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Gitlab phished its own work-from-home staff, and 1 in 5 fell for it
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- m463 6y agoThis is common in many workplaces, and while a little strange, I think it's a good exercise, especially for less sophisticated folks who get a lot of external mail.
- marvion 6y agoIt's not that strange. In a talk at last year's CCC someone explained that it's a good learning experience when you educate the people, that clicked on phishing, right in/after the phishing process. He also found that the learning effect only applies to the method the people failed in - so learning from phishing doesnt teach anything about passwords. While sad, I think it's important to acknowledge and don't be do harsh to people who fail in the first attempt... ... also because my biggest learnings also came from really embarrassing moments or failure too..
- korijn 6y agoI wonder if the other 4 out of 5 even read any _other_ (proper) e-mail.
- redis_mlc 6y ago20% is low for a typical test. A clever insider can get that to 100%, say with "Benefit Plan Updates." lol
- Jonnax 6y agoAt a place I worked at they did something similar with the most obviously fake email possible. Seemed like a pointless box ticking exercise. Funny enough IT sent out an email about a Windows update rolling out (upgrade to a new version like 1709) that looked ever dodgier than their fake email. That had people reporting that as phishing.
- jiofih 6y ago> Seemed like a pointless box ticking exercise. Phishing emails often look pretty obvious - that’s part of the program! It filters out people you can’t trick and leaves you only with the most gullible ones. Had the same at a previous company. If you use GMail, IT needs to manually approve the mail to avoid it going into the spam folder. A huge warning saying “this message has been excluded from your spam filter by your IT department” shows up at the top. People still click through...
- pinum 6y agoThat might actually make it seem like the email has been explicitly sanctioned by IT. "Huh, this email is a bit weird, but IT says it's okay." click
- zulln 6y ago> Phishing emails often look pretty obvious - that’s part of the program! It filters out people you can’t trick and leaves you only with the most gullible ones. For frauds that requires the attacker to spend time with the victim, sure. For a fully automated phishing attack? There is no reason to lose out on people early on. And for a targeted attack against a company? Makes even less sense to make it obvious.
- Rexxar 6y agoIt could be a strategy to make people less careful : send one or two "obvious" fake phishing email and then the real one a little later when they are confident they can avoid phishing.
- als0 6y agoThere have been studies which suggest that phishing your own staff has significant negative effects. I have trouble finding the study names but the NSCS website has a good article about it: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/trouble-phishing https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blog-post/trouble-phishing
- k2xl 6y agoThis article is more of an opinion piece. Would be interested in evidence. It seems logical to me that self phishing is a good way to educate on how to spot phishing/unusual emails, and to realize they are a target
- usrusr 6y ago> This article is more of an opinion piece Wouldn't that be legally required to end with something about selfishly self-phishing shellfish? It does read a bit like SEO copy for a training consultancy that offers an alternative to the intuitive self-phish/reprimand cycle, but it brings up some interesting ideas.
- chrisseaton 6y agoI don’t understand how working from home is relevant to this? Do people working in offices have IT staff come by to update their laptops? Would people in an office not open this email if they’d do so at home? When I worked in an office nobody touched my laptop but me.
- boomboomsubban 6y agoGitlab is a remote-only company, I don't know why this article is choosing to highlight that fact so much though.
- chrisseaton 6y agoI think there's some sort of anti-work-from-home agenda going on here. It's completely irrelevant to the story. If you were in an office you'd get exactly the same email and presumably respond to it in exactly the same way.
- usrusr 6y agoIt's relevant to the story because so many people are currently in their first months of WFH so a headline that mentions WFH will be more interesting to them than one that doesn't. Another way to put it would be "WFH pioneer gitlab phished its own staff", nothing wrong with that.
- wolco 6y agoHow is it different from the same attack done while you are in the office?
- unnouinceput 6y agoWhile in office you're connected to internal network, supposedly within internal domain and IT dept. would have direct access to push updates automatically. When outside you're suppose to connect via a VPN (best case) or communicate via encrypted something (email, ftp etc) but you'll need to enter your credentials somewhere. Also, please remember, it's not your laptop, it's company's laptop, merely given to you to do your work on it. Anybody within the company with correct credential would have the right to touch that laptop.
- KineticLensman 6y agoI worked at a place where they sometimes sent phishing emails to see what people did. They also had mandatory annual training on e-risks, which wasn't in fact too painful. The fun arose when the company employed third-party service providers that required employees to respond to an external email (infrequent but it did happen). Inevitably there had to be a certain amount of internal comms to let people know that this external email was in fact safe to respond to.
- arkitaip 6y agoThat's hilarious but it also highlights that ultimately, there are no 100% inherently safe communications channels. A sufficiently motivated actor can go through extreme lengths to compromise your IT even if it means faking email, voice, letters, physical interaction.
- londons_explore 6y agoIt's important to note the nature of the failure. Opening a phishing email should not be considered a failure. The email client is specifically designed to be able to display untrusted mail. Even clicking a hyperlink in a phishing email isn't too bad - web browsers are designed to be able to load untrusted content from the internet safely. It's only entering credentials by hand into a phishing website, or downloading and executing something from a phishing site that is a real failure. IT departments should probably enforce single sign on and use a password alert to prevent a password being typed into a webpage. They should also prevent downloads of executable files from non-whitelisted origins for most staff.
- chrisseaton 6y ago> The email client is specifically designed to be able to display untrusted mail. Email clients often do things like load images, which can tell the sender you've read the email, which is an information leak. Some email clients try not to do this, but that's actually somewhat recent, and I wouldn't say they're 'specifically designed to be able to display untrusted mail', rather 'they try to avoid common exploits when they become known'.
- capableweb 6y agoEmail clients started out without embedded images. Images came after the initial email implementation. So one could say that displaying images in email clients is rather new. Also, most if not all email clients have the option of disabling Inline images. Email clients, just like browsers, are made specifically to handle untrusted user content. That then some people/clients allow information leak, is another thing. Just like websockets in modern browsers.
- brmgb 6y agoSure, let's pretend images in email are a new development and should be stopped. Meanwhile in the real world some of us have actual users. Pretending we should stop using widely used and useful technology while flailing your arms and shooting "but security!" is not going to help anyone.
- michaelcampbell 6y agoMy company does this but it's somewhat outsourced to phishme.com, so a simple outlook rule finds them all.
- usr1106 6y ago> Hunt said GitLab has implemented multi-factor authentication and that would have protected employees had the attack not been a simulation. "Protected employees" is a weird way to put it to say the least. It's not about protecting employees, it's about protecting gitlab company and their customers. And the protection would have failed. The attacker would have needed to use the credentials (including the one-time credential) in real-time. That makes the attack-site logic a bit more difficult, but it would have allowed to break in. I doubt gitlab employees have to reauthenticate very often during a working day. Well, unless they really use a challenge response system. At least what I use as a gitlab customer is not, it's just standard OTP. I would provide a valid one time password to a phishing site, should I fall for it. (Edit: reworded. Commenting on the phone is never a good idea...)
- tialaramex 6y agoMost challenge response systems don't help either, the attacker gets to forward the challenge to you, and then your response back to the real site. It's some extra work but you can get ready-made software to help perform this attack. WebAuthn (and the older U2F) works, because it's recruiting the browser (which knows perfectly well which site this is) to mint site-specific credentials every time. An attacker with a phishing site https://fake-gitlab.example/ https://fake-gitlab.example/ has a few options, none of which work out for them: * Just don't do WebAuthn, now they don't have a second factor and can't get in * Ask the browser for legitimate WebAuthn credentials for fake-gitlab.example. But, of course GitLab won't accept those credentials, any more than it'd accept a made-up username so they're useless. * Show the browser the "cookie" GitLab offered for GitLab WebAuthn credentials, the browser will cheerfully give a user's FIDO dongle this cookie and the fake-gitlab.example name, and the dongle will explain that it doesn't recognise the combination, maybe use a different dongle? No joy. * Show the browser that cookie and tell it this is gitlab.com. But this is fake-gitlab.example not gitlab.com, so the browser will just raise a DOMException SecurityError in the fake site's JS code. The code can hide that easily, but it doesn't get any credentials.
- usr1106 6y agoThanks for mentioning https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/WebAuthn According to Wikipedia Dropbox supports it. Any other widely used adopters? Need to check whether gitlab supports when I am at my computer. So it might well be that they even mandate it for their employees. But the statement or at least the part of the statement that made it to the article was not that specific.
- Rafert 6y agoTime to send every employee a FIDO compatible security key, implement WebAuthn, and make it mandatory for employee login.
- sokoloff 6y agoIs that meaningfully more secure than something like Auth0 with Duo MFA? (Which doesn’t require a dongle hanging off my USB-C port and works seamlessly on virtual machines.)
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- illuminated 6y agoI support this action and wish more companies do it. It would tremendously improve the security in every organization. The people that "bought" the fake login link feel ashamed, I'm sure, and they'd think twice before logging in next time. Kudos for Gitlab.
- Leherenn 6y agoNot really. Someone told me they did the same thing at his company, send out fishing emails to see who fell for it. Those who did (management was disproportionately represented) had to attend some training lessons. They resent another phishing email a few months later. Most people who fell for it the first time, fell again, despite the training.
- illuminated 6y agoI don't think an additional training is needed, at least in an IT company. The fake-phishing success should be enough to make everyone who fall curious enough to at least research the subject. What company has to make sure to communicate clearly is that the failure in the fake phishing test would not affect the employee's status in the company at all. But eventual failure in a real phishing event would have at least some consequences. For non-IT companies the training should begin and end with the message above and in between should be short and concise with ideas how and where to learn more about the subject.
- LordGrey 6y agoMy company regularly runs internal phishing tests like this, using an outside organization. We apparently have a near-constant 7% failure rate. Personally, I cheat: Long ago I discovered that the outside org puts some identifying headers into the email, so I wrote an email rule that adds "[PHISHME]" to the subject line. The phishing emails are sometimes very good. They appear to be from senior management and address projects or other internal events everyone knows about. Some emails are very easy to spot, in the Nigerian prince category. It is very interesting that we have that 7% failure rate no matter how good or bad the phishing email is. In general, I think internal phishing tests are a great way to educate the workforce.
- JumpCrisscross 6y ago> My company regularly runs internal phishing tests like this... I think internal phishing tests are a great way to educate the workforce Yes and no. I used to report phishing attempts to IT. Then we started running tests like every month, so I'd just delete suspicious messages and move on. Of course, that's when we got a real phishing message. Frequent company-wide tests are, in my opinion, overboard. Once a year company-wide tests, followed up by more-frequent tests for sensitive groups and/or those who failed previous tests, makes more sense.
- WrtCdEvrydy 6y agoThat's the thing, reporting a phising email in my org excludes you from one month's worth of email... then two months... then four months... I spoke to the guy in charge and he checked (my account is set to not receive for 2 years)
- LordGrey 6y agoOur tests seem to be somewhat staggered. We may see phishing email tests twice in a month, then nothing for several months. Typically there is a two-month lag between the tests. I should note that phishing tests are just one component of many company-wide education programs regarding physical, computer, data, and network security. My company deals with very sensitive data, so information security is a Big Deal. The problem with targeting these tests is that new employees are constantly coming in and need to be educated/trained. Also, the persistent failures do not seem to be confined to only certain work groups; they're spread around the company fairly randomly, and they move. Exactly how phishing tests are run probably depends quite a bit on what kind of company you have and what kind of employees work there. A workforce full of programmers would -- I would hope! -- be much less susceptible to phishing scams. The sales force, possibly more susceptible. That may be stereotyping, though.
- lucideer 6y agoIs this newsworthy? My company does this very regularly, and the phishes are well crafted convincing. 20% seems low if they're reasonably well put together emails. In the wild there's plenty of badly made, easy to spot phishing campaigns but one would hope any decent Red Team could put together a good one.
- mensetmanusman 6y agoOur company informed us 2 years ago that they will be attempting to phish us continuously (no frequency specified). If you fail, the last page is corporate training on the topic. I was so inspired to not have to do corporate training, that I assume everything is a scam now.
- blntechie 6y ago> If you fail, the last page is corporate training on the topic. In my work, the policy is 3 strikes and you are gone. First two fails are trainings with tests and third fail is an instant fireable event. As we work with clients and and their data, this is strictly enforced too.
- Igelau 6y agoSounds like a hellhole. That policy is perfectly tailored for corruption and paranoia.
- gruez 6y ago> That policy is perfectly tailored for corruption Elaborate?
- fargle 6y agoconcur. I do hope that the "well meaning" security team that thought this up is diligent in investigating and accounting for false positives. "Oh, I clicked the link in the fishing email IN A VM to see what the F* it was" and "I entered 'fakeceo' and 'mrpassword123'". People have different methods of exploring and learning to decide if something is legit or not. Nor should any "security policy" should be a 3 strikes zero tolerance policy. Everything needs context. P.S. I'm pretty sure that the mental and behavioral damage done by this 3 strikes policy can easily be weaponized. Shame.
- blntechie 6y agoThat’s the cost of client enforced security policy. I have not known or heard anyone personally fired for this but definitely getting warnings and or getting reassigned their roles.
- jamieweb 6y agoThis is especially concerning considering that GitLab is a technology company consisting of mostly technical staff. For a crafted spear-phish like the one used in this test, I wonder what the failure rate would be in larger, non-tech organisations?
- heipei 6y agoI'm not a huge fan of these phishing-test exercises. I run the service at https://urlscan.io https://urlscan.io which a lot of folks use regularly to check out suspicious links in mails / chat messages. I've been approached by some of these phishing-test companies asking me to prevent scanning their domains/IPs. They flat-out told me that they weren't happy about users using my service to check the link, which I always found odd, and I never got an explanation for it. Probably less spectacular findings for these companies if users can figure out a phishing test by themselves...
- WrtCdEvrydy 6y ago> Probably less spectacular findings for these companies if users can figure out a phishing test by themselves... It's the same issue as "ad companies"... if you don't cook the numbers that show your expensive service is worth it, then people will switch to the service that looks worse (this one has 7% fail rate but this one has 50% fail rate)
- tikkabhuna 6y agoPerhaps they should look at doing integration that shows how much urlscan.io is blocking the phishing test companies?
- duckmysick 6y agoWhat are the legitimate cases for excluding the domains from your scanning service?
- heipei 6y agoNot many, I usually only do it when the domain or URL pattern in question is almost exclusively used for sessions/invites/sharing-links and basically every URL submitted leaks either a customer name and/or invite-token and/or PII. zoom.us is a good example, certain DocuSign URL patterns, the sort of thing where knowing the URL gets you a sensitive document, etc.
- tobyhinloopen 6y ago32 per cent? Is their % key broken?
- 7174n6 6y agoSeveral have noted email rules set up to flag phishing simulation emails. Anyone care to share one of those rules?
- StavrosK 6y agoI'm a web developer with a focus on security and I nearly got phished multiple times. Once was a legitimate-looking email from Linode, which I opened and was fooled by (I didn't check the domain because I trusted my spam filter too much to consider that it might be fake), I was saved by my password manager not auto-filling the credentials because the domain didn't match, which made me look and see that I was on the wrong domain. The second time, someone was about to steal $30k worth of cryptocurrency from me with a very convincing page on śtellar.org, where I nearly entered my wallet seed (did you notice the accent over the s? I didn't), and was saved by the fact that I keep my cryptocurrency in a hardware wallet, so I had no seed to enter. Both times, what saved me from being phished wasn't that I'm trained or that I'm more observant (which my parents have no hope of ever being), but that I had used best practices so I didn't have to rely on being trained or observant. I'm hoping WebAuthn takes off, which will really kill phishing for good, but you can take steps now: Use hardware U2F keys as second factors, use a password manager, don't use SMS auth. Make long, random passwords, etc.
- CapacitorSet 6y ago>a very convincing page on śtellar.org If you rarely use IDNs, toggling `network.IDN_show_punycode` in about:config can help with that - you would have seen `xn--tellar-2ib.org`.
- StavrosK 6y agoThanks, I had originally typed up the URL in the comment with https:// https:// and HN did convert to punycode, foiling the attack. I never use IDNs, even though I'm in Greece, so I've set that option, thank you.
- WrtCdEvrydy 6y agoI was honestly almost phished a couple of times until one of my professors said something I had never though about before. "If you have a password manager, use the password manager's 'take me to site' function instead of anything on the email. Just open the site from your password manager instead"
- awd 6y agoI regularly perform tests like these. Overall there's a flat 10% 'critical failure' rate across organizations. You send a phishing e-mail pretending to be from the IT department, with some instructions to install the 'anti-virus scanner' or whatever, and 1 out of 10 people will open the e-mail, click the link, give their credentials, follow all instructions, click through all warnings and infect their machines. If your organization is above a certain size, remote code execution in your network is a given. There's several technical measures you can take to make is _much_ harder to perform these attacks on Windows in general: * Disable unsigned Office macro execution (if on windows with office) * Disable mshta.exe or remove the .hta file association If you can get away with it, productivity wise, enable whitelisting for all software. Attackers can often times still find weak points in your organization. It's not always the marketing or HR department with Windows that gets phished. I once observed a colleague phish a webdev on a macbook with a recruitment 'challenge'.
- unlimit 6y agoMy company does this often. It sends legitimate looking emails and at last I fell for one recently. I thought about it, then I understood why. My company uses a lot of saas products - for submitting expenses, for giving appreciations etc etc. These saas products regularly sends emails, and they come from other domains. When my company used all home grown or on premise web apps I never ever opened any emails coming from a different domain or open them very cautiously. And now I think these saas emails have probably taught my brain to trust emails from other domains. I am not sure.
- benbristow 6y ago"While an attacker would be able to easily capture both the username and password entered into the fake site, the Red Team determined that only capturing email addresses or login names was necessary for this exercise." It says in the article that they never asked for passwords. I wonder if the statistics would have been different if they did? You usually think twice before entering a password.
- kryogen1c 6y agobuying a phishing as a service trainer is the single best bang for your buck in the realm of all security. obviously, all computer security is relative to your use-case and threat model, so your mileage will definitely vary. if all your servers are publicly routable with no firewall or antivirus, emails are the least of your worries. however, spam is not a solved problem. phishing is hard to stop, and spearphishing basically impossible. professionals you know get compromised, upstream toolchains get compromised, etc. the attack effort and risk vs reward is wildy skewed in their favor. it has been a vector of compromise for many highprofile breaches. find a reputable company, pay them, and whitelist them in your spam filters. they will generate incredible phishing emails (using your domain and corporate info, since you let them) and give you a way to train your users in a way that is irreplaceable.
- rhipitr 6y agoThe problem seems to me that companies and orgs want to send emails when it is convenient for them to do so (paystub ready, benefits enrollment open click here, etc.) but distribute the cognitive load to its employees/customers to figure out which emails are trustworthy and which emails are not. You eventually get trained to click on links in emails as a form of legitimate interaction. https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html
- kerng 6y agoSeems pretty typical for results of phishing campaigns - although they targeted 50 people, which is not very representative to get overall numbers and stats on different disciplines in a larger organization. Results are largely driven by the kind of phish that is sent and if its click-worthy. Some companies do these exercises every month.
- donohoe 6y agoI take the point but I also take it with a degree of realism. I've been at companies where they did this and I usually 'fail the test'. I received the email, but given the highly targeted nature (wasn't very generic) I get curious. When you can tell it san internal test its fun to see if you can trace it back to a particular person or department. So I created a VM in a secondary clean laptop and opened it. So based on the test I failed because they detected I followed a link. I don't for one second believe that 1 in 5 Gitlab employees also did this, but I'm certainly distrustful of test numbers like this.
- sytse 6y agoMaybe this article came about because of my tweet: https://twitter.com/sytses/status/1263216521175642112?s=20 https://twitter.com/sytses/status/1263216521175642112?s=20 “ I'm grateful for the red team at GitLab doing an amazingly realistic phishing attack https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/red-team-tech-notes/-/tree/master/RT-011%20-%20Phishing%20Campaign https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/red-tea... with custom domains and realistic web pages. The outcome was that 20% of team-members gave credentials and 12% reported the attack.” I think it is amazing that our res team make https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/red-team-tech-notes/-/tree/master/RT-011%20-%20Phishing%20Campaign https://gitlab.com/gitlab-com/gl-security/gl-redteam/red-tea... public so other companies can learn from it and they where comfortable with sharing the results.
- elliekelly 6y agoI’ve seen this a lot in my work where companies hesitate to conduct phishing exercises that are “too convincing” (or, put another way, too realistic) because they fear documenting poor results. Of course that means the exercise and the learning opportunities are much less impactful. I’ll concede it’s a little different with financial institutions because regulators and auditors will usually see the results at some point but I really admire Gitlab’s commitment to transparency. I try to emphasize to clients that it’s not a test but a phishing exercise akin to a fire drill. You don’t pass or fail a fire drill - you use it assess how prepared you are for a fire. And if you find that you’re totally unprepared, well wouldn’t you prefer to figure that out before anything is actually on fire?
- thomasdub 6y agoI love the lure, and I respect the GitLab team for making it public, but this is a tough read - it’s putting way too much responsibility on the end-user. For example I’m a huge fan of security teams using email headers to analyze suspicious messages, but I think it’s a step too far to expect a user to ever look at an email header, no? We can hardly get regular end-users to hover over a link; encouraging them to open up email headers to see what service the mail was sent from, or to understand what a “received” message header vs an x-originating-ip means is counter-productive. Headers are hard to understand even for a security analyst, asking HR or Recruitment or Sales to analyze them and understand them feels like the red-team are underestimating how little time everyone has and overestimating how technical most employees are!
- sergers 6y agoMy company sends phishing emails every few weeks, for like past 5 years U click it or open attachment, u are automatically enrolled in trainingg u must complete. Very few people click anything remotely obscure, and are asking manager if the email is from a legitimate company we are dealing with. Ex: I got a signup confirmation email from a legitimate website, asked our director about it. He looked into it and confirmed with IT we had been signed up and infosec was fine with it. We then relayed to the whole team that it is legitimate email. I would say highly successful
- globular-toast 6y agoBut the little green padlock was there! It must have been OK. My company has just decided to enable 2FA in order to combat phishing. I'm not sure how this would help. What amazes me is that we allow HTML email at all. That alone would greatly reduce successful phishing attempts. Requiring all emails to have valid signatures doesn't even seem too difficult for an organisation.
- ramoz 6y agoThe most brutal phishing I've seen an enterprise use: "[SPOT BONUS] Your hard work and dedicated efforts are being rewarded!"
- fossuser 6y agoWe do this a lot where I work and it’s fun. There’s a button in the email client for “report phishing link” so I’m always on the lookout. If you report a test evil message you get immediate feedback that you passed the test. If you report a real one the security team immediately looks at it and let’s you know if it’s legitimate or not. I think it’s a good system.
- relaunched 6y agoCompany runs phishing simulation (they were already remote)...is that news? One in five isn't bad. As you target them, based on content and recipients, the results can get much worse. And when non-tech companies run these, the results are...scary. It's no wonder the most sought after entry point into a network, the most reliable and probably the cheapest, is phishing. All it takes is one out of 50,000 to fall for it.
- naetius 6y agoMy company (big Valley corp doing robotics) does exactly the same, and it's very good at it: if you get phished, you'll automatically get signed up for a long and tedious training.
- whydoyoucare 6y agoA better approach is to implement anti-phishing measures way up in the chain -- at the MTA level itself. Simpler ideas like: stripping URLs' from mail, stripping attachments if email origin is outside the organization, converting HTML email to plain-text, disallowing HTML email, yield substantial benefit in stopping phishing. Basically, don't try to solve a problem by humans when it can be solved more efficiently by technology! Phishing exercises are absolutely pointless in my experience and contribute zero to increasing the awareness. Shaming does not address the underlying human weaknesses that make us fall for phishing, they simply make the IT Guys look cooler, and increase CISOs' and Red Team budget. :-(
- somebodythere 6y agoThe best security is multi-layered. The human layer is the weakest part of any security system, and both technical and human measures must be taken to achieve defense in depth. Some technical measures used here were requiring 2FA for all internal services, and scoping keys/POLP to limit the damage from one compromised key. The purpose of exercises like these is not to shame someone who "fell for it", but to educate workers about phishing attacks and strengthen the human security layer.
- whydoyoucare 6y agoTwo decades of experience suggests that "strengthening human security by training" ain't happening, no matter how hard/smart you try. The technical controls have to be beefed up to a point where that human-weak-link is eliminated. These tests are nothing but CISOs'(and Red Teams, and the whole industry around it) justifying their existence, and potentially doing a song-and-dance about it at the quarterly all-hands. Nothing more, nothing less. We can come back to this thread in another year/two years/five years/decade, and I can bet dollars-to-doughnuts, the industry will still be training humans, and claiming these pointless statistics about phishing. ;-) On this note, see #6 "Educating Users", in Marcus Ranum's excellent article "The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security": https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/dumb/ https://www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/...
- ufmace 6y agoI'd just note that it seems Google documented that U2F keys were the only tech they'd tried capable of reducing credentials to Google systems being stolen from employees in phishing attacks to zero. Maybe we need more of that going around. I also don't understand why they keep mentioning that their staff is all-remote. I don't see what difference that makes.
- Trisell 6y agoThe company I work at works with and contains a significant amount of PII regularly phishes on our staff. It’s usually between 1 in 5 and 1 in 4 that will click on the link. Despite all of the education and quarterly repeated phishes those number really aren’t improving much. I think at some point you have to accept that end users will click on things, and add additional protections in place to help mitigate the risk.
- ilikebits 6y agoWhen I worked at Google, orange teams weren't allowed to use phishing tactics because they worked so reliably every single time that they provided no new information about the security of internal systems. The reality is that humans are hard to secure, so defense in depth generally involves preventing compromised accounts from causing lots of damage, detecting them as early as possible, and controls for shutting them down.
- lightlyused 6y agoAt work, failing clicking on a test phishing email can result in a dismissal if you do it too many times in a year.
- EndXA 6y agoReading this article brought this one to mind: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/07/google-security-keys-neutralized-employee-phishing/ https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/07/google-security-keys-neu... (about Google using security keys to deal with phishing)
- trynewideas 6y agoMan I hate these, and I hate that companies get paid serious real US American Dollars to stage these for other companies. Every time I see a colleague laid off, and then see one of these stupid phishing tests land in my inbox, I think about losing my job during a pandemic in order to ensure the security team still had the budget to pull this stupid crap. It doesn't help that our own customers send us stupider looking emails that are actually legitimate.
- m0zg 6y agoAll companies should be doing internal penetration/security testing. If you don't do it, someone in China or Russia will do it for you, you just won't know. I hope GitHub is doing this too. Google, for example, has an entire team whose task it is to exploit such attack vectors and close the holes in all sorts of products and processes, often with stunning results. I'm not sure if the rest of FAANG does this, although I'd be surprised if Facebook doesn't do essentially the same. I would not be surprised if Amazon or Apple don't do it, at least not to the extent you'd see at Google (no holds barred, the red team gets to pwn everything). Netflix, I'm not sure, they probably have something. Microsoft probably doesn't do it, since it'd make people look bad, and in their back-stabbing corporate culture people can't afford to look bad.
- kerng 6y agoIf you look at the logs of phishing exercises you can often see employees messing with the red team, like entering invalid creds for CISO or CEO and stuff. I think phishing exercises should provide much more details, e.g. the following metrics: (1) # targets opened email (2) # clicked link (3) # who entered valid username (must match some identifier in email - to prevent trolling) (3) # who entered password (4) # entered valid(!) password (5) # entered MFA/code or did Push (6) # auth cookies stolen (full compromise) Otherwise it's difficult to compare any of these tests and understand the actual risks and success rates.
- wuxiekeji 6y agoGreat now fire those 1 in 5.
- fargle 6y agoI appreciate the article, gitlabs, and da'reg commenter "Spencer" for pointing out that gitlabs publishes their security handbook: https://about.gitlab.com/handbook/security/ https://about.gitlab.com/handbook/security/ As I read through these comments and the linked handbook, it kinda makes me want to work for a company like that. As important as security is, even the security handbook has an appropriate tone vs. treating people (CS talented or not) as idiots who cannot be trusted. Good job gitlabs.
- xtat 6y agoSeems irrelevant that they work from home
- rurban 6y agoWe did a similar phishing attempt in my previous company, which had a bit more technical background than gitlab. From the 200 people, only one gave up his credentials. from marketing, as expected. We don't let them near anything important anyway.
- badrabbit 6y ago100% of people will fall for a good spear-phish, when you fail to accept that you start doing things like punishing people who fail. The point of these tests is to raise awareness and train people so that successful phishing attacks will need that much more targeting precision in addition to accuracy. It's like combat training, the goal isn't to train your army so they all become elite fighters and martial artists, the goal is to improve their fighting skills so that they fair a good chance at victory against similar ranking enemy troops. So, if your people fall for an emotet phish,that's bad. If they fell for a pentester's phish where he did background research on his subjects and spoofed email header fields, that's normal, just like a navy seal beating up an airforce sergeant would be normal.