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Email accounts are the highest common denominator in online authentication. Phones are competitive, but people lose phones. Phone numbers are more common and du
by tptacek 2y ago
Email accounts are the highest common denominator in online authentication. Phones are competitive, but people lose phones. Phone numbers are more common and durable, but the security of phone numbers is leagues below that of a flagship provider email account. It makes sense that so many authentication flows work this way.
When designing a "fantasy football" alternate authentication system for the Internet, start with account recovery: what happens when a user loses your fancy authenticator? If the answer is "they just don't get access anymore" or "a panel of their peers attests to them", your fantasy authentication system also needs a fantasy species of sentient beings to serve as users, because it won't work for humans.
- hgomersall 2y agoIt's an interesting design problem to have panel of peers attest an individual's identity. It could be made fairly seamless if there was a common system in which a suitably distributed authentication secret could be recombined under instruction from the relevant party. Can it be made to work for normal humans? I daresay we have the ingenuity to design something...
- unilynx 2y agoexcept that those instructions will be handed out by phishers
- jlund-molfese 2y agoApple’s Recovery Contacts are a similar idea. The main difference is that just one can help you recover your account, but it doesn’t seem too hard from a UX perspective to make 3/5 recovery contacts required to unlock an account. https://support.apple.com/en-us/102641 https://support.apple.com/en-us/102641
- efitz 2y agoWe could also leverage trusted third parties for this purpose, for example, banks or DMV or Walmart. However, there needs to be a fiduciary interest by the third-party (eg liability for identity theft, etc) in order to incentivize them to avoid fraud. It is not clear that there would be enough profit involved to offset the liability.
- kfrzcode 2y agoThe Decentralized Recovery (DeRec) Alliance has recently launched to solve this very problem. Dr. Leemon Baird gave a talk last year on how this works at a higher level [0]. The alliance is comprised of members from the Algorand, Hedera, Ripple crypto communities but the application of proper DeRec would be certainly applicable anywhere you have any type of secret; in fact I believe you can be a DeRec 'helper' right now. There's a robust primer on the protocol published as well [1], here's a pull-quote: > Decentralized recovery is a method of safeguarding a user's secret by distributing shares of that secret among multiple helpers, who store their individual share on their local device in order to help the user recover that secret in future. The shares are constructed under a threshold secret-sharing scheme (e.g. Shamir's secret sharing scheme), with a chosen threshold (defaults to half) -- at least three helpers must be present in order to use the protocol. Should the user lose access to their device, they can recover their secret data by retrieving the previously-distributed shares from at least half of their helpers. For successful recovery, the user only needs to recall the identities of half of their helpers and authenticate with them in-person. [0]: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcF4abPoveM https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcF4abPoveM [1]: https://github.com/derecalliance/protocol/blob/main/protocol.md https://github.com/derecalliance/protocol/blob/main/protocol...
- simonw 2y agoSome day someone is going to produce a fantastic heist movie about breaking this kind of scheme - five different characters, each of which need to be scammed in different ways to obtain their piece of a shared secret. Sadly it's quite possible this will be a dramatized version of a real-world event. We've already seen quite a few messed up crimes to steal keys to steal crypto. Secret sharing just means you need to kidnap a few extra people.
- kfrzcode 2y agoBut in fact, in order to kidnap these people you'd also need to know these people, and know they are assigned to be part of the derec network. With DeRec all the helpers don't need to know about each other at all. And you may not know how many helpers a given helper has behind them. It's actually much much more difficult to do the heist-and-interrogate-with-a-pipe-wrench approach if you don't know who to beat up, nor how many of them need to authenticate. Edit: OT but while I have a glimpse of your attention, kudos in order!! I love datasette and basically everything you write is highly useful to me!
- kccqzy 2y agoOf course it works. I was aware of such mechanisms appearing in the Chinese social media app WeChat years ago. In fact I would say it's a great fit for any kind of social media app that involves interacting with peers. However the utility is probably nil if there're no social features to begin with.
- crooked-v 2y agoUnfortunately, "they just don't get access anymore" is the usual pattern with major email providers like Google, as many people who have had a phone lost or stolen and then been locked out of their accounts forever can attest to.
- candiddevmike 2y agoGovernment provided digital IDs would solve a lot of this. Yes, they may have their own problems, but outsourcing the action of identifying individuals to the government seems valuable and less prone to "lock outs" like Google and friends.
- throwaway237289 2y ago[flagged]
- jpalomaki 2y agoYes. I would very much like to tie certain accounts to my government issued digital identity and allow that as the only recovery method.
- JumpCrisscross 2y ago> Government provided digital IDs would solve a lot of this A lot of what? It seems like the worst of all worlds, given that ID would not only unlock some highly sensitive things, but also be difficult to change and tremendously revealing.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- iknowstuff 2y agoNah the government could just give a website a unique id per real user per website, without revealing who the user is. Merely verifying that they are the same person as last time.
- quectophoton 2y agoIt certainly is an alternative we can at least think about. On one hand, the certs you'd use to login to websites wouldn't even need to include any personal info at all, just a valid signature from a CA that the website knows how to verify. And the certificate wouldn't need to be the same for every website, it could be one you generate for a specific website. On the other hand, a lot of thought would need to be put into how expiration/renewal and revocation would play into this. Of course there should be an evaluation of the ways this could go wrong if someone from the gov misuses this CA, and how that compares to someone from your current email provider misusing their permissions. But if nothing else, something I really want is to just be able to have an email address like `random_id@my_country.my_country_tld`, to at least have an email address where I don't have to worry about being locked out, so that I can give freely to ISP, bank, grocery delivery websites, other local companies, etc. Most of this stuff I wouldn't even mind receiving as postal mail anyway. And if shit hits the fan, I can recover access to this email account by walking to an office and identifying myself.
- nfw2 2y agoCan you expand what you mean when you say the security of phone numbers is leagues below email? If someone can gain access to someone's phone, it seems like they would gain access to their email as well.
- tptacek 2y agoPhone number, not phone.
- nfw2 2y agoHow does an attacker gain access to a phone number without having the phone? Like physically stealing the sim card or something else?
- fragmede 2y agobribe, coerce, and social engineer a phone company employee into transferring the victims phone number to you, or a technical attack to get the system to send the sms messages to a device you control, without ever touching the victim.
- Zanfa 2y agoThe attacker just needs to convince/compromise a single carrier employee to get a new SIM for your number.
- 57FkMytWjyFu 2y agoSim swap via pretending to be a clueless customer who lost their physical phone, banking on lax checks at customer service.
- oretoz 2y agoAs others have mentioned, SIM Swap attacks are very common where the attacker impersonates the victim and convinces the mobile operator to transfer the victim’s phone number (known as MSISDN in telecom parlance) to the attacker’s SIM. If you Google SIM Swap, you will find many instances of it. From that moment onwards, all the 2nd factor SMS OTP go to the attacker. There are APIs that are provided by mobile operators via aggregators such as Telesign, Prove, Vonage, Twilio etc. that can be used to check if a SIM Swap has happened recently on that phone number. That API is used by fintech companies and others e.g. when they want to check if a fund transfer is to be allowed or flagged up.
- gerdesj 2y agoAuth apps are crap - each one pretends to be unique and authoritative. TOTP secrets are a string, not just a QR code that can only be seen once and never again - the QR code merely encodes that string! That string can be used in multiple places to generate codes. KeepassXC can do it and that can be shared. I've seen loads of organisations and sites with an elderly mobile phone that has the TOTP auth app on it. Normally MS Authenticator. To add insult to injury, MS Auth can only have one account per email address (id@realm/whatever you want to call it). PrivacyIdea can do email based TOTP with a PIN. That works well but does involve a two stage login with an email delivery in the middle. I totally agree with you: the only useful delivery mechanism available is email. PGP was a nice idea and authenticator apps need to have their owner's heads bashed together to get proper interoperability sorted out. Trying to silo people in your "cloud" without interoperability with others is so sad and needy. If you don't have absolute confidence in your offering then you are shit!
- boneitis 2y agoA little off-topic from the matter of adoption and usability by the greater masses, but I personally prefer these RFC 6238 TOTPs that I have the choice to take into my own hands, as opposed to internet-required, server-side based like my banking app and Okta. I have a copy of all my TOTP generators (minus my dev Okta account) in a common authenticator app and an offline copy stored in an offline password manager, further replicated with an encrypted backup service. I was able to create my offline copy in the first place thanks to a rooted phone to export what I already had up to that point out of the authenticator app. Of course, the discussion starts to morph when we bring in the "un-phishable" software passkeys.
- firesteelrain 2y agoI thought the Authenticator apps were great until I upgraded my iPhone and the apps lost all of my Authenticator setups. Good thing it wasn’t super critical.
- unethical_ban 2y agoI agree, for personal use cases, RFC standard TOTP that can be backed up and managed by the user is the ideal balance of security and availability. Enterprise TOTP apps like Okta and MS Authenticator have some enhancements. Push notifications are convenient when you have to access things many times a day. More importantly, push notifications with a number-matching confirmation reduces the chance of TOTP poaching, since the user themselves are interacting with the service requiring auth. In enterprise environments, there should be a restore process for a lost phone or authenticator. Some kind of backup code with voice/manager approval, or coming into a physical office to reset credentials. This isn't available for regular people/regular retail services except maybe banks, but banks can't even do regular TOTP correctly.
- j45 2y agoPasswords are consent, clicking on a link in an email account that might be open... not always.
- simonw 2y ago> If the answer is "they just don't get access anymore" or "a panel of their peers attests to them", your fantasy authentication system also needs a fantasy species of sentient beings to serve as users, because it won't work for humans. This has been my single biggest argument against blockchain/cryptocurrency stuff for years: the "lose your key, lose your wallet" thing is fundamentally incompatible with real users. Humans need to be able to recover from their mistakes.
- j-bos 2y agoI don't know, we carried physical money for millenia. Humans managed that.
- iamthepieman 2y agoYou didn't lose your entire savings if you lost your wallet, usually.
- onethought 2y agoPerhaps micro wallets should be a thing where your wealth is distributed across many keys mitigating some loss.
- jakelazaroff 2y agoIf I’m having trouble juggling a single ball, why would it help to add more balls into the mix?
- ta_1138 2y agoAt which point I gained the problem of having to keep track of all of my microwallets securely, hopefully in a way that survives my phone being lost, a house fire, or my untimely death, leaving the wealth to inheritors. All while, at the same time, not ending up behind a single key that has access to all the information to those micro wallets. Quickly you end up in a situation that either starts to look like how financial companies keep their most high risk keys, or end up outsourcing the whole thing to something that quickly starts to resemble your bank. So ultimately it's just like cash: Fine for small amounts. Risky, but maybe livable for somewhat larger accounts, or a giant headache that will probably bite you when you start looking at lifetime savings.
- rahimnathwani 2y agoIf the answer is "they just don't get access anymore" or "a panel of their peers attests to them", your fantasy authentication system also needs a fantasy species of sentient beings to serve as users, because it won't work for humans. It won't work for 99.99% of services, but it can work if your service is huge. WeChat uses a mechanism like this, and it works well.
- 8organicbits 2y agoI'm not familiar, which part of the comment does WeChat implement?
- rahimnathwani 2y agoA panel of peers.
- Eddieethan 2y ago[flagged]
- rakkhi 2y agoMaybe we should support logging in with an OTP to email for many more systems than we do currently? Combined with conditional access and MFA its actually not bad. No password to remember and supports this "pattern"
- lxgr 2y agoSure, but please make it optional. I've seen a couple of enterprise/corporate services switch to the "OTP via email" pattern (usually as mandatory 2FA), and I hate it, because there's no way for me to autofill that email OTP, unlike for e.g. WebAuthN or TOTP.
- ReptileMan 2y ago>Phone numbers are more common and durable, but the security of phone numbers is leagues below that of a flagship provider email account. With the - "we banned your account for no reason, and you have no way to appeal and we don't even tell you why we banned you" flagship provider email account caveat.
- AlienRobot 2y agoThis is my gripe with 2 factor authentication: it increases security and as a second factor also increases the risk of you losing your account.
- EVa5I7bHFq9mnYK 2y agoEverything is vulnerable. Lost my email when email provider (openmailbox.org) closed, with no chance of recovery. And with it lost a 28-years old domain. People have lost Gmail accounts over some YouTube comment. Lost my phone couple of times and was able to restore authy from backup ok.