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Critical Update on DAO Vulnerability
- arisAlexis 10y agoSo the attacker can buy very cheap eth/dao right now, then somehow stop/reverse the attack/send money back/claim it was white hacking and effectively launder all the money he gained legitimately.
- granaldo 10y agoMarket is reacting to it https://www.coingecko.com/en/price_charts/ethereum/usd https://www.coingecko.com/en/price_charts/ethereum/usd Ethereum down from $21 to $15 in minutes
- anotheryou 10y agoWhy is there so much money in a crypto currency so young? It's young software, of course it will fail around a little. Is it because the beginning is where you make the bet to become really rich when the thing lifts off?
- Annatar 10y agoEtherScan is a Block Explorer and Analytics Platform for Ethereum, which is a decentralized platform that runs smart contracts. What is this platform??? What is "DAO"??? What are "Uncles"??? What is "Ethereum"???
- deftnerd 10y agoWith all due respect, this wasn't very constructive. HN is full of new and strange acronyms. Most of us either skip the article about it if we're not interested or simply google the term. Ethereum is a blockchain based cryptocurrency that also lets you submit programs to the blockchain that nodes around the world run in exchange for a small fee. I don't know what Uncles are, other than the brother of your father. The DAO is a smart contract, basically a program, that runs on the Ethereum network. It's a bit of a venture capital fund that was open for 30 days to new investors. People submit investment proposals to TheDAO, and the investors decide if the investment proposal should receive funding. If it does, profits are sent back to TheDAO and distributed to the investors EtherScan is a block explorer for Ethereum.
- Annatar 10y agoWell I mean the topic just assumes one knows everything there is to know about the subject, and to me, that's just wrong. I had no idea what any of that stuff meant, so I went to research it, and came back even more confused than I was when I started. Nevertheless, I thank you kindly for taking the time to explain.
- forbiddenlake 10y agoContext-free headlines are a pattern on HN, and apparently are acceptable. Examples include this submission and things like "Buffer layoffs" which was not about staggering layoffs, but about a company named Buffer. Who knew?
- curiousgal 10y agoIt's not as bad as it seems. The hackers have their ETH locked in a Child DAO, so they will not be able to get the ETH out for a long time,by which a fix will be issued. The entire Ethereum Ecosystem is collaborating on a solution. 0.https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oiib4/dao_is_safe/ https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oiib4/dao_is_saf...
- benmmurphy 10y agoMy guess at how the attackers are doing it: They are calling splitDAO: https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/develop/DAO.sol#L618 https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/develop/DAO.sol#L618 splitDAO calls withdrawRewardFor which ends up calling back into the users contract. https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/develop/DAO.sol#L686 https://github.com/slockit/DAO/blob/develop/DAO.sol#L686 withdrawRewardFor(msg.sender); // be nice, and get his rewards totalSupply -= balances[msg.sender]; balances[msg.sender] = 0; paidOut[msg.sender] = 0; the state is modified after the callback in particular the balances variable. however, earlier in the function it moved funds to a new dao based on the balances variable. // Move ether and assign new Tokens uint fundsToBeMoved = (balances[msg.sender] * p.splitData[0].splitBalance) / p.splitData[0].totalSupply; if (p.splitData[0].newDAO.createTokenProxy.value(fundsToBeMoved)(msg.sender) == false) so presumably an attacker can call splitDAO and then recursively call splitDAO and the funds will be transferred twice. there is also some complications around rewardToken because this state is modified before the callback but apparently it is all zero at the moment. if this is the bug the attackers are exploiting then maybe if they generated rewards it would stop the drain of funds. however, the fact the draining is still going on and the DAO people are likely to know how they are doing it and it hasn't been stopped reduces my confidence that this is how the attackers are doing it. EDIT: to add i don't think you can cash out the new DAO for 28 days so this is probably not how the attackers are doing it. EDIT: update again. https://blog.slock.it/dao-security-advisory-live-updates-2a0a42a2d07b#.ajsb7cpgv https://blog.slock.it/dao-security-advisory-live-updates-2a0... 'It would appear the attacker has moved the stolen ether to a child DAO, which means that the funds be moved for at least 27 days.' -> i'm now fairly confident this is how the attack worked :)
- amluto 10y agoThis makes sense to me, but where's the actual code that calls into the attacker's contract and lets the attacker call back into splitDAO? And how on Earth is it a good idea to allow one contract to call another? There are any number of more sensible ways to communicate that don't have this problem: allow contracts to pass messages to other contracts, allow contracts to subscribe to each other's events, etc.
- lordnacho 10y agoI recall reading in the Bitcoin docs that the Forth-like scripting language was non-Turing complete. In addition, nothing particularly complex was using the scripting at the time. I guess this sort of thing would be the reason. One thing is finding bugs in ordinary software, where the bugs are accidents. It's hard. Another thing entirely is where you are looking for adversarial bugs. Just look at security articles that appear on HN now and again. They're incredibly complex, and it's not like you can turn off the firehose. When you fix one gap, someone will find another. I haven't done a lot of reading on ETH, but I would imagine the smart thing to do would be to have some small number of contract types that a lot of people can stare at and try to break. The more attention is distributed among various bespoke contracts, the harder it gets to secure them. It's like everyone building their own awesome cars, with special bells and whistles, and then asking these non-security engineers to design a lock. Everyone will end up re-learning some painful lessons.
- wscott 10y agoThey are debugging it right now. The ultimate bug bounty program.
- fabled_giraffe 10y agoI suggest putting money into the stock market instead. It's much more consistent, e.g. http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=%5EGSPC+Interactive#symbol=%5EGSPC;range=my http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=%5EGSPC+Interactive#symbo...
- curiousgal 10y agoI see a lot of confusion mixed with the good old HN hate for crypto which is justifiable but just to be clear, the breach was with a single piece of software written on the Ethereum network (the DAO). Not a vulnerability with Ethereum. The eth that is locked is the funds that were paid to that contract (TheDAO), not the network's funds.
- SakiWatanabe 10y agodeveloper asks token holders to spam the network to delay the attack o.O griff [10:05 AM] @channel The DAO is being attacked. It has been going on for 3-4 hours, it is draining ETH at a rapid rate. This is not a drill. You can help: If anyone knows who has the split proposals Congo Split, Beer Split and FUN-SPLT-42, please DM me We need their help! If you want to help, you can vote yes on those aforementioned split proposals. especially people who’s tokens are blocked because they voted for Prop 43 (the music app one). We need to spam the Network so that we can mount a counter attack all the brightest minds in the Ethereum world are in on this. please use this: for (var i = 0; i < 100; i++) { eth.sendTransaction({from: eth.accounts[4], gas: 2300000, gasPrice: web3.toWei(20, 'shannon'), data: '0x5b620186a05a131560135760016020526000565b600080601f600039601f565b6000f3'}) } to spam the chain
- jsemrau 10y agoQuick! Create a GUI interface using Visual Basic. See if I can track an IP address.
- dimgl 10y agoThis is the nuttiest thing I've ever seen.
- jlkinsel 10y agoI think that was a message from the rebel base?
- linker3000 10y ago"It's a trap"
- nullc 10y agoBecause it's malicious code to steal a bunch of funds from the users wallet? Or because many people are running it?
- 10y ago
- joosters 10y agoSlock.it will be so disappointed, they never managed to grab any of the cash from their creation...
- SakiWatanabe 10y agoYeah, the presale website was pretty cool though.
- joosters 10y agoStill, maybe they can get a refund from the people that did the code audit?
- Avshalom 10y agoWell, or they've managed to grab over 2m eth from their creation...
- howfun 10y agoSite don't open.
- popey456963 10y agoI'm assuming it's being hugged to death by hacker news. If you wait long enough it loads for me.
- johncolanduoni 10y agoI'm curious how much of Hacker News' kiss of death is trying to access the page in the browser, and how much is following that up when it doesn't immediately work with pinging, "curl -I -v", etc.
- jariz 10y agoIf you wait long enough, CF will serve a cached version to you.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- csomar 10y agoWell, that wasn't long. And we might just found out the single reason against Smart Contracts.
- greenspot 10y agoSite doesn't load. Does anyone have a tl;dr for the not so informed? What's DAO? Does Etherum have a weak spot?
- popey456963 10y agoThis is how I understand the situation: - 2,436,828 Ethereum has been routed to the address starting "0x304a554a310c7e546" [0] - This is worth roughly $46,000,000. - This has happened because there is some weakness in the Ethereum security - The conversion between Ethereum and USD is dropping significantly, now down to 16. [1] Due to this security threat, the developer is telling people to try to effectively DDOS the service in order to stop all transactions. Also, people are being told to split, but I can't see why. Copy of page at 9:45: - http://puu.sh/pvOqy/929f40bddb.png http://puu.sh/pvOqy/929f40bddb.png [0] https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490 https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c... [1] http://puu.sh/pvOVw/5443a70ced.png http://puu.sh/pvOVw/5443a70ced.png
- csomar 10y agoIs this a weakness on Ethereum or the DAO?
- pmorici 10y agoI can't read the page but I was under the impression that recently someone found a problem with the DAO and then they put all DAO activity on hold until they could fix it. Perhaps someone is exploiting that problem or another one they found.
- nullc 10y agoThe fact that many scripts written suffers similar vulnerabilities unless extensive (and, seemingly failure prone) mitigations are applied, suggests that the root cause is a known design flaw in the ethereum smart contract architecture. Doubly so when the latest reviewers of this systems and custodians of the DAO include the system's creators. When building systems that provide irreversible transaction processing, safe only under perfect use is not sufficient.
- y04nn 10y agoThat sounds pretty bad
- ThomasRooney 10y agoI started archiving the slock.it #general slack channel when this attack began. This is where most of the discussion has been taking place. Here's up until a few minutes ago: http://pastebin.com/DykumjLs http://pastebin.com/DykumjLs
- mkohlmyr 10y agoFantastic entertainment right there, thanks for creating this.. So much self importance mixed with faux understanding of technology and a dash of desperate desire to belong to a special group. On a more positive note, my bitcoin wallet is rapidly approaching steak dinner territory as of last month. It's the little things in life!
- _Codemonkeyism 10y ago@channel EMERGENCY ALERT! IF YOU HAVE A SPLIT OPEN PLEASE DM @griff ASAP!!! azzo [2:22 PM] what's DM
- dimgl 10y agoThis is comedy gold.
- 746F7475 10y agoNot everyone uses (I'm assuming) Twitter
- icebraining 10y agoYeah, should it be PM? They are on IRC, after all.
- DCoder 10y agoThat's Slack, not IRC. Slack uses the term "Direct Messages" for private conversations.
- 10y ago
- 1012930112 10y agoIs this related to https://www.ethereum.org/ https://www.ethereum.org/ ? "Ethereum is a decentralized platform for applications that run exactly as programmed without any chance of fraud, censorship or third-party interference." Right ...
- adammunich 10y agoThe system's only as good as the code you write on it.
- pmorici 10y agoNo, it isn't directly related to Ethereum(ETH). The DAO is a thing built on top of ETH that is supposed to operate like a decentralized corporation direct through direct democracy of it's constituent investors. It's website is, https://daohub.org/ https://daohub.org/
- lazaroclapp 10y agoOh, it is absolutely right (as far as we know). But "exactly as programmed" doesn't mean "exactly as intended" it means "exactly as programmed", with bugs and vulnerabilities and all. ' “This is the land where dreams–dreams, do you understand–come to life, come real. Not daydreams: dreams.” There was about half a minute’s silence, and then with a great clatter of armor, the whole crew were tumbling down the main hatch as quick as they could and flinging themselves on the oars to row as they had never rowed before. . . . For it had taken everyone just that half-minute to remember certain dreams they had had–dreams that make you afraid of going to sleep again–and to realize what it would mean to land on a country where dreams come true. ' - C. S. Lewis’s Voyage of the Dawn Treader
- Olscore 10y agoReal time chart for DAO/BTC (Down 41% currently): https://poloniex.com/exchange#btc_dao https://poloniex.com/exchange#btc_dao
- dagw 10y agoAnd has now dropped to down 60% in the 20 minutes since you posted...
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- shocks 10y agoCan someone explain what is going on here?
- distances 10y agoI'd also appreciate an explanation for audience who's never heard of DAO or Etherium.
- jbpetersen 10y agoA Turing complete blockchain was used to create a crowd-funded venture fund [TheDAO]. There was a bug in TheDAO's code. It got exploited in order to siphon off cryptocurrency worth many millions in USD.
- buttershakes 10y agoThis pretty directly contradicts a lot of the hype around Ethereum. Yes, bad contract code is bad, but a lot of money is about to evaporate. If it isn't easy to write secure contracts then there is a serious deployment problem.
- mpeg 10y agoThis is what really annoys me about the Ethereum VM, there was no need for turing completeness. Bitcoin has a perfectly good scripting system that they keep adding opcodes to, and is not vulnerable to some of these kind of attacks.
- kerkeslager 10y agoCould you point me to some resources showing recently added opcodes? Last time I looked at the Bitcoin code they had actually disabled some of the original opcodes due to security concerns. I'd be interested to see that this trend had reversed.
- mpeg 10y agoSorry, I should probably edit my comment to say "over the years" and not necessarily recently. I think my point was more that the conservative approach Bitcoin takes works better on the long term, and there's still proposals that slowly get implemented. I first got into Bitcoin in 2011, and since then there's been plenty of new opcodes, and as you say some original ones that got disabled as they presented risks. Latest one I can think of that got implemented would be OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY in 2014/15 (?), but I haven't really kept up with the BIPs that much with all the infighting
- woah 10y agoIt's a giant pain in the ass to code Bitcoin. In a few years, all of these kinds of attacks will have been tried against various Ethereum contracts and it will be hardened and still easy. It will still be very cumbersome to code Bitcoin.
- anc84 10y ago
- joosters 10y agoJust remember, when the developers inevitably appear with suggestions about how to stop the hack, roll back the blockchain, or come up with other schemes to block the hackers, they are showing everyone that all the talk of blockchains being decentralised, or being beyond the control of governments or other powers... is a complete lie. If this hack can be stopped, then it demonstrates that the currency can be manipulated, that the decentralised system is not so fault tolerant or uncensored after all, and that people out there know this.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- AnonymousPlanet 10y agoLet's call it self delusion. A "lie" needs the intention to deceive. I think most developers of these systems truly believe that they are building the First Distributed Republic or something like that.
- btrask 10y agoWe already knew that blockchains are vulnerable to 51% attacks. There are real problems with points of centralization (including the developers), but events like this don't prove anything. Edit: to be clear, the 51% attack I'm referring to is actually the defense of the network by developers/miners/users that the parent post is complaining about.
- johncolanduoni 10y agoIf this is just a 51% attack then we didn't learn anything about etherium qua etherium or blockchains qua blockchains... but we'll learn something about the lower bound for being big enough that they're not a realistic possibility.
- joosters 10y agoIt's an interesting question - is the DAO 'too big to fail' ? I wonder how different ether will turn out to be, will they bail it out by rolling back the blockchain?
- walrus01 10y agoIt's almost as if a cryptocurrency system used by the grey market and black market sections of the internet contained actual blackhats. What a surprise. Much as I hate to link to reddit, for effective and biting criticism of cryptocurrencies: http://reddit.com/r/buttcoin http://reddit.com/r/buttcoin
- pmorici 10y agoWhat grey/black market sites accept eth. Pretty sure most of them historically have been Bitcoin based.
- walrus01 10y agoeth is traded to and from bitcoin on various exchanges, so it's a parallel.
- uhhuhuh 10y ago>eth is traded to and from bitcoin on various exchanges, so it's a parallel. eth is also traded to and from USD on various exchanges, so that's a parallel, too? Listen, I'm no ethereum fanboy here, but logic, let's use it.
- pmorici 10y agoSo is the USD and a bunch of other currencies, what's your point? You can also trade ETH for USD on most big exchanges.
- njloof 10y agoAnd USD are used for all kinds of illegal things; solutions include restricting paper transactions to $100 units of currency (so that large amounts of currency are bulky and heavy) and all kinds of restrictions on transactions over $10,000.
- mpeg 10y agoThis might serve as a future warning to NOT write your own VM. Sure, it's probably a contract issue, but we'd have some much better contract code if the VM didn't require you to code defensively all the time.
- nneonneo 10y agoThe provided link is just a page showing a bunch of transactions. For someone like me, who is not so intimate with the Ethereum terminology in use (but who is still interested in the DAO, as an observer), could someone provide a layman's explanation of what's going on? Somewhat more specifically, I'm wondering the following: - At a high level, what does this attack actually consist of? - How does ethereum "go missing" in a distributed blockchain, where you can see all the transaction endpoints? - Who loses and who gains from an attack of this scale? - How severe could this attack be - does it pose an existential threat to The DAO (or Ethereum, more broadly)? - How is this attack being perpetrated? Has the attack vector been previously anticipated? Why is this unexpected?
- jabgrabdthrow 10y agoIt's a reentry bug - native ETH always calls the recipient contract's code on transfer, which can call back into the current function. If you manage native ETH do accounting in the wrong order, you can "withdraw" multiple times. It doesn't "go missing", presumably the hacker will drain it into Bitcoin via any anonymous exchange accounts they have. Everyone loses big time (except the attacker if they manage to launder some of the coins). Watch for a wave of rebranding. > How severe could this attack be - does it pose an existential threat to The DAO (or Ethereum, more broadly)? We will see. The group behind TheDAO has a lot of pull - if Ethereum successfully rejects calls for a hard fork that will damage it severely in the public's eye, but will be the ultimate proof of concept. > How is this attack being perpetrated? Has the attack vector been previously anticipated? Why is this unexpected? Why, take a look: https://blog.slock.it/no-dao-funds-at-risk-following-the-ethereum-smart-contract-recursive-call-bug-discovery-29f482d348b#.skdl752nu https://blog.slock.it/no-dao-funds-at-risk-following-the-eth... Copied: """ No DAO funds at risk following the Ethereum smart contract ‘recursive call’ bug discovery Our team is blessed to have Dr. Christian Reitwießner, Father of Solidity, as its Advisor. During the early development of the DAO Framework 1.1 and thanks to his guidance we were made aware of a generic vulnerability common to all Ethereum smart contracts. We promptly circumvented this so-called “recursive call vulnerability” or “race to empty” from the DAO Framework 1.1 as can be seen on line 580: // we are setting this here before the CALL() value transfer to // assure that in the case of a malicious recipient contract trying // to call executeProposal() recursively money can’t be transferred // multiple times out of the DAO p.proposalPassed = true; Three days ago this design vulnerability potential was raised in a blog post which subsequently led to the discovery of such an issue in an unrelated project, MakerDAO. This was highlighted in a reddit post, with MakerDAO being able to drain their own funds safely before the vulnerability could be exploited. Around 12 hours ago user Eththrowa on the DAOHub Forum spotted that while we had identified the vulnerability in one aspect of the DAO Framework, the existing (and deployed) DAO reward account mechanism was affected. His message and our prompt confirmation can be found here. We issued a fix immediately as part of the DAO Framework 1.1 milestone. The important takeaway from this is: as there is no ether whatsoever in the DAO’s rewards account — this is NOT an issue that is putting any DAO funds at risk today. """
- known 10y agoThis is why I prefer https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chiemgauer https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chiemgauer
- walrus01 10y agoscrew that, I'm putting all my money into giant round stones with holes in the centre. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rai_stones https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rai_stones
- pmorici 10y agoFor context 2 Million ETH is in the 30-40 million USD range at recent market prices.
- Quanttek 10y agoI remember reading somewhere, that the DAO was basically hastly coded under pressure, without any QA or security audit, so that explains things
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- goldenkey 10y agoArticle about The DAO since parent link is flakey: http://www.coindesk.com/the-dao-just-raised-50-million-but-what-is-it/ http://www.coindesk.com/the-dao-just-raised-50-million-but-w...
- pmorici 10y agoThis can't be good for the price of ETH.
- pmorici 10y agoRelated reddit thread https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oi2ta/i_think_thedao_is_getting_drained_right_now/ https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oi2ta/i_think_th...
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- narrator 10y agoI always though that Etherium had a huge attack surface. Each script has to be security audited, etc. That's the thing about Bitcoin. It's as simple as possible while still being secure and useful and has been beat up and audited by the best security pros in the world. Distributed Systems are not easy. Secure distributed systems with Byzantine fault tolerance are even harder. Etherium is just trying to do too much.
- buttershakes 10y agoMost people really don't understand the difficulties involved. It's an incredibly hard thing to get right.
- LoSboccacc 10y agoTuring machine, meet the halting problem It's not just hard.
- jpereira 10y agoDoesn't this show an issue with the Distributed Systems on Ethereum, with every script that has to be audited individually, and not with the platform itself? I'm with you on the fact that proper auditing is an absolute must, as this DAO fiasco shows, but I don't think this event exposes any flaws in the Ethereum platform itself.
- sphen 10y agoI recently attended an Ethereum workshop that was scheduled for two hours. Three hours later and most of the audience were no more wise about Ethereum than when they first entered the room. It certainly didn't help that workshop was led by web developer (a passionate Ethereum supporter) who had no interest in the concensus algorithm or other dense technical issues, but what was quickly apparent to me was that Ethereum has a steep learning curve. With such technologies, it is important to take more time to understand the concepts and the details. Maybe in the rush for VC money, some developers have failed to grasp that.
- mcphilip 10y agoNew blog post on dao hub. Seems pretty grim: https://blog.daohub.org/the-dao-is-under-attack-8d18ca45011b#.14ubtbne5 https://blog.daohub.org/the-dao-is-under-attack-8d18ca45011b...
- codingmyway 10y agoThe DAO lasted even less time than I thought.
- andygates 10y agoIt didn't even make it out of the nest! Poor fat tender little fledgling org devoured in a blink. I was expecting it to at least bubble, before failing hard.
- codingmyway 10y agoI was giving it until the splitting time was up. So much idealistic naivety. Would have been interesting to watch. I'm sure there'll be more attempts at DAOs yet. Lesson learnt at least.
- pmorici 10y agoETH's creator just called on exchanges to halt all trading of ETH and DAO. https://np.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oif2x/dao_attack_exchanges_please_pause_eth_and_dao/ https://np.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oif2x/dao_attack_...
- varav 10y agoIn case anybody is wondering how this happened, it looks like the attack is exploiting the "recursive call via default function" vulnerability [1]. [1]: http://vessenes.com/more-ethereum-attacks-race-to-empty-is-the-real-deal/ http://vessenes.com/more-ethereum-attacks-race-to-empty-is-t...
- janan11 10y agoThey are returned to the wallet they were sent from. It would then be up to the exchange to manually refund the ETH
- benmmurphy 10y agoI'm not expert on etherium code (just started looking at it now) but it looks like the DAO didn't look for similar issues with the latest security fix. https://github.com/slockit/DAO/commit/f01f3bd8df5e1e222dde625118b7e0f2bfe5b680 https://github.com/slockit/DAO/commit/f01f3bd8df5e1e222dde62... reward = rewardAccount.balance < reward ? rewardAccount.balance : reward; + paidOut[_account] += reward; if (!rewardAccount.payOut(_account, reward)) throw; - paidOut[_account] += reward; + return true; } but if you grep payOut then you see a similar broken pattern where it modifies the state after the call instead of before it. if(_toMembers) { if (!DAOrewardAccount.payOut(dao.rewardAccount(), reward)) throw; } else { if (!DAOrewardAccount.payOut(dao, reward)) throw; } DAOpaidOut[msg.sender] += reward; but apparently this is not how the DAO is being drained because there are no rewards at the moment. this is a good summary of the problem: https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security/ https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security... and should scare you about the security of smart contracts base on etherium. EDIT: mm.. maybe it is safe because the addresses dao/dao.rewardAccount() can't be controlled by attackers
- romanm 10y agoThat guy just stolen 3.4M ether from the DAO :/ https://live.ether.camp/account/304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490 https://live.ether.camp/account/304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c6...
- hathym 10y agobetter link: https://steemit.com/thedao/@xeroc/ongoing-attack-on-thedao---eth-draining-from-the-pot https://steemit.com/thedao/@xeroc/ongoing-attack-on-thedao--...
- pjc50 10y agoWell, that was kind of inevitable. Building a financial system out of pure code with no humans in the loop and no legal structure is building a self-distributing bug bounty piñata. It's decentralised, so there's nobody who can throw a breaker and shout "stop!"; cryptocurrency transactions are irreversible, so thefts are permanent; and it's somewhat anonymous, so thefts are hard to trace. It also demonstrates that being first-to-market trumps security. If the DAO had waited until a full formal verification system exists and had been applied, they wouldn't have been able to pick up the $160m of overenthusiastic money keen to rush headlong into the hands of hackers.
- drinchev 10y agoExactly what I was thinking. If they had some sort of fraud-related authorized structure, which was able to "reverse" the result of an obvious software bug, I would say that it should've been much more stable financial system.
- pjc50 10y agoExcept that would require human intervention. And the whole reason why people love cryptocurrencies is removing the "man in the loop", with administrative power to deny, reject, roll back, or deem illegal their transactions. It's like these people have never seen War Games. (It also attracts the kind of people who think that banks, financial institutions, VISA and Paypal are "very likely" to defraud them while something entirely new and unproven with no legal structure is somehow less likely to defraud them or lose their money. See also people who think that bitcoin might be more stable than the US dollar.)
- DennisP 10y agoThey sorta do have that. If most of the community agrees to run a software update that rolls back the theft, then it'll happen.
- kalleboo 10y agoI find it endlessly amusing that people are willing to bet their cold hard cash on "this code has no bugs". When widespread old and tested code like OpenSSL has massive security bugs, what chance does something as new and in-development as Bitcoin/Ethereum have? An in the case of Ethereum, the contracts themselves?
- yoloswag1 10y agoAnyone know how to short ETH?
- ultramancool 10y agoBTC-e and Poloniex offer margin trading including short selling.
- yoloswag1 10y agoAnyone know how to short ETH?
- return0 10y agoIs this a weakness of ethereum or the DAO ? How much analog money was invested in total in the DAO ?
- nikolay 10y agoOf both, I guess. Or of cryptocurrencies in general.
- hkjgkjy 10y agoThis is massive. I observe with great interest how it will be handled - Ethereum is still young enough that doing a hard fork can be the sensible choice, and people can agree to do so (since such a large portion of ETH is now owned by baddies). It has been said before, but there ain't no drama like Blockchain drama. No TV show, no book, nothing has me following it's story as Bitcoin and the other blockchains that come after it. Greatest drama of the millennia, so far.
- homakov 10y agoIsn't it race condition?
- Animats 10y agoEtherium just had its busiest day of trading ever and is down 25%.
- gwbas1c 10y agoHahaha! Let me go refill my popcorn!
- 8ig8 10y agoCached version: http://archive.is/YkANN http://archive.is/YkANN
- 6d6b73 10y agoHm, I wonder why people are panicking over virtual money and acting like they've lost something tangible. It's like crying over Monopoly dollars. :)
- simondelacourt 10y agoIt does not matter if the money is virtual or not. It matters whether it is regarded as valuable. If a large group of people trust a certain currency to hold a certain value it becomes relevant to those people. They might invest other forms of money or energy in to that currency. If something happens with that money or currency people do panic, because something they have invested in is under attack. And even with Monopoly, during that game the virtual monopoly dollars hold value. Just during the timespan of the game. They give you certain privileges during that game.
- bbcbasic 10y agoAll money is virtual.
- themusicgod1 10y agoWhen you pay rent with virtual money suddenly it starts getting more serious.
- ProfChronos 10y agoWhy do everyone mixes a decentralized system with a self-controlled system? Decentralization doesn't mean there is no power to regulate or no coordination between users/agents, it is just a model of architecture for a system where power belongs to local entities. That absolutely doesn't mean that there aren't rules and bodies to defend them [1]. [1] https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2015/uploads/proposal_background_paper/SSRN-id2580664.pdf https://www.intgovforum.org/cms/wks2015/uploads/proposal_bac...
- tankenmate 10y agoUse this link because the ethereum blog is suffering. http://pastebin.com/xW16N7Ye http://pastebin.com/xW16N7Ye
- bArray 10y agoThanks! I don't understand why the site should be suffering so much? All these sites seem to suffer when a link gets posted in a few places. Do they all have something in common?
- RubyPinch 10y agoexcessively large userbase compared to the amount of people who vote/comment is what I figure + I'd imagine quite a lot of people were expecting this blogpost, probably anyone who put more than $50 towards the DAO, and is currently awake
- ZenoArrow 10y agoWhilst it's bad that people's money is being stolen, this could end up being a good thing for cryptocurrencies. Investors burned by this will certainly be demanding more robust security around cryptocurrencies in the future.
- bpierre 10y agoArticle content: Posted by Vitalik Buterin on June 17th, 2016. An attack has been found and exploited in the DAO, and the attacker is currently in the process of draining the ether contained in the DAO into a child DAO. The attack is a recursive calling vulnerability, where an attacker called the “split” function, and then calls the split function recursively inside of the split, thereby collecting ether many times over in a single transaction. The leaked ether is in a child DAO at https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490; https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c... even if no action is taken, the attacker will not be able to withdraw any ether at least for another ~27 days (the creation window for the child DAO). This is an issue that affects the DAO specifically; Ethereum itself is perfectly safe. The development community is proposing a soft fork, (with NO ROLLBACK; no transactions or blocks will be “reversed”) which will make any transactions that make any calls/callcodes/delegatecalls that execute code with code hash 0x7278d050619a624f84f51987149ddb439cdaadfba5966f7cfaea7ad44340a4ba (ie. the DAO and children) lead to the transaction (not just the call, the transaction) being invalid, starting from block 1760000 (precise block number subject to change up until the point the code is released), preventing the ether from being withdrawn by the attacker past the 27-day window. This will later be followed up by a hard fork which will give token holders the ability to recover their ether. Miners and mining pools should resume allowing transactions as normal, wait for the soft fork code and stand ready to download and run it if they agree with this path forward for the Ethereum ecosystem. DAO token holders and ethereum users should sit tight and remain calm. Exchanges should feel safe in resuming trading ETH. Contract authors should take care to (1) be very careful about recursive call bugs, and listen to advice from the Ethereum contract programming community that will likely be forthcoming in the next week on mitigating such bugs, and (2) avoid creating contracts that contain more than ~$10m worth of value, with the exception of sub-token contracts and other systems whose value is itself defined by social consensus outside of the Ethereum platform, and which can be easily “hard forked” via community consensus if a bug emerges (eg. MKR), at least until the community gains more experience with bug mitigation and/or better tools are developed. Developers, cryptographers and computer scientists should note that any high-level tools (including IDEs, formal verification, debuggers, symbolic execution) that make it easy to write safe smart contracts on Ethereum are prime candidates for DevGrants, Blockchain Labs grants and String’s autonomous finance grants.
- vegabook 10y agoanyway Ethereum feels like a cult. There's something weirdly disturbing for me about the ethos of blockchain technology, and how it jarrs with "The DAO" (note the capitalised definite article. There Is Only One. Hardly distributed or democratic). Also look at how a bunch of ethereum shills pack its "Curator", for which, by the way, The DAO is "incredibly privileged"[1]. What? Your own organization is incredibly privileged that you appointed yourself to it? Even the name "ethereum" is pretentious and showy, again anti-distributed ethos. I don't get a strong comfort level that this organization is any better than the current central banks. [1] https://daohub.org/curator.html https://daohub.org/curator.html
- Animats 10y agoIt's arguable whether Etherium is a cult. The DAO is definitely a cult, with a cult leader.
- zby 10y agoThe interesting question for now is - is that illegal what that unknown party does? If The DAO code is the contract - then using the code in this way would be like using some fine print clauses in a contract.
- espadrine 10y agoAn official statement was issued by Ethereum: https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/ https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-... Since it is under load, here is a copy: An attack has been found and exploited in the DAO, and the attacker is currently in the process of draining the ether contained in the DAO into a child DAO. The attack is a recursive calling vulnerability, where an attacker called the “split” function, and then calls the split function recursively inside of the split, thereby collecting ether many times over in a single transaction. The leaked ether is in a child DAO at https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490; https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c... even if no action is taken, the attacker will not be able to withdraw any ether at least for another ~27 days (the creation window for the child DAO). This is an issue that affects the DAO specifically; Ethereum itself is perfectly safe. The development community is proposing a soft fork, (with NO ROLLBACK; no transactions or blocks will be “reversed”) which will make any transactions that make any calls/callcodes/delegatecalls that execute code with code hash 0x7278d050619a624f84f51987149ddb439cdaadfba5966f7cfaea7ad44340a4ba (ie. the DAO and children) lead to the transaction (not just the call, the transaction) being invalid, starting from block 1760000 (precise block number subject to change up until the point the code is released), preventing the ether from being withdrawn by the attacker past the 27-day window. This will later be followed up by a hard fork which will give token holders the ability to recover their ether. Miners and mining pools should resume allowing transactions as normal, wait for the soft fork code and stand ready to download and run it if they agree with this path forward for the Ethereum ecosystem. DAO token holders and ethereum users should sit tight and remain calm. Exchanges should feel safe in resuming trading ETH. Contract authors should take care to (1) be very careful about recursive call bugs, and listen to advice from the Ethereum contract programming community that will likely be forthcoming in the next week on mitigating such bugs, and (2) avoid creating contracts that contain more than ~$10m worth of value, with the exception of sub-token contracts and other systems whose value is itself defined by social consensus outside of the Ethereum platform, and which can be easily “hard forked” via community consensus if a bug emerges (eg. MKR), at least until the community gains more experience with bug mitigation and/or better tools are developed. Developers, cryptographers and computer scientists should note that any high-level tools (including IDEs, formal verification, debuggers, symbolic execution) that make it easy to write safe smart contracts on Ethereum are prime candidates for DevGrants, Blockchain Labs grants and String’s autonomous finance grants. — Vitalik Buterin
- baldeagle 10y agoIt looks like it stopped at 6am central us. Maybe someone ran it as a scheduled job thinking they could be sneaky about it before becoming inattentive?
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- jbpetersen 10y agoResponse from the official Ethereum Foundation: https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/ https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-...
- marijn 10y agoThat yields, amusingly, a blank page for me right now.
- jbpetersen 10y agoCrosspost to reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oiqj7/critical_update_re_dao_vulnerability/ https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/4oiqj7/critical_u...
- reddytowns 10y agoUpdate, the coins stolen can't be spent for 27 days and Vitalik (one of the creators of ethereum) is proposing a fork to refund the ether. https://steemit.com/ethereum/@vladislav/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability-posted-by-vitalik-buterin-on-june-17th-2016 https://steemit.com/ethereum/@vladislav/critical-update-re-d...
- Udo 10y agoAs far as attacks go, this seems to fall more within the "for the lolz" category, than an actual attempt to draw money. If they had kept it reasonable, say a couple of hundred thousands worth, this would probably have gone unnoticed for a long time (maybe long enough for the 27 day payout window to expire).
- twoodfin 10y agoSerious questions: Is this a crime? Should it be?
- Tinyyy 10y ago> (The soft fork) will later be followed up by a hard fork which will give token holders the ability to recover their ether. Does this mean that transactions are going to be rolled back? If so, are they planning to do this everytime a vulnerability is exploited? Is The DAO too big to fail?
- jpereira 10y agoI don't think they're going to roll back transactions but rather build in the functionality to "give token holders the ability to recover their ether".
- justusw 10y agoYou're right, this can't happen every time. If users truly want to embrace the decentralization then I see issues with the Ethereum maintainers doing very centralized and specific fixes to solve individual problems. DAO != ETH, but I see how this is an act of self-preservation due to the amount of stakes the maintainers have themselves in ETH.
- johncolanduoni 10y agoRemember that when they say it's a suggestion, it's truly a suggestion. If a majority of the miners refuse to accept the update, then what anyone at the Ethereum foundation wants them to do is irrelevant. There is definitely a lot of social pressure to consider here, but there is still no central switch. I'm generally not a huge fan of cryptocurrency (as currencies that is, I love the tech), but I fail to understand why so many people who are oppose this move so rabidly. They're in the same situation with respect to forking that they were yesterday: whatever 51% of the community decides to do will happen.
- tomp 10y agoCongratulations! A month after the first real test of the "distributed", "safe" cryptocurrency featuring "enforcable" contracts, it turns out it's none of this.
- justusw 10y agoI share your bitterness. The meaning of the word "safe" seems to vary from person to person. The ETH and contract devs think safe means having a static PL to capture contracts. But in reality it is safe as in, whoever exploited the vulnerability now has a "safe" source of income in a few weeks. Perhaps it is a lesson better learnt now than later when the stakes are even higher.
- runn1ng 10y agoWell, she doesn't, they will block the attacker outright by a centralized decree. What's the better proof that decentralized solutions work than blacklisting accounts and making ad-hoc forks for each attack.
- techdragon 10y agoA system not vulnerable to such simple attacks?
- chillydawg 10y agoDepends how you define attack, really.
- imtringued 10y agoWhat if the attacker made their move before it could be blocked?
- abstractbeliefs 10y agoThe DAO code that the stolen ETH is held in doesn't allow spending for 27 days, by which time the Ethereum developers hope to have 51% of node power on the fork that blocks transactions involving this address.
- spdionis 10y agoCan someone eli5 what DAO and ethereum are?
- witty_username 10y agoThe DAO is basically an investment fund, i.e. people pool money to invest in companies and get shares.
- staticelf 10y agoI am thinking the same, this is all hieroglyphs for me.
- mbrock 10y agoEthereum is a P2P accounting system, like Bitcoin, but allowing users to upload automatic contracts that decide autonomously what to do with the tokens they possess. For example, you could upload a contract that lets some specific set of accounts withdraw money unless the balance goes under 500 ETH (which is the basic Ethereum currency). "The DAO" is such a contract but with more complex logic that amounts to a kind of venture fund. If you send money into it, you get to vote in proportion on proposals for "The DAO" to fund projects. That contract was hyped enormously as the future of financing etc and indeed received an enormous amount of ETH from people who hoped it would benefit the Ethereum ecosystem. In the first weeks after its recent launch, the contract logic was shown to have economic flaws that would most likely lead to bad fund performance, and it seemed as if the incentives for voting on proposals didn't work: no proposal ever made it past the threshold. And now it turns out that despite the assurance of security audits, the logic (written in Ethereum's contract language Solidity) had a serious bug that allowed an attacker to start draining all of the fund's assets.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- raisedbyninjas 10y agoCorrect me if I'm wrong, but the patch is not in the DAO contract. It's in the Ethereum platform. I don't know what the alternative would be to prevent the attacker from draining the DAO, but this patch seems incredibly hacky. Will this just be an ever-growing oopsie transaction blacklist in the code?
- sznurek 10y agoI have a (maybe naive) question: why is the person draining ETH from DAO called "attacker"? I seems to me that the idea behind smart contracts was to have unambiguous description of what are participants agreeing to. The "attacker" is doing precisely this - I had not heard of any bug in Ethereum implementation that is used, only "bug" in DAO's smart contract. So he is allowed to do this, by contract definition. Isn't the whole idea of that kind of contracts worthless if people are still rolling back effects of it when "it does not what it was meant to do"?
- PeterisP 10y agoWelcome to real life, where that's exactly how contracts, contract law and disputes over contracts work.
- cpa 10y agoObviously you're right, that's tautological! The "attacker" didn't do more than what the system allowed her to do. People have expectations about what the DAO is and isn't. I'd guess that very few people bothered to read the source code of the contract, let alone look for vulnerabilities. So you have a group of people who have agreed on an informal contract (we pool money, votes are weighted by the sum I've put…) but it turns out that the implementation is not correct w.r.t the informal specification. That's called a software bug and abusing a bug to your own profit makes you an attacker in my book, just as much that using a flash 0-day to drop a rootkit makes you an attacker. People should have been more careful, but hey, I'm not sure I would have.
- sznurek 10y agoThe 'Terms' section on DAO website states: The terms of The DAO Creation are set forth in the smart contract code existing on the Ethereum blockchain at 0xbb9bc244d798123fde783fcc1c72d3bb8c189413. Nothing in this explanation of terms or in any other document or communication may modify or add any additional obligations or guarantees beyond those set forth in The DAO’s code. Doesn't it state that, by definition, that DAO contract is bug-free, so it cannot be exploited? This is exactly what separates DAO case from flash-0-day-rootkit case.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
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- imaginenore 10y agoThey are proposing a soft fork for one specific case and one specific hash. It's a house of cards.
- zepolud 10y ago"They say 'there are no atheists in foxholes.' Perhaps, then, there are also no libertarians in crises." [1] [1] https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jfrankel/CatoRespCrisesJun07+fn15&2.pdf https://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/jfrankel/CatoRespCrisesJun07+...
- clarkmoody 10y agoMy knee-jerk reaction is to say the libertarians rarely have power during crises anyway, and democracy insures that those who "do nothing" lose their power in the face of interventionist opponents come election time. Not that they were libertarians, but the presidents during the 1920-21 Depression[1] acted slowly, and the economy bounced back incredibly quickly. From the article: However, by the time Harding had called his conference, the country's economy had already shown signs of rebound, and by 1922 was starting the economic boom of the 1920s[13] and merely allowed for President Harding to claim success. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depression_of_1920%E2%80%9321 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depression_of_1920%E2%80%9321
- dmix 10y ago(Not to take this post too serious, but I'll take the bait) I'd argue that the solution proposed by Ethereum in this blog post is not antithetical to mainstream Libertarianism. It actually fits perfectly well into the role the majority of libertarians believe a state should take. To begin with, from my understanding they merely proposed a solution which the community has to agree to implement. Just like modifying the bitcoin codebase. It's still ultimately an additional layer of decentralization in between. Taken as a whole - even if Ethereum takes action against the attacker - what DAO represents would still be very very far from the representative democracy style system that libertarians take issue with. Importantly, libertarians are not all anarchists (or 'crypto-anarchists' or 'anarcho-capitalists' to be more accurate) who believe in total decentralized control structures. Mainstream libertarians wish for a minimal state or "night-watchman" state, a not the total absence of a state. This the most prevalent myth about libertarianism and the faulty premise of most attacks against it. Even many hardcore anarcho-capitalists are against the idea of decentralized judicial and law enforcement systems - as they see it as unworkable. In the book "Anarchy, State, and Utopia" [1] popular libertarian thinker Robert Nozick argues that [..] only a minimal state "limited to the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on" could be justified without violating people's rights. Therefore supporting the solution Ethereum proposed does not make you less of a libertarian. But it does make you less of a crypto-anarchist. [1] https://www.amazon.com/Anarchy-State-Utopia-Robert-Nozick/dp/0465051006/ https://www.amazon.com/Anarchy-State-Utopia-Robert-Nozick/dp...
- themgt 10y agoReading their blog about "smart contract security" [1] is just mind-blowing. Like, I thought that was the core of the product, but somehow they've designed a language which makes it extremely difficult to not get your smart contract hacked? And now the solution to this situation is going to be better documentation and IDEs? Oy. [1] https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security/ https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security...
- jerf 10y agoMe from a month ago: "... having had a quick scan over the language documentation, it looks to me like a bog-standard imperative mutable language. One that is very young, and with few if any features designed for being used in a high-security environment. It appears to be based on raw event-based programming, a style of programming very easy to mess up and hard to declare and preserve invariants in. It looks like a very dangerous programming language to be trying to write financial contracts in. At least it's not dynamically typed, does seem to avoid excessive coercion, and should be memory safe; it could certainly be worse. But it could be better, too." https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11726734 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11726734 I don't know off the top of my head what I would design into my contract language, but Solidity has numerous things in it that I would not. I guess in their further defense, the way I'd want to design the contract language is what is right now some really cutting edge programming language theory. I'd be looking very hard at the Total Functional Programming languages [1]. "Total" here is not just an enhancing adjective, it defines a specific characteristic of the languages with regard to how they terminate. But it still would have legitimately been research to figure out how to correctly convert from a programming language to its cost-to-execute correctly enough to be in a financial application. I believe TFP research right now is mostly focused on how to write TFP code that practically accomplishes things without having to write some pretty mathematically-complicated circumlocutions, not modeling costs. I also would have looked at doing something with FRP, not because it's the hottest new thing necessarily, but because the ability to express every participant's obligation in a single block of code like a thread rather than an event-based setup would have made these contracts much easier to write and audit. The combination of these two things is probably an entirely untouched domain, or at least effectively so. Ethereum is a fascinating idea. It's not hard to imagine something architecturally like it being huge in 50 years. It's not hard to even imagine it as the basis of cstross' unspecified "Economy 2.0" in Accelerando. But it might just be 5 or 10 years too early to work now. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_functional_programming https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Total_functional_programming
- imglorp 10y agoThis is what concerns me about contract programming. With human contract law, if there's a minor typo or loophole, participants can generally see the spirit and intent, and at worst go to a judge who will usually enforce the intent. But with software contracts, only the characters matter and there's no intent anywhere: either you get paid or you don't. ETH is advising, "Contract authors should ... be very careful about recursive call bugs, and listen to advice from the Ethereum contract programming community," which indicates there's some subtle behaviors to be aware of and secure contracts are apparently not easy to write. Lest you think, "we'll just be careful, review and QA it", consider the bug[1] in the "Programming Pearls" binary search. Bentley was clearly an expert who had proven the algorithm correct and the algorithm had 20 years of careful study by thousands of professionals. Yet it had a simple overflow. How do _you_ know your contract is secure? 1. https://research.googleblog.com/2006/06/extra-extra-read-all-about-it-nearly.html https://research.googleblog.com/2006/06/extra-extra-read-all...
- 0x006A 10y ago> How do _you_ know your contract is secure? It most likely is not, looking at the recent post on contract security, most if not all examples ever posted as best practice are flawed and can be exploited: https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security/ https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security... (currently down, cached version https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security/ https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https:...)
- LoSboccacc 10y agothat's the gist of the problem Turing machine, meet halting problem.
- panic 10y agoThe halting problem is easy to solve for Ethereum programs by design. Programs are made of instructions, each instruction requires fuel to run, and fuel is limited, so every program must halt eventually.
- infodroid 10y agoThis is what happens when you are the first cryptocurrency with a Turing complete scripting language.
- _pdp_ 10y agoSince when programming languages are considered safe from logic flows?
- koolba 10y agoWhat else did people expect would happen if you give them an arsenal of loaded foot guns?
- Bromskloss 10y agoStill an outstandingly exciting adventure!
- imdsm 10y agoAnd now for a critical update regarding the DAO vulnerability... Error establishing a database connection
- KON_Air 10y agoThe ultimate answer to all attacks, pull the cord.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- Udo 10y agoAs an outsider, this is stunning to me: why isn't there a contract revokation mechanism? Considering these things are programmable, it could be something as simple as a killswitch hash sitting in a lawyer's safe somewhere, right?
- lmm 10y agoThe whole point of the exercise is to not have it under human control.
- Udo 10y agoIt seems that's a very expensive exercise with very predictable results. And "human control" is a very malleable concept, too. Obviously, there are humans in control of Ethereum somewhere, and obviously the DAO was set up by humans, too. For a decentralized commercial entity to have a lawyer on retainer doesn't seem like an inappropriate betrayal of principles to me, but of course the DAO people see it differently.
- datashaman 10y agoEthereum's byline is: Build unstoppable applications.
- vessenes 10y agoI wrote this attack up last week -- a solidity dev initially noticed this bug, but seemed to think it wasn't a big deal. http://vessenes.com/more-ethereum-attacks-race-to-empty-is-the-real-deal/ http://vessenes.com/more-ethereum-attacks-race-to-empty-is-t... The comments here are generally spot on; it's a combination of problems -- upgradability is designed to be hard because other people's money shouldn't be easy to steal, programmers are not used to making whole programs reentrant, existing documentation underplays risks, or alternately just tells people to do the wrong thing. A better language would help, better documentation would help, better standards about how to write the programs would also help. And, of course, more eyes are helpful. I'm an outsider to Ethereum, and got a very polite response, overall the community has been great. That said, there just aren't enough people looking at these contracts right now.
- jobigoud 10y ago> That said, there just aren't enough people looking at these contracts right now I hope this doesn't kill the project. Having programs that give you money when you find bugs in them could be a very powerful incentive to develop new tools to write correct code.
- vessenes 10y agoI've been thinking the same thing!
- CyberDildonics 10y agoWhile it is easy to cherry pick past comments and pretend it was insight instead of luck, I have to say my intuition was pretty quickly validated that so much money in something so untested and complicated was excessively risky: https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=CyberDildonics&next=11793189 https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=CyberDildonics&next=...
- runn1ng 10y agoI will just leave this there http://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm http://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm
- ikeboy 10y agoNot loading for me, see https://archive.is/YkANN https://archive.is/YkANN
- defenestration 10y agoSome numbers to get a grasp of the scale: > There is 2.436.828 Ethereum in the account of the attacker (see: https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490#txreceived https://etherchain.org/account/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c...) > That's about 3% of all Ethereum mined (source: http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/ http://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/ethereum/) > The Ethereum in the account of the attacker has a value of $41 million > The volume is about 30% of all Ethereum trade today
- imaginenore 10y agoIt's up to 3.64M ether now (valued at $60.3M). Here are the working links: https://live.ether.camp/account/304a554a310C7e546dfe434669C62820b7D83490 https://live.ether.camp/account/304a554a310C7e546dfe434669C6... https://etherscan.io/address/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62820b7d83490 https://etherscan.io/address/0x304a554a310c7e546dfe434669c62...
- wslh 10y agoAt the risk of being heavily downvoted, I think it is discussable if the hackers deserve their money or not when all the security and ethics are based on code since hacking is a pure part of it. Note that I said "discussable" and not right or wrong. A good thread is evolving about this here: https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/4oibqw/ding_dong_the_dao_is_dead/ https://www.reddit.com/r/btc/comments/4oibqw/ding_dong_the_d...
- sidthekid 10y agoI cant help but imagine the attacker party/their associates read reddit and online forums, and thus would be vocal in criticizing the soft/hard fork decision. The theft of $50m is being rendered useless in front of their eyes - a maddening situation I'm sure.
- drewm1980 10y agoIt looks to me like the "thief" has already won; it has turned into an ideological debate; I would be surprised if ~any proposal to fork reaches a majority.
- pure_ambition 10y agoAs a non-bitcoin person, I'm sitting here thinking someone's Database Access Object has a vulnerability.
- cplease 10y agoOh, nobody saw that coming. Completely unforeseeable. What other mature, ready-for-primetime autonomous altcoin networks can I dump my savings into for no apparent reason? Edit: "DAO token holders and ethereum users should sit tight and remain calm. Exchanges should feel safe in resuming trading ETH." No they shouldn't. They should running screaming for the exit doors. Less than two months after the launch of this mysterious "DAO" with an entirely bogus value proposition, 1/3 of the money put in, worth presently some $39 million USD in real money, has been confirmed stolen.
- developer2 10y agoWTF. There is the equivalent of millions of dollars in this blockchain? How?! Who willingly puts real cash up front for this kind of thing? Just... what?!
- woah 10y agoPublic blockchains have been around since 2008 (Bitcoin). If you don't like it, I'm not going to try to change your mind. But this kind of shocked response from people who have seemingly been living under a rock is really almost a kind of spam in these threads.
- cplease 10y agoYeah, I know, right? I don't trust actual, qualified fund analysts to pick real investments for me, I stick largely to index funds. Yet a bunch of cryptoweenies have decided to pool their money in cryptoweenie form in some kind of insane, fragile investment club, so a bunch of cryptoweenies stupid enough to think this is a good idea can collectively vote on what to do with each others money by simple majority vote, without restriction? No. Just no. Right now the proponent of this fraudulent scheme, slock.it, is actually urging people to spam the blockchain to slow down the rate of theft. Yet the true believers are claiming this is a "learning experience" that will make it all better in the long run. It's beyond satire.
- mrep 10y agoTwo words: Ignorance and greed.
- deleted 10y ago[deleted]
- kerkeslager 10y agoIt seems to me that the DAO is a large enough player in the Ethereum community that this plan is likely to succeed. If it does, it will be the first example I know of where a 51% attack was successfully executed against a popular blockchain. Whether or not this is a desirable thing depends on your goals. From the perspective of the Ethereum community, which is heavily invested in the DAO, it makes a lot of sense. Even if this vulnerability causes you to write off the DAO as a failed experiment, it makes sense to recover some of your lost value before you exit. However, for my goals, this causes me to write off Ethereum as a cryptocurrency I will never, ever use. It's breaking the fundamental benefits of the cryptocurrency to fix the problems of one group. And further, if this is possible for Ethereum, it makes me think that a 51% attack is more plausible for other cryptocurrencies. This worries me. I'd like to see more research put into defending against 51% attacks.
- abrkn 10y ago> On August 15 2010, it was discovered that block 74638 contained a transaction that created over 184 billion bitcoins for two different addresses. This was possible because the code used for checking transactions before including them in a block didn't account for the case of outputs so large that they overflowed when summed. A new version was published within a few hours of the discovery. The block chain had to be forked. Although many unpatched nodes continued to build on the "bad" block chain, the "good" block chain overtook it at a block height of 74691. The bad transaction no longer exists for people using the longest chain. https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposures https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Common_Vulnerabilities_and_Exposu...
- kerkeslager 10y agoWhile this does demonstrate a 51% attack, I think there's a key difference here. With the 2010 Bitcoin fork, the problem was a bug in the core infrastructure which was broken. The 51% attack broke the core infrastructure, but that core infrastructure was already broken. In that case it was a matter of choosing which way the core infrastructure breaks. In the current Ethereum situation, the core Ethereum infrastructure isn't broken. The problem is with the contracts in the DAO. So creating an intentional fork is breaking the core infrastructure--which isn't broken--to fix the problem of a single majority stakeholder. I don't mean to indicate the Bitcoin fork wasn't a problem--the fact that bugs can break core infrastructure also concerns me. But it's a very different problem from the one the DAO is creating here.
- __jal 10y agoOne thing I'll say for Ethereal - the problems they have read like the flavor text from a Vernor Vinge novel.
- Animats 10y agoTime to reread "Mirrorshades". The street finds its own uses for everything.
- barisser 10y agoWhat concerns me is that they want to do a soft-fork to handle just this case. One shouldn't fiddle with the protocol every time something like this happens.
- eblanshey 10y agoMany people here stating that its purpose is tainted if they can just undo what the attacker did. After all, why not just have a centralized authority after all? I haven't researched this deeply, admittedly, but I think the idea is that they're using consensus from the community in order to undo what the attacker did. In other words, if the community didn't support it, it wouldn't be possible to do at all. Contrast this with a centralized authority that didn't need community involvement at all.
- tdb7893 10y agoThis works for the obvious thefts and high profile contracts but what about smaller contracts and more gray areas? Will the miners know about or care enough to actually efficiently resolve disputes fairly? Will there be a fork for the person who lost 500$ because of a bug in his contract? I’m worried that miners policing everything won’t be sustainable and in the end code will be the final arbiter on Etherium and as we all know writing code without bugs is an unrealistic expectation to place on people.
- yonilevy 10y agoJust an idea - why not contact the attacker (via a public message), and offer him or her a deal - they get to keep say 1% of the stolen amount, given that they upload a smart contract that guarantees the money is sent from the stolen account to a "trusted" address (from where it will go to DAO 2.0). That way everyone wins, hacker gets paid a fair amount for finding the security hole, no messy forks.
- mrep 10y agoGive back tens of millions of dollars for what? Karma?
- jeanduluoz 10y agoLooks like security agencies are placing extra guards at important national security sites like the statue of liberty, NSA, and Best Buy: http://i.imgur.com/5c9H6DO.gif http://i.imgur.com/5c9H6DO.gif
- dang 10y agoPlease don't do this here. We detached this comment from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11922131 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11922131 and marked it off-topic.
- dreamdu5t 10y agoThe hacker should sue them for violating the contract by trying to fork and block him!
- nickpsecurity 10y agoThis is an example of why I created my mantra for high-assurance security: "tried and true beats novel and new." Another is to wait at least 10 years for specific tech and techniques to prove themselves out before betting lives or entire businesses on them (startups an exception). The blockchain and DAO models are very new. They introduce new mathematical constructs, complex code, security issues we haven't thought about, coordination among many for such issues, and so no. Ethereum even includes an interpreter or something, which has its own set of risks. So, I refused to bet on such models given enormous risk means stuff is going to happen to them that isn't going to happen to regular, financial processing. We also have mitigations for most of its risks. Today is a good example. This is the kind of thing you're not going to see the Federal Reserve, VISA/Mastercard, most banks, or even large eCommerce sites announce. It probably won't be the last announcement of an unusual issue. So, anyone wanting stable currency + commerce should avoid stuff like Ethereum unless they're just investing small amounts to help them experiment & improve. Risk/reward doesn't make sense on such immature tech.
- specialist 10y ago"The "hacker" simply used the DAO as it was meant to be used ... and deserves the funds." Exactly. DAO is CoreWar meets Nomic. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Core_War https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomic https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nomic Designers of rulesets (laws, board games, markets, control systems) ignoring Gödel's incompleteness theorems should themselves be ignored. Just like we ignore inventors of perpetual motion machines who ignore the laws of thermodynamics. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel%27s_incompleteness_theorems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel%27s_incompleteness_theor...
- robryk 10y agoHow is the incompleteness theorem relevant?
- rspeer 10y agoNot sure where you're saying Gödel's incompleteness theorems come in, but I agree that DAO is a game of Nomic. Now... the ability to hard-fork is kind of in the rules as well. So it's a Nomic with a complicated endgame. Some guy just won the Nomic, but now he's finding that not only do you want to win, you want to win subtly, or else a majority can vote to undo your win. But anyone who still thinks DAO is an investment vehicle is missing the fact that it's a high-stakes game, and cleverer people than them are going to win it.
- rsync 10y ago"Not sure where you're saying Gödel's incompleteness theorems come in, but I agree that DAO is a game of Nomic." I know what he means - he's suggesting that you can't ever get a bulletproof or watertight set of rules or guidelines for a system because ... blah blah ... Gödel's incompleteness theorem. This is a very tempting idea and I myself have given it a lot of thought over the years. The problem is, Gödel's incompleteness theorem applies to a system that contains the complexity of the set of all real numbers. But there are plenty of systems that do not have that much complexity and there are plenty of rulesets we could create and implement that would also not have anywhere near that amount of complexity. So the analogy sort of falls apart there. It's still worth thinking about, though - the more complex your system of rules/laws/regulations/etc. becomes, the closer you are to a system that is mathematically guaranteed not to be airtight. Good luck explaining that to lawmakers. EDIT: YES, CORRECT, SORRY - I did mean to say the set of natural numbers, not the set of real numbers. Mea culpa.
- peterbonney 10y agoInteresting side point to this: some people wondered why DAO units immediately traded at a discount and many thought it presented an "arbitrage" opportunity, but this hack illustrates why it was always rational that the DAO should trade at less than the redemption value. The value of DAO units is capped on the upside, but not on the downside, and this hack is one way (of many) that downside risk could manifest itself.
- vijayboyapati 10y agoBecause smart contracts are (often) contractual obligations on real world things, they only hold as much power as the apparatus of coercion (usually the State) will allow them to hold. That is, you must trust the political authority first and foremost before you trust the contract. This is very different to bitcoin, which operates purely in the digital realm, where you can trust the ownership of the btc without requiring trust of the political authority. So bitcoin solves a trust problem and this makes the less efficient distributed architecture worthwhile (it would be much cheaper and far faster to operate a digital currency in a centralized way). But if you have to trust the political authority for digital contracts on physical goods, what is the point of the extra cost? I'm dubious there is any real benefit.
- artursapek 10y agoThe price of DAO has tanked: https://cryptowat.ch/kraken/daobtc/1h https://cryptowat.ch/kraken/daobtc/1h
- newobj 10y ago"Put a fork in it"
- newobj 10y agoI don't really understand smart contracts yet, but wouldn't it have been possible to implement the DAO in a way such that forks/cancellations could be "voted" on by the network somehow, versus requiring whatever this is going to require? Code fork? It least the fork would have been "decentralized" then... this does not bode well at all.
- Taek 10y agoThere's a pretty significant lesson here, and it's not that the DAO authors were careless. They were, and so were all of the investors, but the core problem is not the DAO. It's Solidity. It's the Ethereum virtual machine. Even today, security vulnerabilities are being found in code strategies that are generally considered 'best practice'. Writing a safe smart contract on Ethereum is extremely difficult, and most people playing with Ethereum don't seem to realize this. There's a pretty well understood maxim, "don't roll your own crypto." Etherem's smart contracts ARE cryptography, and their safety depends on implementation details that are completely hid from users during tutorials, and that even the language designers are only still discovering. This article does a good job of demonstrating that safety is really hard: https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security/ https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/10/smart-contract-security... And it's one of the major reasons that the Bitcoin devs have not been excited about Ethereum. It's a project whose ambitions have outpaced our ability to engineer safely. One day we can have safe smart contracts. But the Ethereum of today is not well designed, and is not a good foundation for smart contracts. A simple hardfork to fix this DAO mess isn't going to be enough. The whole virtual machine needs to be redesigned. And my money is quite seriously on Bitcoin figuring out the safe way to do smart contracts faster that anyone else. The vast majority of experienced experts in this space are still spending the majority of their time on Bitcoin. As popular as Ethereum has become, Bitcoin still owns the mindshare, and there are good reasons that Bitcoin has chosen not to pursue smart contracts at this time.
- lotsoflumens 10y agoNice summary! I think Ethereum is finished now. The trust in it will disappear, or the money invested in it will disappear. Either way, the value goes to zero. I was just getting interested in it. I'm feeling both sad and relieved. Sad that it didn't succeed, relieved that I didn't sink any time or money into it.
- al_chemist 10y ago> Writing a safe smart contract on Ethereum is extremely difficult Writing may be difficult. It's reading that should be easy. Unless you can read the contract, you can't put your money there and an example of Etherum contract looks like this: ADD SWAP1 RETURN JUMPDEST PUSH1 0x60 SWAP4 DUP5 MSTORE PUSH1 0x80 SWAP3 DUP4 MSTORE PUSH1 0xa0 SWAP2 SWAP1 (750 lines omitted)
- amluto 10y agoWow, theDAO has a shockingly cavalier attitude to security (https://github.com/slockit/DAO/wiki/The-DAO-v1.0-Code https://github.com/slockit/DAO/wiki/The-DAO-v1.0-Code): > At the time of deployment, it was discovered that the solidity compiler is not deterministic. AST nodes are identified by their raw pointers. So if we iterate over data structures, different raw pointers might result in a different iteration order. > We originally wanted to let the community deploy The DAO and then just check the bytecode, but this was not possible at the moment of deployment. So instead a fixed transaction bytecode was provided for the community to deploy. Shouldn't they have waited to deploy until they figured out how to make it verifiable?
- Taek 10y ago"Move fast and break things." In all seriousness though, when it comes to cryptography, cryptocurrency, and smart contracts, people are playing with fire, and they don't realize it. You can't fix a smart contract the same way you can fix a website. The fact that it's function is not good enough to push it out to the public. Most software projects don't have that problem. Most software projects, it is okay to push buggy beta code out to the public. Because most software projects don't steward large amounts of money in an irreversible payment system.
- dolguldur 10y agoPoor Ethereum now gets the bad press for TheDAO's hasty mistakes.
- stevebmark 10y agoAm I misreading this? The suggested solution is hard code an account hash into the source of Ethereum? If that's the case, how can that be taken seriously? It sounds like Ethereum should just start over entirely. The experiment part I failed.
- fovc 10y agoIf the attacker is just moving funds into a child DAO, could someone else attack the attacker? A digital Robin Hood?
- dnautics 10y agoI currently don't own any etherium. I'd like to point out that those who are saying that this mean there's a "too big to fail" concept within etherium are missing the key point that when the US (and other places) did too big to fail bailouts it was a concerted effort between unelected central bankers and government officials who are percieved to not necessarily have the best interests of the people in mind. At least if etherium makes a decision that the DAO is too big to fail, it will have done so via consensus, and parties that don't like it can take their assets and leave.
- xorcist 10y agoThe DAO is written by consultants specializing in Ethereum contracts. They have core developers on their team. They are good, but one mistake is all it takes. (And their business idea to sell a "DAO framework" is probably going to be hard after this.) The bug that was exploited here has been public for a week before someone decided to try it in practice. There was time to dispense back everyone's ether, had they taken it seriously. But taking security seriously requires an almost superhuman distance to your work. The Ethereum developers is actively debating whether to put in logic to replay the blockchain in order to give back everyone's ether. While that's probably a good idea, it also means the company behind Ethereum can reverse any contract. That puts them in a difficult situation, as any smart contract platform will have dissatisfied parties at all times. (In comparison, none of the Bitcoin thefts have been reversed, and it's not clear they could have been as development is much less tightly knit.) It's the most exciting thing since the fall of MtGox. The money at stake is comparable (the DAO is about a fourth of what MtGox was in perceived value).
- Animats 10y agoWell, their language is disappointing. They allow programs to ignore function return values, a misfeature inherited from C which has no place in a contracts language. Then there's the possibility of forcing early program termination via stack overflows.[1] Having to protect against that inside each program is just silly. The contract engine should have been designed so that if a contract program crashes, anything it did is rolled back. [1] http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/16/scanning-live-ethereum-contracts-for-bugs/ http://hackingdistributed.com/2016/06/16/scanning-live-ether...
- melvinmt 10y agoThe price of ETH just went from $20.45 to $14.01 in the last 24 hours... I just got out in time and am gonna wait this out a little bit :) https://www.gdax.com/trade/ETH-USD https://www.gdax.com/trade/ETH-USD
- powera 10y agoI always thought nobody had any actual plans as to how the DAO could do anything useful. Now I guess we know it won't. Either "hackers" will bankrupt it, or all the decentralization zealots will back out (and bankrupt it).
- Bombthecat 10y agoI mostly invested only in bitcoin. I knew already that they will win at end anyway. I think I invested around 10% in dao / ether. More for fun then anything else. Seems like I was right.
- johnhenry 10y agoFor me, the interesting part is that the creators of Ethereum have decided that the owners of the address in question have committed a "crime" and to change the way the blockchain works in order to punish them specifically. Sure, users can "vote" by choosing whether or not to accept the fork in the code that does this, but because of the way it's set up, the community isn't going to take it that way. I'm afraid that this sets a precedent that would discourage development (what if we change the way the entire internet works every time someone hacks a website?) and also allow powerful entities within the system an unfair advantage (would we do this for everyone who used a contract of which they didn't understand the full implications? Or is this only in the case of the DAO because of it's high profile?).
- aws_ls 10y agoOh, I didn't know that you could make recursive calls on the DAO! Gosh, to me plain for loops (what people call Turing complete) itself looked a bit too much, from scaling point of view. I wrote my thoughts on the same 23 days back, when there was an article on CoinBase praising Ethereum in comparison to Bitcoin[1]. I have no axe to grind against Eth vis-a-vis Bitcoin. Infact support both. But, try to look at parts of the former skeptically which I think are over sold, without being looked at critically. [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11772397 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11772397 edit: minor rephrase
- cia48621793 10y agoWill Bitcoin/Litecoin/*.?coin ever met the same problem?
- kovek 10y agoI do not understand Ethereum well, but it seems like bigger contracts (with 10$ million worth of value) could be built on top of smaller ones which have been proven (with time) to be correct and not contain mistakes. We all know that smaller pieces of code can be more easily reviewed and understand. I think that this applies for simpler contracts with smaller value. If a contract has been running for a while without being exploited, then it means that it is pretty solid, and others can build on top of that contract. It is an interesting dynamic, because there is an incentive to exploit bad contracts, and the contracts that have ran a long amount of time and and that have not been exploited yet are thus trusted to be unexploitable (because no-one exploited them) If that is how it works, it means that Ethereum will eventually because a fail-proof system. However, one should not mistakenly create contracts from the ground up or using untrusted sub-contracts. The ones who do so will see their contract exploited and everyone will learn from that mistake. Edit: Seems like Vitalik Buterin asking people to get that patch if they agree for the Ethereum ecosystem to move in that direction is just creating opportunity for fragmentation in the community. It would make more sense to let that "exploit" become a lesson instead of trying to work around this non-issue.
- akulbe 10y agoPlease forgive my ignorance here, but what _is_ "The DAO"? The link to Ethereum doesn't help much. What is a "smart contract"?
- akulbe 10y agoThat was a legitimate question. Why the downvote?