cwerling

4 ms·

1. 1.▲
   by cwerling 3y ago

   Please note, though, that's imperative to then go for a BitLocker TPM+PIN configuration at least. A standalone (discrete) TPM with TPM-only protectors can be attacked by bus sniffing, a hardware attack much simpler than ours. [1] The b
2. 2.▲
   by cwerling 3y ago

   Your idea roughly goes into the direction of what the industry has started implementing: Tunable Replica Circuits: https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/newsroom/news/the-st...
3. 3.▲
   by cwerling 3y ago

   Thanks for the pointer, we haven't checked out OPAL yet. It seems to be the most popular standard when it comes to "Self Encrypting Drives" (SED). Looking into it shortly, I've found a paper from 2019 from Meijer et al.
4. 4.▲
   by cwerling 3y ago

   One of the authors here. This attack is relevant if your machine is physically exposed to attacks, e.g., in an office environment or while traveling, and if you don't use any additional pre-boot passphrase to protect the disk (but rely
5. 5.▲
   by cwerling 7y ago

   PSPTool author here. Since all PSP firmware must be signed by AMD, something like a psp_cleaner would be possible given that a bug in the firmware allows to inject arbitrary code. This was shown by CTS-Labs earlier. [1] [1] https:/&#x
6. 6.▲
   by cwerling 7y ago

   The author here. Although some previous work on this controversial subsystem that is comparable to Intel ME was done [1, 2], this tool aims to lower the entry barrier for looking into the code running on the PSP (and other AMD subsystems, t
7. 7.▲
   Show HN: PSPTool – Parse and Trace Firmware of AMD's Platform Security Processor(github.com)

   3 points by cwerling 7y ago|1 comments