idiot proof method that's vetted by millions of reviewers because it's developed in the open. The ability to self validate is also invaluable, hard to have major widespread bugs with that, especially if it's widely adopted by trillion $ companies. OpenSSL is a great example of this.
- candiddevmike 4y agoHow would open source software crypto replace the purpose of a TPM?
- astrange 4y agoYou can't replace an HSM with software on an insecure system.
- anthk 4y agoAnd now I remember people telling me Windows is more secure than Unix because of TPM, foo... bar... No, thanks, bioctl(4) works well under OpenBSD for disk encryption and so will do under HyperbolaBSD.
- shitter 4y agoWindows, Linux, OpenBSD - it doesn't matter. Without a TPM you're vulnerable to trivial attacks (Evil Maid), far easier than the one in this article.
- anthk 4y agoDid you try OpenBSD with bioctl? You can tamper with the bootloader, but not the rest. And you can always set the bootloader in another media and always boot from that.
- shitter 4y agoTampering with the bootloader is game over. And what, are you keeping this other bootloader medium on your person and in your sight at all times? It's never ever unattended?
- codedokode 4y agoUsing TPM with closed source firmware, especially written and designed by Microsoft, probably full of backdoors, when you don't even know what it's doing is a worse choice.
- shitter 4y agoI don't think it's a worse choice. Either way, you're screwed with physical access. At least with TPM, the attack requires more sophistication.
- salawat 4y agoSo.... Take your laptop with you everywhere? When did we start creating nightmarish system complexity to guard against attacks that are generally exceedingly rare....oh wait. Forgot where I was.
- als0 4y agoIt's worth mentioning that standalone TPM chips from Infineon and others are a lot more hardened than Intel or AMD's fTPMs. Infineon's TPMs are tested against fault injection attack, package removal, side channels and so on.
- cwerling 4y agoPlease note, though, that's imperative to then go for a BitLocker TPM+PIN configuration at least. A standalone (discrete) TPM with TPM-only protectors can be attacked by bus sniffing, a hardware attack much simpler than ours. [1] The beauty of a discrete TPM is its anti-hammering protection, making a numerical PIN a very effective security measure (akin to a SIM/SmartCard). [1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0898122112004634?via%3Dihub https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089812211...
- als0 4y agoBus sniffing can be mitigated by encrypting communications using the TPM's in-built parameter encryption capabilities.
- cryptonector 4y agoYes, this. Bitlocker could absolutely do this. There's still other active attacks resulting from the BMC and BIOS and parts of the OS not also doing the encrypted session thing.
- charcircuit 4y agoThis works up to Zen 3. This is going to set the PC consumer space's security back even further than it already is compared to mobile.
- riedel 4y agoStupid question: was there no responsible disclosure and is there no cve assigned? Seems like a rather practical attack (or am I missing something? Do the researchers consider it a known fact that that fTPM is broken by design and thus do think that nobody will get hurt? It would make sense to require an additional passphrase on fTPM devices for bitlocker. Was there a statement from Microsoft or AMD?
- hnj2 4y agoFrom the paper: "All security-relevant findings discussed in this paper were responsibly disclosed to AMD, Microsoft, and the systemd-cryptenroll maintainers. The systemd-cryptenroll maintainers quickly got back to us to discuss specific mitigation strategies."
- deleted 4y ago[deleted]
- riedel 4y agoThx. I overlooked this part. So AMD and Microsoft simply ignored it and leave customers unprotected. Wow.
- asldkfjaslkdj 4y agoQuestion, this is a widely used tpm since it's 'free', so it makes sense it was the first one looked into, but anyone did similar tests to the el-cheapo ones that will end up on 99% of computers around the world? My bet is that messing with voltages on those chips too will expose all sorts of exploits too.
- snvzz 4y agoUnsurprisingly, a key is better protected with a good passphrase than a TPM, if you have to pick one.
- cryptonector 4y agoI've not yet read past the abstract, though I've read (and responded to) a lot of the commentary here. QUESTION FOR THE AUTHORS: Is there any way in which a voltage fault injection vulnerability in the SP can affect only the fTPM and not actually be a full host compromise but for the fTPM compromise? I believe the answer to that has to be no. If you can compromise the SP you can compromise the whole system. Therefore this isn't really about fTPM. But you'll notice that many commenters are running away with this and saying that TPMs make systems less secure, which is not really correct. Yes, TPMs are not used correctly by most BMC/BIOS implementations, or even by OSes, and there are vulnerabilities that arise from that misuse. But TPM 2.0 does provide what is needed to solve those issues. The wholesale attacks on TPM 2.0 itself here are not warranted, especially if the SP vulnerabilities are more general rather than being specifically limited to fTPMs.
- nyanpasu64 4y agoRelying on an TPM to rate-limit an attacker's ability to brute-force a comically short PIN and get the encryption key (Microsoft's promoted way to login to a Windows device), is less secure (once the TPM is exploited) than relying on the attacker to guess a high-entropy password to get the encryption key.
- cryptonector 4y ago> once the TPM is exploited This is not addressing my question. It's not the TPM that's exploited but the SP. If the SP is compromised then the whole host is compromised.
- maribi 4y ago[dead]