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Telegram founder: US intelligence tried to bribe us to weaken encryption

654 points by anjalik 9y ago

Callmenorm 9y ago
There aren't a lot of places that are embracing truly end-to-end encryption for the masses. I think it would be tough in the U.S. but it's not clear to me where the better place.
- steevenwee 9y ago
  Something like Iceland or Sweden?
Asmod4n 9y ago
There is no need for the US intelligence do to that, looking at the choices Telegram made on its own.
otalp 9y ago
>"It would be naive to think you can run an independent/secure cryptoapp based in the US." This seems to be a shot at WhatsApp and Signal, implying that they have loopholes that allow the FBI to snoop in. I'm not sure how true that is. This might be an attempt to deflect from the fact that Telegram uses a home-baked encryption protocol which might be insecure, while WhatsApp uses the OWS protocol.
- retox 9y ago
  If I'm not mistaken Telegram has already been proven insecure once in the past. WhatsApp is a zuck property now, you can consider it insecure.
  - deleted 9y ago
    [deleted]
  - dymk 9y ago
    > WhatsApp is a zuck property now, you can consider it insecure. Another day on HN...
  - Dolores12 9y ago
    when telegram has been proven insecure? in every topic about telegram people keep saying telegram is not secure. i failed to find info about how insecure their secure chats. maybe you can help me?
    - narrowrail 9y ago
      Many prominent and respected HNers have laid out the case for why Telegram has security issues. If you use the search function at the bottom, you will easily find these issues raised. I don't personally possess the knowledge to determine the soundness of Telegram's crypto, but there have been enough red flags raised on HN over the years to merit skepticism.
      - Dolores12 9y ago
        Is that how you prove something - by reading comments on HN? Oh, how about all these red flags are raised to scare people to not let them use Telegram which is really secure?
        WillyOnWheels 9y ago
        > Is that how you prove something - by reading comments on HN? I enjoy the comments of tpacek and ryanlol
        Dolores12 9y ago
        I don't think you answered my question.
        WillyOnWheels 9y ago
        I don't base my life on them but I think tpacek and ryanlol know more about computer security than I do.
      - RodericDay 9y ago
        tbh, people like tptacek and his buddies have a clear agenda and attitude of their own. I'm definitely not sated by their pronouncements alone.
  - toephu2 9y ago
    Why? Do you have any proof WhatsApp is insecure?
    - ams6110 9y ago
      I think the question should be do we have proof that it is secure?
      - moosingin3space 9y ago
        Moxie Marlinspike's reputation is dependent on his ability to deliver a secure product. Signal/Signal Protocol development is funded by donations and grants from groups like the Freedom of the Press Foundation, EFF, etc, and those groups desire a secure messaging product. Moxie has staked his reputation on WhatsApp's implementation of the Signal Protocol multiple times on the OWS blog, which he would not do if he disapproved of WhatsApp's implementation. There's no hard proof (except what can be gained through analysis of the executables), but there's no incentive for Moxie to lie, therefore, WhatsApp's implementation should be reasonably secure.
        vkazanov 9y ago
        And you call that a proof? :-)
        moosingin3space 9y ago
        I did say "there's no hard proof". This was purely an analysis of incentives.
        vkazanov 9y ago
        I think "speculation" is a better word here. :-)
    - snakeanus 9y ago
      Yes https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13389935 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13389935
- ghughes 9y ago
  Bingo. The CEO of Telegram likes to spread conspiracy theories that are good for business. In a recent tweet he claimed that Signal is "funded by the US government", [1] citing a ridiculous hit piece on OWS and Moxie. [2] [1] https://twitter.com/durov/status/872891017418113024 https://twitter.com/durov/status/872891017418113024 [2] https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/government-backed-privacy-tools-are-not-going-to-protect-us-from-president-trump https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/government-backed-privac...
  - BoumTAC 9y ago
    Even wikipedia say it's founded by the governement ... As of October 2016, the project has received an unknown amount of donations from individual sponsors via the Freedom of the Press Foundation.[100] Open Whisper Systems has received grants from the Knight Foundation,[101] the Shuttleworth Foundation,[102] and the Open Technology Fund,[103] a U.S. government funded program that has also supported other privacy projects like the anonymity software Tor and the encrypted instant messaging app Cryptocat. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software)
    - heartsucker 9y ago
      Funded by the government != The government has their hands all over it
      - gambiting 9y ago
        Even TOR was originally a government funded project
        aluhut 9y ago
        Even "the Internet" was originally a government funded project
        akerro 9y ago
- fossuser 9y ago
  You can read about the court filings [1] for Whatsapp metadata (unencrypted), but the actual text communication from Whatsapp is secure - or at least not returned by subpoena. I think Signal doesn't even have the metadata available, but I'm not sure about that. [1] (Horrible Forbes Link) https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/22/whatsapp-facebook-backdoor-government-data-request/print/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/22/whats...
  - r3bl 9y ago
    Someone already tried requesting data about two suspects from Whisper Systems. What they got is "one number is not a Signal user, while the second one created his account on X day at Y time."[0] So yeah, Signal doesn't retain metadata. All they can provide is whether you're using Signal or not and when you've started using it. [0] https://whispersystems.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/ https://whispersystems.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand...
- mtgx 9y ago
  I agree that it's somewhat a deflection, too, and I wish the Telegram team wasn't so stubborn about at least studying the Signal protocol and perhaps making its own version, if it doesn't trust it by default. I don't know if their "math Ph.Ds" would know how to do that, though. That said, I think it's pretty clear that WhatsApp does have a way to allow the FBI to snoop on users: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/13/whatsapp-backdoor-allows-snooping-on-encrypted-messages https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/13/whatsapp-... I know it's controversial and many don't believe WhatsApp would actually use it like that, but I don't buy it. Either they already use that "feature" as a legal intercept or they're about to do it at least in the UK, where Snoopers' Charter passed and the law is vague enough to force them to do something like that. It may happen in Australia, too, if the new anti-crypto bill passes. I still trust Signal for now, but I'm not sure whether or not their server-based solution will be so backdoor-proof against future bills, and I think they should be prioritizing decentralizing Signal somehow. EDIT: Sigh, Germany, too: http://fortune.com/2017/06/14/germany-fingerprint-children-spy-messages/ http://fortune.com/2017/06/14/germany-fingerprint-children-s...
- permanentdecaf 9y ago
  Pavel Durov wants everyone to think security is about trust in people. Most companies in that business do the same, because it's easier than building something that doesn't require trust in people. The way Pavel Durov and others like him present "trust" is (ironically) shady corporate structures[1], shell companies, or use of the word "Switzerland." They want people to think like that because they've built businesses that require it. Telegram stores the messages you send/receive unencrypted on their servers. That's not good, unless you've been trained to think that "privacy" is just about choosing the company, government, or legal jurisdiction that gets total access to your data. Security professionals know that's not how we should think about security (never trust people!), because Durov is leaving a lot out: there aren't safe jurisdictions, servers get hacked, and centralized databases will get compromised. Logic, though, is probably no match for conspiracy theories. 1: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/11/23/the-secret-american-origins-of-telegram-the-encrypted-messaging-app-favored-by-the-islamic-state/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/11...
  - skinnymuch 9y ago
    I read the WP article you cited, titled, "The secret American origins of Telegram, the encrypted messaging app favored by the Islamic State". If Telegram isn't that secure, then why are extremists like IS using it over Signal or WhatsApp? I know Telegram has better features for big groups and much better multi-platform support, so is that the reason? I'm legitimately asking without any snark.
    - kasey_junk 9y ago
      Because they have fallen for the marketing hype and are not secure messaging systems experts? We know some extremists still use SMS which is definitely not secure. Also, is there evidence that extremists aren't using Signal and WhatsApp?
      - skinnymuch 9y ago
        Them falling for the marketing makes sense.
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
- borncrusader 9y ago
  Indeed, looks like a shot at Signal. I was under the impression that Signal is much secure than WhatsApp at least in terms of getting away from the prying eyes of Facebook. In reality both of them use the Whisper protocol underneath AFAICT for end-point encryption.
- yogthos 9y ago
  Even if the protocol is mathematically sound, there is no way to verify that it's implemented faithfully by closed source software such as WhatsApp. Telegram protocol is open and has an open source reference client. While not as good as having both the server and the client open source, at least it allows independent verification that the protocol is being implemented faithfully.
- dingo_bat 9y ago
  How do we know what WhatsApp uses? And do they use it in a secure way?
tuna-piano 9y ago
Assuming this isn't just PR, in some ways this is scary and disheartening. But my first reaction was "Cool, our government really cares, is creative and has the necessary power to get things done." For those of you who've worked with government, you've seen how insanely difficult the procurement process is. Being as specific as needing to get competitive bids for toilet paper purchases, etc. So the fact that they could get potentially large amounts of bribe money means (a)This goes to high levels in the organization (b)They've probably done this before. I wonder how much they offered? And I wonder how many other pieces of software have backdoors. I would think the first things they would try and get access to is (a)Certificate issuers and (b) VPN software. Do we know that Godaddy,LetsEncrypt, OpenVPN, Cisco VPN, Juniper, etc don't have backdoors?
- falcolas 9y ago
  > Cool, our government really cares I wonder what they really care about? Liberty, individual rights, security, or more power? They're people too, so I'm sure they believe in the first three, but the last one is a more seductive and drives a lot more of the bad we see governments do; worse is that the drive for more power is frequently justified as "we need this power to protect our nation". > has the necessary power to get things done This actually frightens me a bit. The US government has the ability (and has displayed the willingness) to absolutely destroy people's lives in their pursuit of "national security". What checks and balances are in place to keep this kind of power in check?
  - tuna-piano 9y ago
    I agree with you completely. I think it's good that they aren't sitting behind a desk doing nothing, but I'm glad these stories come out so we can have the proper conversations and keep privacy-security tradeoffs at a comfortable level for society.
  - AmIFirstToThink 9y ago
    One... to see if you are for sale. If you can be bought, other state actors will try and may succeed, whether US actually bribes you or not. US needs to know if a successful App is up for taking bribe, including top developers individually, or not, because millions of Americans including persons in position of power might be using that app. Two... essentially, this is power of people applied. Lot of interest in keeping status quo of power, of narrative, of money. They want to have dirt on everyone and then choose to use it when needed. Putting pressure or not can be decided later, dirt will be collected by default. No point in digging the well when you are thirsty, you need to do it well upfront the need arising. >What checks and balances are in place to keep this kind of power in check? Either play the game, or be too big to fail and lobby the government for your needs. I think the best one can do is choose your masters either USA, China, Russia or to some extent India or EU main players.
retox 9y ago
Sounds like a reasonable exit if noone wants to buy your popular e2e encrypted chat app. Take the bribe, shutdown and move on to the next iteration.
- ethbro 9y ago
  1) Open source codebase pre-backdoor 2) Take bribe 3) Insert backdoor 4) Close company
  - amq 9y ago
    truecrypt?
    - mverwijs 9y ago
      FUD? http://istruecryptauditedyet.com http://istruecryptauditedyet.com
robert_foss 9y ago
This is pretty alarming stuff. Especially considering how that competitors like Signal are US based. Signal is owned by twitter which by no means is a small player, so it isn't likely to fly under anyones radar.
- Ar-Curunir 9y ago
  Signal is not owned by Twitter. Moxie works there, but that doesn't mean his code is owned by Twitter.
  - WillyOnWheels 9y ago
    I hate to pedantically bore people but Moxie does not work at Twitter. He did for a short period of time after Twitter acquired his 2 person startup.
- daxorid 9y ago
  Signal is owned by twitter No. OWS != WS
- kardos 9y ago
  If Wikipedia is current on the topic [1], then Twitter owns Whisper Systems (RedPhone, TextSecure, ...), but Moxie runs Open Whisper Systems (Signal). [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Whisper_Systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Whisper_Systems
- geofft 9y ago
  It's not a stretch to believe that people working on Signal have been offered bribes. But it's definitely a stretch to believe that they've accepted them, or that it's worked. The protocol and the source code are public and well-reviewed (Telegram has a much less well-reviewed algorithm and does code drops on GitHub); it'd be a challenge to successfully fit a back door in Signal. The thread that @durov was replying to was portraying being hired away from a public crypto project as a "bribe". Certainly that's a thing you could successfully do, but it also doesn't weaken Signal's encryption as long as there are still people working on it.
jquast 9y ago
"a few months later i was offered an interview for a position at the fbi office for cyber-warfare in nyc who as well offered to fix my immigration status" and, "before going to monterey and while exploring the beauty of san francisco i was contacted once by a us navy intelligence officer who seemingly unintentionally appeared next to me at the bar" http://mickey.lucifier.net/b4ckd00r.html http://mickey.lucifier.net/b4ckd00r.html
- groby_b 9y ago
  Would you mind clarifying what your quotes and the linked wall of text have to do with the story?
  - dmix 9y ago
    Seems to be a similar story by a security guy who wrote crypto code for OpenBSD. The larger quote: > about the same time at the bazaar show in nyc i was contacted by a representative of us-ins and a ukrainian millitary attache at un. both investigating my involvement with openbsd. a few months later i was offered an interview for a position at the fbi office for cyber-warfare in nyc who as well offered to fix my immigration status (or none thereof at the time ;) with a greencard. nonetheless for the lack of credibility from the future employer i refused to talk to them as for me deportation did not sound like an acceptable worst-case scenario. > before going to monterey and while exploring the beauty of san francisco i was contacted once by a us navy intelligence officer who seemingly unintentionally appeared next to me at the bar. later on my way back during a short stay in chicago also randomly appearing fbi agent. fellow was ordering food and beer for me and just like his navy pal gave me a warning to keep my mouth shut! He was a foreign national visiting the US who probably got targeted by various agencies after attending some security conferences.
    - groby_b 9y ago
      Ah, thank you.
loceng 9y ago
The ridiculousness of it all is it's unreasonable at its base to try to prevent encryption as a form of safety and security from violence. Sure, you can lock up all communication for privacy reasons, and the government can spend all kinds of resources on trying to control to prevent or circumvent encryption - however it's a waste of resources as it's simply a bandaid. If I wanted to do something violent or evil I/you can simply have regular meetings and use paper communication - the old spy-style stuff. Of course those networks can be infiltrated by governments with the resources, and they can maintain that presence by allowing certain acts within networks to occur vs. deciding which ones they should stop; it's how the war against Hitler was won once their encryption was broken - watch the very well-done The Imitation Game - http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2084970/ http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2084970/ - for a reference. The only real solution is dealing with the root causes. I heard an analyst on TV (a rare occasion for me) mention after Trump's Saudi visit and speech, that he didn't mention that the Saudis should look into the root causes of why there is terrorist activity growing in their countries; of course a lot of it is historical karma and rage from violent acts against their families, however a lot is because people's basic needs aren't being met which prevents the higher levels of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs from being reached and maintained. There's a solution and it requires building real community, locally, where you are now - and striving for people to become healthy so they don't develop bias and other coping mechanisms which prevent empathy and understanding and therefore compassion; preventing responsible ownership of weapons isn't useful either, not developing and supplying weapons on mass would be beneficial, however most attacks recently have been with vehicles or knives. Universal Basic Income will also allow closer to a truly free work market and it can evolve from there, giving people the time to do what they feel is the most important in that moment for themselves, while not having to be forced to working in a shitty environment with shitty managers or co-workers; the health improvement and increased productivity here alone is worth it.
- aeorgnoieang 9y ago
  > however a lot is because people's basic needs aren't being met which prevents the higher levels of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs from being reached and maintained. This is contradicted by a lot of evidence. Terrorists are most commonly middle class members of their society and often well educated. If anything, terrorism is a powerful means of satisfying the higher levels of 'needs', e.g. meaning, purpose, community.
killjoywashere 9y ago
Hmmmm.... A Russian peddling undocumented crypto warez implies US crypto is untrustworthy despite the obvious open source code. Don't suppose this would be one of Putin's patriotic citizen artists spreading fake news do you? Edit: thanks to all the replies. I am smarter now.
- daxorid 9y ago
  > A Russian Russophobia seems to be the only acceptable form of Xenophobia these days. And a wildly popular one, at that.
  - madez 9y ago
    Is it bad to be afraid when there is reason to be?
    - dmix 9y ago
      Of course not, but there should be more to it than merely seeing the word 'Russian'. I see this all the time now in left-leaning US papers (NYTimes, WaPo) that immediately imply association with something bad happening (he spoke with a Russian!). Much like the other popular generalization of 'Muslim' without qualification of type of Muslim where significant subsets have never been involved with terrorism (sufism vs wahhabism for example). There are proponents who want to eliminate any type of generalization based on nationality/religion/etc which is also heavily flawed. Somewhere in between is the rational approach.
      - mikeash 9y ago
        The stuff in the papers is not taking "Russian" to mean "bad." It's looking at serious allegations of collusion with the Russian government, known interference in the 2016 election by the Russian government, statements by various administration officials that they had no contact with the Russian government, and then using meetings with high-level officials in the Russian government to imply something bad happening. With this comment, the idea is that crypto software built in Russia could easily be compromised by the rather un-free Russian government, which seems pretty reasonable. Of course, the fact that this fellow no longer lives in Russia scuttles it, but that's just not being fully informed, not "xenophobia."
logicallee 9y ago
The problem I have as an end user is that I want the infrastructure protecting me to be invisible. Let's return to this after the following paragraphs. I will make some pretty far-reaching conclusions. I think we can all agree that if some totally below-the-radar crypto anarchist who happens to have a few million dollars from bitcoins figured out that they actually have enough access via the dark web to bribe a few Russian generals and long story short detonate a nuclear bomb a few miles outside New York City, just for shits and giggles, then they should be stopped at some point along the way. This will seem like a made-up example to you but I purposefully don't want to confuse the issue with practical examples. We can all agree that at some point this should be stopped. A reasonable time to stop it might be if intelligence agencies get a literal screenshot from a darkweb chatroom (from a concerned participant, where the participant thinks they're really going too far) where this is being planned in exacting detail but more information is needed to be precise. (For example, suppose the source of the nuclear bomb were not Russia but not enough information was given to identify it. There are actually quite a few nuclear states and many of them are quite corrupt. A short list includes India, North Korea, Pakistan.) I would think that this kind of actionable urgent intelligence should unlock whatever privacy safeguards are in place, but the issue is that if there is a correct "technical" solution (if cryptography works 'correctly' and is not broken, in an academic sense), then there is no technical possibility to unlock anything. If Tor, crypto currencies, and encryption "work" (in a binary, yes it works, or no, it's broken sense) then following the receipt of such a screenshot there is no technical means of any further step. Here I'm going to be philosophical for a second. The future of technology is nearly infinite human power. You can already in the next few seconds initiate a crypto currency transfer to anyone anywhere in the world, who can receive it without any banking infrastructure or oversight. The arc of technology has been personal human enablement. When individuals become nearly God-like and all-powerful, it is dangerous to be in a position where, like the Muslims reporting the madman banned from his U.K. mosque for radical insanity, the status quo is that if you report your friend to the authorities saying, "My online friend, God-like in his powers, is planning to murder a million people just for shits and giggles, and he's kind of insane. Unfortunately, I don't know where he is or what he's doing, but I'm pretty concerned. He has a lot of money from a few ponzi schemes he ran. It's pretty credible for the following specific reasons (screenshots, quotes, etc)." And the only response from the authorities is, "Thanks for all this. We don't know where he is either, in the grand scheme of things a million deaths isn't that much and if it happens we will look at preventing another such case." That's a pretty silly response, isn't it? That the only possible response is, sorry, nothing can be done. Okay, now I've laid out why there should probably be some infrastructure on the back-end. What I don't like is that this translates to humans literally reading people's private correspondence, web searches, etc. It's not very good. What is a good middle ground? Can't the NSA make things that run locally, so that no human is reading your correspondence or web traffic, but as you start researching nuclear weapons and making plans on how to murder a million people, and start making those transactions, all this starts adding up and, to quote the Constitution, its tools can receive instructions "particularly describing the place to be searched, and things to be seized", so that after such a report, its perpetrator can be found, or at least enough information can be collected to stop it if it is actually taking place? I think that all of us here could be okay with being stopped at some point between purchasing a hundred million dollars in anonymous currency, and detonating a nuclear bomb. It's sensible. That can be part of the social contract. It's difficult. Nobody wants to live with a judge, jury, and executioner in their home looking at everything they are doing in case they break some law. I am glad that I personally don't have to answer these questions. But we can all agree on the need for privacy (no human looks at what you're doing), and also on the reasonableness, as each individual online progresses toward infinite personal power, for protecting the rest of society from credible and immediate, specific threats. I agree with cryptographers who think of cryptography as a tool that is either working or broken. (If it has a back door, it's 'broken'). Perhaps if tools included a certain portion that runs locally they could increase the extent to which the tools are not actually 'broken' (i.e. they are actually working, and actually not backdoored), while also increasing the safety every single person has from other individuals being able to plan or pay for their specific death anonymously, and with impunity. I realize that my suggestions here are not specific enough to be actionable, they are not clear recommendations. But I don't even see these possibilities being discussed (at least publicly), so I wanted to at least move the conversation a bit in this direction. EDIT: --- I'm getting downvoted pretty heavily. Let me ask point-blank: are you okay with someone being able to spend two weeks on the dark-web researching how to make and detonate a bomb using totally innocent chemical purchases, and then your spouse, parents, relatives, or you, being an innocent victim of my exploding the results, or would you want that person to be stopped at some point after they started doing that? The future of information is that it is ubiquitous and easy to access [I edited this paragraph edited from first to third person.] Actually secure communications would mean that it is technically impossible to see if someone has started communicating with people at ISIS who have overseen and helped people explode themselves. I am not saying communication should be weak and insecure, but should I really practically be able to start doing that if I want? This is not some kind of false example, either. Also, for downvoters: I think it is easier for you to agree with the other half of my statement, that nobody should be looking at our web traffic and correspondence, and that it should be actually secure, and also actually private.
angry_octet 9y ago
Read the replies from all the serious crypto security people on twitter and you will see the overwhelming consensus is that the FSB/Spetssviaz and FBI/NSA probably love Telegram for its roll-your-own-crypto and server mediated group chats. One also has to wonder if the FBI consider the Telegram team to be essentially undeclared Russian agents, and hence fair game.
- nf05papsjfVbc 9y ago
  Indeed despite what they say, we only have their word for it but no source code to check whether they accepted these requests from the snoopers in usa.
  - rthomas6 9y ago
    I thought they open sourced the code?
    - slipmagic 9y ago
      Yeah, it's open and the encryption is done in the client, so it should be available on Github. [1] - https://telegram.org/apps https://telegram.org/apps
- Turbots 9y ago
  That's why the UK is trying to ban Telegram because they can't seem to decrypt the secure chats of British and other terrorists... I know they wouldn't tell us if they would have cracked telegram, but there's no reason to believe they have... They would find all of the homegrown terrorists so fast if they could (there are many sources confirming most of ISIS chats are over secure telegram chats)
strictnein 9y ago
Cryptography experts like Matthew Green were having fun with some of his claims on Twitter a couple of days ago. I would read whatever Durov claims with a large amount of skepticism. ex: https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/873696211722784768 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/87369621172278476...
- tptacek 9y ago
  If there are any professional cryptographic engineers that take this seriously, I'd be interested in hearing from them. From what I can tell, the response to this has been pretty much unanimous.
throw2016 9y ago
Governments never believed in privacy. Before they were opening envelopes and tapping phones. Now they are trying to keep up with technology and given the sheer scale of resources, manpower and power at hand operating 24/7 they will prevail. A journalist like Poitras is on all sorts of lists and incessantly harassed. There are secret courts, secret laws and secret processes at play. And beyond this the power of harassment, intimidation, blackmail and bribery. Individuals and even organizations cannot prevail against the array of capabilities. Its nice to think of democratic theory and the rights but these only exist when not exercised as talking points. The moment you start exercising them you end up on all sorts of lists, marked for harassment and basically have a target on your back. Dissent is squashed even before it can formulate.
EternalData 9y ago
The government has progressed from banning encryption to trying to subvert it :/
- killjoywashere 9y ago
  That's actually a central tenant of the NSA's mission. But that mission predates the internet and public key crypto. Now it's like the gas company is running around drilling holes in gas pipes.
boulette 9y ago
French Gendarmerie did this : http://www.papergeek.fr/telegram-securite-messagerie-chiffree-contournee-par-gendarmes-37820 http://www.papergeek.fr/telegram-securite-messagerie-chiffre...
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
_RPM 9y ago
they "trust me", dumb fucks
- dsacco 9y ago
  Are we really still doing this? Can't we just collectively agree to think whatever we want about Facebook and not make the same unsubstantive, pointless comments over and over again every time Facebook or one of its subsidiaries is mentioned? Is no discussion safe from this never ending circlejerk? I don't care if you hate Facebook, or Mark Zuckerberg, for whatever reason, but can we please just stop infecting every thread with comments like this? It's not productive! No one was convinced who didn't already side with you, and everyone else remains just as unconvinced as they were before. At least try.
- sctb 9y ago
  We detached this comment from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14560721 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14560721 and marked it off-topic.
custos 9y ago
Option 1: Could be Russian/Telegram propaganda. Option 2: Could be true because seriously, who trusts the FBI/NSA not to violate our privacy anymore? Really not sure what to believe about this one.
- tptacek 9y ago
  Option 2 requires you not just to believe that the FBI and NSA would want to compromise Telegram (I have no trouble believing that) but that they'd be comfortable disclosing that to Pavel Durov. I have a very hard time believing that any branch of the US IC is comfortable trusting secrets to Pavel Durov.
- mverwijs 9y ago
  A person born in Russia says something and you think it's "russian propaganda". Mccarthy would be proud.
  - custos 9y ago
    Both the US and Russia are well known in interfering with foreign governments. Hell even America has their own foreign propaganda service "Voice of America" radio. Also I have no problem with communism, I have problems with corruption and government over-reach/attempts to influence populations. I'm not new to this. I've worked with people who flood social networks with bullshit to sway public opinion. Always be skeptical, of both sides. And at this point I don't trust either the NSA or the Russian equivalents.
ricksharp 9y ago
Can someone correct me if I am wrong, but it seems relatively easy to make an encrypted peer-to-peer messaging system. I mean, simply use a public/private encryption algorithm that has proven to be highly secure: - Share your public key openly - Anyone can send a message to you using your public key to encrypt the message - You decrypt with your private key on device Do all the encryption/decryption on device and viola, secure messaging. (This is basically how https works.) Of course this only allows a single device the ability to decrypt the message. However, if you want to allow multiple devices to share a private key, they can simple send each other their own private keys using the same encrypted protocol. In addition, for super paranoid use, a master password could be used to salt the private key so that would be required with the private key to enable decryption. (Which is similar to how password keepers basically work.) What am I missing?
- closeparen 9y ago
  Who do you trust to distribute the keys? This person is empowered to MITM. Who do you trust to know the metadata about how encrypted messages are flowing? Who do you trust to get the crypto implementation details right? How will you support use of multiple devices? People generally expect seamless switching between phone and laptop these days.
  - ricksharp 9y ago
    Public keys are open, they can be distributed any way (they could be published to a hosted directory a shared wherever). Only the device that owns the private key could decrypt the message. In fact encrypted messages could be stored publically anywhere and only the intended recipient could read them. The flow of messages is not encrypted, the system only encrypts message contents. (However, there are options to make it very difficult to trace, but that is a different issue.) Trust is up to the user to decide and is always necessary. Multiple devices is easy enough, a device can encrypt its own private key and send it to another device (using the target devices public key). The target device would now have 2 private keys for decryption.
    - 9y ago
drawkbox 9y ago
I am not sure about the claim here but the FBI has always been all over cryptography companies and products and this was well before Snowden, Phil Zimmermann (PGP) knows about this. In 2003-2006, we built a service that was a financial system to exchange financial data through various means including AS/2 EDI over HTTP with big companies and the government suppliers such as AAFES (Army and Air Force Exchange). Initially we had RSA, PGP and a custom encryption in there, the latter two for other features besides EDI. We got a letter from the FBI asking us to switch only to RSA, they wanted to know about our use of PGP and wanted to see our custom encryption if we continued to use it. Being a small/medium company we switched to just RSA to avoid any issues. It was an odd day, when I came into the office they told me I had an FBI letter on my desk and you can imagine what happens around an office when something like that happens. Very strange day indeed. Moral of the story, if you create your own crypto or aren't using the ones you are supposed to use, in any capacity, expect some knocking.
- ben_w 9y ago
  Interesting. That strongly implies that RSA has a flaw, which is news to me.
  - tptacek 9y ago
    If the USG was aware of a secret flaw in RSA, they wouldn't be tipping their hands about it to random small companies. Come on. But: avoid RSA anyways. It's inferior to modern curve crypto.
    - drawkbox 9y ago
      I think the only reason they contacted us was because we were one of 25ish companies certified to communicate with government endpoints early on in HTTP based EDI. It was right at the moment that EDI went from faxing to FTP to HTTP/email in AS2/3/4. Others were Oracle, Microsoft, IBM, EDS, Axway, /n software etc. It wasn't until we had to connect to AAFES that it was a problem. We were small but we were sending a good amount of orders and financial data from Wal-mart, AAFES, and other gov't sources that had early EDI over HTTP/S going. They were also recommending us to vendors on their approved EDI software list and probably wanted to recommend ones that played nicely.
pigeons 9y ago
There isn't even any need to weaken the homebrew encryption, good luck using it. I don't even have the option on the Linux desktop client at least. The "secret chat" feature isn't available.
lngnmn 9y ago
Good PR.
lilleshan 9y ago
im happy to finally know the truth about my husband infidelities all these years…and promised Mich to share his contact to anyone in need of same help after getting all the evidence and proofs on my husband’s phone….contact michackersolution@ gmailcom for any real Hacking job has my experience online with hackers have really been frustrating until i met Mich.….within some few hours he was able to reveal all the real truth of his infidelities and lies on fb,whatsap, emails and instagr without touching the phone you can call, text or whatsap him on his contact +16282043675 tell him Lille referred you gt
prawn 9y ago
Surely it's not just an issue of location but scale? Unless there is a huge team reviewing code, an individual or small team could be paid-off by an agency to provide a backdoor? For the right combination of large scale app by small team, there'd have to be a price at which many individuals capitulate? If the backdoor is somehow revealed, "doesn't matter, got my money". I used to wonder whether some success of social media companies couldn't be explained by secret payments for backdoor access. You could be operating out of Europe or Africa and still get offered money, and other pressure carefully applied. You might think you'd hold true to your plan of privacy-for-all, but if they offer $x00m or more?
19eightyfour 9y ago
But wouldn't it be in the interests of mass surveillance to herd people toward a chat option that isn't secure, or that the surveillants have a backdoor to? You get two benefits: 1) chat people think is secret you can read, 2) people self-identify as selectors / targets by choosing to try to hide their communications, which you can actually read And if such PR herding worked, wouldn't the surveillants be prepared to pay for such efforts to make their job easier? So, what seems readily apparent is: Telegram takes state money, to offer an insecure option, while dissimulating to the world that it's: a) secure and b) turning down state money all the time. I know why this perspective isn't discussed in MSM. But I don't get why it's not discussed more here. It seems obvious to me. And personally IMHO, I think that's a good thing. Catch more criminals / terrorists.
known 9y ago
"Never do anything against conscience even if the state demands it." --Einstein
known 9y ago
How Telegram is making money?
amai 9y ago
Pavel Durov is the guy who started vk.com which stores passwords in plain text: https://thehackernews.com/2016/06/vk-com-data-breach.html https://thehackernews.com/2016/06/vk-com-data-breach.html He has no clue about security. Whatever he claims, I would never use Telegram.

654 points by anjalik 9y ago

There aren't a lot of places that are embracing truly end-to-end encryption for the masses. I think it would be tough in the U.S. but it's not clear to me where the better place.

steevenwee 9y ago
Something like Iceland or Sweden?

Asmod4n 9y ago

There is no need for the US intelligence do to that, looking at the choices Telegram made on its own.

otalp 9y ago

>"It would be naive to think you can run an independent/secure cryptoapp based in the US." This seems to be a shot at WhatsApp and Signal, implying that they have loopholes that allow the FBI to snoop in. I'm not sure how true that is. This might be an attempt to deflect from the fact that Telegram uses a home-baked encryption protocol which might be insecure, while WhatsApp uses the OWS protocol.

retox 9y ago
If I'm not mistaken Telegram has already been proven insecure once in the past. WhatsApp is a zuck property now, you can consider it insecure.
- deleted 9y ago
  [deleted]
- dymk 9y ago
  > WhatsApp is a zuck property now, you can consider it insecure. Another day on HN...
- Dolores12 9y ago
  when telegram has been proven insecure? in every topic about telegram people keep saying telegram is not secure. i failed to find info about how insecure their secure chats. maybe you can help me?
  - narrowrail 9y ago
    Many prominent and respected HNers have laid out the case for why Telegram has security issues. If you use the search function at the bottom, you will easily find these issues raised. I don't personally possess the knowledge to determine the soundness of Telegram's crypto, but there have been enough red flags raised on HN over the years to merit skepticism.
    - Dolores12 9y ago
      Is that how you prove something - by reading comments on HN? Oh, how about all these red flags are raised to scare people to not let them use Telegram which is really secure?
      - WillyOnWheels 9y ago
        > Is that how you prove something - by reading comments on HN? I enjoy the comments of tpacek and ryanlol
        Dolores12 9y ago
        I don't think you answered my question.
        WillyOnWheels 9y ago
        I don't base my life on them but I think tpacek and ryanlol know more about computer security than I do.
    - RodericDay 9y ago
      tbh, people like tptacek and his buddies have a clear agenda and attitude of their own. I'm definitely not sated by their pronouncements alone.
- toephu2 9y ago
  Why? Do you have any proof WhatsApp is insecure?
  - ams6110 9y ago
    I think the question should be do we have proof that it is secure?
    - moosingin3space 9y ago
      Moxie Marlinspike's reputation is dependent on his ability to deliver a secure product. Signal/Signal Protocol development is funded by donations and grants from groups like the Freedom of the Press Foundation, EFF, etc, and those groups desire a secure messaging product. Moxie has staked his reputation on WhatsApp's implementation of the Signal Protocol multiple times on the OWS blog, which he would not do if he disapproved of WhatsApp's implementation. There's no hard proof (except what can be gained through analysis of the executables), but there's no incentive for Moxie to lie, therefore, WhatsApp's implementation should be reasonably secure.
      - vkazanov 9y ago
        And you call that a proof? :-)
        moosingin3space 9y ago
        I did say "there's no hard proof". This was purely an analysis of incentives.
        vkazanov 9y ago
        I think "speculation" is a better word here. :-)
  - snakeanus 9y ago
    Yes https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13389935 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13389935
ghughes 9y ago
Bingo. The CEO of Telegram likes to spread conspiracy theories that are good for business. In a recent tweet he claimed that Signal is "funded by the US government", [1] citing a ridiculous hit piece on OWS and Moxie. [2] [1] https://twitter.com/durov/status/872891017418113024 https://twitter.com/durov/status/872891017418113024 [2] https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/government-backed-privacy-tools-are-not-going-to-protect-us-from-president-trump https://surveillancevalley.com/blog/government-backed-privac...
- BoumTAC 9y ago
  Even wikipedia say it's founded by the governement ... As of October 2016, the project has received an unknown amount of donations from individual sponsors via the Freedom of the Press Foundation.[100] Open Whisper Systems has received grants from the Knight Foundation,[101] the Shuttleworth Foundation,[102] and the Open Technology Fund,[103] a U.S. government funded program that has also supported other privacy projects like the anonymity software Tor and the encrypted instant messaging app Cryptocat. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software)
  - heartsucker 9y ago
    Funded by the government != The government has their hands all over it
    - gambiting 9y ago
      Even TOR was originally a government funded project
      - aluhut 9y ago
        Even "the Internet" was originally a government funded project
        akerro 9y ago
fossuser 9y ago
You can read about the court filings [1] for Whatsapp metadata (unencrypted), but the actual text communication from Whatsapp is secure - or at least not returned by subpoena. I think Signal doesn't even have the metadata available, but I'm not sure about that. [1] (Horrible Forbes Link) https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/22/whatsapp-facebook-backdoor-government-data-request/print/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/22/whats...
- r3bl 9y ago
  Someone already tried requesting data about two suspects from Whisper Systems. What they got is "one number is not a Signal user, while the second one created his account on X day at Y time."[0] So yeah, Signal doesn't retain metadata. All they can provide is whether you're using Signal or not and when you've started using it. [0] https://whispersystems.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand-jury/ https://whispersystems.org/bigbrother/eastern-virginia-grand...
mtgx 9y ago
I agree that it's somewhat a deflection, too, and I wish the Telegram team wasn't so stubborn about at least studying the Signal protocol and perhaps making its own version, if it doesn't trust it by default. I don't know if their "math Ph.Ds" would know how to do that, though. That said, I think it's pretty clear that WhatsApp does have a way to allow the FBI to snoop on users: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/13/whatsapp-backdoor-allows-snooping-on-encrypted-messages https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/13/whatsapp-... I know it's controversial and many don't believe WhatsApp would actually use it like that, but I don't buy it. Either they already use that "feature" as a legal intercept or they're about to do it at least in the UK, where Snoopers' Charter passed and the law is vague enough to force them to do something like that. It may happen in Australia, too, if the new anti-crypto bill passes. I still trust Signal for now, but I'm not sure whether or not their server-based solution will be so backdoor-proof against future bills, and I think they should be prioritizing decentralizing Signal somehow. EDIT: Sigh, Germany, too: http://fortune.com/2017/06/14/germany-fingerprint-children-spy-messages/ http://fortune.com/2017/06/14/germany-fingerprint-children-s...
permanentdecaf 9y ago
Pavel Durov wants everyone to think security is about trust in people. Most companies in that business do the same, because it's easier than building something that doesn't require trust in people. The way Pavel Durov and others like him present "trust" is (ironically) shady corporate structures[1], shell companies, or use of the word "Switzerland." They want people to think like that because they've built businesses that require it. Telegram stores the messages you send/receive unencrypted on their servers. That's not good, unless you've been trained to think that "privacy" is just about choosing the company, government, or legal jurisdiction that gets total access to your data. Security professionals know that's not how we should think about security (never trust people!), because Durov is leaving a lot out: there aren't safe jurisdictions, servers get hacked, and centralized databases will get compromised. Logic, though, is probably no match for conspiracy theories. 1: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/11/23/the-secret-american-origins-of-telegram-the-encrypted-messaging-app-favored-by-the-islamic-state/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/11...
- skinnymuch 9y ago
  I read the WP article you cited, titled, "The secret American origins of Telegram, the encrypted messaging app favored by the Islamic State". If Telegram isn't that secure, then why are extremists like IS using it over Signal or WhatsApp? I know Telegram has better features for big groups and much better multi-platform support, so is that the reason? I'm legitimately asking without any snark.
  - kasey_junk 9y ago
    Because they have fallen for the marketing hype and are not secure messaging systems experts? We know some extremists still use SMS which is definitely not secure. Also, is there evidence that extremists aren't using Signal and WhatsApp?
    - skinnymuch 9y ago
      Them falling for the marketing makes sense.
deleted 9y ago
[deleted]
borncrusader 9y ago
Indeed, looks like a shot at Signal. I was under the impression that Signal is much secure than WhatsApp at least in terms of getting away from the prying eyes of Facebook. In reality both of them use the Whisper protocol underneath AFAICT for end-point encryption.
yogthos 9y ago
Even if the protocol is mathematically sound, there is no way to verify that it's implemented faithfully by closed source software such as WhatsApp. Telegram protocol is open and has an open source reference client. While not as good as having both the server and the client open source, at least it allows independent verification that the protocol is being implemented faithfully.
dingo_bat 9y ago
How do we know what WhatsApp uses? And do they use it in a secure way?

tuna-piano 9y ago

Assuming this isn't just PR, in some ways this is scary and disheartening. But my first reaction was "Cool, our government really cares, is creative and has the necessary power to get things done." For those of you who've worked with government, you've seen how insanely difficult the procurement process is. Being as specific as needing to get competitive bids for toilet paper purchases, etc. So the fact that they could get potentially large amounts of bribe money means (a)This goes to high levels in the organization (b)They've probably done this before. I wonder how much they offered? And I wonder how many other pieces of software have backdoors. I would think the first things they would try and get access to is (a)Certificate issuers and (b) VPN software. Do we know that Godaddy,LetsEncrypt, OpenVPN, Cisco VPN, Juniper, etc don't have backdoors?

falcolas 9y ago
> Cool, our government really cares I wonder what they really care about? Liberty, individual rights, security, or more power? They're people too, so I'm sure they believe in the first three, but the last one is a more seductive and drives a lot more of the bad we see governments do; worse is that the drive for more power is frequently justified as "we need this power to protect our nation". > has the necessary power to get things done This actually frightens me a bit. The US government has the ability (and has displayed the willingness) to absolutely destroy people's lives in their pursuit of "national security". What checks and balances are in place to keep this kind of power in check?
- tuna-piano 9y ago
  I agree with you completely. I think it's good that they aren't sitting behind a desk doing nothing, but I'm glad these stories come out so we can have the proper conversations and keep privacy-security tradeoffs at a comfortable level for society.
- AmIFirstToThink 9y ago
  One... to see if you are for sale. If you can be bought, other state actors will try and may succeed, whether US actually bribes you or not. US needs to know if a successful App is up for taking bribe, including top developers individually, or not, because millions of Americans including persons in position of power might be using that app. Two... essentially, this is power of people applied. Lot of interest in keeping status quo of power, of narrative, of money. They want to have dirt on everyone and then choose to use it when needed. Putting pressure or not can be decided later, dirt will be collected by default. No point in digging the well when you are thirsty, you need to do it well upfront the need arising. >What checks and balances are in place to keep this kind of power in check? Either play the game, or be too big to fail and lobby the government for your needs. I think the best one can do is choose your masters either USA, China, Russia or to some extent India or EU main players.

retox 9y ago

Sounds like a reasonable exit if noone wants to buy your popular e2e encrypted chat app. Take the bribe, shutdown and move on to the next iteration.

ethbro 9y ago
1) Open source codebase pre-backdoor 2) Take bribe 3) Insert backdoor 4) Close company
- amq 9y ago
  truecrypt?
  - mverwijs 9y ago
    FUD? http://istruecryptauditedyet.com http://istruecryptauditedyet.com

robert_foss 9y ago

This is pretty alarming stuff. Especially considering how that competitors like Signal are US based. Signal is owned by twitter which by no means is a small player, so it isn't likely to fly under anyones radar.

Ar-Curunir 9y ago
Signal is not owned by Twitter. Moxie works there, but that doesn't mean his code is owned by Twitter.
- WillyOnWheels 9y ago
  I hate to pedantically bore people but Moxie does not work at Twitter. He did for a short period of time after Twitter acquired his 2 person startup.
daxorid 9y ago
Signal is owned by twitter No. OWS != WS
kardos 9y ago
If Wikipedia is current on the topic [1], then Twitter owns Whisper Systems (RedPhone, TextSecure, ...), but Moxie runs Open Whisper Systems (Signal). [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Whisper_Systems https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Whisper_Systems
geofft 9y ago
It's not a stretch to believe that people working on Signal have been offered bribes. But it's definitely a stretch to believe that they've accepted them, or that it's worked. The protocol and the source code are public and well-reviewed (Telegram has a much less well-reviewed algorithm and does code drops on GitHub); it'd be a challenge to successfully fit a back door in Signal. The thread that @durov was replying to was portraying being hired away from a public crypto project as a "bribe". Certainly that's a thing you could successfully do, but it also doesn't weaken Signal's encryption as long as there are still people working on it.

jquast 9y ago

"a few months later i was offered an interview for a position at the fbi office for cyber-warfare in nyc who as well offered to fix my immigration status" and, "before going to monterey and while exploring the beauty of san francisco i was contacted once by a us navy intelligence officer who seemingly unintentionally appeared next to me at the bar" http://mickey.lucifier.net/b4ckd00r.html http://mickey.lucifier.net/b4ckd00r.html

groby_b 9y ago
Would you mind clarifying what your quotes and the linked wall of text have to do with the story?
- dmix 9y ago
  Seems to be a similar story by a security guy who wrote crypto code for OpenBSD. The larger quote: > about the same time at the bazaar show in nyc i was contacted by a representative of us-ins and a ukrainian millitary attache at un. both investigating my involvement with openbsd. a few months later i was offered an interview for a position at the fbi office for cyber-warfare in nyc who as well offered to fix my immigration status (or none thereof at the time ;) with a greencard. nonetheless for the lack of credibility from the future employer i refused to talk to them as for me deportation did not sound like an acceptable worst-case scenario. > before going to monterey and while exploring the beauty of san francisco i was contacted once by a us navy intelligence officer who seemingly unintentionally appeared next to me at the bar. later on my way back during a short stay in chicago also randomly appearing fbi agent. fellow was ordering food and beer for me and just like his navy pal gave me a warning to keep my mouth shut! He was a foreign national visiting the US who probably got targeted by various agencies after attending some security conferences.
  - groby_b 9y ago
    Ah, thank you.

loceng 9y ago

The ridiculousness of it all is it's unreasonable at its base to try to prevent encryption as a form of safety and security from violence. Sure, you can lock up all communication for privacy reasons, and the government can spend all kinds of resources on trying to control to prevent or circumvent encryption - however it's a waste of resources as it's simply a bandaid. If I wanted to do something violent or evil I/you can simply have regular meetings and use paper communication - the old spy-style stuff. Of course those networks can be infiltrated by governments with the resources, and they can maintain that presence by allowing certain acts within networks to occur vs. deciding which ones they should stop; it's how the war against Hitler was won once their encryption was broken - watch the very well-done The Imitation Game - http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2084970/ http://www.imdb.com/title/tt2084970/ - for a reference. The only real solution is dealing with the root causes. I heard an analyst on TV (a rare occasion for me) mention after Trump's Saudi visit and speech, that he didn't mention that the Saudis should look into the root causes of why there is terrorist activity growing in their countries; of course a lot of it is historical karma and rage from violent acts against their families, however a lot is because people's basic needs aren't being met which prevents the higher levels of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs from being reached and maintained. There's a solution and it requires building real community, locally, where you are now - and striving for people to become healthy so they don't develop bias and other coping mechanisms which prevent empathy and understanding and therefore compassion; preventing responsible ownership of weapons isn't useful either, not developing and supplying weapons on mass would be beneficial, however most attacks recently have been with vehicles or knives. Universal Basic Income will also allow closer to a truly free work market and it can evolve from there, giving people the time to do what they feel is the most important in that moment for themselves, while not having to be forced to working in a shitty environment with shitty managers or co-workers; the health improvement and increased productivity here alone is worth it.

aeorgnoieang 9y ago
> however a lot is because people's basic needs aren't being met which prevents the higher levels of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs from being reached and maintained. This is contradicted by a lot of evidence. Terrorists are most commonly middle class members of their society and often well educated. If anything, terrorism is a powerful means of satisfying the higher levels of 'needs', e.g. meaning, purpose, community.

killjoywashere 9y ago

Hmmmm.... A Russian peddling undocumented crypto warez implies US crypto is untrustworthy despite the obvious open source code. Don't suppose this would be one of Putin's patriotic citizen artists spreading fake news do you? Edit: thanks to all the replies. I am smarter now.

daxorid 9y ago
> A Russian Russophobia seems to be the only acceptable form of Xenophobia these days. And a wildly popular one, at that.
- madez 9y ago
  Is it bad to be afraid when there is reason to be?
  - dmix 9y ago
    Of course not, but there should be more to it than merely seeing the word 'Russian'. I see this all the time now in left-leaning US papers (NYTimes, WaPo) that immediately imply association with something bad happening (he spoke with a Russian!). Much like the other popular generalization of 'Muslim' without qualification of type of Muslim where significant subsets have never been involved with terrorism (sufism vs wahhabism for example). There are proponents who want to eliminate any type of generalization based on nationality/religion/etc which is also heavily flawed. Somewhere in between is the rational approach.
    - mikeash 9y ago
      The stuff in the papers is not taking "Russian" to mean "bad." It's looking at serious allegations of collusion with the Russian government, known interference in the 2016 election by the Russian government, statements by various administration officials that they had no contact with the Russian government, and then using meetings with high-level officials in the Russian government to imply something bad happening. With this comment, the idea is that crypto software built in Russia could easily be compromised by the rather un-free Russian government, which seems pretty reasonable. Of course, the fact that this fellow no longer lives in Russia scuttles it, but that's just not being fully informed, not "xenophobia."

logicallee 9y ago

The problem I have as an end user is that I want the infrastructure protecting me to be invisible. Let's return to this after the following paragraphs. I will make some pretty far-reaching conclusions. I think we can all agree that if some totally below-the-radar crypto anarchist who happens to have a few million dollars from bitcoins figured out that they actually have enough access via the dark web to bribe a few Russian generals and long story short detonate a nuclear bomb a few miles outside New York City, just for shits and giggles, then they should be stopped at some point along the way. This will seem like a made-up example to you but I purposefully don't want to confuse the issue with practical examples. We can all agree that at some point this should be stopped. A reasonable time to stop it might be if intelligence agencies get a literal screenshot from a darkweb chatroom (from a concerned participant, where the participant thinks they're really going too far) where this is being planned in exacting detail but more information is needed to be precise. (For example, suppose the source of the nuclear bomb were not Russia but not enough information was given to identify it. There are actually quite a few nuclear states and many of them are quite corrupt. A short list includes India, North Korea, Pakistan.) I would think that this kind of actionable urgent intelligence should unlock whatever privacy safeguards are in place, but the issue is that if there is a correct "technical" solution (if cryptography works 'correctly' and is not broken, in an academic sense), then there is no technical possibility to unlock anything. If Tor, crypto currencies, and encryption "work" (in a binary, yes it works, or no, it's broken sense) then following the receipt of such a screenshot there is no technical means of any further step. Here I'm going to be philosophical for a second. The future of technology is nearly infinite human power. You can already in the next few seconds initiate a crypto currency transfer to anyone anywhere in the world, who can receive it without any banking infrastructure or oversight. The arc of technology has been personal human enablement. When individuals become nearly God-like and all-powerful, it is dangerous to be in a position where, like the Muslims reporting the madman banned from his U.K. mosque for radical insanity, the status quo is that if you report your friend to the authorities saying, "My online friend, God-like in his powers, is planning to murder a million people just for shits and giggles, and he's kind of insane. Unfortunately, I don't know where he is or what he's doing, but I'm pretty concerned. He has a lot of money from a few ponzi schemes he ran. It's pretty credible for the following specific reasons (screenshots, quotes, etc)." And the only response from the authorities is, "Thanks for all this. We don't know where he is either, in the grand scheme of things a million deaths isn't that much and if it happens we will look at preventing another such case." That's a pretty silly response, isn't it? That the only possible response is, sorry, nothing can be done. Okay, now I've laid out why there should probably be some infrastructure on the back-end. What I don't like is that this translates to humans literally reading people's private correspondence, web searches, etc. It's not very good. What is a good middle ground? Can't the NSA make things that run locally, so that no human is reading your correspondence or web traffic, but as you start researching nuclear weapons and making plans on how to murder a million people, and start making those transactions, all this starts adding up and, to quote the Constitution, its tools can receive instructions "particularly describing the place to be searched, and things to be seized", so that after such a report, its perpetrator can be found, or at least enough information can be collected to stop it if it is actually taking place? I think that all of us here could be okay with being stopped at some point between purchasing a hundred million dollars in anonymous currency, and detonating a nuclear bomb. It's sensible. That can be part of the social contract. It's difficult. Nobody wants to live with a judge, jury, and executioner in their home looking at everything they are doing in case they break some law. I am glad that I personally don't have to answer these questions. But we can all agree on the need for privacy (no human looks at what you're doing), and also on the reasonableness, as each individual online progresses toward infinite personal power, for protecting the rest of society from credible and immediate, specific threats. I agree with cryptographers who think of cryptography as a tool that is either working or broken. (If it has a back door, it's 'broken'). Perhaps if tools included a certain portion that runs locally they could increase the extent to which the tools are not actually 'broken' (i.e. they are actually working, and actually not backdoored), while also increasing the safety every single person has from other individuals being able to plan or pay for their specific death anonymously, and with impunity. I realize that my suggestions here are not specific enough to be actionable, they are not clear recommendations. But I don't even see these possibilities being discussed (at least publicly), so I wanted to at least move the conversation a bit in this direction. EDIT: --- I'm getting downvoted pretty heavily. Let me ask point-blank: are you okay with someone being able to spend two weeks on the dark-web researching how to make and detonate a bomb using totally innocent chemical purchases, and then your spouse, parents, relatives, or you, being an innocent victim of my exploding the results, or would you want that person to be stopped at some point after they started doing that? The future of information is that it is ubiquitous and easy to access [I edited this paragraph edited from first to third person.] Actually secure communications would mean that it is technically impossible to see if someone has started communicating with people at ISIS who have overseen and helped people explode themselves. I am not saying communication should be weak and insecure, but should I really practically be able to start doing that if I want? This is not some kind of false example, either. Also, for downvoters: I think it is easier for you to agree with the other half of my statement, that nobody should be looking at our web traffic and correspondence, and that it should be actually secure, and also actually private.

angry_octet 9y ago

Read the replies from all the serious crypto security people on twitter and you will see the overwhelming consensus is that the FSB/Spetssviaz and FBI/NSA probably love Telegram for its roll-your-own-crypto and server mediated group chats. One also has to wonder if the FBI consider the Telegram team to be essentially undeclared Russian agents, and hence fair game.

nf05papsjfVbc 9y ago
Indeed despite what they say, we only have their word for it but no source code to check whether they accepted these requests from the snoopers in usa.
- rthomas6 9y ago
  I thought they open sourced the code?
  - slipmagic 9y ago
    Yeah, it's open and the encryption is done in the client, so it should be available on Github. [1] - https://telegram.org/apps https://telegram.org/apps
Turbots 9y ago
That's why the UK is trying to ban Telegram because they can't seem to decrypt the secure chats of British and other terrorists... I know they wouldn't tell us if they would have cracked telegram, but there's no reason to believe they have... They would find all of the homegrown terrorists so fast if they could (there are many sources confirming most of ISIS chats are over secure telegram chats)

strictnein 9y ago

Cryptography experts like Matthew Green were having fun with some of his claims on Twitter a couple of days ago. I would read whatever Durov claims with a large amount of skepticism. ex: https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/873696211722784768 https://twitter.com/matthew_d_green/status/87369621172278476...

tptacek 9y ago
If there are any professional cryptographic engineers that take this seriously, I'd be interested in hearing from them. From what I can tell, the response to this has been pretty much unanimous.

throw2016 9y ago

Governments never believed in privacy. Before they were opening envelopes and tapping phones. Now they are trying to keep up with technology and given the sheer scale of resources, manpower and power at hand operating 24/7 they will prevail. A journalist like Poitras is on all sorts of lists and incessantly harassed. There are secret courts, secret laws and secret processes at play. And beyond this the power of harassment, intimidation, blackmail and bribery. Individuals and even organizations cannot prevail against the array of capabilities. Its nice to think of democratic theory and the rights but these only exist when not exercised as talking points. The moment you start exercising them you end up on all sorts of lists, marked for harassment and basically have a target on your back. Dissent is squashed even before it can formulate.

EternalData 9y ago

The government has progressed from banning encryption to trying to subvert it :/

killjoywashere 9y ago
That's actually a central tenant of the NSA's mission. But that mission predates the internet and public key crypto. Now it's like the gas company is running around drilling holes in gas pipes.

boulette 9y ago

French Gendarmerie did this : http://www.papergeek.fr/telegram-securite-messagerie-chiffree-contournee-par-gendarmes-37820 http://www.papergeek.fr/telegram-securite-messagerie-chiffre...

deleted 9y ago

[deleted]

_RPM 9y ago

they "trust me", dumb fucks

dsacco 9y ago
Are we really still doing this? Can't we just collectively agree to think whatever we want about Facebook and not make the same unsubstantive, pointless comments over and over again every time Facebook or one of its subsidiaries is mentioned? Is no discussion safe from this never ending circlejerk? I don't care if you hate Facebook, or Mark Zuckerberg, for whatever reason, but can we please just stop infecting every thread with comments like this? It's not productive! No one was convinced who didn't already side with you, and everyone else remains just as unconvinced as they were before. At least try.
sctb 9y ago
We detached this comment from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14560721 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=14560721 and marked it off-topic.

custos 9y ago

Option 1: Could be Russian/Telegram propaganda. Option 2: Could be true because seriously, who trusts the FBI/NSA not to violate our privacy anymore? Really not sure what to believe about this one.

tptacek 9y ago
Option 2 requires you not just to believe that the FBI and NSA would want to compromise Telegram (I have no trouble believing that) but that they'd be comfortable disclosing that to Pavel Durov. I have a very hard time believing that any branch of the US IC is comfortable trusting secrets to Pavel Durov.
mverwijs 9y ago
A person born in Russia says something and you think it's "russian propaganda". Mccarthy would be proud.
- custos 9y ago
  Both the US and Russia are well known in interfering with foreign governments. Hell even America has their own foreign propaganda service "Voice of America" radio. Also I have no problem with communism, I have problems with corruption and government over-reach/attempts to influence populations. I'm not new to this. I've worked with people who flood social networks with bullshit to sway public opinion. Always be skeptical, of both sides. And at this point I don't trust either the NSA or the Russian equivalents.

ricksharp 9y ago

Can someone correct me if I am wrong, but it seems relatively easy to make an encrypted peer-to-peer messaging system. I mean, simply use a public/private encryption algorithm that has proven to be highly secure: - Share your public key openly - Anyone can send a message to you using your public key to encrypt the message - You decrypt with your private key on device Do all the encryption/decryption on device and viola, secure messaging. (This is basically how https works.) Of course this only allows a single device the ability to decrypt the message. However, if you want to allow multiple devices to share a private key, they can simple send each other their own private keys using the same encrypted protocol. In addition, for super paranoid use, a master password could be used to salt the private key so that would be required with the private key to enable decryption. (Which is similar to how password keepers basically work.) What am I missing?

closeparen 9y ago
Who do you trust to distribute the keys? This person is empowered to MITM. Who do you trust to know the metadata about how encrypted messages are flowing? Who do you trust to get the crypto implementation details right? How will you support use of multiple devices? People generally expect seamless switching between phone and laptop these days.
- ricksharp 9y ago
  Public keys are open, they can be distributed any way (they could be published to a hosted directory a shared wherever). Only the device that owns the private key could decrypt the message. In fact encrypted messages could be stored publically anywhere and only the intended recipient could read them. The flow of messages is not encrypted, the system only encrypts message contents. (However, there are options to make it very difficult to trace, but that is a different issue.) Trust is up to the user to decide and is always necessary. Multiple devices is easy enough, a device can encrypt its own private key and send it to another device (using the target devices public key). The target device would now have 2 private keys for decryption.
  - 9y ago

drawkbox 9y ago

I am not sure about the claim here but the FBI has always been all over cryptography companies and products and this was well before Snowden, Phil Zimmermann (PGP) knows about this. In 2003-2006, we built a service that was a financial system to exchange financial data through various means including AS/2 EDI over HTTP with big companies and the government suppliers such as AAFES (Army and Air Force Exchange). Initially we had RSA, PGP and a custom encryption in there, the latter two for other features besides EDI. We got a letter from the FBI asking us to switch only to RSA, they wanted to know about our use of PGP and wanted to see our custom encryption if we continued to use it. Being a small/medium company we switched to just RSA to avoid any issues. It was an odd day, when I came into the office they told me I had an FBI letter on my desk and you can imagine what happens around an office when something like that happens. Very strange day indeed. Moral of the story, if you create your own crypto or aren't using the ones you are supposed to use, in any capacity, expect some knocking.

ben_w 9y ago
Interesting. That strongly implies that RSA has a flaw, which is news to me.
- tptacek 9y ago
  If the USG was aware of a secret flaw in RSA, they wouldn't be tipping their hands about it to random small companies. Come on. But: avoid RSA anyways. It's inferior to modern curve crypto.
  - drawkbox 9y ago
    I think the only reason they contacted us was because we were one of 25ish companies certified to communicate with government endpoints early on in HTTP based EDI. It was right at the moment that EDI went from faxing to FTP to HTTP/email in AS2/3/4. Others were Oracle, Microsoft, IBM, EDS, Axway, /n software etc. It wasn't until we had to connect to AAFES that it was a problem. We were small but we were sending a good amount of orders and financial data from Wal-mart, AAFES, and other gov't sources that had early EDI over HTTP/S going. They were also recommending us to vendors on their approved EDI software list and probably wanted to recommend ones that played nicely.

pigeons 9y ago

There isn't even any need to weaken the homebrew encryption, good luck using it. I don't even have the option on the Linux desktop client at least. The "secret chat" feature isn't available.

lngnmn 9y ago

Good PR.

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prawn 9y ago

Surely it's not just an issue of location but scale? Unless there is a huge team reviewing code, an individual or small team could be paid-off by an agency to provide a backdoor? For the right combination of large scale app by small team, there'd have to be a price at which many individuals capitulate? If the backdoor is somehow revealed, "doesn't matter, got my money". I used to wonder whether some success of social media companies couldn't be explained by secret payments for backdoor access. You could be operating out of Europe or Africa and still get offered money, and other pressure carefully applied. You might think you'd hold true to your plan of privacy-for-all, but if they offer $x00m or more?

19eightyfour 9y ago

But wouldn't it be in the interests of mass surveillance to herd people toward a chat option that isn't secure, or that the surveillants have a backdoor to? You get two benefits: 1) chat people think is secret you can read, 2) people self-identify as selectors / targets by choosing to try to hide their communications, which you can actually read And if such PR herding worked, wouldn't the surveillants be prepared to pay for such efforts to make their job easier? So, what seems readily apparent is: Telegram takes state money, to offer an insecure option, while dissimulating to the world that it's: a) secure and b) turning down state money all the time. I know why this perspective isn't discussed in MSM. But I don't get why it's not discussed more here. It seems obvious to me. And personally IMHO, I think that's a good thing. Catch more criminals / terrorists.

known 9y ago

"Never do anything against conscience even if the state demands it." --Einstein

known 9y ago

How Telegram is making money?

amai 9y ago

Pavel Durov is the guy who started vk.com which stores passwords in plain text: https://thehackernews.com/2016/06/vk-com-data-breach.html https://thehackernews.com/2016/06/vk-com-data-breach.html He has no clue about security. Whatever he claims, I would never use Telegram.