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It's important to note the nature of the failure. Opening a phishing email should not be considered a failure. The email client is specifically designed to be
by londons_explore 7y ago
It's important to note the nature of the failure.
Opening a phishing email should not be considered a failure. The email client is specifically designed to be able to display untrusted mail.
Even clicking a hyperlink in a phishing email isn't too bad - web browsers are designed to be able to load untrusted content from the internet safely.
It's only entering credentials by hand into a phishing website, or downloading and executing something from a phishing site that is a real failure.
IT departments should probably enforce single sign on and use a password alert to prevent a password being typed into a webpage. They should also prevent downloads of executable files from non-whitelisted origins for most staff.
- chrisseaton 7y ago> The email client is specifically designed to be able to display untrusted mail. Email clients often do things like load images, which can tell the sender you've read the email, which is an information leak. Some email clients try not to do this, but that's actually somewhat recent, and I wouldn't say they're 'specifically designed to be able to display untrusted mail', rather 'they try to avoid common exploits when they become known'.
- capableweb 7y agoEmail clients started out without embedded images. Images came after the initial email implementation. So one could say that displaying images in email clients is rather new. Also, most if not all email clients have the option of disabling Inline images. Email clients, just like browsers, are made specifically to handle untrusted user content. That then some people/clients allow information leak, is another thing. Just like websockets in modern browsers.
- brmgb 7y agoSure, let's pretend images in email are a new development and should be stopped. Meanwhile in the real world some of us have actual users. Pretending we should stop using widely used and useful technology while flailing your arms and shooting "but security!" is not going to help anyone.
- capableweb 6y ago> Sure, let's pretend images in email are a new development and should be stopped. What? No. No one is arguing that... The only thing I'm refuting in my previous comment is "Some email clients try not to do this, but that's actually somewhat recent" which seems to indicate chrisseaton thinks that email clients that don't load images is a new thing. So the idea is that first we had email clients, then the email clients added the option to hide images. When in reality, email clients started out without images, then they added images. Way to reply to a comment without reading the context and subsequently completely miss the point.
- wolco 7y agoThunderbird has always done this. Loading images prompting before send receipt notifications you name it.
- Aeolun 7y ago> Email clients often do things like load images, which can tell the sender you've read the email, which is an information leak. That makes it less than ideal, but describing it as a ‘failure’ isn’t going to help any users pay more attention to phishing mails, because they get tons of legitimate emails with images in.
- mewpmewp2 7y agoWhat can be done with this information? Most companies have e-mail addresses that are completely predictable, so you can pretty much assume that this e-mail address exists. If this really was a security risk shouldn't you have UUID emails for everyone? Also how do you as an attacker know that it was user not a e-mail server checking those images?
- chrisseaton 7y ago> What can be done with this information? It will reveal if they're working right now, what time they work otherwise, their IP address, their approximate physical location, their internet provider. A lot you can do with that. > Most companies have e-mail addresses that are completely predictable That's the point. Predict an email address, send it, find out if such a person works there. If I email unusual.name@sis.gov.uk and they open it then guess what I've worked out? > Also how do you as an attacker know that it was user not a e-mail server checking those images? Agent signatures.
- pbowyer 7y ago>> Also how do you as an attacker know that it was user not a e-mail server checking those images? > Agent signatures. Can you Expand? Googling isn't helping me understand what this means/how it works.
- eganist 7y agoThe "user agent string" of the email client is different from that of the user's browser.
- chrisseaton 7y agoAlso called agent fingerprinting. You can look at exactly how the agent is responding and make educated guesses at what agent it is. You think one HTTP request looks like any other, but there's enough little bits of information here and there to leak info. The user agent is the simplest example. That can be spoofed, but there's more subtle traces as well, all the way down the stack https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCP/IP_stack_fingerprinting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TCP/IP_stack_fingerprinting.
- jandrese 7y agoThis is one thing I like about Outlook. It doesn't load embedded images unless you click on a button at the top. All email clients should do this. Not only is it safer, but it discourages people from putting a ton of images in emails which is just annoying in general anyway.
- ttsda 7y agoGmail used to do this, but it seems they've phased it out.
- hannob 7y agoMy understanding of the text is that 10 of 50 actually entered credentials. So the 1/5th is really the number of people who a phisher would've stolen credentials (although they say later they use 2fa which would've prevented a real attack, but still bad enough, as you can expect these people use other accounts which may not even support 2fa).
- oefrha 7y ago2FA (assuming TOTP, not hardware keys) prevents attacks using credentials leaked from side channels, but does not work in phishing attacks using a fake login form. The attacker just needs to channel the TOTP you entered into the real login form, and on average they have a bit more than 15 seconds to do so, which is more than enough.
- datguacdoh 7y agoThis is what makes security keys so great, you can't surreal a token from one domain and use it on another. They completely remove this type of attack, which no amount of training will ever fully protect you from. You can't put the onus on the employee, you have to make it impossible for them to do the wrong thing in this case.
- oefrha 7y agoAny password manager with browser integration can make sure you don’t fill in credentials on the wrong domain. No need for additional hardware.
- munchbunny 7y agoThat just stops you from automatically entering the password. A security key will literally not authenticate in that situation. Defense in depth is just as much of a thing for personal security as network security.
- guerby 7y ago
- eganist 7y agodiscriminating between different failure modes is important. However, every situation you've described is still some form of failure mode. 1. A user opening a phishing email means the email made it into their inbox (spamming failure unless whitelisted for the sake of a test) and the user was moved to click the email based on the subject line. This in itself is the lowest risk of the failure modes we're about to describe, But some risk will exist considering e.g malware has spread through the simple opening of emails before. 2. Clicking a link in a phishing email is much higher risk and, regardless of how the phishing test was crafted, is considered with absolute certainty to be a failure mode of any phishing test or event for three reasons: A user has definitively disclosed their presence within a company (email clients today may block trackers from loading, but clicking a link gives it away), the user has disclosed their receptivity to the message, and in a real world attack, merely landing on the page may trigger an event such as the delivery of a malware payload via a functioning exploit against the browser and the underlying operating system. 3. Entering credentials is probably the most obvious one. --- Rather than a "password alert" control that just alerts a user that their account was signed into, what would be more helpful is a second factor; a bare minimum would be a prompt on a user's phone indicating that a login attempt was detected and requesting confirmation before that attempt can succeed. This at least helps a user potentially preempt an attack against their own account (assuming they're trained on how this works) even if they never figure out that they've entered their credentials into a phishing site, And if the second factor challenge is never met, an alert to the security team could automatically get the security team to triage the risky login. Pardon typos. Voice to text.
- mewpmewp2 7y agoWhat can be done with the info that user has read, opened and clicked on the website? Our company for example has completely predictable e-mail addresses with first letter of first name and then last name @ company.com. You would have this knowledge even without having to send e-mails. I assume Gitlab has it similarly. Also I assume Gitlab already has 2fa.
- eganist 7y ago> What can be done with the info that user has read, opened and clicked on the website? Follow it up with a much more tailored spear phishing attack - https://www.knowbe4.com/spear-phishing/ https://www.knowbe4.com/spear-phishing/ Reworked to sales terms: it's the difference between a cold lead and a hot lead. A user who's clicked through has proven themselves to at least be warm or receptive to phishing campaigns in general. As an adversary, I'd probably couple unique links (for tracking clicks) with heatmapping and other front-end tracking technologies to see what exactly the user is doing and how far they've gone before backing out, which helps me refine the attack. Most attackers probably wouldn't go that far (spear phishing the people who clicked would probably be the extent of it), but if someone is after something of particular value at your firm, there's no reason why they wouldn't put more effort into sharpening the attack.
- kjaftaedi 7y agoClicking a hyperlink is certainly bad. Browsers have vulnerabilities and you're broadcasting the attacker valuable information about yourself, including the fact that you're receiving, reading, and clicking on links in their mails. Also, the article states clearly that 1 in 5 fully entered their credentials.
- zulln 7y ago> Clicking a hyperlink is certainly bad. HN must be a boring place if you are not prepared to click on external links.
- ubercow13 7y agoThe point is to recognise the email/situation as phishing or otherwise malicious before deciding to click the link. The chance of clicking a malicious link on HN is pretty low if you stick to the front page.
- marcosdumay 7y agoOk, so you close a tiny window, while leaving the entire web open as a giant door by its side. And you do by a really invasive means that will make sure that everybody that knows what they are doing but are curious to safely inspect it further will be marked as clueless. Leading to false positive and negative errors larger than the signal, but you still expect to get useful data from it.
- stingraycharles 7y agoThere’s a fundamental difference between HN links and links in targeted emails. I cannot start phishing GitLab employees using HN posts, the threat model is just different.
- nathantotten 7y agoI’m not so sure about that. With enough dedication and time I think you could target a specific company from HN. Start writing a few good blog posts that would appeal to your audience, only run attack when some attribute is true to that company (i.e. their Corp IP addresses). You could even combine the two. Post the blog to hacker news, then send phishing email pointing to HN post. That is a trusted link. Then the user will likely click the source link in HN. Obviously, a lot harder and lower chance of success, but not impossible.
- jfkebwjsbx 7y ago> The email client is specifically designed to be able to display untrusted mail. No, they weren’t, which means chances are you are using one that wasn’t. > web browsers are designed to be able to load untrusted content from the internet safely Yes, but they aren’t perfect.
- technion 7y agoYou cannot reasonably expect a person to refuse to even look at a suspicious email. Let's say your support product x at your workplace. From: Person you don't know. Subject: Bug report. Noone would delete that email without reading it, just like the finance department when they see something claiming to be a bill. Now what if your email said "I have sample website that demonstrates this bug". Again, there's no reason for you to not click that. The only thing that you should be able to reasonably expect a person to "fail" on is getting there and downloading a .exe or providing a set of credentials.
- jfkebwjsbx 7y agoI have not claimed otherwise. Please read my message again.
- OJFord 7y agoWhen I worked somewhere large enough to have an IT dept. running these tests, it was obvious they were from IT, and people would open them for amusement. So yeah, definitely some interaction should be required to consider it a failure, but also the test email should be as convincing high quality phishing as possible. Not just because it makes for a better test, but because it's more likely to be a valuable lesson for more people, people who thought they wouldn't fall for it.
- furyofantares 7y agoAnyone can get phished if, on an off day when you're tired or distracted by personal issues or whatever, your guard is down and you happen to receive a phishing attempt that also pattern matches something you're kind of expecting, either because it's a targeted attempt or just randomly for a wide-net phishing attempt. That's my model of how phishing works, they just make lots of attempts and know they will get lucky some small percentage of the time. With that as my model: the email getting to your inbox is of course the first failure and increases the chance of getting phished from zero to not zero. Opening the email is another failure that raises the chance. Clicking the link is another. All of the steps leading up to entering credentials or downloading and executing something from a phishing site is a real failure in that it increases the chances of becoming compromised. That's even true if you're suspicious the whole way through. If you know it's a phishing attempt and are investigating, fine. But if you are suspicious, that means you can still go either way. You can also get distracted and end up with the phishing link in some tab waiting for you to return to it with all the contextual clues missing.
- phire 7y agoSomeone once posted a link on hackernews titled "new phishing attack uses google domain to look legit" I opened it in a new tab along with several other links to read, I was expecting a nice blog post explaining an exploit. After about 20min of reading the other tabs I came across that tab again. I had forgotten the title of what I had clicked, I'm not sure I even remembered it was a hackernews link that got me to that page. "Oh, looks like Google has randomly logged me out, that doesn't happen often" I think as I instinctively enter my email and password and hit enter. Followed half a second later by "oh shit, that wasn't a legitimate google login prompt." I raced off to quickly change my password, kick off any unknown IPs and make sure nothing had changed in my email configuration. I'm lucky I came to my senses quickly. I think it was the redirect to generic google home page that made me click, along with the memory of the phishing related link I had clicked 20min ago. But yeah, it can happen to anyone on a bad day.
- PowerfulWizard 7y agoThere should really be a browser-managed 'tainted' flag on any tab opened from an email that prevents password input. Or if not prevents, at least a scary warning click through like an unsigned certificate creates, which at least shows the true full domain name. Whenever it read about phishing it seems insane we have a system that requires human judgement for this task. If there isn't a deterministic strategy to detect it, how could the user ever reliably succeed? And if there is such a strategy, it should be done by the mail server, mail client, and browser. Even an extension doing this might work in a corporate context. That makes me wonder if companies do their own extensions to enhance the browser for their needs. If all your employees are using web browsers for multiple hours per day it might really be worth it.
- gregorsaurus 7y agoAgreed that entering credentials is the most serious security failure here. It is worth noting that credentials alone are never sufficient to access a GitLab employee's account. GitLab employees are required to use MFA on all accounts, including GitLab.com. https://about.gitlab.com/handbook/security/#security-process-and-procedures-for-team-members https://about.gitlab.com/handbook/security/#security-process.... Yubikey/hardware token or TOPT (time-based one-time password) from authenticator are necessary to access employee accounts. OTP via email or SMS or email is strongly discouraged and not an option for employees.
- mmxmb 7y agoI disagree that clicking a hyperlink is not bad. If you have a determined attacker with some 0-days up their sleeves, simply opening a hyperlink may result in arbitrary code execution. See an example from last summer: https://blog.coinbase.com/responding-to-firefox-0-days-in-the-wild-d9c85a57f15b https://blog.coinbase.com/responding-to-firefox-0-days-in-th...
- yunesj 7y ago> It's important to note the nature of the failure. Definitely! UCSF had a security firm send out a fishy-looking fishing email. My email client pointed out the url did not match the link text, whois told me it was a security company, and I opened the URL in a VM. “You just got fished!” eye roll I wouldn’t be surprised if most of those employees at gitlab were not so much fished as curious.
- leppr 7y agoVM escape exploits are a actually used in the wild, so yes, if that was on your work machine, you failed the test.
- bpodgursky 7y agoThis is kinda ridiculous. You first need the email client to have a bug which enables some kind of cross-site scripting just rendering an email, then a sandbox bug for a webpage to leak into the underlying system, and THEN a bug for the VM to escape to the parent OS. At that point, I think it's as likely that your airgapped email laptop can hack into your work machine through local network exploits. If you think a hacker is going to manage all that, you might as well assume that the hacker can trick gmail in to opening the email for you. There's a point at which we have to realistically assume that some layer of security works, and go about our lives.
- Godel_unicode 7y ago> airgapped...local network exploits. I'm curious what definition of airgap you're using?
- Zenbit_UX 7y agoThe wrong one I suspect. An Airgapped machine is a term reserved for a pc never connected to the internet, hence the gap. Usually for extreme security concerns like managing a paper crypto wallet or grid infrastructure.
- 7y ago
- vmception 7y agoyeah the article says 10 out of 50 entered their credentials, which is the same as the headline
- vilhelm_s 7y agoIt depends on what your threat model is. If you are a high value target, clicking on a link could definitely get your hacked through a browser vulnerability, e.g. https://blog.coinbase.com/responding-to-firefox-0-days-in-the-wild-d9c85a57f15b?gi=a9fd63cfdaa4 https://blog.coinbase.com/responding-to-firefox-0-days-in-th... and https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/20/alleged_dnc_hackers_six_zerodays/ https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/10/20/alleged_dnc_hackers... . Most people are probably not worth the effort of this, but I could imagine a source code hosting company could be, as a step to try to compromise some other software...
- msla 7y ago> Opening a phishing email should not be considered a failure. The email client is specifically designed to be able to display untrusted mail. I'll go further: It is impossible to never open a phishing email. From addresses can be spoofed. Path information... well, it isn't available at all unless you open the email, is it? Also, it can be spoofed right up to the point it enters your company's email system. The Subject can be made appropriate and innocuous, or it can be made just as "OPEN THIS EMAIL IF YOU WANT TO KEEP YOUR JOB!" as the sender desires, and there isn't a person on Earth who has to respond to emails who will be able to divine the inner intent of the sender from just the Subject line. Should corporate email systems prevent address spoofing? Argue amongst yourselves. My point is, they don't, or at least they haven't anywhere I've worked.
- cameronh90 7y ago"use a password alert to prevent a password being typed into a webpage. " Out of curiosity, would you mind explaining what this means and how one would achieve it?
- aarreedd 7y agoGenerally I agree. Interacting with the email is counted as "phished" because it makes the security team look better. The counter-argument is that if an attacker sees you interacted with the phishing attempt they may try again with a more targeted attack in the future.
- Kalium 7y ago> IT departments should probably enforce single sign on and use a password alert to prevent a password being typed into a webpage. They should also prevent downloads of executable files from non-whitelisted origins for most staff. I can hear the developers raising Hell at just the suggestion that they don't have local root and free reign with brew, docker, and npm. PMs and marketing can be relied upon to react similarly to being told that they have to use SSO-equipped tools that have been through procurement, and not someone's random free shared Retrium or whatever. That SSO tends to add a zero or two to the cost makes them even more skittish, on top of the chance that the procurement process says no. Trying to enforce SSO use can be challenging.
- badrabbit 6y agoMostly agree, but you "fail" when opening a link due to browser exploitation. Not all phish is credential phish. Good example is the coinbase attack in 2019(18?).