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In second largest DeFi hack, Blockchain Bridge loses $320M Ether
- dannyw 5y agoThe actual exploit (simplified for brevity): if (validSignature == signatureFromGuardian) approve() If you send an invalid signature from a non-guardian, the condition also resolves to true.
- civilized 5y agoMaybe I'm having a dumb day here but I'm not following... is the code block there the intended behavior or the exploit? In the case you mention, both conditions are false...
- dannyw 5y agoApologies, == instead of &&. false == false
- chairmanwow1 5y agoCan you link to the code. This seems bizarre to me that someone would write it this way.
- ajross 5y agoMicrobugs always look like that. Weird stuff pops out of our brains when transcribing ideas about rules into logic. The overwhelming majority of such thinkos are clearly wrong and don't work, or often even build. And sometimes you get bugs that take a while to find because the case where it would fail is an untested edge case. And then, once in a while, one of those edge cases...
- emerged 5y agoThe longer it takes to find the cause of a bug, the more likely the bug is a thinko.
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- theli0nheart 5y ago> If you send an invalid signature from a non-guardian, the condition also resolves to true. Huh? That resolves to false && false, which equals false.
- bvanheu 5y agoI think dannyw meant something like this: # This function is defined by the system def validSignature(sig): return false # This function is defined by the system def isSignaturefromGuardian(sig): if sig.validator == "guardian": return true return false # A bug in the system compared both return values if validSignature(tx.sig) == signatureFromGuardian(tx.sig): approve() ```
- civilized 5y agoI looked at your post, then at these Twitter threads recommended in the other comments https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30187898 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30187898 I think "something about not checking signatures right" is about as deep as I'm going to understand this.
- PretzelPirate 5y agoThere is a parameter passed in as part of a function call that basically says “here’s where you can find the function to validate the signature”. The attacker was able to point that to a function they wrote instead of using the real one, so the function returned saying “yep, that’s a valid signature” when it wasn’t.
- Ansil849 5y agoI understand the first part, "There is a parameter passed in as part of a function call that basically says “here’s where you can find the function to validate the signature", but I'm having trouble understanding the second part, "The attacker was able to point that to a function they wrote instead of using the real one". In other words I (relatively) understand the 'what', but I don't understand how was the attacker able to do the redirect?
- civilized 5y agoSomething something system addresses.
- mewse 5y agoWait.. are you saying that the conditional was actually: if (isSignatureValid == isSignatureFromGuardian) As variable names, “validSignature” and “signatureFromGuardian” sound like they’re storing the literal signature values, but from your description these are actually holding boolean results _describing_ the signatures, and not the signatures themselves? Geez, if you name variables that it’d be amazingly easy to make a mistakes like what you describe, and then just read straight over them when you’re reviewing the code.
- kwertyoowiyop 5y agoI wonder if the hacker did any smaller transactions in the last two weeks, as proof of concept.
- VHRanger 5y agoAnd here's to the crypto skeptics who were saying the number is going down
- zydex 5y agoWhat does this mean?
- badkitty99 5y ago
- mattwilsonn888 5y agoThis highlights an incentive issue and a paradigm issue in the blockchain space. There is a strong incentive to get new protocols up and running and even though users are technically responsible as they can audit the code, most users, of course, are not qualified to do so, and stand to make more from exploiting any vulnerabilities they find than they are pointing for them out. The issue of paradigm is just how poorly suited EVM is as a smart contract language. It is too hard to manage the complexity of bytecode with memory managed on chain and in contract code. When small errors have huge consequences and there are no second chances, EVM is and should be pointed out to be one of the worst standards Ethereum has brought to crypto. When it comes to high stakes programming and especially in a space where new programs are written quickly and often, its almost objectively obvious that functional styles with more guard rails is the better choice. Nothing running on chain needs an infinite loop or many other fancy features one typically expects from a programming language - restrictions and readability in smart contract code are more important to computational chains than seat-belts are to automobiles, but the network effect is slowing the space down. Edit: Some people have pointed out this was an issue with Solana contracts, which run on Rust - so I was wrong to use this as an example for half of my point, but still believe the point stands. Even Rust IMO is not tied down enough for contract code, but the fact that it can happen on Rust which is loads better then EVM for bug catching I think proves the point a bit more if anything.
- berberous 5y agoI think the exploit took place using Rust contracts on Solana.
- vkou 5y ago> most users, of course, are not qualified to do so, and stand to make more from exploiting any vulnerabilities they find than they are pointing for them out. The incentives are even worse then that. Participants who aren't active crooks are actively incentivized to not look for vulnerabilities, because the easiest way to make money in this space, but to sell to a bigger fool. The quality of the underlying 'investment' doesn't matter.
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- crummy 5y agoThere's clearly plenty of money to be made in crypto if you're clever.
- koolba 5y agoThe entire ecosystem is one big bug bounty.
- TacticalCoder 5y agoI'd say this whole ecosystem is the strongest proof we have so far that the secp256k1 curve is not backdoored. At least there's that.
- latchkey 5y agoAny financial ecosystem is a bug bounty. Banks are bug bounties. Stock market is a bug bounty. ...
- erulabs 5y agoIs the implication of your comment that the solution is for everyone to just stop committing crimes? I'm not sure how realistic that is.
- Beaver117 5y agoMaybe. You can just walk into a bank and claim you are robbing them, and walk out with money, because tellers are trained not to refuse. Is that a security loophole? Probably not, because you can easily be tracked and caught. Similar with the stock market. If you find a "bug" it's likely that the SEC will want to have a chat with you.
- zepto 5y agoOver time it will become extremely robust
- paulpauper 5y agocrime pays. who knew. someone would have to work 500-1000 years at google to make what this person did instantly
- jonathan-adly 5y agoSo - you have an open-source smart contract with code that allows you to do “X”. You go ahead and do “X”. Not sure if hack is the best word here. Exploit, maybe? Interested to see one of these cases going to court.
- notyourwork 5y ago(IANAL) Don't contracts have intent of the contract and in some courts the interpretation of the contract is as important as the contract itself. What was meant versus what it literally says so to speak?
- zepto 5y agoWhere is the intent other than in the contract?
- astrange 5y agoGithub comments, tweets saying you didn't mean to get hacked like that. Contracts also need things like consideration and not being "against public policy".
- zepto 5y agoI guess we’re just waiting for a court case to test this. Smart contract code as an exhibit for the defense, and GitHub comments as an exhibit for the plaintiffs. We need a smart court to handle it.
- kittywav 5y agoYes, but a "smart contract" is not a (legal) contract: it's just a fancy name for "a software program that runs on a blockchain". Thus, "smart contracts" behave like software programs (what happens is what is actually written in the "smart contract", not the intent that programmer had when he wrote it, nor the expectation of the user when he interacts with it), and not like legal contracts (where intents and expectations come into play, and courts can be involved for arbitration). Besides, which exact court would have jurisdiction over a smart contract exploit that happens in Ethereum, for example? A court in the country of the person deploying the contract? A court in the country of the person that interacted with the contract and lost their assets? A court in the country of the (unknown) exploiter? A court in the country of the blockchain developers?
- _ugfj 5y agoObligatory https://twitter.com/qrs/status/1395784294451265536 https://twitter.com/qrs/status/1395784294451265536 > Smart contracts should be considered self-funded bug-bounty platforms.
- encryptluks2 5y agoIf only banks could say they are sorry that they lost your money cause they accidentally left the vault open for their friends to come raid it.
- blunte 5y agoNo, what banks do is take most of the money you deposited and make high risk investments with it. Then when the unthinkable happens, and that 0.001% chance that their models said could happen happens, they turn to the government (which means taxes and debt for you) to bail them out. Neither scenario is good.
- woodruffw 5y agoBanks are required to maintain capital reserves (distinct from the federal reserve rate) sufficient to weather most financial upsets. And the fact that the federal reserve moves to compensate customers in the (extremely rare) case of bank insolvency is an incredibly good thing, probably among the single greatest stabilizing factor in consumer banking in the US.
- danielmarkbruce 5y agoIt's not actually the fed who does it. It's the FDIC, which is a different entity. The FDIC's money comes from... banks. Technically the FDIC is backed by the US Government and has a credit line with the US Treasury, but they seem to get along fine with the money they collect from banks.
- woodruffw 5y agoI had always thought that the FDIC was a division of the Fed! Thanks for the correction.
- latchkey 5y agoBailed out by the FDIC... https://www.valuewalk.com/2020/02/top-10-biggest-bank-failures/ https://www.valuewalk.com/2020/02/top-10-biggest-bank-failur...
- throwhauser 5y ago> “ETH will be added over the next hours to ensure wETH is backed 1:1,” the protocol wrote. Where would the ETH come from?
- danielvf 5y agoGiant investors, who have put a huge amount of money into the Solana blockchain, or into the company behind the Wormhole bridge. It's also likely that these same companies/individuals were the same ones that took most of the loss anyway, so they may mostly be paying back themselves, while at the same time keeping up the value of their investments the projects.
- gzer0 5y agoFrom the looks of it, they've closed up shop and left. Their website is just a massive banner pointing to their twitter [1]. If this is temporary, than this is extremely shady behaviour for an organization handling "millions" of crypto tokens. [1] https://portalbridge.com/ https://portalbridge.com/
- democracy 5y agoEven if they left for Cuba - it's the famous "bank the unbanked" principle in action. They will be distributing the cash among the poor! Strong fundamentals! Legit team! Bright future!
- Zpalmtree 5y agoNo, that's just the bridge where you can actually transfer tokens they took down. Their main website is https://wormholenetwork.com/ https://wormholenetwork.com/
- Animats 5y agoThat's a very good question. Where do they get a quarter of a billion dollars on short notice? Do they have that much of their own capital? Or are they taking this out of some other fund that nominally belongs to others?
- gzer0 5y agoExcerpt explaining the exploit: "Preliminary analysis from CertiK shows that the attacker exploited a vulnerability on the solana side of the Wormhole bridge to create 120,000 so-called “wrapped” ethereum tokens for themselves. (Wrapped etherum tokens are pegged to the value of the original coin but are interoperable with other blockchains.) It appears that they then used these tokens to claim ethereum that was held on the ethereum side of the bridge. Prior to the exploit, the bridge held a 1:1 ratio of ethereum to wrapped ethereum on the solana blockchain, “acting essentially as an escrow service,” according to CertiK. “This exploit breaks the 1:1 peg, as there is now at least 93,750 less ETH held as collateral,” continued the report."
- dannyw 5y agoThe actual exploit (simplified for brevity): if (validSignature == signatureFromGuardian) approve() If you send an invalid signature from a non-guardian, the condition also resolves to true..
- randomhodler84 5y agoIt’s more than this no? I think the attacker substituted their own ECDSA verify function contract because the load call didn’t check it was the system verifier?
- kristjansson 5y agoSeems like it accepted a point to the verification function from the thing it was supposed to be verifying?
- can16358p 5y agoIsn't it in line with what the parent comment said? (Though in a simpler manner)
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- cdiddy2 5y agoBest description of the hack I have found yet. The hack is on the solana side not the ethereum side of the bridge https://twitter.com/kelvinfichter/status/1489041221947375616 https://twitter.com/kelvinfichter/status/1489041221947375616 *edit: another good thread https://twitter.com/samczsun/status/1489044939732406275 https://twitter.com/samczsun/status/1489044939732406275
- lostmsu 5y agoBoth cut short for me.
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- encoderer 5y agoEvery one of these attacks reads more like a chemical process than a hack. “First, synthesize o2 by borrowing an oxygen molecule…”
- ZephyrBlu 5y agoExploit is a more apt description than hack.
- btown 5y agoFrom the first thread: > A commit was made ~9 hours ago replacing usage of load_instruction_at with load_instruction_at_checked, which actually confirms that the program being executed is the system program. It's interesting that this commit was made ~9 hours ago and the exploit happened a few hours after that. Possible that an attacker was keeping an eye on the repository and looking out for suspicious commits. Could be that the Wormhole team spotted the bug, patched it, but the attacker got to it before the patch could be rolled out. Super important to keep these sort of patches lowkey and to try to stuff them into larger commits. > It looks like maybe Wormhole tried to do this by including the change in a much larger and unassuming commit called "Update Solana to 1.9.4". Not sure exactly what happened here, but a clear lesson to try to deploy before making any patch details public, if you can afford to do that. Of course this ends up being at odds with Web3 ideals, so not always clear how to best handle these sort of things. One thing that would be healthy for the larger ecosystem would be for chains to build in regular "maintenance windows" where trades are halted by contract, at which time sensitive security patches can be rolled out to the codebase and then to the network by the maintaining team. Of course, this requires a lot of foresight. But the alternative is something like this. Also - why would you ever set up a system where the majority of its assets can be drained by a single transaction, whether legitimate or not? Just because it's not centralized doesn't mean every transaction is made equal; one could require timeout periods for transactions above a certain amount, or any size of transactions could trigger a halt once a certain amount has been bled in aggregate, that requires supermajority consensus to "unlock" the chain. That this wasn't built in, in an ecosystem where hacking is rampant, by a team focused on creating a cross-chain transmission utility, is surprising, to say the least. There are far, far worse things than a halt on trading. There are many domains where unsupervised 100% uptime on systems with access to a substantial portion of an organization's assets is ideal; finance, whether centralized or decentralized, is rarely one of them.
- jakelazaroff 5y agoThe total crypto market cap is just over $1 trillion. The two biggest hacks alone have made off with almost $1 billion. That’s just under .1% of all cryptocurrency stolen, with no recourse for those on the losing end. When can we acknowledge that this is an absolutely insane basis for a financial system?
- jbkiv 5y agoYou have to compare that to the equivalent of the float in stocks. Most crypto holdings are not that liquid and come from early backers. If the big holders (mostly pump and dump) sell, the market will collapse.
- eof 5y agoIt’s closer to two trillion. But I think 0.1% is a hilarious number to assert is too high a price to pay. How much is skimmed as central banks flow money to citizens? How much is embezzled in corrupt orgs/nations? Traditional finance puts power in men that don’t even need to hack anything to take far more than 0.1%. Half of everything would be likely worth it if crypto lives upto even a smidge of it’s true promise.
- uncomputation 5y ago90% of Coinbase’s Q3 revenue was from transaction fees. One benefit of crypto is you have options to move to a zero-fee alternative, but let’s not get overly optimistic either. Many tradfi solutions will be copied at the outset because they work.
- Scott_Sanderson 5y agoI'd rather have 0.1% of my money stolen than do business with banks.
- paulpauper 5y agolol ask the victims of the mtgox scam and ask if they only lost .1% of their money
- jbkiv 5y agoWe are working on an insurance product for crypto. :-( The more we dig into it the more scams we find. Everywhere. Wash trading, click baiting, pump and dump, code is law, etc. You will find the biggest bazaar there is in the crypto world. Biggest than the Nevarro bazaar. The anonymous ecosystem is a paradise for scammers and money launderers. And a terrifying "crypto lord" on Telegram or Twitter may just be your nicest coworker. I am not sure we will ever find a backer. So far we are working on the private risk management side of the venture. I would expect more mainstream users, and they will hammered day one. Look at what is going with NFTs, all the wash trading pushing price ups (source: https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/2022-crypto-crime-report-preview-nft-wash-trading-money-laundering/ https://blog.chainalysis.com/reports/2022-crypto-crime-repor...)
- thelibrarian 5y agoI think you would have less risk if you were selling life insurance policies to Soviet soldiers in Stalingrad in 1942.
- beebmam 5y agoSeeing cryptocurrencies grow so much over the last few years, it seems to me that without governance over cryptocurrency transactions, cryptocurrencies tend to incentivize scams and black market trading, and they tend to function as speculation/gambling schemes. "Shilling" is common among everyone I know that has purchased cryptocurrencies, and many of them have been ruining friendships over it. I used to be more optimistic, but I can't help but see cryptocurrencies as a strong negative on society now. It's pretty wild cryptocurrencies are still legal in many parts of the world.
- adrr 5y agoWho is ends up paying for this in the end? I am not familiar with what this smart contract is doing. Were these user held coins or was it part of an institution?
- SEJeff 5y agoLooks like they're eating the cost themselves: https://twitter.com/wormholecrypto/status/1489001949881978883 https://twitter.com/wormholecrypto/status/148900194988197888...
- chrononaut 5y agoWhat would be the actual cost in USD to do this, assuming a short term resolution? Let's they actually had $320M USD ready and waiting. I assume the order book would not allow them to reach the fixed amount of ETH lost. .. Sort of curious what would be the actual USD cost if someone actually tried to purchase the amount of ETH lost given a fixed order book. Do any exchanges make that information available where you could calculate that?
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- pcmonk 5y agoIn practice the people who are doing this very likely have that much ETH on hand and can simply use it, then rebuy over time to get back to their preferred holding levels. If you had $320mm USD and needed ETH, you'd want to use an OTC desk, because the markets will feel it, even though they won't actually run out of depth. Right now the "+2% depth" (https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/markets/ https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/markets/) on Coinbase, Binance, and FTX is about 5mm, and there's probably a dozen other markets with similar depth, though you'd want to execute the trades simultaneously. Decentralized exchanges have depth too; uniswap's USDC/ETH pool would let you buy $40mm for 2% slippage. All in all, you could probably get it all at about a 5% premium if you were really prepared for it.
- PeterisP 5y ago$320M is the kind of money where it's sufficient motivation for organized crime to simply kidnap and torture major crypto company officers/techies or individual crypto holders to force them to do whatever needs to be done. The reason why it's not done as much for ordinary businesses is that you can't just force someone to surrender $320M worth of stocks, real estate or wire transfers and actually keep that, it's reversible and traceable so most of it will be reversed and the rest traced. At best you can expect briefcases of cash ransom which is physically limited to much smaller amounts (e.g. it's simply impossible for a person to carry $320M in cash or fit it in a random car) and still needs laundering, and as the payoff is less lucrative then it's not worth the risk compared to other activities like trafficking drugs. Crypto, on the other hand, has this possibility to just force a large transaction and actually get away with it - so I'm just wondering why we aren't seeing cases of violently forced crypto transfers; perhaps they're just kept under wraps.
- danielvf 5y agoI've wondered this too. Three reasons: - It's currently easy enough to hack the same money. Way less effort. - Doing something physical puts the crime into areas where law enforcement is used to working, used to catching people, and leaves physical evidence in the world. At least in the developed world, kidnapping rich people goes to the head of the line for police resources. - Most large projects use multisigs. This means you may need to kidnap a half dozen people in multiple counties. Doable, but the odds of none of these failing and exposing the whole operation goes way up.
- paulpauper 5y agonot a single defi hacker has ever been caught or identified. pretty amazing when you consider the amount of money involved.
- danielvf 5y agoAs far as I know, not one has been caught by law enforcement. But several attackers have been tracked down by blockchain sleuths, or by the hacked projects themselves. In the usual case, when messaged with personal details about themselves, the attacker gives back 90%, and everyone calls it a day. Except for this guy. https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/12/22/teenage-suspect-in-16m-defi-hack-wanted-for-arrest-in-canada/ https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2021/12/22/teenage-suspect-i... Who might be first DeFi hacker to go to trial.
- pcmonk 5y agoI found it interesting that the patch was apparently published before it was exploited: https://twitter.com/kelvinfichter/status/1489050921938132996 https://twitter.com/kelvinfichter/status/1489050921938132996
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- astrange 5y agoI wonder how their deployment system works. They should probably be deploying security patches before they land in a public repo. Also, if it auto deploys from a git repo, then you just need a committer's git keys to exploit it. Having code auditing and multisig git tags has to be rare.
- 8note 5y agoDoesn't it have to land in a public repo before it can be patched? Somebody else is going to run that code publicly, and each person who runs it will find out about the patch with some time delay
- astrange 5y agoIf it's a library normally you'd share a security patch with important customers privately, if they're otherwise going to lose $300 million. I thought this was the service's own repo though.
- hamiltonians 5y agowhat is stopping someone from going through each protocol and finding an explioit. no one has been arrested despite dozens of these hacks.
- PretzelPirate 5y agoNothing stops them, but that’s why you shouldn’t put your crypto assets into random contracts and just hope for the best. This is especially true for chains that haven’t had a long history of being attacked and having the right tooling built. Ethereum isn’t easy to securely develop for, but Solana is too new and untested to be trusted with the amount of money it’s in control of (and that’s ignoring how it’s largely centralized and has gone down multiple times recently).
- valzam 5y agoCan you elaborate on how it's centralized? I keep hearing this but they have 1400 active validators all over the world, which is more than most smart contract chains except Eth
- cletus 5y agoI wish I remember where I saw this but someone described crypto like this: imagine you're a smart person who is super knowledgeable about something like software engineering, distributed systems and consensus. That's great. But then you make the mistake of thinking because you're really smart and good at this thing you must be smart about something completely different, like oh I don't know the financial system. That's crypto. Basically, we're going to go through a process where a ton of people realize that things like reversible transactions in the traditional financial system are a feature not a bug. Thing like KYC/AML are a feature not a bug. The idea that crypto is extragovernmental is a myth. And things like smart contracts and NFTs only really work when they're completely self-contained on the blockchain. Like, I can create an NFT for a song but that doesn't mean I have the legal right to sell that (there's lots of scams like this). Even if I do, you still need traditional systems to enforce such rights anyway.
- rawtxapp 5y agoThat's very "pigeonholey" way of looking at things though, no? Just because you're good at something doesn't mean you can't become good at something else too. If you're super knowledgeable about very technical things, learning other hard sciences is feasible as well given enough time. At the end of the day, if you create anything that's worthless, it will be worthless independent of whether you're an insider or outsider.
- RC_ITR 5y agoI think GP’s underlying point (besides paraphrasing a popular YouTube video) is that for good reason, society elevated “computer engineers” because the work they did (e.g., build Google) was very impactful and value-creative. A bunch of computer engineers are now burning through that good will in a misguided attempt to accumulate personal wealth.
- manquer 5y agoGood will built when building Google (and others from that era) is already burnt by Google (and others ) of today. You rarely here positive stories about tech in general media these days compared to say 00's.
- ipsin 5y ago"We’d like to offer you a whitehat agreement, and present you a bug bounty of $10 million for exploit details" So, um, wouldn't the person pulling off the exploit be a fool to try and accept this "bug bounty"? Even if the offer is fully sincere, the legal system doesn't run on "code is law", and it seems like the original hack could be prosecuted under CFAA whether Bridge wants that or not.
- dmix 5y ago$10m for giving up details on the exploit is probably a good deal rather than operating in the shadows trying to exfiltrate such a huge amount. We've seen other ETH hackers get wiped out by their forks plus there could be voluntary flags on major networks excluding it to fringe markets.
- devoutsalsa 5y agoBlockchain newb question. Would it be possible to add protection to a protocol so that when a theft occurs, the stolen tokens are erased/burned/retrieved and a credit for the stolen amount is automagically credited to the wallet from which the tokens were taken?
- danielvf 5y agoYes. The USDT and and USDC stablecoins do this. Competent attackers immediately trade these for other currencies that can't do this. Newb attacker don't, and loose those funds back to the projects.
- manquer 5y agoIf you are building a truly distributed blockchain that is decentralized then very hard to do. Building consensus to classify some trades as theft is hard to do in-band. Even if do build such a workflow in the chain, how do you get everyone to agree ? Distributed consensus will take lot more time than attacker quickly making trades and moving the coins across multiple chains etc. If you centralize this action and have few people decide ( as has happened in some coins in the past) it is no longer a decentralized system.
- Acrobatic_Road 5y agohttps://portalbridge.com/#/ https://portalbridge.com/#/ >A fix has been deployed and all funds are safe. So...does this mean they reversed it or are they just promising to pay everybody back at their own expense?
- menage 5y agoAll remaining funds are safe from future exploitation (of this particular bug).
- sewercake 5y ago` / ][p
- YATA0 5y agoCrypto Darwinism strikes again! Code is Law! This is the natural order!
- usehackernews 5y agoVitalik Buterin, creator of Ethereum, wrote a long Reddit comment I read in January about the high risk of bridges, and why he doesn’t support them. The fundamental security limits of bridges are actually a key reason why while I am optimistic about a multi-chain blockchain ecosystem (there really are a few separate communities with different values and it's better for them to live separately than all fight over influence on the same thing), I am pessimistic about cross-chain applications. To understand why bridges have these limitations, we need to look at how various combinations of blockchains and bridging survive 51% attacks. Many people have the mentality that "if a blockchain gets 51% attacked, everything breaks, and so we need to put all our force on preventing a 51% attack from ever happening even once". I really disagree with this style of thinking; in fact, blockchains maintain many of their guarantees even after a 51% attack, and it's really important to preserve these guarantees. For example, suppose that you have 100 ETH on Ethereum, and Ethereum gets 51% attacked, so some transactions get censored and/or reverted. No matter what happens, you still have your 100 ETH. Even a 51% attacker cannot propose a block that takes away your ETH, because such a block would violate the protocol rules and so it would get rejected by the network. Even if 99% of the hashpower or stake wants to take away your ETH, everyone running a node would just follow the chain with the remaining 1%, because only its blocks follow the protocol rules. More generally, if you have an application on Ethereum, then a 51% attack could censor or revert it for some time, but what comes out at the end is a consistent state. If you had 100 ETH, but sold it for 320000 DAI on Uniswap, even if the blockchain gets attacked in some arbitrary crazy way, at the end of the day you still have a sensible outcome - either you keep your 100 ETH or you get your 320000 DAI. The outcome where you get neither (or, for that matter, both) violates protocol rules and so would not get accepted. Now, imaging what happens if you move 100 ETH onto a bridge on Solana to get 100 Solana-WETH, and then Ethereum gets 51% attacked. The attacker deposited a bunch of their own ETH into Solana-WETH and then reverted that transaction on the Ethereum side as soon as the Solana side confirmed it. The Solana-WETH contract is now no longer fully backed, and perhaps your 100 Solana-WETH is now only worth 60 ETH. Even if there's a perfect ZK-SNARK-based bridge that fully validates consensus, it's still vulnerable to theft through 51% attacks like this. For this reason, it's always safer to hold Ethereum-native assets on Ethereum or Solana-native assets on Solana than it is to hold Ethereum-native assets on Solana or Solana-native assets on Ethereum. And in this context, "Ethereum" refers not just to the base chain, but also any proper L2 that is built on it. If Ethereum gets 51% attacked and reverts, Arbitrum and Optimism revert too, and so "cross-rollup" applications that hold state on Arbitrum and Optimism are guaranteed to remain consistent even if Ethereum gets 51% attacked. And if Ethereum does not get 51% attacked, there's no way to 51% attack Arbitrum and Optimism separately. Hence, holding assets issued on Optimism wrapped on Arbitrum is still perfectly safe. The problem gets worse when you go beyond two chains. If there are 100 chains, then there will end up being dapps with many interdependencies between those chains, and 51% attacking even one chain would create a systemic contagion that threatens the economy on that entire ecosystem. This is why I think zones of interdependency are likely to align closely to zones of sovereignty (so, lots of Ethereum-universe applications interfacing closely with each other, lots of Avax-universe applications interfacing with each other, etc etc, but NOT Ethereum-universe and Avax-universe applications interfacing closely with each other) This incidentally is also why a rollup can't just "go use another data layer". If a rollup stores its data on Celestia or BCH or whatever else but deals with assets on Ethereum, if that layer gets 51% attacked you're screwed. The DAS on Celestia providing 51% attack resistance doesn't actually help you because the Ethereum network isn't reading that DAS; it would be reading a bridge, which would be vulnerable to 51% attacks. To be a rollup that provides security to applications using Ethereum-native assets, you have to use the Ethereum data layer (and likewise for any other ecosystem). I don't expect these problems to show up immediately. 51% attacking even one chain is difficult and expensive. However, the more usage of cross-chain bridges and apps there is, the worse the problem becomes. No one will 51% attack Ethereum just to steal 100 Solana-WETH (or, for that matter, 51% attack Solana just to steal 100 Ethereum-WSOL). But if there's 10 million ETH or SOL in the bridge, then the motivation to make an attack becomes much higher, and large pools may well coordinate to make the attack happen. So cross-chain activity has an anti-network-effect: while there's not much of it going on, it's pretty safe, but the more of it is happening, the more the risks go up. https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/rwojtk/ama_we_are_the_efs_research_team_pt_7_07_january/hrngyk8/?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&utm_name=iossmf&context=3 https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/rwojtk/ama_we_are...
- revskill 5y agoThis is fake. All is planned already since the btc sell-off from 69k.
- revskill 5y agoFor the downvoters, just try to answer me, why the hack is happening now, but not at the bull run ? It's all planned, sirs.
- EGreg 5y agoExplanation of what happened: https://twitter.com/intercoinorg/status/1489106792286150659?s=21 https://twitter.com/intercoinorg/status/1489106792286150659?...
- lfmunoz4 5y ago
- joosters 5y agoRegardless of the hack, ..."Wormhole said earlier that the network was down for maintenance." A great summary of so-called 'DeFi'. How can a system be decentralized if someone can unilaterally decide to take it down for maintenance?
- shp0ngle 5y agoDeFi definition of “decentralized” is “everyone is anonymous and nobody pays taxes”, not “does not have central point of failure”.
- 2pEXgD0fZ5cF 5y agoThe definitions (or rather, "goals") of most things from the cryptocurrency sphere appear to conveniently and arbitrarily change in adaptation to flaws being pointed out.
- philosopher1234 5y agoDeFi is “decentralized” in that saying so increases its price.
- ALittleLight 5y agoThey seem to have a similarly creative definition for security too.
- xyst 5y agojust the default response for the news/general public. Bad PR to say "we fucked up" or something to that effect.
- kreeben 5y agoThe non-decentralization of DeFi is something that along with using too much energy while being very slow at processing transactions, will be fixed in the future. Way, way into the future. This is a good thing, btw. It means there's still plenty of time for you to "get in".
- xyst 5y agoit's been discussed before, but would like to know if people view this as a "hack" or a bounty? these are "smart contracts", and it's written into the code. Finding these relatively simple bugs are like finding a loophole in a law. In this case, the researcher found a loophole and then used that loophole to pay his/her self ~98K ETH.
- manquer 5y agoIt is theft, technical details are not relevant. Whether you jacked the car or you found it unlocked and keys inside it is still theft. The owners/ custodians of the coins or of the program managing the coin did not intend for you to have the coins or actually transferred the coins to you. Even if they had a bug in their program that automatically transferred their coin to you and you didn't return it the law still generally considers that also as theft.
- arrow7000 5y agoExcept if code is law then whatever the code permits is by definition allowed
- manquer 5y agoCode can be perhaps the contract. Contract is not the law. Contract law is only one part of the law. There are myriad reasons legal reasons actual contracts are voided and thrown out in court as unenforceable, no consideration, illegal actions or unilateral negotation or even unfair terms etc. You cannot have a legal contract which for murder for example.
- LittlePeter 5y agoIs "code is law" also valid in real life (TM)? It is quite catchy, "code is law". But law where? In some virtual crypto land?
- xyst 5y agowell law is only as good as the enforcement. Possession of cannabis in the US is still a federal offense. But some states choose to prosecute them and others choose to ignore it and legalize it at the state level. Enforcement in this case is not LEOs but rather the smart contract that lives in the blockchain. Except there are no grey areas
- marban 5y ago"The first breakthrough came from this transaction on Solana which somehow minted 120k Wormhole ETH out of nowhere" Which begs the question, why such a humble amount...?
- Ansil849 5y agoWhy was 'only' 300 million minted, instead of 600?
- Bayart 5y agoThe exploiter could have generated any arbitrary amount of wETH. The limit is the actual ETH held in the contract. They used their fake wETH to exchange for real ETH.
- Ansil849 5y agoRight, hence my question; I believe the bridge had somewhere around double the amount they actually took, so why didn't they take it all?
- Bayart 5y agoAh my bad, I was actually under the impression it was emptied out. If it's not the case my assumption would be that he was eyeballing for something that wouldn't impede the regular money flow and would allow him to have more time to exfiltrate the ETH before it's blacklisted by exchanges. That or he just took what he could as fast as possible when he saw the minting actually go through.
- unfocussed_mike 5y agoRIP the meaning of the word "protocol", which died after a long illness in February 2022.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- jdrc 5y agoAFAIK solana has been a darling of investors the past year who propped it up a lot. Is this their money that have been stolen?
- danielvf 5y agoNo, this was bridge users money stolen.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- mathieubordere 5y ago“ETH will be added over the next hours to ensure wETH is backed 1:1,” Are they just going to create 320M USD out of thin air?
- tomcam 5y agoI can’t imagine a more important question to ask. That jumped right out of me too.
- pawelduda 5y agoETH cannot be minted "out of thin air" so I guess this will go from reserves?
- user-the-name 5y agoReserves of 320M just sitting there?
- pawelduda 5y agohttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30196343 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30196343
- angio 5y agoThey're going to buy 320M USD worth of ETH and use it to replenish the reserves. Solana has big VC backing it so it shouldn't be an issue to find that money.
- baobabKoodaa 5y agoThat's 320M USD. It might be an issue.
- Ygg2 5y ago> Of course this ends up being at odds with Web3 ideals I thought Web3 ideals are "Scam as many people as possible, run away laughing. It's only wrong if you get caught."
- capableweb 5y agoWhat is it with cryptocurrencies and HN that makes people make low-effort comments like this? Seems so emotional if you compare to other subjects, even threads about Facebook has better arguments for/against Facebook than with cryptocurrencies. In general HN commentators seems to be relatively emotionless and focus mostly on facts, while as soon as cryptocurrency stories appear, the threads get filled with comments like this that doesn't actually try to make faithful arguments but rather appeal to peoples emotions about cryptocurrencies. I see it happening from both sides (pro/against), but always around cryptocurrencies.
- ogogmad 5y agoThere are similar snarky comments in some politics threads. I'm not pro-cryptocurrency, but this is how you identify HN groupthink. "Cute", "jaded", snarky comments. I mostly just downvote instead of confronting HN's groupthink.
- AgoRapide 5y agoMaybe because blockchains are just a Ponzi scheme while Facebook may have some actual value?
- capableweb 5y agoReplying to a complaint about low-effort comments with your own low-effort comment? Brave effort, but you'd be doing everyone a favor to stop doing one-line middlebrow dismissals that have been done here at least a thousands times before. It's not creative nor interesting, which I hope is why most of us are here in the first place. I may agree or not with you, but it simply doesn't make for a good reading of the comments to hear the same thing over and over again...
- andylynch 5y agoThis has an interesting parallel in the tradfi world in the City bonds robbery in 1990, where back when bearer bonds were still used a messenger on the street in London was mugged for £290 million worth. Several people wound up dead with more imprisoned and 99% of the bonds were recovered... I'm curious to see the outcome in this case.
- jakub_g 5y agoNever heard this, thanks for sharing. Link: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_bonds_robbery https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/City_bonds_robbery Pretty crazy they would just walk around with £300M in a briefcase.
- andylynch 5y agoIt used to be messenger boys would literally carry piles of stock certificates between offices to settle trades. Fairly sure large boxes of cash in the other direction as well.
- ceva 5y agoI would just say hats off to a master mind who did this!
- rasz 5y ago>It's interesting that this commit was made ~9 hours ago and the exploit happened a few hours after that. Where do you find employees, even $500K/year ones, you would trust not to pick up $300m just sitting there in the open for the taking? Hey team we need to patch this bug allowing anyone to drain all the funds of our company, get right on it while I browse Taycan options to match my wristwatch color.
- boringg 5y agoI think the other part of the equation, that is far uglier, is when you have that excess amount of returns why would you not expect criminal organizations to apply leverage on staff. I'm not saying that this happens but it is certainly a considerable security flaw - manageable but risky.
- astoor 5y agoDo you even have any incentive to find employees that won't steal, if you've already made off with millions in pre-mine or up-front no-commitment investment? Cryptocurrency and DeFi is one giant moral hazard.
- yrro 5y agoI guess you don't want the employees to steal from _you_?
- gitfan86 5y agoBut even in a world where everyone is a good actor, bugs and accidents will still exist. Then what happens when someone accidently sends money to a wallet where the owner is dead or unreachable? Why would anyone want to put their life savings into that situation?
- picsao 5y ago
- whywhywhywhy 5y agoBecause (they believe) the alternative is just as bad if not worse.
- ejb999 5y agoSorry for this possibly stupid question - really not into crypto space (and not in small part because of these types of stories). But, these hackers walked away with $320M in ether, but is what they did actually illegal or did they just exploit a flaw in the code that allowed them to make huge profits on someone else's mistake, but wasn't actually illegal? Does the FBI even get involved with cases like this? or is it just the wild west out there, and may the best hacker win?
- whatever1 5y agoThe better feature is that it is also irreversible. Irreversible contracts with holes that you cannot dispute in a court of law.
- koonsolo 5y agoIt's not really irreversible, it's irreversible by consensus. So if there is a consensus to roll back, it can be done. And in fact it has been done in the past https://levelup.gitconnected.com/how-ethereum-reversed-a-50-million-dao-attack-cee528d8c030 https://levelup.gitconnected.com/how-ethereum-reversed-a-50-...
- whatever1 5y agoIt is done only if the supreme leaders decide to push for a fork. They did it once, and it is not clear what criteria they used to do so. Should we expect that the core dev team will push for a fork again? If so, what is the threshold for future scams? 100M? 10? If I get scammed of $100k don’t I deserve my money back? Are we going to create a fork for every dispute, or are we going to just ignore all disputes? The whole thing does not work.
- koonsolo 5y agoSeems to work. Everyone can decide for their own if they want to use the fork or not. Like I say, it's a consensus. Remember Ethereum Classic? Well, that network was powered by those who didn't agree with that rollback. Isn't it better to make up your own mind than to have some 'leader' decide for everyone? Welcome to decentralization.
- m12k 5y agoIs it just me, or has crypto massively increased the number of "digital bank robberies" taking place? Or did stuff like this commonly happen previously as well, but we just never heard about it?
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- andrew_ferr 5y agoIs there a good technical description of how exactly this vulnerability works? (Ideally not behind a paywall). Thanks.
- danielvf 5y agoThere is something unusual about this hack. And it's not the hack itself. Crypto projects get hacked every week. Multichain bridges are the target of the month, with eye-watering amounts and complex code running on different blockchains, and off blockchain. And a Solana bug like this one is to be expected. What is surprising is to see a project promise to fully repay everyone, within two hours of the attack occurring. That size of cash for a "we'll fund it back up", and that kind of speed is really unusual. In the immediate aftermath of the hack, people were commenting that the now unbacked Solana side eth was still trading near its normal prices, and it stayed that way until the announcement. This leads me to guess that insiders must have known that there would be a chunk of money coming to refill the coffers after the hack, which in turn means that the decision to send the project hundreds of millions of dollars must have been made at or before minutes had elapsed from the hack.
- swalsh 5y agoThe value of WETH going to zero could cause a near system wide collapse. It is being used as collateral for a staggering number of loans. Bridges in the colloquial way of saying it, are too big to fail. I wonder if network insiders had been prepared for the eventuality of something like this happening, and were just executing a playbook.
- BeFlatXIII 5y agoHow much impact would a total cryptocurrency collapse have on the outside economy?
- zepto 5y agoProbably a nice uptick
- faeyanpiraat 5y agoOr millions of working people would suddenly be able to afford a gaming GPU and would disappear into imaginary worlds for a couple of weeks.
- loceng 5y agoIs there a mechanism yet to prevent these stolen funds from being spent?