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Devices Which Track Cellphones, Intercept Calls Found All Over DC, MD, VA
- softwaredoug 9y agoAwesome this was broken by local journalists
- tedunangst 9y agohttps://apnews.com/d716aac4ad744b4cae3c6b13dce12d7e https://apnews.com/d716aac4ad744b4cae3c6b13dce12d7e
- eps 9y agoDevices near the embassies can be explained in two ways and the US spying on foreign diplomats is a far more logical one.
- chiefalchemist 9y agoOr the US spying on its own.
- qaq 9y agoWhy is it logical relevant agencies have access to providers they don't need these devices to track cellphones.
- heartbreak 9y agoDiversification probably.
- mcthorogood 9y agoOr, Russian spies and other foreign entities listening to the conversations of U.S. Congressional staffers.
- walshemj 9y agoLooking for patterns that might disclose the watchers that follow diplomats / intelligence officers I assume.
- jlgaddis 9y agoRelated article, "Feds: There are hostile stingrays in DC, but we don’t know how to find them" [0], and discussion [1] from 45d ago. [0]: https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/04/dhs-to-senator-malicious-use-of-stingrays-is-a-real-and-growing-risk/ https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/04/dhs-to-senator-m... [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16748971 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=16748971
- madengr 9y agoNot knowing how to find them, is a load of crap. You can certainly find them, it just takes expensive equipment and time.
- SSLy 9y agoor just asking the cell towers providers for list of genuine hardware, and then cross-checking that against triangulated antennas.
- Scoundreller 9y agoIf it were me, the antenna would be a few hundred feet away from the equipment. And the antenna wouldn’t be anything like an antenna, just something that looks like a lawn-chair. And I’d move it every day or two. And definitely not run it 24h!!! Could still be found, but good luck.
- exikyut 9y agoHmm, then you need a super-mega-amplifier tacked on to boost the signal over the cable (AFAIK, the frequencies used really like short antenna runs). So that then means a super-thick faraday cage around the actual device, and probably somewhat noteworthy power consumption (a battery certainly wouldn't be enough).
- coolspot 9y agoProbably meant transmitter (antennae + encoder/decoder) separated from actual BTS hardware & operatives. So after counter-side finds your camouflaged BTS, it is only disposable and relatively cheap part and doesn’t lead to whole operation uncover. That probe part then would connect to starbucks wi-fi and interact with BTS software somewhere far from physical location, so you can’t quickly trace channel between probe and spy team.
- mattsilv 9y agoThe irony of this article being posted on a website that asks for location information from mobile users every time you visit.
- natch 9y agoTrue, but at least they have to ask in order to get your location. Rather than just getting the information 24/7 without asking you. Slight difference there.
- neom 9y agoCurious what this magic software on the phone detecting the devices is doing, anyone have any insights?
- newnewpdro 9y agoThe willful negligence from our governments in the (in)security of our communications infrastructure is criminally obscene.
- trumped 9y agothey like it this way, maybe.
- atomical 9y agoWhat android app shows suspicious events?
- walterbell 9y agoAndroid app: https://opensource.srlabs.de/projects/snoopsnitch/wiki/FAQ#What-does-SnoopSnitch-do https://opensource.srlabs.de/projects/snoopsnitch/wiki/FAQ#W... > SnoopSnitch offers tests to assess whether a device is exposed to attacks or surveillance from the mobile network. Here, the primary goal is to help mobile users detect network originated attacks, such as via SS7, SMS, or ISMI catchers. Our secondary goal is to provide a fact-based incentive to Mobile Network Operators to better improve the security of their networks. GSM ratings: https://gsmmap.org/#!/about https://gsmmap.org/#!/about > GSM Security Map compares the protection capabilities of mobile networks. Networks are rated in their protection capabilities relative to a reference network that implements all protection measures that have been seen “in the wild”. The reference is regularly updated to reflect new protection ideas becoming commercially available. Networks, therefore, have to improve continuously to maintain their score, just as hackers are continuously improving their capabilities.
- kelnos 9y agoBah, looks like SnoopSnitch requires root access (and a Qualcomm chipset in the phone) for most/all of the interesting mobile network tests, which is a shame.
- robocat 9y agoOr just buy a cheap second-hand Android phone - has mostly advantages.
- natch 9y agoYeah, great. Get a phone that secretly sends your text messages to a collection point in China. https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/15/13636072/budget-android-phones-blu-china-text-messages https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/15/13636072/budget-android-...
- dannyw 9y agoDoesn’t matter if it’s a $50 burner phone to detect snooping.
- bwilliams18 9y agoI don't understand the assertion that the US Gov't can't do anything to prevent the foreign governments from doing this... The FCC has broad powers to regulate the public airwaves. This technology clearly disturbes authorized and licensed utilizaton of the airwaves OUTSIDE of the bounds of the Embassies. FCC should have the power to prevent this.
- adventured 9y ago> I don't understand the assertion that the US Gov't can't do anything to prevent the foreign governments from doing this... There has been zero evidence presented so far that it is in fact foreign governments doing any of this. More likely it's the vast cabal of Federal agencies in the greater DC area all disregarding the law because nobody in the US Congress has the will to rein them in. And of course for all we know, the espionage may be entirely legal courtesy of some clandestine national security FISA sign-off. The US Government system is made up of dozens of extremely powerful agencies, and they are at war with each other at all times for power, information and budget. Sometimes that war is cold, sometimes it's warm. Simply put, they're all spying on each other and all aspects of the system that is meant to control them (while they attempt to control the system instead).
- spaceandthyme 9y agoSource?
- indiv0 9y agoI wouldn't go so far as to say that there's no federal agencies in the DC Stingray soup, but how can you say it's more likely to be federal agencies in DC of all places? If there was a single city in the US that foreign agencies would target, it would undoubtedly be DC. The abundance of embassies in the city make it a very easy target.
- ballenf 9y agoThe situation discussed in the article was with regard to Stingray-type devices placed at foreign embassies which are considered foreign soil. The FCC doesn't regulate embassies any more than it regulates Beijing or Moscow. The Stingrays found on K Street (far from Embassy Row) and some bridges were more likely US government operations. So the question comes back to are there non-embassy, non-US government Stingrays deployed and how to find them.
- Operyl 9y agoHeh. You know what I found most hilarious about this article? I went to it with my iPhone in safari and got asked to share my location. Who needs potential spy devices when all you need to do is compromise your local news site!
- IAmGraydon 9y agoI know almost nothing about the systems and protocols involved here, but aren't these cell systems hackable? Why has no one tried to connect to one and then compromise it to learn more about what (and who) makes them tick?
- dboreham 9y agoMost likely this has been done but the people who did it aren’t posting here.
- liamtk43 9y agoIMSI Catcher Detector for Android https://github.com/CellularPrivacy/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Detector https://github.com/CellularPrivacy/Android-IMSI-Catcher-Dete...
- guelo 9y agoIt was the responsibility of the FCC to have never allowed these devices to manufactured, but as typical they fell for the police exemption excuse. Now they'll be abused more and more.
- nyolfen 9y agoyou can manufacture one in your bedroom with an sdr and an rpi: https://julianoliver.com/output/stealth-cell-tower https://julianoliver.com/output/stealth-cell-tower
- CamperBob2 9y agoControl of 'manufacturing' was never going to happen. They would literally have to prohibit the sale of high-speed DACs and ADCs to civilians. If you think the War on Drugs was an expensive boondoggle, try keeping LTC2216s out of my hands. :-P However, it is the responsibility of the FCC to not throw up their hands and say "Duh, we don't know how to find 'em." They have one job -- regulating the use of the RF spectrum -- and that's it.
- tajen 9y agoOr have private-key encoding. That’s the case for HDMI: No-one can manufacture devices that aren’t approved. Of course the funny part is, it’s designed so pirates can only send HDMI output to approved screens (=not recording devices), but for backwards comparibility, they has to allow HDMI-to-SVGA adapter with decoding, so the breach is wide open. But you get the intent: HDMI was supposed to bea fully-encrypted standard with only preapproved devices.
- AlexCoventry 9y ago> HDMI was supposed to bea fully-encrypted standard with only preapproved devices. Interesting. Where can I read more about this intent, and how it was compromised?
- slashink 9y ago
- dghughes 9y agoThere was a similar thing in Ottawa Canada http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cse-supreme-court-cra-cellphone-trackers-1.4360759 http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/cse-supreme-court-cra-cellph...
- Exuma 9y agoDoes this apply to iPhones? So someone could put this outside my house and listen to all my iPhone calls?
- dboreham 9y agoAny kind of phone.
- UncleEntity 9y agoThey can't listen to your calls without cracking the keys shared between the phone company and your phone...though I do remember reading a while back that "someone" managed to steal the list from sim card manufacturers on more than one occasion.
- willstrafach 9y ago> though I do remember reading a while back that "someone" managed to steal the list from sim card manufacturers on more than one occasion. To avoid getting folks too worried about it being a widespread issue, this occurred for specifically targeted MENA-based cellular carriers, as I recall.
- dsl 9y agoThat is not true. Stingray's are cell towers and phones trust them. The device just downgrades to A5/2 (export grade) encryption, or broadcasts that it does not support encryption at all.
- kalleboo 9y agoSeems like a huge oversight to not let SIM cards disable certain types of encryption (that it knows the home network will never use). IIRC this is how downgrade attacks are prevented in EMV - the chip card will reject known-broken auth methods.
- supertrope 9y agoThe FCC takes a dim view on 911 call failures. All phones must support disabling GSM encryption as a fail safe. Never disabling encryption would be “fail secure” (like door locks that remain locked during a power outage).
- patrickg_zill 9y agoOccam's razor says that these are all run by the various agencies of the United States government... Any foreign embassy running one, has no right to radiate beyond the border of the embassy, where it is US soil and not foreign.
- wu-ikkyu 9y ago>Occam's razor says that these are all run by the various agencies of the United States Is there a more high value city for a foreign government to spy in? Seems foolish to assume occams razor here, at least for all of the devices
- whataretensors 9y agoThe device owners better not accidentally track an EU citizen or they might have to pay fines.
- throwaway9803 9y agoThis is old news to anyone living here and paying attention. I've been tracking suspicious cell sites for the past three years in my DC metro neighborhood with an old Android phone and some prosumer software. Some of the sites are mobile, but most of the ones I found were stationarity, and could be easily identified once you know what to look for. I'm pretty sure some of them are seriously degrading cell data/vocie quality. I stopped once I realized there was nothing you could do once you found them. there are only a couple of options for who is deploying them none of which I want to screw with.
- toomuchtodo 9y agoYou should report their approximate location to the FCC.
- saudioger 9y agoso they could continue to do nothing?
- throwaway9803 9y agoHonestly, I don't want to be on the radar of any entity that is deploying this type of gear in the DC metro area. I am under no illusion that I can protect myself if targeted by a state based actor. Better to be lost in the crowd. Best case scenario is it's a legitimate LEO operation. Worse, it's a federal national security operation. Worse still, it's a criminal, or foreign national security operation. Only in the first scenario would the FCC even remotely have the chance to do anything. Even then it might be a legitimate operation, and they do nothing.
- ILikeConemowk 9y agoI’m interested in attempting something similar in Europe. Do you have some links/pointers? Thanks!
- shabble 9y ago
- natch 9y agoI know journalism is severely challenged these days, but I wonder if anyone has done or is doing investigations in other cities outside of that region? It would be a surprise if it was limited to just that (admittedly interesting, and yes we already know why) geographic area.
- yosito 9y agoWhen I was living in DC, I would frequently find that my phone would have a signal but not functioning service, and I'd have to restart it to get service back. I always suspected Stingray devices.
- ddtaylor 9y agoFix the busted protocol, why is anyone expecting this not to be a problem? Use legitimate warrants to monitor communications on premise at the telco.
- tialaramex 9y agoEncryption protocols are hard. Two stories, one public and one from my current job: HTTPS is secured using SSL/ TLS. SSLv1 is so bad it didn't survive the laugh test when it was explained to actual cryptographers, I can't find any records of what it did. SSLv2 is also pretty bad. SSLv3 is at last good enough that actual cryptographers spent time finding holes in it and today it's considered so broken as to be useless. TLSv1.0 went to the IETF. More eyeballs will fix it right? Note if they're all engineers. Finally in TLSv1.2 the cryptographers were called in, but only after it was finished. "Hey, is this finished thing secure? Yes or No answers only" Only in TLS 1.3 which is finished but yet to be official, did they _start_ with cryptographers and do the engineering problems later after the cryptographers had baked in the security. At work, after a system being in use for several years, I was told we couldn't put more key-value pairs into the session information, it was "full". So I went to see how this could possibly be true. All the session information is turned into a JSON blob, which is turned into a few hundred bytes, and then those bytes are encrypted with RSA with the results stored in a Cookie. RSA is only designed to encrypt small quantities of data, which isn't a problem because it's supposed to be used to move a symmetric key. But far, far more importantly - even if this particular _method_ of doing so is crazy why are we encrypting all this data and hiding it in a Cookie at all? That's crazy.
- ddtaylor 9y agoI agree encryption is hard, but phone encryption protocols are intentionally weak for the wrong reasons. In the past the parameters have been picked low enough that domestic intelligence agencies can purposely hack them, while exporting even worse versions so that foreign adversaries are dead simple to hack. The protocols have changed over time, but this hasn't. Also the examples you cite it's not clear of those standards bodies were infiltrated by the same agencies implicated above. They very much do run private cover operations and "plant" people or acquire companies that allow them to weaken these protocols or standards.
- exabrial 9y agoIn D.C., I wouldn't be surprised if there also are foreign agents targeting US elected officials, in addition to the normal FBI nonsense.
- ptero 9y agoThis is likely the tip of the iceberg: devices with active transmission that are easy to find with some effort. I bet there are a lot of passive listeners (cheap SDR is probably all you need) sprinkled around as well that would be very hard to find.
- bvinc 9y agoWhen an encryption algorithm is no longer secure, it gets phased out and any protocol that uses that algorithm eventually gets denied. Can someone explain why older protocols like 2g with inadequate encryption can't be phased out? Or why there isn't even an effort or attempt or option to disable it?
- supertrope 9y agoIt’s not just the ciphers that were weak to begin with. It’s also the lack of mutual authentication: the network checks if the phone is entitled to service but the phone never checks if it’s a legitimate base station. Telcos do not care about technical means of security. As long as the average person can’t eavesdrop it’s good enough. When it comes to protecting their economic interest (preventing free calls) they use smart cards and strong encryption. 800MHz scanners have been illegal for decades. Legacy support and reliability are very important (in the context of cellular service which still is inferior to fixed telecommunications). Customers will get angry if you tell them their phone is obsolete. Or encryption incompatibility causes failed calls. The FCC takes a dim view on 911 failures, so phones must have a fallback no enciphering mode to maximize 911 call success. Compatibility with roaming host networks must be maintained. AT&T shut down their GSM network Jan 1 2017 but UMTS has plenty of vulnerabilities too. The SS7 protocol underpinning the PSTN lacks authentication.
- cameldrv 9y agoIf these are in embassies, the FBI should just roll up in a van with a HERF gun and take 'em out.
- maxander 9y ago> Turner said cell carriers can't completely secure our phones because they have to allow for law enforcement access. The key sentence in the article. The reason there isn’t a fix is that our (U.S.) government prefers spying on its citizens over being protected from other powers’ spying.