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I absolutely support ranked-choice voting as an improvement to the current system. BUT, the proposed system is specifically Instant Run-Off Voting (IRV), which
by crazygringo 7y ago
I absolutely support ranked-choice voting as an improvement to the current system.
BUT, the proposed system is specifically Instant Run-Off Voting (IRV), which does not make a centrist third-party candidate likely to win. Because it removes whoever gets the least first-place votes, the only improvement it gives is that a third-party candidate doesn't spoil an election, because your second-place vote will still count.
(E.g. Nader wouldn't have taken votes from Gore, so Gore would have won instead of Bush.) But you're still stuck with one of the polarizing two-party candidates who will win.
Contrast this to the Borda Count [2], where points are assigned by rank. In this case, suppose about half of everyone votes first-place for an extreme liberal, and the other half vote first-place for an extreme conservative. But everyone votes second-place for a moderate centrist they can live with, and third-place for the opposite-party candidate they detest. With IRV, the centrist is ignored and one of the extremists will win. But with Borda, the centrist candidate will win.
So to really get away from the poisonous political polarization of our times, ranked choice is necessary, but it needs to be Borda or similar, not IRV. Still -- it's a start, and I'm grateful for that alone.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant-runoff_voting
[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count
- chadlavi 7y ago> a third-party candidate doesn't spoil an election that's enough of an improvement for me
- karmelapple 7y agoAgreed. Let’s not allow perfect to be the enemy of the better. After not making any significant changes to voting in over 200 years (besides expanding it to more people, thank goodness) in the USA, taking one step towards a better future is gigantic. Once we take that first step, future steps will be easier (even if they’ll still be difficult at first). I can’t wait for RCV, any flavor, to come to more cities and states. P.S. if you’re in Massachusetts and feel strongly about ranked choice voting, come join me helping out https://voterchoice2020.org/ https://voterchoice2020.org/
- ElijahLynn 7y agoAlso, some interactive examples of different voting techniques: https://ncase.me/ballot/ https://ncase.me/ballot/
- throw_away 7y agoI came here to post this. I don't understand why Approval Voting and Score Voting don't get more love. The UX is easily understandable as we have been trained to thumbs-up and X/Y star ratings on everything from yelp and netflix. A simplified version in the form of the old pick one UX could be provided for voters who don't understand the new mechanism. They both seem strictly better than what we have and yet I never hear anything about them. They even solve Arrow's Impossibility Paradox and have the confidence of Arrow himself.
- macawfish 7y agoFairVote has a lock on the "we need to change our voting system: this is the best alternative" message, and from what I can tell are dogmatically opposed to cardinal systems in general. There's also a history of bickering and personal attacks between different voting reform activists, including people in leadership positions. The various ordinal voting advocates (Equal Vote, CES, etc.) really need help on the messaging and movement-building front. A lot of lay people struggle to "get" the abstract framing these issues are often presented in. It comes easy to computer programmers and mathematicians because we're relentlessly trained to think abstractly about algorithmic tradeoffs and emergent limits of systems. But a lot of people just don't see why this issue is important. It just seems like an obscure focus.
- ClayShentrup 7y ago> The various ordinal voting advocates (Equal Vote, CES, etc. Cardinal. FairVote is ordinal (IRV).
- elihu 7y agoFargo ND recently adopted approval voting (it was approved by voters by a wide margin), and there's a campaign to get an approval voting ballot measure in St. Louis. The Center for Election Science seems to be the main advocacy group that's pushing approval voting. They're a much smaller organization than fairvote.org, but they seem to be getting more funding and gaining momentum.
- pkulak 7y agoIf I understand your example, then one of the extreme candidates would actually have a super-majority of first-place votes, right? I'm not sure elevating the centrist there is the right move. I mean, it sounds like a pleasant outcome, but at some point you have to accept the will of the voters.
- ElijahLynn 7y agoBut also it gives voters the option to actually vote for whom they want to vote for instead of who they think will win. Big game changer and will fundamentally affect everything about the vote. Big vision here is that it also shifts the discussion to how can we make the voting system better, just by implementing _something_ better. I agree with you hugely that "it's a start, and I'm grateful for that alone". And we need to push this across the finish line, even though it isn't _perfect_. We just need _better_ right now, we need momentum.
- jefftk 7y ago> But also it gives voters the option to actually vote for whom they want to vote for instead of who they think will win. You already have the option to vote for who you want to vote for in "first past the post", you just might get an outcome you don't like very much... IRV and every other voting system is the same way: you can vote your heart, but you'll get an outcome you prefer more often if you vote tactically. There's even a theorem: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard–Satterthwaite_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gibbard–Satterthwaite_theorem For the specific case of IRV, consider an election like: * 32% of people: Clinton, Sanders, Trump * 33% of people: Sanders, Trump, Clinton * 35% of people: Trump, Clinton, Sanders Now, this is a terrible election and there's no clear winner because people's preferences point around in a circle. Under traditional voting Trump wins, while under IRV Clinton is eliminated and Sanders wins. But if a few people preferring Trump > Clinton > Sanders had instead voted just Clinton > Trump > Sanders we could have had: * 32% of people: Clinton, Sanders, Trump * 33% of people: Sanders, Trump, Clinton * 32% of people: Trump, Clinton, Sanders * 3% of people: Clinton, Trump, Sanders Then Trump would have been eliminated first, with only 32% of the first place votes, and his second place votes would have gone to Clinton, making her win. So by voting for a candidate they liked less, these voters got an outcome they liked more.
- unethical_ban 7y agoEvery single voting system has some element of fault. Very few voting systems are close to "perfect representation" and they tend to be more math heavy, in a way that would lead to distrust from the average voter. IRV might have some corner cases, such as the one you listed, where strategic voting is beneficial for some. IRV reduces that element drastically, and encourages positive voting and true representation to a much larger degree. Essentially, everything the NYT article says.
- jcoffland 7y ago> a third-party candidate doesn't spoil an election Without the fear of throwing their vote away, more will rank the 3rd party candidate first.
- NickM 7y agoBut IRV still does allow you to throw your vote away. Once third parties become competitive, the best strategy in IRV regresses back to "your first choice vote should be whichever of the two most viable candidates you prefer". IRV solves the problem of people irrationally throwing their votes away on candidates who have no chance of winning, but it absolutely still allows competitive third-party candidates to spoil an election. This is not just theoretical, it happened in Burlington in their 2009 mayoral election, which subsequently resulted in IRV being repealed there.
- Dylan16807 7y agohttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Burlington_mayoral_election https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Burlington_mayoral_electi... I don't see the problem? The third party won. That's not a spoiler. And several of the criticisms listed on that page are really dumb. Edit: Okay, so someone else would have won using ranked pairs... that's a different problem from "a spoiler" though.
- NickM 7y agoIn this election, the spoiler candidate was the Republican. If the Republican hadn't run, the Democrat would've beaten the Progressive, and the majority of voters would've preferred that outcome (including the majority of Republican voters who assumedly thought that their honest rankings would be properly reflected in the election result). It's a confusing example because we're used to spoiler candidates coming from third parties, but the politics in Vermont are a little bit unusual.
- vkou 7y agoI feel that the reason IRV was repealed in Burlington, was because an independent won, which was not palatable to either the Democrat, or the Republican political machines. The system worked exactly as intended, the people who usually hold power felt threatened by it, and engaged their political machinery to restore that power.
- 0-_-0 7y agoCouldn't then a completely unknown person win?
- unethical_ban 7y agoI get your concerns, but this IS an instance where I think progress over perfection is key. The mere idea of changing a voting process is a big hurdle, and if it is shown that "yeah, we can do that" and that FPTP is not the only voting system in history, we have achieved a victory. And as others have said, IRV is a huge win by allowing people to vote "FOR" something, rather than strategically vote against something. So, even if the third parties rarely break out, it would more accurately poll the public's sympathies.
- Sniffnoy 7y agoI don't think Borda count is an acceptable alternative. It's vulnerable to the teaming problem; elections would turn into contests of which party can nominate the most candidates. The simplest alternative you can actually get people behind and that doesn't have serious problems is probably approval voting. (For those unfamiliar: Just vote for any number of candidates, most votes wins.) It's simple, it works well, it doesn't really have glaring flaws like vote-splitting or teaming. There are various ways it's still not ideal, but if you want something for people to rally behind, I think its simplicity makes it the best candidate for that.
- shakna 7y ago> I don't think Borda count is an acceptable alternative. It's vulnerable to the teaming problem; elections would turn into contests of which party can nominate the most candidates. Isn't the simple solution there to limit the number of candidates a party can put forward? Forcing the party to try and be united about who they want representing an area?
- bargle0 7y agoWould that force them to be united? Putting some kind of rule in place might just force parties to balkanize. The barrier to candidate proliferation might be the ability to raise funds. Would a party get more out of one candidate, or two candidates with half the money?
- JAlexoid 7y agoRepublican and Democratic parties are already conglomerates of ideologies. Both should split up, for the better gauge of people's opinions.
- BurningFrog 7y agoYou can always launch several parties.
- Sniffnoy 7y agoOK, let's say we institute this cap. The obvious thing to do then is to spawn off officially-separate parties that can nominate more candidates for you. You could outlaw that, I suppose, but now we're getting into the area of things you need a judge to adjudicate, and, well... yeah. Anyway yeah you see where I'm going with this. When I say "party", that's shorthand -- I'm not talking about literal party organizations. The teaming problem is just that having a bunch of candidates that are similar to each other increases the chance that one of them will win; it's the opposite of the vote-splitting problem, where having similar candidates decreases the chance that any of them will win. This problem doesn't require a formal party organization in order to manifest; strategic nomination is still possible. Ideally one wants a voting system that is "cloneproof", i.e., has neither of these problems. (IRV is cloneproof, actually, but it has other glaring problems -- most notably its lack of monotonicity.)
- sidlls 7y agoThe duopoly parties are both right wing parties, and increasingly extremely so. Third-parties tend to be more centrist or leftist.
- drdeca 7y agoOften (but not always) when people talk about a party or politician or political position being right or left, they are talking about its relative position compared to the distribution at hand. Or, I guess sometimes they also might mean, like, some ambiguous combination of an idea of an objective left/right axis, along with the idea of a relative axis? Regardless, people generally agree that, currently in the US, that the Democratic Party is “to the left of” the Republican Party. As such, for the purpose of practical communication, it is often useful to understand what people are talking about in terms of this way of distinguishing between the two.
- sidlls 7y agoYour second paragraph is closer, though in fact most people don't think about it at that level. They typically don't know or understand that the position is relative to the current distribution. When they say "democrats are on the left" they mean it in an absolute sense, and both the duopoly parties play that ambiguity up to their collective advantage. The kind of voting system proposed isn't likely to change that.
- munk-a 7y agoI think the confusion here is mostly coming out of comparing US stances to globally expressed stances - both US parties are pretty right leaning on the global scale, but within the US left is democrat and right is republican - while people at the more extreme ends of the spectrum complain that, on the right, the republicans are too liberal and, on the left, democrats are too conservative. The sort of interesting thing is it's really hard to be objective about this, if you were to measure where parties have stood on minority representation over history both parties today are astronomically to the left of any parties in the 1800s. I think the main thing we can sort of examine is where policies lie in relative comparison to the voting base and under that measure I'd expect that we have far more conservative and corporate representation today from both parties than the people voting - in a large part due to the political corruption existent in our system.
- mc32 7y agoMaybe it takes time for people to adjust. In SF it’s netted dissatisfaction in many voters in my neighborhood. People are treating it like a trifecta rather than most favorite to least favorite of top three. So you end up with people few people had as their main favorite. And do it’s very underwhelming, at least first go round.
- gradys 7y agoTotally with you on supoorting ranked-choice voting. It seems like a clear and obvious upgrade over what we're doing now in ways that can be mathematically verified. Question though - why prefer the Bourda Count over a Condorcet method[1] like the Schulze method[2]? I recently went down the voting method rabbit-hole when recreationally overengineering the procedure for selecting a fun offsite activity for my team. I picked the Schulze method basically because it satisfies more[3] of the formal criteria that seemed important, including the Condorcet criterion, which seems especially important. The Bourda Count method doesn't[4] seem to satisfy the Condorcet criterion, so it's possible that a candidate that would win every head to head match up would lose the election. Also, like most (all?) methods that allocate variable numbers of points to candidates, it's subject to tactical voting[5], i.e. it might be rational not to allocate any points to your second place candidate in order to maximize the margin between your first place and second place candidates, even if you prefer your second place candidate to several others. 1 - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method 2 - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method 3 - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Comparison_table https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method#Comparison_ta... 4 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count#Evaluation_by_criteria https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count#Evaluation_by_crit... 5 - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count#Potential_for_tactical_manipulation https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count#Potential_for_ta...
- davidw 7y agoSeems good, but perhaps a bit difficult to explain to the average voter?
- tunesmith 7y agoCondorcet isn't particularly hard to explain. Easier to explain than IRV anyway. Call it "Instant Round Robin" - if one candidate would beat every other candidate head-to-head, then that candidate should win. The annoying part about Condorcet enthusiasts is that they insist on lumping the uncommon "tie-breaking" methods (i.e. when there is the rare loop) in with the above general definition. That's when people start talking about Schulz, Ranked-Pairs, etc etc. I personally think a loop is valuable and shouldn't be tie-breaked - it's an indication that the voters are not ready to decide and that there should be another round of debate among the finalists before revoting. In my opinion, the main flaw with Condorcet is that it is possible to have a Condorcet Winner that does not have the "approval" of a majority of voters.
- moultano 7y agoBorda count may be the only ranked choice voting system worse than Instant Runoff. The simulations here are more compelling than any mathematical argument I could make. http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ http://zesty.ca/voting/sim/ Approval voting is my preferred system, both for its intuitive appeal and quality of outcomes, but I'll settle for any change at all.
- jakelazaroff 7y agoWhat about those simulations makes you prefer Borda to IRV? The weird shapes IRV produces seem to make a pretty compelling argument against it.
- moultano 7y agoIf you look at the IRV plots boundary by boundary instead of as a whole, you see that most of the boundaries are in the same places as they are for other methods, but the boundary for whichever candidate is in the center can become chaotic. If you look at borda however, all of the boundaries shift, and they all shift in ways that favor candidates toward the center of the distribution. This says to me that Borda would not intuitively match people's ideas of what an election would do far more often, while IRV would have chaotic results mainly in exceptional cases. (I like approval the best. The one argument I've heard for why IRV is useful is that you can adapt it to do multi member proportional representation in a clever way https://www.fairvote.org/fair_rep_in_congress#what_does_the_fair_representation_act_do https://www.fairvote.org/fair_rep_in_congress#what_does_the_... )
- Alex3917 7y ago> But you're still stuck with one of the polarizing two-party candidates who will win. In New York City most people just vote for the candidate that most closely matches their own ethnicity / gender, so none of the candidates have any reason to run especially polarizing campaigns.
- cooljacob204 7y agoCitation needed
- ajennings 7y agoIf Nader takes enough votes from Gore, then Gore will have the fewest first place votes and get eliminated first. Then Nader has to go up against Bush and it all comes down to who the Gore voters put as their second choice. It may only take a small percentage of them putting Bush second for Bush to win. https://youtu.be/JtKAScORevQ https://youtu.be/JtKAScORevQ Was this election spoiled? By Nader or by Gore? You can argue the semantics of what "spoiler" means, but to me it's clear that IRV doesn't handle this situation well. It is safe to vote for a third-party only if they can't win. When three-way elections get close, you have to be more careful.
- jacques_chester 7y agoThis hypothetical is so far from the 2000 election as to be unrecognisable. If I'd written "If Nader takes enough votes from Bush..." it would be about as realistic. In any case, if Gore preferences flow to Bush over Nader, that's because those voters are expressing their preference for Bush over Nader. That's not spoiling: it's literally the entire point of providing a full ranking, is so that nobody's vote is ever discarded and so that any winning candidate must have accumulated an absolute majority.
- ajennings 7y agoThe parent post said: > a third-party candidate doesn't spoil an election, because your second-place vote will still count. (E.g. Nader wouldn't have taken votes from Gore, so Gore would have won instead of Bush.) I was just trying to point out that this isn't always true. Instant Runoff Voting can eliminate the centrist, the best compromise candidate, first. If we adopt IRV and third-parties grow, then we move into territory where IRV gets some elections obviously wrong. It has happened.
- flukus 7y ago> Was this election spoiled? By Nader or by Gore? You can argue the semantics of what "spoiler" means, but to me it's clear that IRV doesn't handle this situation well. In that scenario more people preferred Bush to Nader, all the bush supporters plus a few Gore supporters. So no it wasn't spoiled at all, the most popular candidate won and the system worked. It seems you think the goal is to elect the centerist candidate or something?
- lr4444lr 7y agoI don't see why it should be taken for a given moral good that a third party cannot spoil an election (Ranked Choice doesn't actually prevent that, at any rate, it just lessens the effect near the midpoint). If your political values are that a multiparty system is better than a binary choice, the risk of an upstart candidate being a spoiler gives him and by extension potential voters more bargaining power.
- kennywinker 7y ago> the risk of an upstart candidate being a spoiler gives him and by extension potential voters more bargaining power. bargaining power how? if you have a situation like this: - 55% of people vote left - 45% of people vote right The left party has a clear but narrow majority. Now a third party, further to the left enters the race! Say they can pull 15% of the vote, largely from the left (quite popular!) - 15% of people vote farther-left - 40% of people vote center-left - 45% of people vote right now the election likely to be won by the right-wing party - even though 55% of voters still favour a left-of-center result. Voters feel pressured to vote for the center-left party, despite having farther-left views, because they don't want the right wing party to win. Under first-past-the-post systems, there is no bargaining power short of "I will drop out of the race if you do x" which does not seem to happen much If they are unable to pull enough support to "spoil" the election result, they are considered a "throwaway vote" and marginalized. No power at all.
- lr4444lr 7y agoBecause they don't have to win in order to have power: they can extract concessions from one of the stronger candidates in exchange for dropping out and possibly endorsing him. In Ranked Choice, especially with IRV, third party candidates can be more easily ignored if their 1st choice votes will be assimilated. In your example, under Ranked Choice, the 15% who really wanted far left policies can be safely ignored after the primary. In traditional voting, the majoritarian center left now has to take their concerns seriously if they don't want to lose the whole thing.
- 7y ago
- zjaffee 7y agoWhile I agree with you in principal, in the context of the state of NY, and especially within NYC, ranked choice voting will do nothing more than hand the results of every future election to those who control the political machine. Think of it this way, in 2018, a top 2 primary in NY-14th district could very well have resulted in both AOC and Crowley, just like it did in the case of various districts in states like California and Washington which have top two primaries, but unlike in AOC's case, the incumbent largely pulled in those who would otherwise be Republican voters. This same exact story would've played out in the Queens DA race as well. In the democratic primary, there were 3 candidates who could be in some ways marked as left, center and right. The left and center candidates both got around 40% of the vote +- 100 votes, but the right leaning candidate got around 15% of the vote. If there was a second round of voting among this block of voters, the center candidate would've likely done much better in said second round. The issue you describe is really only likely to happen, when you have something like 10+ competitive candidates, when you have two candidates pulling 30-45% of the votes each, this being a problem becomes way less likely.
- mumblemumble 7y ago> the proposed system is specifically Instant Run-Off Voting (IRV), which does not make a centrist third-party candidate likely to win. I agree with you that it's not as nice as something like Borda count, but I think I only agree with you that it wouldn't help a centrist third-party candidates chances if we assume, for the sake of argument, that switching from first-past-the-post to IRV wouldn't change who voters pick as their top candidate. And that seems like a very difficult assumption to support, because the typical public discussion around third party candidates makes it explicit that people habitually choose to vote for someone other than their top choice in first-past-the-post elections. I can speak somewhat from experience here. Some of my local elections use (non-instant) runoff voting, and my decisionmaking process in the first round of those elections is markedly different from the one I use in elections without a runoff. For starters, it doesn't typically involve having to hold my nose while I fill out the ballot.
- novok 7y agoWhy not score voting instead? People can actually understand it and it gives even better results: https://ncase.me/ballot/ https://ncase.me/ballot/
- crazygringo 7y agoTo be honest, I do personally think score voting comes the closest to what is truly most democratic and accurate, even better than Borda. I hesitate to recommend it, however, because I'm not entirely convinced it's intuitive enough for the average voter to understand and apply properly. I'm also afraid it's too open to criticism of seeming overly "subjective", though I personally don't think it is. I would be very, very, very happy to have evidence that my fears are unfounded, however.
- contravariant 7y agoThe one thing I find iffy about score voting (or range voting) is that there's a decent chance people will just score everyone 5~8. This would give more voting power to people that deliberately only use 0 and 10. So I'd advocate approval voting. Just vote for the options that you find acceptable, the option with the highest acceptance rate wins.
- pgcj_poster 7y ago> there's a decent chance people will just score everyone 5~8 That sounds incredibly unlikely to me. I don't think I know anyone who would rank both Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton as a 7. To the contrary, it seems like people will almost always put either 0 or 10, making it not much different from approval voting.
- contravariant 7y agoThat is a rather extreme example, but still I don't think many people will actually fill in a 0, plenty of 2s and 3s maybe. Besides, like you said, if everyone always puts either 0 or 10 then it's the same thing as approval voting anyway so it can't hurt to just use approval voting.
- bhauer 7y agoI highly recommend CES's video on voting methods that highlights the non-monotonicity of IRV [1]. I would prefer the adoption of simpler models that can be implemented and understood by voters easily, such as approval or score voting. [1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2q_eMUGCU5U&feature=youtu.be&t=487 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2q_eMUGCU5U&feature=youtu.be...
- iron0013 7y agoThe point of getting rid of FPTP is absolutely not to “make a centrist third-party candidate likely to win”.
- sparrc 7y agoI'm not sure I follow why IRV means the centrist would be ignored. That assumes people actually _want_ to vote for the extreme polarizing candidates. People may currently only be voting for the more polarizing candidates because they get the most press and they seem the most "electable". With IRV people could actually vote for the boring centrist candidate without worrying that their vote isn't going to count.
- Mountain_Skies 7y agoWonder how this would have worked out during the two elections where Ross Perot pulled in a decent share of the vote.
- RockIslandLine 7y agoPerot pulled roughly evenly from across the political spectrum. There is no reason to assume it would have changed any result. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111651?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents https://www.jstor.org/stable/2111651?seq=1#metadata_info_tab...
- mntmoss 7y agoIRV produces a direct improvement in the politics in that it promotes coalition-building among minor candidates to defeat better-equipped competition: "vote for me and for this guy too". That means that instead of everyone running alone and mudslinging each other, which gives voters little narrative to work with(which in turn tends to lead towards the incumbents and partisan votes winning) there's more time and space going towards specific issues and platforms that consensus can be built around. As a voting system there are certainly better ones in terms of the vote itself, but having experienced the change I now think that the impact on consensus-building is an worthy criterion too.
- throwaheyy 7y agoExactly. Toxic two-party politics is a direct result of FPTP voting, not a reason to dismiss IRV Preferential voting, including IRV, effects change to toxic politics by encouraging a greater number parties, and encouraging them to work together and form coalitions to build strength through consensus and common ground.
- specialist 7y agoRCV/IRV absolutely reduces negative campaigning. Because all challenger candidates want to be your second choice.
- egypturnash 7y agoIs "the middle-of-the-road candidate wins" necessarily a feature when you're in a political environment that's been generally dragged far to the right of the rest of the world by decades of big business donating to right-wing candidates? Most "centrist" Dems feel more like the Repubs of my youth these days.
- mdasen 7y agoIRV isn't perfect, but it's a huge improvement over the current state of affairs. I would point out that the "won't elect a centrist" perspective might be a bit of an American perspective and a perspective that might change with IRV. For example, let's look at Canada. You have approximately from right to left, Conservative, Liberal, NDP, and Green. There are districts where the Conservative party won with around 30-40% of the vote while left-of-center parties gained 60%+. I'm guessing that most people that voted Green would prefer a Liberal candidate to a Conservative one. Similar for NDP voters. In that case, votes would have been transferred toward a more centrist party. I think in the US there's also the trap of the primary system. Primaries often have extremely low turnout compared to the electorate and so finding an energetic base can swing a primary in a way that it can't swing a general election. Many people who are more centrist don't vote in primaries. Frankly, you might just be underestimating how many centrist voters there are in general elections compared to primaries. Even as the Democrats have lots of great candidates, Biden is still topping the polls so far. IRV certainly isn't perfect, but it's an incredible improvement, easy to explain, easy to trust, etc. It might not end up with the candidate that is the most acceptable by some weighting system, but it does favor people with broad appeal. Honestly, if we got rid of the primary process and had a hypothetical general election that was Trump, Romney, Biden, and Warren, I think it's very likely that Romney or Biden would win. I think the big issue drawing parties away from the center is partly that primaries are decided by the small number of people who show up to them. If there was one general election with many candidates, it would likely be a different story. Heck, if the Republican primaries had been IRV, Trump likely wouldn't have been the candidate. Even if he was popular on the extreme, more centrist votes would have coalesced around someone else. IRV is simple and trustworthy. Borda, frankly, seems difficult to explain and trust. Ok, let's say that I have 4 Democrats and 1 far-right Republican with a uniform distribution of the 50% of democratic votes for the democrats. With 10,000 voters, the Republican gets 5,000 points. Each Democrat gets 1,250 * 1 + 1,250 * 0.8 + 1,250 * 0.6 + 1,250 * 0.4 which is only 3,500 points. The Republican wins a landslide victory despite an evenly split electorate. Or do you force people to list all candidates? Heck, let's go with Bush, Gore, and Nader. Let's say Bush gets 48%, Gore gets 37%, and Nader gets 15% (and assume that Nader voters aren't going to vote Bush). With IRV, it's easy. 13% protest-vote for Nader and Gore gets elected once their votes transfer. With Borda, it's more complicated. Bush gets 48% of the points and then Gore gets .37 * 1 + .15 * .67 which is only 47% of the points. Bush wins - but that's not what the public wanted to happen. They thought they could vote for Nader first without hurting Gore! IRV does have tactical voting considerations, but they seem really simple to understand and trust by comparison. IRV isn't perfect, but replacing a voting system requires something that people easily understand and trust. People easily understand the implications of ranking and eliminating the bottom person, redistributing those votes. They understand how it eliminates spoilers and lets them vote for who they want in the order they want. A points based system is a lot harder for people to understand and trust. Again, IRV isn't perfect, but if we're going to have change, it has to be easy for people to understand and accept. Personally, I prefer single-transferrable-vote and multi-seat constituencies, but that requires radical change to our system. IRV is a simple change that people intuitively understand, accept, and that so many people have wanted for decades now.
- JAlexoid 7y agoAnything for a least objectionable candidate winning majority of support. See the stupidity of the result of Maine Governor election of 2010. How can a person with a mere 37% win?!?!?!
- mtgx 7y agoI doubt it's so clear cut. With RCV the candidates are encouraged to play more centrist because they don't actually know how they will do ahead of time. If they play the extremist card and get only 40% and nothing else at the recount, then all is lost. This isn't just a theory, I've seen a few elections where the candidates were praising RCV for the lack of negative campaigns (i.e. not extremist), which happened precisely because of how RCV works. My biggest issue is that states don't also adopt multi-winner RCV, also called Single Transferable Vote, which is another form of proportional representation. This would both make elections more fair by giving minorities a bigger voice in districts, and it would also solve the gerrymandering problem in one go as a mere side-effect of how it works (a single party can't dominate any single district). Watch the video here to see how it would work: https://www.fairvote.org/fair_representation https://www.fairvote.org/fair_representation RCV is nice and all, mostly because of how bad the status quo FPTP is (along with other barriers the two parties have established against third-parties), but for much more democratic government you need a proportional representation voting system.
- beat 7y agoIf your goal is to give outsider candidates who can't get as many votes as mainstream candidates the win, then no, IRV isn't going to work. But if your goal is to break the Duverger's Law spoilering problem a bit, to give third parties a chance to build up from small rather than their current direction of starting with President of the United States, IRV is good. I've been living with IRV in Minneapolis for a couple of elections now, and what it's led to so far is tolerable, non-radical mayors. The most recent race was particularly interesting, as it took like five rounds to get a winner. I didn't vote for him, but he's been a much better mayor than I expected.
- sampo 7y ago> So to really get away from the poisonous political polarization of our times, ranked choice is necessary, but it needs to be Borda or similar, not IRV. All these fancy vote counting methods will only give you some scattered "third party" (actually more like independent, no party) candidates here and there. They will not give you a multi-party system. Only proportional voting can do that.
- r00fus 7y agoCondorcet [0] is widely recognized as the best voting system to address voting issues raised by Arrow's impossibility theorem [1]. No voting system is perfect, but Condorcet gets as close as possible. [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Condorcet_method [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theorem https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arrow%27s_impossibility_theore...
- ErikVandeWater 7y ago> BUT, the proposed system is specifically Instant Run-Off Voting (IRV), which does not make a centrist third-party candidate likely to win Perhaps not the third party candidate, but what about a same-party candidate that garners votes? Perhaps for example, lots of democrats would have selected Bernie as their number one choice last time around, then Hillary, then Trump. Perhaps Bernie would have had a better chance in that situation. Then again, I'm not sure this suggested system in NYC would even allow you to select someone who is not the nominee of a party without a write-in.
- aerovistae 7y agoIt's actually kind of hilarious. You're totally right. So what it means is third-party candidates still have zero chance to win whatsoever, but the votes cast towards them would no longer be lost. You're still allowed to pointlessly vote for an independent, but now you can do that AND still influence the actual battle between Rep and Dem.
- lucasmullens 7y ago> So what it means is third-party candidates still have zero chance to win whatsoever Third-party candidates have won in many elections, just not the presidency.
- ajross 7y ago> which does not make a centrist third-party candidate likely to win. The goal to ranked-choice voting schemes isn't to promote centrism, it's to eliminate the possibility of electing candidates without majority support due to factional vote splitting. As far as fixing polarization of factions within the electorate, that's not something an election scheme is going to be able to do at all. Modern Fox viewers and vegan college students are simply never going to see eye-to-eye, and that has nothing to do with what choices they're presented with every year in November.
- wmeredith 7y agoI agree with your criticism, but this still seems like an improvement.
- throwaheyy 7y agoA third party running against two polarizing candidates is a pathological case (as are two polarizing candidates alone). IRV gets better when there are more candidates, because they can form alliances and trade preferences. It goes further than that by /encouraging/ new candidates too because they can align themselves with other candidates and band together against competition. FPTP voting doesn’t encourage new candidates, because they’re competing against the big two. That’s why American politics sucks so much, both in its staleness and how the opponents treat each other.
- mjevans 7y agoI prefer the Schulze (path voting/winner) method, and I don't care if the most moderate candidate wins, I care that voters are able to express their desires and if a centralist candidate happens to be the overall best choice that's fine; I just disagree that it's always the best option to fully compromise. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schulze_method
- throwaway287391 7y agoBorda seems to assume every voter ranks every single candidate. That seems pretty impractical -- it's asking way too much of voters, unless the total number of candidates is somehow limited to ~5 (and even 5 would be pushing it IMO). Am I missing an obvious workaround to avoid voters essentially needing to rank every single candidate for their ballot to be considered valid? Edit: Wikipedia has a discussion on this issue [1], and none of the solutions seem great. The obvious one (giving unmarked candidates the lowest number of points) devolves into anyone being strategic only ranking their single favorite candidate as #1, which is the current system. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count#Truncated_ballots https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Borda_count#Truncated_ballots
- rstuart4133 7y ago> So to really get away from the poisonous political polarization of our times, ranked choice is necessary, but it needs to be Borda or similar, not IRV. You are definitely better off, but none of these solve polarisation issue. All deliver the tyranny of the majority. In the current system we generally elect one person per electorate. If you have 4 polarised groups, the split is 40%, 30%, 20% and 10%, and they are roughly evenly distributed among the electorates, then most of the people elected will be from the 40% group simply because they will win most electorates. The 40% will run the place, the other 60% will get very little say in what happens. This doesn't change much if you use one of the other voting systems. Lets 30% and 20% groups mostly agree with each other. It's true that with First Past Post the place is run by the 40%'s. But if with one of the others the only change is it the place will likely run by a coalition of the 30% + 20% because they are the only ones that will be elected. So yes the people in power change - but again 50% the people get no say in parliament. We are a whole 10% getter off. Whoopee. One way to get a balance is to have bigger electorates and have 10 people elected from each. Since 10 are elected from each the likely outcome is 4 of the 40%'s, 3 of the 30%'s and so on. Since none have a majority in parliament, they all have to compromise to get what they want. And that nice outcome happens regardless of which of these voting systems you use. I think all this focus on voting systems distracts from the real issue - tyranny of the majority.
- pgcj_poster 7y agoIn your thought experiment, the entire country is extreme one way or another. If this country used the Borda method, it seems like a moderate would win every time, despite the fact that there are no moderates in the entire country. Under IRV, the country would probably regularly rotate between extremes, which seems to correspond more closely to the actual makeup of the electorate. If a country is mostly moderate, it should have a moderate government. If a country is polarized, both sides should be represented in government. This is especially pronounced if we suppose that the "moderate" party isn't just the middle of two extremes, but actually has some distinctive characteristics of its own. For instance, imagine that there's a liberal party, a conservative party, and a single-issue party that advocates for the interests of farmers. Supposing a split like you proposed, with the farmer party as the "moderate centrists" it seems like the government would perpetually dedicate most of its money and energy towards agriculture, even though no voters particularly cared about that issue. It really seems like your preference for Borda is based on your own preference for moderate politics, not on any desire to faithfully represent the electorate.
- specialist 7y agoPolitical parties have four jobs: Build the party. Elect their endorsed candidates. Forge a platform. Lobby for their platform. RCV mostly helps with #1. No more spoiler effect enables 3rd parties to slowly, incrementally build awareness, socialization, support. At the bottom of the pyramid (locally). To eventually mount challenges to higher offices. Think of politics as a marathon (or maybe a horde invasion), with elections being periodic opinion polls.