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Just one bad packet can bring down a vulnerable DNS server thanks to DNSSEC
- tptacek 3y agoI had no hand in writing this headline.
- PreInternet01 3y agoNo, but admit it, you felt a certain glee in submitting it... (which is not to say you're wrong about that, and I write that as someone who once penned a public standard mandating DNSSEC -- which just goes to show we all make mistakes...)
- tptacek 3y agoI think the case against it, while extraordinarily strong, is actually pretty subtle, and I generally don't look at advocacy for it in the early days as a mistake at all. We learned a lot from the experience of trying to get it to work. I was a vocal advocate for key pinning, and I don't think I was mistaken to push for it, despite its ultimate non-viability and the success of the competing CT model.
- PreInternet01 3y agoGood point. I guess that any technology with a huge built-in "ah, yes, that one simple mistake you made, now means you'll have to completely rename your endpoint before anyone will be able to talk to it again" foot-gun requires a bit of a re-think prior to general availability.
- tptacek 3y agoThe only way to get it right is to try. An issue I think people sleep on with DNSSEC is that the service model was designed in the mid-1990s, as a TIS Labs project for DoD, and was premised on the idea that cryptography would be far too expensive to do "live" on servers. That's why we have a DNSSEC architecture built around offline signers, which is one of the original sins of the protocol. So I think a more precise meta-criticism of DNSSEC would be that it should have been obvious by the early-mid oughts, when the entire Internet was running off online TLS cryptography, and DNSSEC still wasn't even deployable (because roots weren't signed, and because we hadn't gotten to the typecode roll and DNSSECbis) let alone mired in the single digits where it is now, that it was time to scrap the original design and come up with something new.
- teddyh 3y agoNote: can bring down a DNSSEC-validating DNS resolver. Not any authoritative DNS server. Most people already use a centralized resolver like Google or Cloudflare anyway, and you can be sure those will be patched. People who use their ISP’s resolver might be disappointed if their ISP is slow to patch things, but what else is new?
- systems_glitch 3y agoI bet it'll still manage to serve ad pages instead of NXDOMAIN, though. Actually that's what will get them to patch up.
- wtallis 3y agoIsn't the ads-instead-of-NXDOMAIN attack the one thing DNSSEC is actually good at protecting against? So I would expect the guilty ISPs to avoid providing any form of DNSSEC support whatsoever, and thereby avoid consequences of any of DNSSEC's downsides.
- tptacek 3y agoNo, DNSSEC does nothing about ads-instead-of-NXDOMAIN. DNSSEC is server-to-server. If you rely on your ISP's resolver server, they can ignore DNSSEC and feed you whatever they want. If you run your own validating recursing resolver, you don't have the ads-instead-of-NXDOMAIN problem in the first place.
- wtallis 3y agoWho relies directly on their ISP's DNS servers? Isn't the ordinary use (for residential networks, who are the targets of the attacks in question) that your router is running dnsmasq and handing out DHCP leases that instruct hosts to query that dnsmasq instance?
- londons_explore 3y agobut that dnsmasq instance is configured by default to consult the ISP's DNS servers by default as upstream.
- PreInternet01 3y agoAt this point, someone should just file a high severity / high impact CVE against DNSSEC in its entirety, and ensure the box-tickers all across the world mandate its eradication. While I'm sure (even stronger: I know) that at some point DNSSEC was a good idea, it's just a liability-slash-infrastructure-tax these days (a footgun at best, an additional DoS vector in most cases), and it's time for it to go. 99% of DNSSEC deployments come down to "I trust the entity I have outsourced my DNS management to with my private key management as well", which makes no sense whatsoever, and the reasoning behind the remaining 1% doesn't inspire much confidence either. DoH satisfies the DNS privacy/security requirements of most Internet users just fine, and with or without DNSSEC, the management of the underlying infrastructure remains the same as it was before, i.e. "trust us"...
- pornel 3y agoDNSSEC doesn't have encryption, and does nothing for end-user privacy, so that's not even an alternative to DoH or DNSCurve. The only thing it deems a potential privacy issue is possibility of enumeration of subdomains, which is security by obscurity for the domain owner, from a time before certificate transparency logs ruined that anyway.
- RegnisGnaw 3y agoNSEC3 pretty much solves this issue.
- tptacek 3y agoIt doesn't, at all. NSEC3 is crackable like a 1990s password file, and several tools exist to do it. The "standard" solution to this is "whitelies" (RFC4470), which requires your DNSSEC server to be an online signer so it can generate chaff records; the supposedly upcoming solution is NSEC5, which fixes the broken cryptography in NSEC3.
- jcranmer 3y ago> from a time before certificate transparency logs ruined that anyway. Isn't it possible under WebPKI rules to get an intermediate cert for all of your subdomains so that only the intermediate cert needs to get logged in certificate transparency? Or at the very least, you could use a wildcard underneath the domain you own...
- codegeek 3y agoI am not an expert in DNS but isnt' DNSSEC sort of like IPV6 when it comes to utility vs adoption vs overhead ? In other words, hasn't really lived up to the expectations or am I missing something ?
- tptacek 3y agoIt has massively underperformed expectations in a way that far outstrips any disappointment anyone could have in IPv6. IPv6 has adoption approaching 50%. If you have a modern ISP and a modern router, you might be using IPv6 right now without even noticing it. Meanwhile: less than 5% of the major US TLDs are signed, and an even smaller fraction of the "top domains" (given any list of top domains, like the Moz 500) are. The major prevailing use case for DNSSEC, which is DANE, has no browser support --- browsers actually tried it and removed that support.
- teddyh 3y agoMy usual alternative viewpoint whenever you try to claim that DNSSEC is dead: From where I sit, I work at a registry and DNS server host (among other things) where about 40% of all our domains have DNSSEC (and that number is constantly climbing). Every conference I go to, and in every webinar, people seemingly always talk about DNSSEC and how usage is increasing. From my perspective, your continuous claim that “nobody uses” DNSSEC is simply false. DNSSEC works, usage of DNSSEC is steadily increasing, and new protocols (like DANE) are starting to make use of DNSSEC for its features. Conversely, I only relatively rarely hear anything about MTA-STS. (Originally written as a two year old comment of mine: <https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27837530 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27837530>, but the details given have not changed substantially.)
- tptacek 3y agoStart by convincing Geoff Huston, from who I could shoplift all the rebuttals I'd need to this argument. TLD DNSSEC signing stats are easy for people to look up, and people can quickly see I'm not making any of this up.
- tialaramex 3y agoAs far as I can tell this is a BIND bug. There are typically a dozen or so of these each year. The BIND 9 codebase (which is where this bug arose) dates back to when Bill Clinton was President of the US. Rather than "Ooh, DNSSEC is bad" the correct take is that we need to wean ourselves off ISC BIND. Maybe ISRG can pay somebody to make a less awful DNS server implementation in Rust.
- quickthrower2 3y agoThe Linux codebase dates back to when George H. W. Bush was president.
- IshKebab 3y agoWell... security vulnerabilities in Linux are a fairly common occurrence too!
- quickthrower2 3y agoHow are Biden codebases doing?
- HankB99 3y agoBiden caused problems with both EXT4 and ZFS.
- obscurette 3y agoIt MIGHT originated from ISC, but at the moment it's the behavior standard specifies and the fix all DNS software vendors have applied, breaks the standard.
- mjevans 3y agoIMO every operation should have a maximum time to execute, and rejecting an update / response for failure to process fast enough SHOULD be valid, even for a an otherwise well formed packet. A protocol must be resilient to valid communications failing for arbitrary reasons including operator error or cosmic bit-flips that corrupt the transmission.
- zaik 3y ago> As of December 2023, approximately 31 percent of web clients worldwide used DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers That doesn't seem right. Ever since enabling DNSSEC validation on my system, YouTube and every other Google product except basic searching is broken for me. The percentage of internet users who enforce DNSSEC must be much much smaller.
- bongodongobob 3y agoYeah, I don't buy that either. Consulting and working for MSPs over the last 10 years I've probably been exposed to a couple hundred environments and I've never once seen DNSSEC validation used.
- neonnomad 3y agoI'm not sure the logic, since you have problems everyone else must have them too? Google DNS / Cloudflare DNS are both DNSSEC validating revolvers, two of the most popular DNS services on the planet. Most US based ISP resolvers are DNSSEC validating (Xfinity's 75.75.75.75 is). Google Chrome ships with DOH going to Google DNS on by default now, Firefox does DOH by default as well. So I can absolutely see where this would easily be the case, if not more. You can view a map of DNSSEC validation rates here: https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec https://stats.labs.apnic.net/dnssec
- xz53 3y ago> Ever since enabling DNSSEC validation on my system, YouTube and every other Google product except basic searching is broken for me. Enabling DNSSEC wouldn't change resolution of those properties unless you somehow set your system to treat insecure delegations as bogus. Is that what you've done?
- TacticalCoder 3y ago> by exploiting a 20-plus-year-old design flaw in the DNSSEC specification. If it's an error in the specification, how can patches already be available without breaking the specs? Can anyone shed light on this? I'm asking for I'm running unbound which is affected (because it's following the spec IIUC) and yet a patch for unbound is already out.
- xz53 3y agoIn a nutshell, the vulnerability is stuffing a lot of broken signatures from different keys in a response so the validator wastes a bunch of time retrieving keys and then validating signatures that'll never validate. The fixes just limit the amount of time before validators yield to another task and/or give up. It's a big deal if you run a public resolver but otherwise you can probably fix it at your leisure.
- tsimionescu 3y agoIt's similar to how compilers often have limits on compile time constructs that are maybe not explicitly in the standard, but that no one really cares about. Say, if you design some recursive template in C++ that resolves after a million steps, that might technically be a valid program according to the spec but no compiler will actually accept it (I think the C++ spec actually allows recursion limits, but that's beside the point). This vulnerability is a bit like not having that limit. So, maybe an RFC to explicitly call out the need for some limit on DNSSEC processing time will be issued, but in practice no one except for attackers should ever come anywhere near the newly imposed non-standard ones.
- clwg 3y ago> The academics who found this flaw – associated with the German National Research Center for Applied Cybersecurity (ATHENE) in Darmstadt – claimed DNS server software makers briefed about the vulnerability described it as "the worst attack on DNS ever discovered." This seems a bit hyperbolic, the txid[0] randomization bug found by Kaminsky was objectively worse as it would allow you to poison the cache and in the days before encryption was considered standard. https://www.computerworld.com/article/2534823/dns-researcher-convinces-skeptics-that-bug-is-serious.html https://www.computerworld.com/article/2534823/dns-researcher...
- kazinator 3y agoHow not to use git: https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commits/main https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commits/main
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 3y agoHere is the paper: https://www.athene-center.de/fileadmin/content/PDF/Technical_Report_KeyTrap.pdf https://www.athene-center.de/fileadmin/content/PDF/Technical...
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 3y agoThis is really a design flaw in DNSSEC itself. It isn't so much a "vulnerability" in any particular software. BIND and Unbound, and subsequently everyone else that follows internet trends, intentionally added DNSSEC support even though DNSSEC was flawed from the outset. Why was DNSSEC revived from the RFC graveyard^1 and implemented by authors of BIND and Unbound. Cache poisoning. Why does cache poisoning exist. Because people use third party shared caches. Why do people use third party shared caches. That one I will leave for the reader. There are other, varied options. I use stored DNS data from a variety of sources that I can cross-check against each other. I use iterative resolution instead of recursive. I am happy to discover when websites occasionally change their IP addresses. I want to know. But most websites I visit keep the same addresses for years. Almost all DNS lookups I do are _not_ on a "phone". The number of IP addresses I need for the "phone" is relatively small. 1. According to djb, DNSSEC was first conceived in 1993. And the charlatans behind it started taking money from the USG sometime in or after 1994. https://cr.yp.to/talks/2009.10.30/slides.pdf https://cr.yp.to/talks/2009.10.30/slides.pdf That is a long time to be awaiting release in some version of BIND. Gee, I wonder why. With this "KeyTrap" demonstration, one might guess that DNSSEC sat around for 15 years because it was never ready for prime time. One might even conclude it still isn't.
- tptacek 3y agoDNSSEC hasn't been adopted at all, and was designed before the first cache poisoning attacks (both the bailiwick-style extra-records attack and the XID prediction attack, which were exploited separately from 1996 through 1997; Kaminsky's attack that combined the two wouldn't come out for another decade). It isn't motivated by any real threat model, but rather by a DoD effort to synergize all the Internet protocols with IPSEC.
- 1vuio0pswjnm7 3y agoI run DNS servers behind CurveDNS forwarders at home and it works fine. Of course that's not enough to convince anyone except me that it works. There are some nameservers that offer DNSCurve on the internet. This proves that it works. For example, dq a ianix.com 192.5.6.30 1 ianix.com - regular DNS: 197 bytes, 1+0+2+2 records, response, noerror query: 1 ianix.com authority: ianix.com 172800 NS uz5dns2sdrnxskf5lqt46v34cdlfqb9q2lvvmpr95g3l1qh0148sf6.ianix.com authority: ianix.com 172800 NS uz5dns1bx64zu3pgn9nm4zfvmh2vy4hpjy7nkjz6qjcu325bg9hzcx.ianix.com additional: uz5dns2sdrnxskf5lqt46v34cdlfqb9q2lvvmpr95g3l1qh0148sf6.ianix.com 172800 A 104.207.143.9 additional: uz5dns1bx64zu3pgn9nm4zfvmh2vy4hpjy7nkjz6qjcu325bg9hzcx.ianix.com 172800 A 104.248.15.206 dq -s -k dns2sdrnxskf5lqt46v34cdlfqb9q2lvvmpr95g3l1qh0148sf6 ianix.com 104.207.143.9 1 ianix.com - streamlined DNSCurve: 229 bytes, 1+2+2+2 records, response, authoritative, noerror query: 1 ianix.com answer: ianix.com 3600 A 104.248.15.206 answer: ianix.com 3600 A 104.207.143.9 authority: ianix.com 259200 NS uz5dns1bx64zu3pgn9nm4zfvmh2vy4hpjy7nkjz6qjcu325bg9hzcx.ianix.com authority: ianix.com 259200 NS uz5dns2sdrnxskf5lqt46v34cdlfqb9q2lvvmpr95g3l1qh0148sf6.ianix.com additional: uz5dns1bx64zu3pgn9nm4zfvmh2vy4hpjy7nkjz6qjcu325bg9hzcx.ianix.com 259200 A 104.248.15.206 additional: uz5dns2sdrnxskf5lqt46v34cdlfqb9q2lvvmpr95g3l1qh0148sf6.ianix.com 259200 A 104.207.143.9 The query to 192.5.6.30 is not encrypted because the .com nameservers do not provide a DNSCurve public key prefixed by "uz5" in the subdomain. The query to 104.248.15.206 is encrypted using DNSCurve. Each packet is encrypted separately. Packets are exchanged via UDP just like regular DNS. DNSCurve predates QUIC. There is also a free secondary DNS service that will let anyone offer DNSCurve without having to set up CurveDNS forwarders. Assuming they are still in business. I have not tested it. This should put to rest any doubts that DNSCurve actually works. But I know it won't. https://www.bunnyns.com https://www.bunnyns.com
- tptacek 3y agoThe whole point of CurveDNS (and now DoH) is that it works right away, and doesn't depend on the rest of the Internet cooperating with you. It's a bottom-up design, contrasted to DNSSEC's (failed) top-down model. The only problem with DNSCurve is that it's been effectively superseded by DoH. It's the Betamax of secure DNS protocols. Doesn't matter if it's better.
- 3y ago
- rurban 3y agoProper link: https://www.presseportal.de/pm/173495/5713546 https://www.presseportal.de/pm/173495/5713546