hnj2

6 ms·

1. 1.▲
   by hnj2 3y ago

   There is actually an interesting point regarding TPM+PIN and systemd-cryptenroll: The data sealed in the TPM can directly be used to decrypt the disk (it is base64 encoded and used as a passphrase for a luks key slot). The PIN is only used
2. 2.▲
   by hnj2 3y ago

   We haven't looked to much into encrypted sessions, but for anyone wondering how they prevent MITM attacks in such a scenario: systemd-cryptenroll seems to be ahead in this regard: https://github.com/systemd/systemd
3. 3.▲
   by hnj2 3y ago

   Author here: TPMs are not a TEE (trusted execution environment), and the TEE included in AMD's CPUs function completely separately from the TPM. So you could disable the TPM and still have the TEE run DRM code. The fact that both TEE a
4. 4.▲
   by hnj2 3y ago

   From the paper: "All security-relevant findings discussed in this paper were responsibly disclosed to AMD, Microsoft, and the systemd-cryptenroll maintainers. The systemd-cryptenroll maintainers quickly got back to us to discuss specif