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I’m an open source maintainer, so I empathize with the sentiment that large companies appear to produce labor for unpaid maintainers by disclosing security issu
by woodruffw 1y ago
I’m an open source maintainer, so I empathize with the sentiment that large companies appear to produce labor for unpaid maintainers by disclosing security issues. But appearance is operative: a security issue is something that I (as the maintainer) would need to fix regardless of who reports it, or would otherwise need to accept the reputational hit that comes with not triaging security reports. That’s sometimes perfectly fine (it’s okay for projects to decide that security isn’t a priority!), but you can’t have it both ways.
- Msurrow 1y agoMy takeaway from the article was not that the report was a problem, but a change in approach from Google that they’d disclose publicly after X days, regardless of if the project had a chance to fix it. To me its okay to “demand” from a for profit company (eg google) to fix an issue fast. Because they have ressources. But to “demand” that an oss project fix something with a certain (possibly tight) timeframe.. well I’m sure you better than me, that that’s not who volunteering works
- vadansky 1y agoOn the other hand as an ffmpeg user do you care? Are you okay not being told a tool you're using has a vulnerability in it because the devs don't have time to fix it? I mean someone could already be using the vulnerability regardless of what Google does.
- wpm 1y agoThey could be, and the chances of that increase immensely once Google publishes it.
- cogman10 1y agoSure but how. Let's say that FFMPEG has a 10 CVE where a very easy stream can cause it to RCE. So what? We are talking about software commonly for end users deployed to encode their own media. Something that rarely comes in untrusted forms. For an exploit to happen, you need to have a situation where an attacker gets out a exploited media file which people commonly transcode via FFMPEG. Not an easy task. This sure does matter to the likes of google assuming they are using ffmpeg for their backend processing. It doesn't matter at all for just about anyone else. You might as well tell me that `tar` has a CVE. That's great, but I don't generally go around tarring or untarring files I don't trust.
- omnicognate 1y agoAIUI, (lib)ffmpeg is used by practically everything that does anything with video, including such definitely-security-sensitive things as Chrome, which people use to play untrusted content all the time.
- cogman10 1y agohmm, didn't realize chrome was using ffmpeg in the background. That definitely makes it more dangerous than I supposed. Looks like firefox does the same.
- conradev 1y agoFirefox has moved some parsers to Rust: https://github.com/mozilla/mp4parse-rust https://github.com/mozilla/mp4parse-rust
- rebelwebmaster 1y agoFirefox also does a lot of media decoding in a separate process.
- xxs 1y agoPretty much anything that has any video uses the library (incl. youtube)
- godshatter 1y agoThen maybe the Google chrome devs should submit a PR to ffmpeg.
- omnicognate 1y agoSure. And fund them.
- walletdrainer 1y agoChrome devs frequently do just that, Chrome just doesn’t enable this codec.
- afiori 1y agoThis is a fantastic argument for the universe where Google does not disclose vulnerability until the maintainers had had reasonable time to fix it. In this world the user is left vulnerable because attackers can use published vulnerabilities that the maintainers are to overwhelmed to fix
- esrauch 1y agoThis program discloses security issues to the projects and only discloses them after they have had a "reasonable" chance to fix it though, and projects can request extensions before disclosure if projects plan to fix it but need more time. Google runs this security program even on libraries they do not use at all, where it's not a demand, it's just whitehat security auditing. I don't see the meaningful difference between Google doing it and some guy with a blog doing it here.
- XorNot 1y agoGoogle is a multi-billion dollar company, which is paying people to find these bugs in the first place. That's a pretty core difference.
- thevillagechief 1y agoCorporate Social Responsibility? The assumption is that the work is good for end users. I don't know if that's the case for the maintainers though.
- tpmoney 1y agoGreat, so Google is actively spending money on making open source projects better and more secure. And for some reason everyone is now mad at them for it because they didn't also spend additional money making patches themselves. We can absolutely wish and ask that they spend some money and resources on making those patches, but this whole thing feels like the message most corporations are going to take is "don't do anything to contribute to open source projects at all, because if you don't do it just right, they're going to drag you through the mud for it" rather than "submit more patches"
- AlienRobot 1y agoIf you use a trillion dollar AI to probe open source code in ways that no hacker could, you're kind of unearthing the vulnerabilities yourself if you disclose them.
- walletdrainer 1y agoThis particular bug would be easy to find without any fancy expensive tools.
- nemothekid 1y ago>Are you okay not being told a tool you're using has a vulnerability in it because the devs don't have time to fix it? Yes? It's in the license >NO WARRANTY >15. BECAUSE THE LIBRARY IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE LIBRARY, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE LIBRARY "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. If I really care, I can submit a patch or pay someone to. The ffmpeg devs don't owe me anything.
- inkysigma 1y agoNot being told the existence of bugs is different from having a warranty on software. How would you submit a patch on a bug you were not aware of? Google should provide a fix but it's been standard to disclose a bug after a fixed time because the lack of disclosure doesn't remove the existence of the bug. This might have to be rethought in the context of OSS bugs but an MIT license shouldn't mean other people can't disclose bugs in my project.
- dotancohen 1y agoGoogle publicly disclosing the bug doesn't only let affected users know. It also lets attackers know how they can exploit the software. Holding public disclosure over the heads of maintainers if they don't act fast enough is damaging not only to the project, but to end users themselves also. There was no pressing need to publicly disclose this 25 year old bug.
- tpmoney 1y agoHow is having a disclosure policy so that you balance the tradeoffs between informing people and leaving a bug unreported "holding" anything over the heads of the maintainers? They could just file public bug reports from the beginning. There's no requirement that they file non-public reports first, and certainly not everyone who does file a bug report is going to do so privately. If this is such a minuscule bug, then whether it's public or not doesn't matter. And if it's not a minuscule bug, then certainly giving some private period, but then also making a public disclosure is the only responsible thing to do.
- necovek 1y agoAs clearly stated, most users of ffmpeg are unaware of them using it. Even them knowing about a vulnerability in ffmpeg, they wouldn't know they are affected. Really, the burden is on those shipping products that depend on ffmpeg: they are the ones who have to fix the security issues for their customers. If Google is one of those companies, they should provide the fix in the given time.
- tpmoney 1y agoBut how are those companies supposed to know they need to do anything unless someone finds and publicly reports the issue in the first place? Surely we're not advocating for a world where every vendor downstream of the ffmpeg project independently discovers and patches security vulnerabilities without ever reporting the issues upstream right?
- necovek 1y agoIf they both funded vulnerability scanning and vulnerability fixing (if they don't want to do it in-house, they can sponsor the upstream team), which is to me the obvious "how", I am not sure why you believe there is only one way to do it. It's about accountability! Who really gets to do it once those who ship it to customers care, is on them to figure out (though note that maintainers will have some burden to review, integrate and maintain the change anyway).
- tpmoney 1y agoThey regularly submit code and they buy consulting from the ffmpeg maintainers according to the maintainer's own website. It seems to me like they're already funding fixes in ffmpeg, and really everyone is just mad that this particular issue didn't come with a fix. Which is honestly not a great look for convincing corporations to invest resources into contributing to upstream. If regular patches and buying dev time from the maintainers isn't enough to avoid getting grief for "not contributing" then why bother spending that time and money in the first place?
- dylan604 1y agoIn my case, yes, but my pipeline is closed. Processes run on isolated instances that are terminated without haste as soon as workflow ends. Even if uncaught fatal errors occur, janitor scripts run to ensure instances are terminated on a fast schedule. This isn't something running on my personal device with random content that was provided by unknown someone on the interwebs. So while this might be a high security risk because it possibly could allow RCE, the real-world risk is very low.
- EasyMark 1y agoI have about 100x as much sympathy for an open source project getting time to fix a security bug than I do a multibillion dollar company with nearly infinite resources essentially blackmailing a small team of developers like this. They could -easily- pay a dev to fix the bug and send the fix to ffmpeg.
- tpmoney 1y agoSince when are bug reports blackmail? If some retro game enthusiast discovered this bug and made a blog post about it that went to the front page of HN, is that blackmail? If someone running a fuzzer found this bug and dumped a public bug report into github is that blackmail? What if google made this report privately, but didn't say anything about when they would make it public and then just went public at some arbitrary time in the future? How is "heads up, here's a bug we found, here's the reproduction steps for it, we'll file a public bug report on it soon" blackmail?
- naasking 1y ago> On the other hand as an ffmpeg user do you care? Are you okay not being told a tool you're using has a vulnerability in it because the devs don't have time to fix it? Yes, because publicly disclosing the vulnerability means someone will have enough information to exploit it. Without public disclosure, the chance of that is much lower.
- xign 1y agoPublic disclosures also means users will know about it and distros can turn off said codec downstream. It's not that hard lol. Information is always better. You may also get third-party contributors who will then be motivated to fix the issue. If no one signs up to do so, maybe this codec should just be permanently shelved. Note that ffmpeg doesn't want to remove the codec because their goal is to play every format known to man, but that's their goal. No one forces them to keep all codecs working.
- Lerc 1y agoThat is standard practice. It is considered irresponsible to not publicly disclose any vulnerability. The X days is a concession to the developers that the public disclosure will be delayed to give them an opportunity to address the issue.
- SpicyLemonZest 1y agoThe entire conflict here is that norms about what's considered responsible were developed in a different context, where vulnerability reports were generated at a much lower rate and dedicated CVE-searching teams were much less common. FFmpeg says this was "AI generated bug reports on an obscure 1990s hobby codec"; if that's accurate (I have no reason to doubt it, just no time to go check), I tend to agree that it doesn't make sense to apply the standards that were developed for vulnerabilities like "malicious PNG file crashes the computer when loaded".
- adastra22 1y agoIt is accurate. This is a codec that was added for archival and digital preservation purposes. It’s like adding a Unicode block for some obscure 4000 year old dead language that we have a scant half dozen examples of writing.
- Lerc 1y agoI think the discussion on what standard practice should be does need to be had. This seems to be throwing blame at people following the current standard. If the obscure coded is not included by default or cannot be triggered by any means other than being explicitly asked for, then it would be reasonable to tag it Won't Fix. If it can be triggered by other means, such as auto file type detection on a renamed file, then it doesn't matter how obscure the feature is, the exploit would affect all. What is the alternative to a time limited embargo. I don't particularly like the idea of groups of people having exploits that they have known about for ages that haven't been publicly disclosed. That is the kind of information that finds itself in the wrong hands. Of course companies should financially support the developers of the software they depend upon. Many do this for OSS in the form of having a paid employee that works on the project. Specifically, FFMPEG seems to have a problem that much of their limitation of resources comes from them alienating contributors. This isn't isolated to just this bug report.
- jsnell 1y ago> My takeaway from the article was not that the report was a problem, but a change in approach from Google that they’d disclose publicly after X days, regardless of if the project had a chance to fix it. That is not an accurate description? Project Zero was using a 90 day disclosure policy from the start, so for over a decade. What changed[0] in 2025 is that they disclose earlier than 90 days that there is an issue, but not what the issue is. And actually, from [1] it does not look like that trial policy was applied to ffmpeg. > To me its okay to “demand” from a for profit company (eg google) to fix an issue fast. Because they have ressources. But to “demand” that an oss project fix something with a certain (possibly tight) timeframe.. well I’m sure you better than me, that that’s not who volunteering works You clearly know that no actual demands or even requests for a fix were made, hence the scare quotes. But given you know it, why call it a "demand"? [0] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2025/07/reporting-transparency.html https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2025/07/reporting-tra..., discussed at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44724287 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44724287 [1] https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/reporting-transparency.html https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/reporting-transpare...
- joemi 1y agoThe fact that details of the issue _will_ be disclosed publicly is an implicit threat. Sure it's not an explicit threat, but it's definitely an implicit threat. So the demand, too, is implicit: fix this before we disclose publicly, or else your vulnerability will be public knowledge.
- saagarjha 1y agoYou should not be threatened by the fact that your software has security holes in it being made public knowledge. If you are, then your goals are fundamentally misaligned with making secure software.
- joemi 1y agoI don't think that you understand the point of the delayed public disclosure. If it wasn't a threat, then there'd be no need to delay -- it would be publicly disclosed immediately.
- Too 1y agoNobody is demanding anything. Google is just disclosing issues. This opens up transparency of ffmpeg’s security posture, giving others the chance to fix it themselves, isolate where it’s run or build on entirely new foundations. All this assuming the reports are in fact pointing to true security issues. Not talking about AI-slop reports.
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- m463 1y agoif you've ever read about codependency, "need" is a relative term. codependency is when someone accepts too much responsibility, in particular responsibility for someone else or other things out of their control. the answer is to have a "healthy neutrality".
- AbrahamParangi 1y agoIf google bears no role in fixing the issues it finds and nobody else is being paid to do it either, it functionally is just providing free security vulnerability research for malicious actors because almost nobody can take over or switch off of ffmpeg.
- eddd-ddde 1y agoSo your claim is that buggy software is better than documented buggy software?
- rsanek 1y agoI think so, yes. Certainly it's more effort to both find and exploit a bug than to simply exploit an existing one someone else found for you.
- jakeydus 1y agoYeah it's more effort, but I'd argue that security through obscurity is a super naive approach. I'm not on Google's side here, but so much infrastructure is "secured" by gatekeeping knowledge.
- Brian_K_White 1y agoI don't think you should try to invoke the idea of naivete when you fail to address the unhappy but perfectly simple reality that the ideal option doesn't exist, is a fantasy that isn't actually available, and among the available options, even though none are good, one is worse than another. "obscurity isn't security" is true enough, as far as it goes, but is just not that far. And "put the bugs that won't be fixed soon on a billboard" is worse. The super naive approach is ignoring that and thinking that "fix the bugs" is a thing that exists.
- rcxdude 1y agoIf I know it's a bug and I use ffmpeg, I can avoid it by disabling the affected codec. That's pretty valuable.
- ryandrake 1y ago> But appearance is operative: a security issue is something that I (as the maintainer) would need to fix regardless of who reports it I think this is the heart of the issue and it boils off all of the unimportant details. If it's a real, serious issue, you want to know about it and you want to fix it. Regardless of who reports it. If it's a real, but unimportant issue, you probably at least want to track it, but aren't worried about disclosure. Regardless of who reports it. If it's invalid, or AI slop, you probably just want to close/ignore it. Regardless of who reports it. It seems entirely irrelevant who is reporting these issues. As a software project, ultimately you make the judgment call about what bugs you fix and what ones you don't.
- vacuity 1y agoBut if it's a real, serious issue without an easy resolution, who is the burden on? It's not that the maintainers wouldn't fix bugs if they easily could. FFmpeg is provided "as is"[0], so everyone should be responsible for their side of things. It's not like the maintainers dumped their software on every computer and forced people to use it. Google should be responsible for their own security. I'm not adamant that Google should share the patch with others, but it would hardly be an imposition to Google if they did. And yes, I really do intend that you could replace Google with any party, big or small, commercial or noncommercial. It's painful, but no one has any inherent obligations to provide others with software in most circumstances. [0] More or less. It seems the actual language is shied from. Is there a meaningful difference?
- ryandrake 1y agoWell, it's open source and built by volunteers, so nobody is obligated to fix it. If FFmpeg volunteers don't want to fix it or don't have the time/bandwidth to fix it, then they won't fix it. Like any other bug or CVE in any other open source project. The burden doesn't necessarily need to be on anyone.
- lenerdenator 1y agoThey aren't obligated to fix CVEs until they're exploited, and then, suddenly, they very much were obligated to fix the CVEs, and their image as FLOSS maintainers and as a project are very much tarnished.
- grayhatter 1y agoI feel this comment is far to shallow a take. I would expect that you know better than most of HN, exactly how much a reputation security has as a cost center. Google uses ffmpeg internally, how many millions would they have to spend if they were required to not only create, but maintain ffmpeg themselves? How significant would that cost be at Google's scale? I dont agree the following framing is accurate, but I can mention it because you've already said the important part (about how this issue exists, and mearly knowing about it doesn't create required work.) But here announcing it, and registering a CVE, Google is starting the clock. By some metrics, it was already running, but the reputational risk clearly was not. This does change priorities, and requires as urgent context switch. neither are free actions, especially not within FOSS. To me, being someone who believes everyone, individuals and groups, have a responsibility to contribute fairly. I would frame it as Google's behavior gives the appearance weaponizing their cost center externally, given this is something Google could easily fix, but instead they shirked that responsibility to unfunded volunteers.
- woodruffw 1y agoTo be clear, I think Google (Apple, Microsoft, etc.) can and should fund more of the OSS they depend on. But this doesn’t change the fact that vulnerability reports don’t create work per se, they just reveal work that the project can choose to act on or not.
- grayhatter 1y agoHopefully, until that changes, more people with influence will keep saying it, and always say it until it stops being true, and important. So thank you for saying the important thing too! :)
- Yokolos 1y agoI see you didn't read the article. The problem isn't Google reporting vulnerabilities. It's Google using AI to find obscure bugs that affect 2 people on the planet, then making a CVE out of it, without putting any effort into fixing it themselves or funding the project. What are the ffmpeg maintainers supposed to do about this? It's a complete waste of everybody's time. > The latest episode was sparked after a Google AI agent found an especially obscure bug in FFmpeg. How obscure? This “medium impact issue in ffmpeg,” which the FFmpeg developers did patch, is “an issue with decoding LucasArts Smush codec, specifically the first 10-20 frames of Rebel Assault 2, a game from 1995.”
- inkysigma 1y agoI don't think that's an accurate description of the full scope of the problem. The codec itself is mostly unused but the code path can possibly be triggered from file fuzzing that ffmpeg uses so a maliciously crafted payload (e.g. any run of ffmpeg that touches user input without disabling this codec) could possibly be exploited.
- saagarjha 1y agoClose the bug, if they don’t care. They don’t want to do that because then people will yell at them for not caring.
- Dylan16807 1y ago> that affect 2 people on the planet Wrong. The original files only affect 2 people. A malicious file could be anywhere. Do you remember when certain sequences of letters could crash iphones? The solution was not "only two people are likely to ever type that, minimum priority". Because people started spreading it on purpose.
- prmoustache 1y agoOTOH they could disclose security issues AND send patches to close them.
- xethos 1y agoFrom TFA: > The latest episode was sparked after a Google AI agent found an especially obscure bug in FFmpeg. How obscure? This “medium impact issue in ffmpeg,” which the FFmpeg developers did patch, is “an issue with decoding LucasArts Smush codec, specifically the first 10-20 frames of Rebel Assault 2, a game from 1995.” This doesn't feel like a medium-severity bug, and I think "Perhaps reconsider the severity" is a polite reading. I get that it's a bug either way, but this leaves me with a vague feeling of the ffmpeg maintainer's time being abused.
- bragr 1y agoIf it causes a crash, that's denial of service, so medium would be appropriate. But it's true that medium CVEs aren't that bad in most situations.
- javier2 1y agoIf you need this kind of security, build ffmpeg with only decoders you find acceptable
- walletdrainer 1y agoThis bug can most likely lead to RCE, proving that it can’t is generally a very difficult problem. There’s absolutely no reason to assume that it does not lead to RCE, and certainly no reason whatsoever to invest significant time to prove that one way or the other unless you make a living selling exploits.
- tpmoney 1y agoOn the other hand, if the bug doesn't get filed, it doesn't get fixed. Sure Google could spend some resources on fixing it themselves, but even if they did would we not likely see a complaint about google flooding the maintainers with PR requests for obscure 30 year old codec bugs? And isn't a PR even more of a demand on the maintainer's time because now there's actual code that needs to be reviewed, tests that need to be run and another person waiting for a response on the other end? "Given enough eyeballs, every bug is shallow" right? Well, Google just contributed some eyeballs, and now a bug has been made shallow. So what's the actual problem here? If some retro game enthusiast had filed the same but report would that be "abusing" the maintainer's time? I would think not, but then we're saying that a bug report can be "abusive" simply by the virtue of who submits it. And I'm really not sure "don't assign employees to research bugs in your open source dependencies and if you do certainly don't submit bug reports on what you find because that's abusive" is the message we want to be sending to corporations that are using these projects.
- WhyNotHugo 1y agoThe issue at hand is that Google has a policy of making the security issue public regardless of whether a fix has been produced. Typically disclosures happen after a fix exists.
- woodruffw 1y agoThis isn’t true at all in my experience: disclosures happen on a timeline (60 to 90 days is common), with extensions provided as a courtesy based on remediation complexity and other case-by-case considerations. I’ve been party to plenty of advisories that went public without a fix because the upstream wasn’t interested in providing one.
- Orygin 1y agoFor OSS projects or commercial ones? I feel it's not the same when one has trillion in market cap and the other has a few unpaid maintainers.
- woodruffw 1y agoThe norm is the same for both. Perhaps there’s an argument that it should be longer for OSS maintainers, but OSS maintainers also have different levers at their disposal: they can just say “no, I don’t care” because nobody’s paying them. A company can’t do that, at least not without a financial hit. To my original comment, the underlying problem here IMO is wanting to have it both ways: you can adhere to common notions of security for reputational reasons, or you can exercise your right as a maintainer to say “I don’t care,” but you can’t do both.
- raffael_de 1y agoSure, but this is about Google funding FFmpeg not providing bug fixes.
- samus 1y agoSo what is Google gonna do if security fixes don't happen in time and the project takes a "reputational hit"? Fork it and maintain it themselves? Why not send in patches instead? Maintaining a reputation might be enough reward for you, but not everyone is happy to work for free for a billion dollars corporation breathing down their necks. It's puzzling to me why people keep defending their free lunch.
- surajrmal 1y agoIf ffmpeg maintainers cannot keep up, downstream customers should know so they can help.
- kierank 1y agoFFmpeg is developed almost entirely by volunteers. We have no "customers".
- seb1204 1y agoWhy complain about pressure from customers then?
- surajrmal 1y agoThere are people who use and depend on ffmpeg. Maintainers seem to go out of their way to solve issues these folks face. If you don't care, then ignore the bug reports and force them to solve their own problems by contributing.
- kierank 1y agoThen you and your security friends will create lots of FUD about FFmpeg being "insecure" with lots of red and the word "critical" everywhere.
- samus 1y agoThese people are not customers though. The maintainers do their best, but overall the project seems to be understaffed though, so customers (for example Google, as it seems they occasionally chip in) get priority.
- jitbit 1y agoTrue - if we're talking about actual security bugs, not the "CVE slop" P.S. I'm an open source maintainer myself, and I used to think, "oh, OSS developers should just stop whining and fix stuff." Fast forward a few years, and now I'm buried under false-positive "reports" and overwhelmed by non-coding work (deleting issue spam, triage, etc.) P.P.S. What's worse, when your library is a security component the pressure’s even higher - one misplaced loc could break thousands of apps (we literally have a million downloads at nuget [1] ) [1]: https://www.nuget.org/packages/AspNetSaml https://www.nuget.org/packages/AspNetSaml
- seb1204 1y agoPlease speak openly about that on your dev page Manage expectations.
- surajrmal 1y agoI wonder if language plays a large role in the burden imposed on the maintainers.