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I agree with all of the articles points except for the first one: TPM and Secure Boot do not reduce user choice or promote state or corporate surveillance. If

I agree with all of the articles points except for the first one: TPM and Secure Boot do not reduce user choice or promote state or corporate surveillance. If you want to be able to prevent root kits you need secure boot, and if you want to store secrets that don't need a user password to unlock and can't be stolen by taking apart the computer, you need a TPM; or you need substantially similar alternatives. I would say that specifically with Secure Boot, Microsoft actually promoted user choice: A Windows Logo compliant PC needs to have Microsoft's root of trust installed by default. Microsoft could have stopped there, but they didn't. A Windows Logo compliant PC _also_ needs a way for users to install their own root of trust. Microsoft didn't need to add that requirement. Sure, there are large corporate and government buyers that would insist on that, but they could convince (without loss of generality) Dell to offer it to them. Instead, Microsoft said all PCs need it, and as a result, anybody who wants to take advantage of secure boot can do so if they go through the bother of installing their own root of trust and signing their boot image.

IlikeKitties 1y ago
You are 100% correct and we can see the situation on phones where you can't boot anything not approved by the vendor.
trinsic2 1y ago
I think it has the potential to create that situation if those features ever change. I should probably update that language, but I still feel from a consumer choice perspective, those solutions seem vendor specific and not governed by an open organization.
AstralStorm 1y ago
Thing is, because the whole design is closed as well as firmware, the security of it is near zero, even for sealing firmware device images (e.g. option ROM), much less bootloaders. Multiple security holes have been found. There's no issue booting a boot rootkit with the standard Windows bootloader unless you manually seal the image with command line or group policy, and even then it's possible to bypass by installing a fresh bootloader because the images are identical and will boot after a wipe.
- hulitu 1y ago
  >Thing is, because the whole design is closed as well as firmware, the security of it is near zero, even for sealing firmware device images (e.g. option ROM), much less bootloaders. Multiple security holes have been found. This. It is secure only for MS, AMD or Intel.
juped 1y ago
These are old counterproductive FSF memes that should be retired, but stick around anyway.
heavyset_go 1y ago
> I would say that specifically with Secure Boot, Microsoft actually promoted user choice: A Windows Logo compliant PC needs to have Microsoft's root of trust installed by default. Microsoft could have stopped there, but they didn't. This was not the case with the initial rollout of Secure Boot, it was combined with locked BIOS to lock PCs so that they could only boot Windows 8 on some devices. This was the case on Windows RT ARM machines from that era. All that has to be done today for machines to be locked down again is to flip a bit or blow an e-fuse. It's already the case on phones and tablets. There is also a real potential for abusing TPMs or cryptographic co-processors to enforce remote attestation. I say this as someone who agrees with your first paragraph and uses Secure Boot + TPMs on all of my machines.
- IlikeKitties 1y ago
  > There is also a real potential for abusing TPMs or cryptographic co-processors to enforce remote attestation. People here REALLY need to start understanding this issue. Remote Attestation is the kind of tech that if abused will end free computing over night.
  - weikju 1y ago
    s/if/when/
  - heavyset_go 1y ago
    Remote attestation is already here with Play Protect/Integrity on Android, and Microsoft's Pluton co-processor enables the same thing
    - nerdsniper 1y ago
      See also: - Private Access Token [0] - Web Environment Integrity [1] among other proposals. 0: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31751203 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31751203 1: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36785516 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36785516
  - dataflow 1y ago
scheeseman486 1y ago
On the face of it they're just security features, and I don't deny they are, but the industry as a whole are using those features to implement device verification systems that are being used to lock down their platforms and centralize control over their software ecosystems. Being able to install another OS isn't much good if critical applications and websites refuse to run on it.
- gruez 1y ago
  >Being able to install another OS isn't much good if critical applications and websites refuse to run on it. The battle has already been lost on this. Just look at all the companies that are app-only and don't offer a web version.
  - cam_l 1y ago
    I honestly have only come across one company that is app only. That was because I was with them when they changed over, otherwise I would never have signed up. This was my local gym which sacked their front desk staff and moved to app access only, and with an app infested with trackers at that. Needless to say I don't go to that gym anymore.
    - gruez 1y ago
      It's popular with fintechs, especially new ones. Robinhood for instance was app-only for a few years before they got their web version. Revolut theoretically has a web version but it has far less features than the mobile app. Restaurant "apps" (for ordering and offers) are often app-only as well.
      - chromehearts 1y ago
        Honest question: What does TPM have to do with this? I mean, Revolut developers don't need to check for TPM or similar to serve other functionalities just because you're on browser or mobile app. Am I getting something wrong?
josephcsible 1y ago
TPM and Secure Boot would be good things if there were no way to prove to third parties that you're using them, or have them configured a certain way (i.e., remote attestation). It's the fact that that is possible that makes them reduce user choice and promote state and corporate surveillance.
- aleph_minus_one 1y ago
  > TPM and Secure Boot would be good things if there were no way to prove to third parties that you're using them, or have them configured a certain way (i.e., remote attestation). This is exactly what a TPM was made for, so your statement is a little bit paradoxical.
  - throwaway7679 1y ago
    The ideal is the owner being able to use TPM/SecureBoot/etc to ensure that the device is in the configuration they want. That means resisting tampering, and making any successful tampering become obvious. The problem is third parties using TPM/SecureBoot/etc as a weapon against the owner via remote attestation, by preventing them from configuring their own device, with the threat of being cut off from critical services. Having the upside without the downside would be nice, but how could it work? Is a technical solution feasible, or would it need a law/regulation?
    - dietr1ch 1y ago
      Not a crypto expert, but given how both, bad players seeking control and people seeking to verify their cloud machines are both remote it seems that the technology will rollout without problem and will end up being force fed into all consumer devices with bullshit excuses.
- actsasbuffoon 1y ago
  Maybe. This assumes I trust Microsoft to have part of my computer where I have no ability to interrogate it to see what they’re doing in there. If it’s on my computer, I should be allowed to read and write to it. End of story. I don’t care if that makes it vulnerable. So far as I’m concerned, letting Microsoft keep secrets from me on my own computer is similarly catastrophic to losing my HD to a crypto-locker virus.
ivolimmen 1y ago
https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bo...
deleted 1y ago
[deleted]
matheusmoreira 1y ago
> TPM and Secure Boot do not reduce user choice or promote state or corporate surveillance Now with remote attestation they do. > installing their own root of trust and signing their boot image Won't matter. They can tell we did this. They won't trust our keys. Only their own.
edg5000 1y ago
> if you want to store secrets that don't need a user password to unlock and can't be stolen by taking apart the computer, you need a TPM I had a Win 7 system and just entered a password on boot, this decrypted the disk. It was supported without mods or TPM (maybe some registry tweaks though). On Ubuntu I do the same, no need for TPM. Am I missing something? My disk is encrypted. If they take it apart, they need my password to crack the encryption.
- Cu3PO42 1y ago
  The important part in the parent is "that don't need a user password". You just said you had to supply a (user) password. With a TPM you can set it up that your disk is unlocked automatically, but only if no-one changed anything in the signed boot chain. This is the default with Bitlocker on Windows and is also possible on Linux, though somewhat more finicky.
  - beeflet 1y ago
    but why bother? I can fit enough entropy in my head to make my hard drive uncrackable, and I can back up my data even if some chip breaks. It's just added complexity and corporate control so people can use worse passwords
    - repiret 1y ago
      But most people don't want to enter a password, and if you make people enter a password too much, they'll choose terrible passwords and put them on a sticky note. Windows Hello can only be done securely with a TPM. A server that I want to turn back on all by itself after a power outage can only be done securely with a TPM. I want a TPM in my computer so I can have the security and convenience. Yes, it's another point of failure. But I need backups in case the hard drive fails anyway. And besides, the OS can be designed so I can enter a password if I need to use the drive without the TPM.
      - beeflet 1y ago
        >Windows Hello can only be done securely with a TPM I think in general biometrics are in the same ballpark as low-entropy passwords. IDK, I personally have no faith in trusted computing hardware because it can be broken with the right equipment. You're right that it can be used alongside ordinary security measures, but I just think it encourages putting your eggs into a cryptographicially-weak hardware-strong basket (which represents a downgrade because crypto is stronger than hw). >A server that I want to turn back on all by itself after a power outage can only be done securely with a TPM. Can you describe how this prevents a MITM attack? I assume you mean a remote server? I've heard of colocation setups like this, but I think they rely on a couple of unstated assumptions.
isodev 1y ago
> Microsoft actually promoted user choice Let’s not give Microsoft too much credit here… Between 2011 and 2013, multiple Linux / free software organisations raised the issue with the EC. There was an actual antitrust investigation which at the time was seen as what motivated Microsoft to open the solution to third parties by 2013. So in a way, thank you EU for making it so we have choices at all. With that said, I think the technology still does more to promote vendor lock-in and as others have said, it’s one windows update away from a dystopian hellscape where all your bits have been pre-approved by someone else.
terabyterex 1y ago
a lot of what he says is straight lies or stupidity. I love linux but disagree with everything he says.
bob1029 1y ago
I am starting to see the benefits to secure boot and TPM from a gaming perspective. I realize this can still be tampered with but it eliminates so many casual cheaters that the edge case is practically irrelevant. I don't see how my TPM module will prevent me from using the machine the way I want. The offer of a cryptographic assurance to a 3rd party is something I happily provide in order to gain access to a competitive gaming resource. Cheaters really fucking suck and if this is what it takes to ruin their day, then fantastic. I'm looking forward to TPM3.0 now after seeing how ruinous this has been to their schemes. These tools are effective. Battlefield 6 is especially problematic for malcontents because its developers also enjoy using statistical methods to detect cheaters. TPM2.0 + statistical methods + $69.99 per try = probably can't afford to play this game unfairly for very long. Even if you can afford it, the in game progression takes an eternity. You're gonna need that 8x scope if you want your "undetectable" frame scanning aimbot to be of any use.
- realusername 1y ago
  I don't think it helps for cheaters, you have cheaters on console and it's even more locked down than that.
  - LadyCailin 1y ago
    Not to mention hardware based cheating that just implements a fully compliant USB mouse, keyboard, and HDMI setup, and DMA like https://www.dma-cheats.com/ https://www.dma-cheats.com/
    - account42 1y ago
      I'm sure some jackass is going to suggest cryptographically verifying that you are using peripherals from trusted manufacturers soon.
      - realusername 1y ago
        That's physically not possible though, you could always have a device which pushes through the buttons on a genuine controller.
weightedreply 1y ago
Many OEM's don't allow changing keys and Microsoft doesn't even enforce their own certification requirements. See: https://linustechtips.com/topic/1610033-hp-charges-for-warranty-support/ https://linustechtips.com/topic/1610033-hp-charges-for-warra...
naasking 1y ago
> If you want to be able to prevent root kits you need secure boot I think this is very misleading. Secure boot was a response to the poor security of commodity operating systems which allowed programs easy access to make low-level system modifications. In other words, the poor security models of commodity operating systems was the actual cause that allowed rootkits to spread and become a major threat that required mitigation. In an alternate world in which operating systems enforced least privilege on all programs, the likelihood of a rootkit spreading would be orders of magnitude smaller, almost not even worth mentioning. The motivation for secure boot in this world is really only to prevent supply chain attacks, which can also be solved by just buying hardware from reputable companies. Secure boot arguably would not have been created in this world, thus avoiding the new dangers inherent to it.
- hollerith 1y ago
  Yes, but when an individual hacker needs a secure computer and is deciding which computer to buy, it does him no good to tell him that if the whole industry had evolved in a more convenient way over the last 4 decades, he would have been able to avoid secure boot: in the actual world, the only user-facing computers on the market with decent security use secure boot to help deliver that decent security where "user-facing" means "used to browse the web and maybe other things". Also remote attestation has pro-social uses. Without it, photographs will soon become useless as evidence because soon there will be no way to distinguish a photo of a real scene from the output of generative AI.
  - naasking 1y ago
    My point is that secure boot isn't the only way forward, and depending on your circumstances, a foundation built on something like seL4 could suffice for particular applications. And it doesn't even require a whole new OS or foundation like seL4, even Windows has the right core primitives if they're used in the right way [1]. And that work was from 2005, not 40 years ago, but still long before any of this really became an issue. [1] https://cacm.acm.org/research/polaris-2/ https://cacm.acm.org/research/polaris-2/
  - fsflover 1y ago
dogleash 1y ago
> Microsoft didn't need to add that requirement. Yes, they did. It was written by the specter of the US Department Of Justice.
hulitu 1y ago
> If you want to be able to prevent root kits you need secure boot Secure boot is a rootkit.

IlikeKitties 1y ago

You are 100% correct and we can see the situation on phones where you can't boot anything not approved by the vendor.

trinsic2 1y ago

I think it has the potential to create that situation if those features ever change. I should probably update that language, but I still feel from a consumer choice perspective, those solutions seem vendor specific and not governed by an open organization.

AstralStorm 1y ago

Thing is, because the whole design is closed as well as firmware, the security of it is near zero, even for sealing firmware device images (e.g. option ROM), much less bootloaders. Multiple security holes have been found. There's no issue booting a boot rootkit with the standard Windows bootloader unless you manually seal the image with command line or group policy, and even then it's possible to bypass by installing a fresh bootloader because the images are identical and will boot after a wipe.

hulitu 1y ago
>Thing is, because the whole design is closed as well as firmware, the security of it is near zero, even for sealing firmware device images (e.g. option ROM), much less bootloaders. Multiple security holes have been found. This. It is secure only for MS, AMD or Intel.

juped 1y ago

These are old counterproductive FSF memes that should be retired, but stick around anyway.

heavyset_go 1y ago

> I would say that specifically with Secure Boot, Microsoft actually promoted user choice: A Windows Logo compliant PC needs to have Microsoft's root of trust installed by default. Microsoft could have stopped there, but they didn't. This was not the case with the initial rollout of Secure Boot, it was combined with locked BIOS to lock PCs so that they could only boot Windows 8 on some devices. This was the case on Windows RT ARM machines from that era. All that has to be done today for machines to be locked down again is to flip a bit or blow an e-fuse. It's already the case on phones and tablets. There is also a real potential for abusing TPMs or cryptographic co-processors to enforce remote attestation. I say this as someone who agrees with your first paragraph and uses Secure Boot + TPMs on all of my machines.

IlikeKitties 1y ago
> There is also a real potential for abusing TPMs or cryptographic co-processors to enforce remote attestation. People here REALLY need to start understanding this issue. Remote Attestation is the kind of tech that if abused will end free computing over night.
- weikju 1y ago
  s/if/when/
- heavyset_go 1y ago
  Remote attestation is already here with Play Protect/Integrity on Android, and Microsoft's Pluton co-processor enables the same thing
  - nerdsniper 1y ago
    See also: - Private Access Token [0] - Web Environment Integrity [1] among other proposals. 0: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31751203 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=31751203 1: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36785516 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36785516
- dataflow 1y ago

scheeseman486 1y ago

On the face of it they're just security features, and I don't deny they are, but the industry as a whole are using those features to implement device verification systems that are being used to lock down their platforms and centralize control over their software ecosystems. Being able to install another OS isn't much good if critical applications and websites refuse to run on it.

gruez 1y ago
>Being able to install another OS isn't much good if critical applications and websites refuse to run on it. The battle has already been lost on this. Just look at all the companies that are app-only and don't offer a web version.
- cam_l 1y ago
  I honestly have only come across one company that is app only. That was because I was with them when they changed over, otherwise I would never have signed up. This was my local gym which sacked their front desk staff and moved to app access only, and with an app infested with trackers at that. Needless to say I don't go to that gym anymore.
  - gruez 1y ago
    It's popular with fintechs, especially new ones. Robinhood for instance was app-only for a few years before they got their web version. Revolut theoretically has a web version but it has far less features than the mobile app. Restaurant "apps" (for ordering and offers) are often app-only as well.
    - chromehearts 1y ago
      Honest question: What does TPM have to do with this? I mean, Revolut developers don't need to check for TPM or similar to serve other functionalities just because you're on browser or mobile app. Am I getting something wrong?

josephcsible 1y ago

TPM and Secure Boot would be good things if there were no way to prove to third parties that you're using them, or have them configured a certain way (i.e., remote attestation). It's the fact that that is possible that makes them reduce user choice and promote state and corporate surveillance.

aleph_minus_one 1y ago
> TPM and Secure Boot would be good things if there were no way to prove to third parties that you're using them, or have them configured a certain way (i.e., remote attestation). This is exactly what a TPM was made for, so your statement is a little bit paradoxical.
- throwaway7679 1y ago
  The ideal is the owner being able to use TPM/SecureBoot/etc to ensure that the device is in the configuration they want. That means resisting tampering, and making any successful tampering become obvious. The problem is third parties using TPM/SecureBoot/etc as a weapon against the owner via remote attestation, by preventing them from configuring their own device, with the threat of being cut off from critical services. Having the upside without the downside would be nice, but how could it work? Is a technical solution feasible, or would it need a law/regulation?
  - dietr1ch 1y ago
    Not a crypto expert, but given how both, bad players seeking control and people seeking to verify their cloud machines are both remote it seems that the technology will rollout without problem and will end up being force fed into all consumer devices with bullshit excuses.
actsasbuffoon 1y ago
Maybe. This assumes I trust Microsoft to have part of my computer where I have no ability to interrogate it to see what they’re doing in there. If it’s on my computer, I should be allowed to read and write to it. End of story. I don’t care if that makes it vulnerable. So far as I’m concerned, letting Microsoft keep secrets from me on my own computer is similarly catastrophic to losing my HD to a crypto-locker virus.

ivolimmen 1y ago

https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bootkit-myth-confirmed/ https://www.welivesecurity.com/2023/03/01/blacklotus-uefi-bo...

deleted 1y ago

[deleted]

matheusmoreira 1y ago

> TPM and Secure Boot do not reduce user choice or promote state or corporate surveillance Now with remote attestation they do. > installing their own root of trust and signing their boot image Won't matter. They can tell we did this. They won't trust our keys. Only their own.

edg5000 1y ago

> if you want to store secrets that don't need a user password to unlock and can't be stolen by taking apart the computer, you need a TPM I had a Win 7 system and just entered a password on boot, this decrypted the disk. It was supported without mods or TPM (maybe some registry tweaks though). On Ubuntu I do the same, no need for TPM. Am I missing something? My disk is encrypted. If they take it apart, they need my password to crack the encryption.

Cu3PO42 1y ago
The important part in the parent is "that don't need a user password". You just said you had to supply a (user) password. With a TPM you can set it up that your disk is unlocked automatically, but only if no-one changed anything in the signed boot chain. This is the default with Bitlocker on Windows and is also possible on Linux, though somewhat more finicky.
- beeflet 1y ago
  but why bother? I can fit enough entropy in my head to make my hard drive uncrackable, and I can back up my data even if some chip breaks. It's just added complexity and corporate control so people can use worse passwords
  - repiret 1y ago
    But most people don't want to enter a password, and if you make people enter a password too much, they'll choose terrible passwords and put them on a sticky note. Windows Hello can only be done securely with a TPM. A server that I want to turn back on all by itself after a power outage can only be done securely with a TPM. I want a TPM in my computer so I can have the security and convenience. Yes, it's another point of failure. But I need backups in case the hard drive fails anyway. And besides, the OS can be designed so I can enter a password if I need to use the drive without the TPM.
    - beeflet 1y ago
      >Windows Hello can only be done securely with a TPM I think in general biometrics are in the same ballpark as low-entropy passwords. IDK, I personally have no faith in trusted computing hardware because it can be broken with the right equipment. You're right that it can be used alongside ordinary security measures, but I just think it encourages putting your eggs into a cryptographicially-weak hardware-strong basket (which represents a downgrade because crypto is stronger than hw). >A server that I want to turn back on all by itself after a power outage can only be done securely with a TPM. Can you describe how this prevents a MITM attack? I assume you mean a remote server? I've heard of colocation setups like this, but I think they rely on a couple of unstated assumptions.

isodev 1y ago

> Microsoft actually promoted user choice Let’s not give Microsoft too much credit here… Between 2011 and 2013, multiple Linux / free software organisations raised the issue with the EC. There was an actual antitrust investigation which at the time was seen as what motivated Microsoft to open the solution to third parties by 2013. So in a way, thank you EU for making it so we have choices at all. With that said, I think the technology still does more to promote vendor lock-in and as others have said, it’s one windows update away from a dystopian hellscape where all your bits have been pre-approved by someone else.

terabyterex 1y ago

a lot of what he says is straight lies or stupidity. I love linux but disagree with everything he says.

bob1029 1y ago

I am starting to see the benefits to secure boot and TPM from a gaming perspective. I realize this can still be tampered with but it eliminates so many casual cheaters that the edge case is practically irrelevant. I don't see how my TPM module will prevent me from using the machine the way I want. The offer of a cryptographic assurance to a 3rd party is something I happily provide in order to gain access to a competitive gaming resource. Cheaters really fucking suck and if this is what it takes to ruin their day, then fantastic. I'm looking forward to TPM3.0 now after seeing how ruinous this has been to their schemes. These tools are effective. Battlefield 6 is especially problematic for malcontents because its developers also enjoy using statistical methods to detect cheaters. TPM2.0 + statistical methods + $69.99 per try = probably can't afford to play this game unfairly for very long. Even if you can afford it, the in game progression takes an eternity. You're gonna need that 8x scope if you want your "undetectable" frame scanning aimbot to be of any use.

realusername 1y ago
I don't think it helps for cheaters, you have cheaters on console and it's even more locked down than that.
- LadyCailin 1y ago
  Not to mention hardware based cheating that just implements a fully compliant USB mouse, keyboard, and HDMI setup, and DMA like https://www.dma-cheats.com/ https://www.dma-cheats.com/
  - account42 1y ago
    I'm sure some jackass is going to suggest cryptographically verifying that you are using peripherals from trusted manufacturers soon.
    - realusername 1y ago
      That's physically not possible though, you could always have a device which pushes through the buttons on a genuine controller.

weightedreply 1y ago

Many OEM's don't allow changing keys and Microsoft doesn't even enforce their own certification requirements. See: https://linustechtips.com/topic/1610033-hp-charges-for-warranty-support/ https://linustechtips.com/topic/1610033-hp-charges-for-warra...

naasking 1y ago

> If you want to be able to prevent root kits you need secure boot I think this is very misleading. Secure boot was a response to the poor security of commodity operating systems which allowed programs easy access to make low-level system modifications. In other words, the poor security models of commodity operating systems was the actual cause that allowed rootkits to spread and become a major threat that required mitigation. In an alternate world in which operating systems enforced least privilege on all programs, the likelihood of a rootkit spreading would be orders of magnitude smaller, almost not even worth mentioning. The motivation for secure boot in this world is really only to prevent supply chain attacks, which can also be solved by just buying hardware from reputable companies. Secure boot arguably would not have been created in this world, thus avoiding the new dangers inherent to it.

hollerith 1y ago
Yes, but when an individual hacker needs a secure computer and is deciding which computer to buy, it does him no good to tell him that if the whole industry had evolved in a more convenient way over the last 4 decades, he would have been able to avoid secure boot: in the actual world, the only user-facing computers on the market with decent security use secure boot to help deliver that decent security where "user-facing" means "used to browse the web and maybe other things". Also remote attestation has pro-social uses. Without it, photographs will soon become useless as evidence because soon there will be no way to distinguish a photo of a real scene from the output of generative AI.
- naasking 1y ago
  My point is that secure boot isn't the only way forward, and depending on your circumstances, a foundation built on something like seL4 could suffice for particular applications. And it doesn't even require a whole new OS or foundation like seL4, even Windows has the right core primitives if they're used in the right way [1]. And that work was from 2005, not 40 years ago, but still long before any of this really became an issue. [1] https://cacm.acm.org/research/polaris-2/ https://cacm.acm.org/research/polaris-2/
- fsflover 1y ago

dogleash 1y ago

> Microsoft didn't need to add that requirement. Yes, they did. It was written by the specter of the US Department Of Justice.

hulitu 1y ago

> If you want to be able to prevent root kits you need secure boot Secure boot is a rootkit.