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Snowden: FBI obscuring crucial details in Apple case

643 points by Karunamon 11y ago

trenchy12 11y ago
The phone in question is a government issued work phone? Hadn't heard that before. Pretty big detail that isn't mentioned often.
- Bud 11y ago
  Yep. It's his employer's property. The shooter intentionally destroyed his personal iPhone before the attacks.
  - mtgx 11y ago
    Which likely means it contains no useful information there. But the FBI wants to use the case to give it one more go at pushing for backdoors. The fact that Apple wanted to keep this private, but the FBI wanted it to be public (which they almost never do in cases where it's about revealing how they hacked into something), just confirms that to me: https://bgr.com/2016/02/19/apple-vs-fbi-iphone-encryption/ https://bgr.com/2016/02/19/apple-vs-fbi-iphone-encryption/
    - Spooky23 11y ago
      Maybe not. Government phone in a social services organization without MDM? Holy incompetent batman.
      - joezydeco 11y ago
        Looks like MDM was in effect because the San Bernadino Health Dept remotely changed the iCloud password of the phone after the attack, locking the FBI out of accessing the most recent backup of the phone. http://gizmodo.com/the-san-bernardino-terrorists-icloud-password-was-accid-1760158613 http://gizmodo.com/the-san-bernardino-terrorists-icloud-pass...
        zaroth 11y ago
        Forgive me if I nit-pick this a bit, as we are probably saying the same thing two different ways. iCloud backups are not protected by your iCloud password. I know this because I've personally reset my password and then successfully recovered an iCloud backup to a new phone with the new password. However, the auto-backup feature, which would have pushed the most recent data from the phone onto iCloud just by leaving the phone powered on... apparently that is disabled when the iCloud password is reset. Which makes sense if you think about it, the phone still has the old iCloud password, and it would need the new password in order to authenticate to iCloud. So they inadvertently disabled the backup feature by locking the phone out of iCloud! The first question this raises is can the auto-backup be made to start working again by Apple changing their backend iCloud authentication code to specifically allow this device to login to iCloud with the "wrong" (old) passsword? That would not involve touching the phone and seems like a much cleaner solution. Unless there is code on the phone which disables or destroys the iCloud authentication token / stored password after encountering a login error, which really would surprise me, because API errors could be spurious, but I guess it's possible if they are looking specifically for an "invalid login" return code and then dumping the old token in order to trigger a UI prompt to enter a new password. The second question is why are the existing backups a month and a half old? Doesn't this imply the device was not even turned on or connected to the network for that last month and a half? The other interesting tidbit in the article you linked is the statement the FBI was able to verify that the phone was never paired with any devices to obtain data. How in the world could they know that?
        cdcarter 11y ago
        By changing the iCloud password, the device is no longer able to upload a backup to iCloud, since the device doesn't know the new password yet! The new iCloud password IS required to re-enable auto backup, but you need to get past the PIN screen first to enter the new password.
        Spooky23 11y ago
        I haven't verified this in awhile, but I think that a password reset will log some services out until you enter the new password on the device.
    - rtpg 11y ago
      >But the FBI wants to use the case to give it one more go at pushing for backdoors. Really? The FBI said it was 100% totally fine with giving the phone to Apple and just having remote access to the phone in this one specific case. That is to say, not having Apple turn over the tools of the trade. I feel like a lot of people here should try to play devil's advocate on this case. I'm (kind of) for Apple in this case, but I think the general representation of the gov't's stated request has been completely morphed from what was asked. The devil's advocate is that this is an Apple PR move. Apple spent a bunch of time trumping up how safe their new phones are against this very thing, and that they even backported most of it. But the fact is that Apple _can_ install a backdoor without even requiring the phone PIN code! On the older phones at least. The FBI asked for the contents, not the tool to get the contents. A thing that has been mentioned elsewhere, but: by fighting this case (a single phone unlock with a specific warrant), we are mixing this case with the more dangerous and important fight of having backdoor laws be codified. As it stands, Apple _can and should_ make the most un-backdoorable phones possible. Legislation that could be enacted because of this fight could make us lose the war on the right to not have backdoors. The fact is that the iOS update mechanism _is already a_ backdoor. Which exists for many reasons (and, to my understanding, is already mostly fixed by asking for a PIN code when updating now).
      - sehugg 11y ago
        The FBI said it was 100% totally fine with giving the phone to Apple and just having remote access to the phone in this one specific case. It's really up to the court to decide that, and this post makes the argument that it may not be possible to keep the tools under wraps if the case progresses: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645
        rtpg 11y ago
        Thanks for that read. The amount of validation required for the tool to be used in court seems to really cause the danger of a leak to go sky high... I think the DoJ might be discounting that risk with their reasoning of "Apple can just delete it" As an aside, I find it funny that the author finds it "stupid" that the jury is allowed to ask questions in a California court. I would almost declare that a constitutional right (judged by a jury of the peers)
  - stordoff 11y ago
    I hadn't really looked at the details, because the fundamental question of "Can the courts compel work/backdoors from Apple?" is much more important IMO, but this really makes it feel like a fishing exercise from the FBI. Though possible, the chance that the attackers used an employer-owned phone to discuss/plan/coordinate the attackers seems rather remote if they a) had personal phones, and b) took the time to destroy them.
    - blazespin 11y ago
      It's not a fishing exercise at all. It's a "let's prove that we can create a backdoor for further use" exercise.
    - crimsoneer 11y ago
      It's going to be a brave ass FBI agent who says "well, we didn't bother to try to access this phone because he probably didn't use it".
ayyghost 11y ago
I would like to see some clarification on point #5. The only other option I see for the FBI is to continue manually bruteforcing PINs, the arduousness of such a task being why they requested Apple's help in the first place. Is he talking about 0days?
- gpm 11y ago
  Manually bruteforcing PINs is actually not a way to get in here, the phone will wipe the keys that the pin protects after 10 attempts. I'm not sure what method Snowden has in mind for decrypting this device without going through Apple. It seems like it must be a 0day.
  - nxzero 11y ago
    Depending on the device/iOS versions, you're able to bypass the count limits.
    - Crito 11y ago
      The FBI is asking that Apple provide them the ability to bypass the PIN timeout limits. In modern iphones, those limits are handled by the secure enclave. However on the 5C in question, the limits are done in iOS and can be disabled by flashing a custom version of iOS. That's what the FBI is requesting.
  - ap3 11y ago
    The phone "may" wipe the keys after 10 failed attempts. That is a configuration option. Can't that be changed by the remote configuration management software?
- jdiez17 11y ago
  Just one way I can think of would be to dump the contents of ROM chip, bruteforcing the encryption key by checking all possible PINs and comparing the decrypted data against some known plaintext that would be present on all iOS devices. (this would require the FBI to know what key derivation algorithm is used on pre-secure-enclave devices, but that's not outside the realm of possibility).
notthegov 11y ago
He is suggesting that the FBI sees this as an opportunity to set a precedent and doesn't care about the data? If so, in FBI logic, in the future there could be a more legitimate need for Apple to comply because a suspect could have a WMD. But so far no such threat exists. However, let's distort the issue and exploit this opportunity now knowing few will go against law enforcement tactics against the San Bernardino killers? Because they will need the power in the future but the public has to be scared into acting now to prevent the real hypothetical future attack?
- blazespin 11y ago
  Why was this downvoted? I'm sure this is exactly the thinking? Man HN can be weird sometimes.
  - thesimpsons1022 11y ago
    well now it's top comment. funny how that happens.
    - bcook 11y ago
      Whether it is true or not, I dunno, but I was told that the native Americans thought that immediate responses/reactions were disrespectful. Regardless of the historical truth of my folk-tale, I find the idea interesting. Nowadays, slow == bad (or forgotten/disregarded). The recent Springer "publications greater than 10 years old are free" comes to mind.
- takeda 11y ago
  This could also be an act to regain trust and make us less paranoid.
- vonklaus 11y ago
  This was raised and discussed in another thread and I believe this to be the case. Walt Mossberg, a pretty well known verge reporter who wrote one of the articles that was circulating a few weeks ago about the decline in Apple software, was discussing this on his podcast. The idea that actors move forward with a specific case was new to me, but I obviousloy never thought much about it and it seems pretty intuitive when considered. Roe v. Wade and the Rosa Parks case were raised in the other thread as well as, IIRC the Brown v. Board of Edu. What happens is that the prosecution or another actor can Appeal to the supreme court (or choose what case to prosecute etc.) with the ultimate goal of timing sentiment, finding the perfect array of facts and discovery, and having everything align perfectly. They then push up to the supreme court with the best chance of getting a binding ruling that would become defacto law. In this scenario (and from here forward is my non-expert opinion) the data is probably in a best case scenario for the FBI slightly useful. However, not getting this data is pretty much meaningless. So they are likely to: * Use public sentiment and the recent terrorist attacks as a catalyst for their demand (you quite correctly raised this point). * The suspects are dead. So while they may not be guilty in the court of law, it is pretty obvious that they did it thus there is no risk of them being acquitted. * Most evidence suggests a fairly lone wolf attack scenario, so if they were working with anyone the data would likely be on a computer or in call logs. Thus the minimal gov't gain which would be maybe mapping a name to some of the numbers. * They have a successful narrative to frame and this coincided with a bill to limit encryption. So yes. This was a strategic move. If John McAfee is to be believed, and on one hand he sort of fucking isn't, but on the other hand I actually do but mostly on faith, he and his team can successfully decrypt the phone. He has publicly offered (possibly taking out an editorial but I did see the article at least) that he would unlock the phone for free if they would drop the case. Now, even if they gov can't get in (and they can), it isn't unreasonable to not give the phone to a suspected murder. That said I think John McAfee and probably a few people on here could get in, so the tl;dr is ya they coming for that secure enclave.
deleted 11y ago
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mayneack 11y ago
Off topic, but this is exactly the scenario that Twitter wants to replace by expanding the tweet size limit. Instead of a picture of text, we could expand to real (presumably searchable) text.
- hndl 11y ago
  Right. Perhaps they can begin by rolling this out only to individuals who have verified accounts.
  - glenstein 11y ago
    I think it would be nifty to treat it as if it were a specialized form of embedded media like pictures and videos. Wall of text as a media type, and maybe even support links to, say, pastebin-type sites (or don't, this parts not critical). Then you still have tweets as the basic unit of Twitter and preserve some consistency.
    - digi_owl 11y ago
      Look up Twitlonger. Various clients have that built in, and it basically but the first few words in the tweet alongside a link to the full text.
      - riffic 11y ago
        Look up OStatus. I don't know why people place all their eggs in one walled-garden basket.
        deleted 11y ago
        [deleted]
        digi_owl 11y ago
        Network effect, basically. Everyone is on Twitter, therefore everyone is on Twitter.
- 11y ago
nostromo 11y ago
The intelligence community never lets a terrorist attack go to waste. I'm convinced they have a wish list in wait for every tragedy. Next on the list was getting a back door on every cellphone.
- CamperBob2 11y ago
  I'm convinced they have a wish list in wait for every tragedy That's not even remotely debatable, unless you believe the 350+-page Patriot Act was written within a month after 9/11.
  - paulddraper 11y ago
    That's not unbelievable.
    - nullc 11y ago
      > The Patriot Act is huge and I remember someone asking a Justice Department official how did they write such a large statute so quickly, and of course the answer was that it has been sitting in the drawers of the Justice Department for the last 20 years waiting for the event where they would pull it out. -- Richard Clarke (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism) Often political changes are artifacts of opportunity. I don't personally think that its evil that the justice department had a laundry list of civil rights violations waiting for an opportunity to propose them. It's the responsibility of the public and earnest lawmakers to be aware of efforts to exploit sentiment and resist bad law regardless of when it's proposed.
    - tunap 11y ago
      Biden submitted the virtually identical bill shortly after the OK City bombing 6 years prior... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibus_Counterterrorism_Act_of_1995 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibus_Counterterrorism_Act_o...
    - CamperBob2 11y ago
      Yes, it is. Can you imagine how different life would be if the rest of government worked at that pace?
nickysielicki 11y ago
Maybe I'm too far-out there, but what do we really know about the NSA's quantum computing abilities? Given their budget and their ability to keep things under wraps (eg: consider the scope of PRISM and how they ran that for close to a decade), is it that crazy to think this is a debate they don't care about winning? Teams at universities made 16 qbit machines something like 5 years ago. D-wave claims 512 qubits today. I don't think it's out of the question that NSA is far ahead of both of them. D-wave employs "100+ people" according to Wikipedia. NSA is estimated to have upwards of 30,000. It makes a lot of sense, then. NSA got caught with their pants down, naturally backlash from it is still happening today. So if your opponents are going to be winning some ground back, the best PR move is to have them win ground that doesn't matter. (Or that won't matter in a couple years.) I think these debates about the necessity of key escrow and modified firmware are conversations they're having with the intention of losing, to prevent meaningful pushback but to still provide the illusion of it. It just doesn't make sense to me that they would invest billions into dragnet infrastructure with the knowledge that something as inevitable as letsencrypt or an iPhone passcode could make it all useless. Edit: wording and some additional comments
- jay_kyburz 11y ago
  > It just doesn't make sense to me that they would invest billions into dragnet infrastructure with the knowledge that something as inevitable as letsencrypt would make it all useless. Never underestimate the stupidity of massive bureaucracies.
- mtgx 11y ago
  We know that it isn't anymore advanced than everyone else's. How do you think they figure out most if not all of the quantum breakthroughs? By either stealing the information or reading the public papers themselves like all the other scientists. I think Google will be the first to have a small useful (but not crypto-breaking) quantum computer by 2020. D-WAVE can't break encryption.
  - nickysielicki 11y ago
    You don't think they are doing independent research at NSA? When I look at the technical problems they solved 10 years ago when they were first setting all of this up, I'm nothing short of amazed. Say what we will about the ethics behind it, I have no doubt that they've got a handful of the best minds in the country over at NSA. Like I said, this is all conjecture on my part. They probably can't break all of our encryption. But the places that NSA is drawing lines seem a bit out of place to me.
jack9 11y ago
I'm a fan of snowden, but this is wrong on so many levels it's hard to understand why anyone thinks his points are valid? This is about privacy and technology - depending on the specifics. I'm not sure what these points are speaking to, because it's none of the relevant issues...I guess it's just to contradict the FBI? 1. Can't prove all when there's data that hasn't been retrieved (encrypted data). What they do have is irrelevant. 2. What they do have is irrelevant...is this a pattern? 3. What they do have is irrelevant. Also, coworkers aren't what they are looking for...wtf 4. Irrelevant...wtf 5. Unsubstantiated and unlikely that Apple has a way to break it's own strong encryption. Apple probably can disable the bricking-by-attempts. If the FBI are so damn confident the 256-bit AES key can be bruteforced, they can damn well do it themselves.
- blazespin 11y ago
  ?? I think he's just saying that this is a pretty unlikely source of intel and not worth creating a massive security back door over. 5 isn't really unsubstantiated. I would be curious to know exactly what version of iOS the device has though
blazespin 11y ago
Does anyone know which version of iOS 9 the device is? Plenty of security updates just in 9.2.1 alone: https://support.apple.com/en-ca/HT205732 https://support.apple.com/en-ca/HT205732 I'm sure if must be an early version of iOS 9. Probably lots of zero days (that are no longer zero days) available.
ojbyrne 11y ago
It seems like "parallel construction." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction The FBI already have what they need, by illegal means. Unfortunately, due to security, they're stuck.
- jonathankoren 11y ago
  Plausible. However, they already have admitted to NSA intercepts[0](which inconveniently show how completely ineffective mass surveillance is). What's more plausible is that this is a CYA operation. The FBI fucked up, and let San Bernardino's Health Department change the password on a health department issued device. They got locked out, and fucked up the chain of custody. [0] http://www.npr.org/2015/12/09/459099478/investigators-say-san-bernardino-shooters-were-radicalized-years-before-attack http://www.npr.org/2015/12/09/459099478/investigators-say-sa... [1] http://www.buzzfeed.com/johnpaczkowski/apple-terrorists-appleid-passcode-changed-in-government-cust#.cuywX69QW http://www.buzzfeed.com/johnpaczkowski/apple-terrorists-appl...
- krylon 11y ago
  I used to think, in such moments, that I was on the way to getting paranoid. These days, I more often think that maybe I should be a lot more paranoid. It has become really hard to figure out what to believe and what not. The whole affair could simply be a PR stunt. Maybe the FBI wants to create a precedent so they can get an easy access to everybody's phones where they consider it convenient. But maybe, they actually do not want that phone at all and want to create precedent where people think, "Oh look, now I know for sure the Feds cannot get at my iPhone". At times, it all seems like plots within schemes within hidden agendas.
  - macns 11y ago
    > It has become really hard to figure out what to believe and what not. This. Thankfully it is also becoming obvious to more people the necessity of end to end encryption and open source software. Then - depending on the level of paranoia - we would only need to deal with the encryption tech.
meowface 11y ago
There are allegations that the FBI could easily decrypt the phone if they actually wanted to, found here: https://www.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/46exkr/john_mcafee_ill_decrypt_the_san_bernardino_phone/d04tyzm https://www.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/46exkr/john_mca... https://www.reddit.com/r/news/comments/46np5t/san_bernardino_shooters_apple_id_passcode_changed/d06q9ff https://www.reddit.com/r/news/comments/46np5t/san_bernardino... Any truth to this?
- cmurf 11y ago
  In the government's filing, they claim Apple has exclusive technical means to gain access, and FBI is explicitly stated as being unable to. What are the implications of lying to the court in a legal filing?
  - swang 11y ago
    absolutely nothing, the fbi lied to congress and no one is in jail.
- citizensixteen 11y ago
  If the government hacks the iPhone themselves, they don't get the legal precedent they are so desperate to establish in this case. This paves the way for legislation that forces technology companies to install backdoors in software/hardware. This case is not about the data on the phone itself, the government is simply continuing its march towards comprehensive surveillance systems. Secret Memo Details U.S.’s Broader Strategy to Crack Phones http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/secret-memo-details-u-s-s-broader-strategy-to-crack-phones http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/secret-mem... "Silicon Valley celebrated last fall when the White House revealed it would not seek legislation forcing technology makers to install “backdoors” in their software -- secret listening posts where investigators could pierce the veil of secrecy on users’ encrypted data, from text messages to video chats. But while the companies may have thought that was the final word, in fact the government was working on a Plan B. In a secret meeting convened by the White House around Thanksgiving, senior national security officials ordered agencies across the U.S. government to find ways to counter encryption software and gain access to the most heavily protected user data on the most secure consumer devices, including Apple Inc.’s iPhone, the marquee product of one of America’s most valuable companies, according to two people familiar with the decision."
cat-dev-null 11y ago
Does anyone have additional follow-up details of the supposed black SUVs at Apple Cupertino? VEEP, POTUS, TLA, etc. EDIT: Previous item: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11120365 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11120365
- nitrogen 11y ago
  Looking in that thread, it seems no pictures were ever posted (or if they were, they are there no longer).
ianamartin 11y ago
No tinfoil intended here, but it strikes me as very unfortunate that the Supreme Court Justice most likely to be opposed to this recently passed away last weekend. In my not-a-lawyer opinion, I think that Apple will absolutely take this as far as it can. With only an 8-member court, Anthony Kennedy becomes even more important than ever. We should be lobbying SCOTUS harder now than ever before. We need them to rule against this far more than we need to be calling congress people. We need the Supreme Court to act with the effect of precedent. But I'm not optimistic. We would need Roberts and Thomas to back off their national security platforms, and we need RBG and Kagan to understand the problem better. Kennedy is a wildcard, but if we can explain the issue in plain English to those key people and get them to agree, this is doable. Alito and Sotomayor will fall in line. If we do our jobs as members of the body politic, write amicus briefs, and hound the members of the court, this is doable. Thomas and Roberts can be swayed. So can RBG and Kagan. It would be an easier 5-4 decision with Scalia still around, but this is possible without him, and we need to focus our efforts. I'll be putting my money where my mouth is over the weekend and creating a website that submits comments to the individual justices. I'll also be asking for help/edits on the boilerplate I'm offering as a starting point.
- lifeisstillgood 11y ago
  I don't think you can lobby SCOTUS. Theoretically you could present an amicus brief but I think the bar is very high It's probably a good thing we can't lobby them
  - ianamartin 11y ago
    You absolutely can write letters to the members individually. Perhaps lobby was a bad word for it. Perhaps my idea is broken on the face of it. But an amicus brief put together by the HN community doesn't seem completely unreasonable. My point here is that there are things we are capable of doing that might affect the outcome of such a court case. For those of us who care--in either direction--it seems reasonable to try. What I'm going to try to research and build this weekend is the most effective way of contacting the court and sharing your opinions. It could very well fail to be effective, but that's not going to stop me from trying.
tuyguntn 11y ago
Everytime I hear such stories remember about Overton window [1], its a way from unthinkable to policy, Around 10-15years ago privacy issues were almost unthinkable (phase #1) (average person didn't think about privacy too much), then wikileaks came out, then Snowden (phase #2, radical) and so on. Sure FBI has access to phone calls in San Bernardino case, but they are making buzz in news, in order to step to next level, probably from sensible phase into popular, then naturally next step would be `policy phase` and surveillance would be totally legal and everyone will accept this, if not we, then next generation would accept it. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window
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musesum 11y ago
Senator Feinstein wants with compel Apple to put in a backdoor though legislation: http://www.mercurynews.com/politics-government/ci_29527867/trump-bashes-apple-over-privacy-fight http://www.mercurynews.com/politics-government/ci_29527867/t... Would suggest anyone living in California let her know what you think. I went to a RightsCon in the midst of the Arab spring. Talked to folks with friends that were being "disappeared" based on what was on their phone. Meanwhile, David Chaum is suggesting a secret sharing scheme: http://www.therebel.media/david_chaum_restoring_internet_privacy http://www.therebel.media/david_chaum_restoring_internet_pri... "Chaum’s proposed Privategrity system would use nine special servers in nine different countries to encrypt users' data. The theory is, the system would almost always prevent mass government surveillance but would allow government access to combat terrorism or child sex abuse."
- alblue 11y ago
  As I wrote in my InfoQ piece (linked from another of my comments elsewhere) he has since backed down from his stance and will not be filing that legislation.
  - tamana 11y ago
    She.
- tamana 11y ago
  Everything is "terrorism" today, and the notion of having a subject matter exemption in an encryption system is utter nonsense anyway.
- stcredzero 11y ago
  If Feinstein is weighing in on any issue with any technical depth, look carefully at what she's proposing and what she's opposing. More often than not, she's wrong, and her true motivation is likely to pander to a knee-jerk emotional reaction, without careful regard to the technical implications.
  - yompers888 11y ago
citizensixteen 11y ago
More on All Writs Act of 1789. The Dangerous All Writs Act Precedent in the Apple Encryption Case http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/a-dangerous-all-writ-precedent-in-the-apple-case?mbid=social_twitter http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/a-dangerous-all-w... "Tim Cook, the C.E.O. of Apple, which has been ordered to help the F.B.I. get into the cell phone of the San Bernardino shooters, wrote in an angry open letter this week that “the U.S. government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create.” The second part of that formulation has rightly received a great deal of attention: Should a back door be built into devices that are used for encrypted communications? Would that keep us safe from terrorists, or merely make everyone more vulnerable to hackers, as well as to mass government surveillance? But the first part is also potentially insidious, for reasons that go well beyond privacy rights. The simple but strange question here is exactly the one that Cook formulates. What happens when the government goes to court to demand that you give it something that you do not have? No one has it, in fact, because it doesn’t exist. What if the government then proceeds to order you to construct, design, invent, or somehow conjure up the thing it wants? Must you?"
- madaxe_again 11y ago
  You go to prison. For anyone familiar with what happened in Russia during the Stalinist era the US's current trajectory is clear. It doesn't matter that what the state is telling you to do is impossible - the only relevant fact is that you're not complying, and are therefore an enemy of the people (the state). We'll be finding out how Tim runs a secret paedophile ring, or how he has been laundering money, or how he has been supporting IS through action and/or inaction. HUAC will return, lazarus like, but you'll call it the centre for American improvement or some such shit. Remember Chaplin? Anyway. That's one potential future, an actual past, and while the apparatus is more subtle this time, it's the same old forces doing the same old things.
  - sillysaurus3 11y ago
    That works for Qwest's CEOs, but probably not Apple's. If this is the endgame, it's good that computers exist. Without Twitter, the public might believe absurd lies. Nowadays, the lies would have to be pretty nuanced to have an effect. Of course, there's something to be said for overwhelming power. If those in the government really want their way, and all three branches refuse to yield, and none of us can control who are in those branches, is there really anything we can do to stop it? Luckily, this is roughly as likely as the moon disappearing. For now.
alblue 11y ago
I've written up a summary of the current situation for InfoQ here: http://www.infoq.com/news/2016/02/fbios-update http://www.infoq.com/news/2016/02/fbios-update Basically, the FBI shot themselves in the foot by changing the password for the iCloud account within a day or two of the incident, instead of consulting with Apple. This meant the phone couldn't auto backup data which is why the snapshot of the data is not necessarily the most recent. Had they not done this they would have been able to connect the phone to a power outlet and a wifi connection, and it would have uploaded the data to Apple's servers from which they could have asked Apple to acquire the data. Both Apple and the FBI have been requested to appear before a bipartisan committee to answer specific questions about the case.
- kahirsch 11y ago
  "The auto reset was executed by a county information technology employee, according to a federal official. Federal investigators only found out about the reset after it had occurred and that the county employee acted on his own, not on the orders of federal authorities, the source said."[1] [1]http://abcnews.go.com/US/san-bernardino-shooters-apple-id-passcode-changed-government/story?id=37066070 http://abcnews.go.com/US/san-bernardino-shooters-apple-id-pa...
  - alblue 11y ago
    That's not the information reported by Reuters this morning [2] "San Bernardino County reset the password on the iCloud account at the request of the FBI, said county spokesman David Wert." Sounds like both sides are blaming each other for the event. [2] http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0VS2GC http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0VS2GC
    - toyg 11y ago
      That's actually the best piece of news coming out of the whole affair at this point: despite almost 10 years of practice, authorities still don't have a consistent procedure to deal with iPhones, not even relatively old models. Some groups here and there might know it, but it has not trickled down to average grunts.
Shivetya 11y ago
I am more concerned about the idea that the phone password was changed after the government obtained the phone. How is that story not gaining more traction?
MikeNomad 11y ago
The lies that so many of the citizenry buy into are far from nuanced. Rather, they are bald-faced. Often, the liars simply rely on Status Conferral, Ignorance, and Indifference to get by. I contend that Twitter is as much hindrance as help. It has been a long time since the citizenry last needed to fully engage the Check Boxes of Government: Soap, Jury, Ballot, Ammo. A lot of folks are having a hard time believing the last one is an option. Know Your Roots, indeed.
geographomics 11y ago
Snowden's analysis is rather lacking. He claims that the FBI already has all of the suspect's communication records as retrieved via service providers, but ignores the important detail that iMessage uses end-to-end encryption, rendering any such records unobtainable by the service provider. Yes, the last backup was six weeks prior to the phone being seized, but this only means that the phone may well include six weeks' worth of pertinent evidence. And there is nothing to suggest that the FBI is only interested in messages between co-workers. Ultimately, the phone's data would need to be decrypted and analysed to see if the first four assumptions that Snowden makes are actually true. The final assumption is that there are other feasible technical measures that could be taken to crack this phone. This would perhaps be the most interesting point, but Snowden chose to not expand upon it at all.
- ianhawes 11y ago
  Normally I don't like Snowden, but in this case I think he raises great points all around, the biggest being that the non-work phone (Operational Phone) was completely destroyed. Do you think with that sort of OPSSEC that they slip up and use a work phone? Doubtful. But hey, the FBI exists to turn over every stone. The real story here is that they specifically chose this case to go after Apple because they suspected the backlash if Apple tried to fight it would be more than they could handle.
  - geographomics 11y ago
    Even if there's less likelihood of useful evidence on the suspect's work phone, it's still worth checking. The FBI's request isn't too bad really. It's not like they are requesting Apple to build a new mass surveillance tool or anything similarly far-reaching. This is limited to the domain of digital forensics, and how best to extract data in a criminal investigation, against firmware that is hostile to cracking. Given that, by design, the phone has been locked down to only accept Apple-signed firmware, then Apple is really the most feasible choice to assist in bypassing this.
    - Consultant32452 11y ago
draw_down 11y ago
I don't think the backups they got are viable because apparently the suspect's employer changed the iCloud password.
ryan606 11y ago
If Snowden's allegations are true, then it seems pretty clear that the FBI already has all information they claim they need, and doesn't need Apple's help. Rather, this seems to be a "land grab" by the DOJ/BHO Administration to secure government access to all communication devices, all in the name of "National Security". Not unlike the 2001 Patriot Act. Very sad.
- free2rhyme214 11y ago
  And a PR move from Apple.
augb 11y ago
This may have already been stated, but in case it hasn't ... If Apple, as a legal "person" [1], can be compelled against their will to create something that does not exist at the government's will, then what is holding the government from compelling an individual to do the same? [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_personality#United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_personality#United_State...
markman 11y ago
I think apple should tell the court/gov to fk off!

643 points by Karunamon 11y ago

The phone in question is a government issued work phone? Hadn't heard that before. Pretty big detail that isn't mentioned often.

Bud 11y ago
Yep. It's his employer's property. The shooter intentionally destroyed his personal iPhone before the attacks.
- mtgx 11y ago
  Which likely means it contains no useful information there. But the FBI wants to use the case to give it one more go at pushing for backdoors. The fact that Apple wanted to keep this private, but the FBI wanted it to be public (which they almost never do in cases where it's about revealing how they hacked into something), just confirms that to me: https://bgr.com/2016/02/19/apple-vs-fbi-iphone-encryption/ https://bgr.com/2016/02/19/apple-vs-fbi-iphone-encryption/
  - Spooky23 11y ago
    Maybe not. Government phone in a social services organization without MDM? Holy incompetent batman.
    - joezydeco 11y ago
      Looks like MDM was in effect because the San Bernadino Health Dept remotely changed the iCloud password of the phone after the attack, locking the FBI out of accessing the most recent backup of the phone. http://gizmodo.com/the-san-bernardino-terrorists-icloud-password-was-accid-1760158613 http://gizmodo.com/the-san-bernardino-terrorists-icloud-pass...
      - zaroth 11y ago
        Forgive me if I nit-pick this a bit, as we are probably saying the same thing two different ways. iCloud backups are not protected by your iCloud password. I know this because I've personally reset my password and then successfully recovered an iCloud backup to a new phone with the new password. However, the auto-backup feature, which would have pushed the most recent data from the phone onto iCloud just by leaving the phone powered on... apparently that is disabled when the iCloud password is reset. Which makes sense if you think about it, the phone still has the old iCloud password, and it would need the new password in order to authenticate to iCloud. So they inadvertently disabled the backup feature by locking the phone out of iCloud! The first question this raises is can the auto-backup be made to start working again by Apple changing their backend iCloud authentication code to specifically allow this device to login to iCloud with the "wrong" (old) passsword? That would not involve touching the phone and seems like a much cleaner solution. Unless there is code on the phone which disables or destroys the iCloud authentication token / stored password after encountering a login error, which really would surprise me, because API errors could be spurious, but I guess it's possible if they are looking specifically for an "invalid login" return code and then dumping the old token in order to trigger a UI prompt to enter a new password. The second question is why are the existing backups a month and a half old? Doesn't this imply the device was not even turned on or connected to the network for that last month and a half? The other interesting tidbit in the article you linked is the statement the FBI was able to verify that the phone was never paired with any devices to obtain data. How in the world could they know that?
        cdcarter 11y ago
        By changing the iCloud password, the device is no longer able to upload a backup to iCloud, since the device doesn't know the new password yet! The new iCloud password IS required to re-enable auto backup, but you need to get past the PIN screen first to enter the new password.
        Spooky23 11y ago
        I haven't verified this in awhile, but I think that a password reset will log some services out until you enter the new password on the device.
  - rtpg 11y ago
    >But the FBI wants to use the case to give it one more go at pushing for backdoors. Really? The FBI said it was 100% totally fine with giving the phone to Apple and just having remote access to the phone in this one specific case. That is to say, not having Apple turn over the tools of the trade. I feel like a lot of people here should try to play devil's advocate on this case. I'm (kind of) for Apple in this case, but I think the general representation of the gov't's stated request has been completely morphed from what was asked. The devil's advocate is that this is an Apple PR move. Apple spent a bunch of time trumping up how safe their new phones are against this very thing, and that they even backported most of it. But the fact is that Apple _can_ install a backdoor without even requiring the phone PIN code! On the older phones at least. The FBI asked for the contents, not the tool to get the contents. A thing that has been mentioned elsewhere, but: by fighting this case (a single phone unlock with a specific warrant), we are mixing this case with the more dangerous and important fight of having backdoor laws be codified. As it stands, Apple _can and should_ make the most un-backdoorable phones possible. Legislation that could be enacted because of this fight could make us lose the war on the right to not have backdoors. The fact is that the iOS update mechanism _is already a_ backdoor. Which exists for many reasons (and, to my understanding, is already mostly fixed by asking for a PIN code when updating now).
    - sehugg 11y ago
      The FBI said it was 100% totally fine with giving the phone to Apple and just having remote access to the phone in this one specific case. It's really up to the court to decide that, and this post makes the argument that it may not be possible to keep the tools under wraps if the case progresses: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645 http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=5645
      - rtpg 11y ago
        Thanks for that read. The amount of validation required for the tool to be used in court seems to really cause the danger of a leak to go sky high... I think the DoJ might be discounting that risk with their reasoning of "Apple can just delete it" As an aside, I find it funny that the author finds it "stupid" that the jury is allowed to ask questions in a California court. I would almost declare that a constitutional right (judged by a jury of the peers)
- stordoff 11y ago
  I hadn't really looked at the details, because the fundamental question of "Can the courts compel work/backdoors from Apple?" is much more important IMO, but this really makes it feel like a fishing exercise from the FBI. Though possible, the chance that the attackers used an employer-owned phone to discuss/plan/coordinate the attackers seems rather remote if they a) had personal phones, and b) took the time to destroy them.
  - blazespin 11y ago
    It's not a fishing exercise at all. It's a "let's prove that we can create a backdoor for further use" exercise.
  - crimsoneer 11y ago
    It's going to be a brave ass FBI agent who says "well, we didn't bother to try to access this phone because he probably didn't use it".

ayyghost 11y ago

I would like to see some clarification on point #5. The only other option I see for the FBI is to continue manually bruteforcing PINs, the arduousness of such a task being why they requested Apple's help in the first place. Is he talking about 0days?

gpm 11y ago
Manually bruteforcing PINs is actually not a way to get in here, the phone will wipe the keys that the pin protects after 10 attempts. I'm not sure what method Snowden has in mind for decrypting this device without going through Apple. It seems like it must be a 0day.
- nxzero 11y ago
  Depending on the device/iOS versions, you're able to bypass the count limits.
  - Crito 11y ago
    The FBI is asking that Apple provide them the ability to bypass the PIN timeout limits. In modern iphones, those limits are handled by the secure enclave. However on the 5C in question, the limits are done in iOS and can be disabled by flashing a custom version of iOS. That's what the FBI is requesting.
- ap3 11y ago
  The phone "may" wipe the keys after 10 failed attempts. That is a configuration option. Can't that be changed by the remote configuration management software?
jdiez17 11y ago
Just one way I can think of would be to dump the contents of ROM chip, bruteforcing the encryption key by checking all possible PINs and comparing the decrypted data against some known plaintext that would be present on all iOS devices. (this would require the FBI to know what key derivation algorithm is used on pre-secure-enclave devices, but that's not outside the realm of possibility).

notthegov 11y ago

He is suggesting that the FBI sees this as an opportunity to set a precedent and doesn't care about the data? If so, in FBI logic, in the future there could be a more legitimate need for Apple to comply because a suspect could have a WMD. But so far no such threat exists. However, let's distort the issue and exploit this opportunity now knowing few will go against law enforcement tactics against the San Bernardino killers? Because they will need the power in the future but the public has to be scared into acting now to prevent the real hypothetical future attack?

blazespin 11y ago
Why was this downvoted? I'm sure this is exactly the thinking? Man HN can be weird sometimes.
- thesimpsons1022 11y ago
  well now it's top comment. funny how that happens.
  - bcook 11y ago
    Whether it is true or not, I dunno, but I was told that the native Americans thought that immediate responses/reactions were disrespectful. Regardless of the historical truth of my folk-tale, I find the idea interesting. Nowadays, slow == bad (or forgotten/disregarded). The recent Springer "publications greater than 10 years old are free" comes to mind.
takeda 11y ago
This could also be an act to regain trust and make us less paranoid.
vonklaus 11y ago
This was raised and discussed in another thread and I believe this to be the case. Walt Mossberg, a pretty well known verge reporter who wrote one of the articles that was circulating a few weeks ago about the decline in Apple software, was discussing this on his podcast. The idea that actors move forward with a specific case was new to me, but I obviousloy never thought much about it and it seems pretty intuitive when considered. Roe v. Wade and the Rosa Parks case were raised in the other thread as well as, IIRC the Brown v. Board of Edu. What happens is that the prosecution or another actor can Appeal to the supreme court (or choose what case to prosecute etc.) with the ultimate goal of timing sentiment, finding the perfect array of facts and discovery, and having everything align perfectly. They then push up to the supreme court with the best chance of getting a binding ruling that would become defacto law. In this scenario (and from here forward is my non-expert opinion) the data is probably in a best case scenario for the FBI slightly useful. However, not getting this data is pretty much meaningless. So they are likely to: * Use public sentiment and the recent terrorist attacks as a catalyst for their demand (you quite correctly raised this point). * The suspects are dead. So while they may not be guilty in the court of law, it is pretty obvious that they did it thus there is no risk of them being acquitted. * Most evidence suggests a fairly lone wolf attack scenario, so if they were working with anyone the data would likely be on a computer or in call logs. Thus the minimal gov't gain which would be maybe mapping a name to some of the numbers. * They have a successful narrative to frame and this coincided with a bill to limit encryption. So yes. This was a strategic move. If John McAfee is to be believed, and on one hand he sort of fucking isn't, but on the other hand I actually do but mostly on faith, he and his team can successfully decrypt the phone. He has publicly offered (possibly taking out an editorial but I did see the article at least) that he would unlock the phone for free if they would drop the case. Now, even if they gov can't get in (and they can), it isn't unreasonable to not give the phone to a suspected murder. That said I think John McAfee and probably a few people on here could get in, so the tl;dr is ya they coming for that secure enclave.

deleted 11y ago

[deleted]

mayneack 11y ago

Off topic, but this is exactly the scenario that Twitter wants to replace by expanding the tweet size limit. Instead of a picture of text, we could expand to real (presumably searchable) text.

hndl 11y ago
Right. Perhaps they can begin by rolling this out only to individuals who have verified accounts.
- glenstein 11y ago
  I think it would be nifty to treat it as if it were a specialized form of embedded media like pictures and videos. Wall of text as a media type, and maybe even support links to, say, pastebin-type sites (or don't, this parts not critical). Then you still have tweets as the basic unit of Twitter and preserve some consistency.
  - digi_owl 11y ago
    Look up Twitlonger. Various clients have that built in, and it basically but the first few words in the tweet alongside a link to the full text.
    - riffic 11y ago
      Look up OStatus. I don't know why people place all their eggs in one walled-garden basket.
      - deleted 11y ago
        [deleted]
      - digi_owl 11y ago
        Network effect, basically. Everyone is on Twitter, therefore everyone is on Twitter.
11y ago

nostromo 11y ago

The intelligence community never lets a terrorist attack go to waste. I'm convinced they have a wish list in wait for every tragedy. Next on the list was getting a back door on every cellphone.

CamperBob2 11y ago
I'm convinced they have a wish list in wait for every tragedy That's not even remotely debatable, unless you believe the 350+-page Patriot Act was written within a month after 9/11.
- paulddraper 11y ago
  That's not unbelievable.
  - nullc 11y ago
    > The Patriot Act is huge and I remember someone asking a Justice Department official how did they write such a large statute so quickly, and of course the answer was that it has been sitting in the drawers of the Justice Department for the last 20 years waiting for the event where they would pull it out. -- Richard Clarke (former National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism) Often political changes are artifacts of opportunity. I don't personally think that its evil that the justice department had a laundry list of civil rights violations waiting for an opportunity to propose them. It's the responsibility of the public and earnest lawmakers to be aware of efforts to exploit sentiment and resist bad law regardless of when it's proposed.
  - tunap 11y ago
    Biden submitted the virtually identical bill shortly after the OK City bombing 6 years prior... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibus_Counterterrorism_Act_of_1995 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnibus_Counterterrorism_Act_o...
  - CamperBob2 11y ago
    Yes, it is. Can you imagine how different life would be if the rest of government worked at that pace?

nickysielicki 11y ago

Maybe I'm too far-out there, but what do we really know about the NSA's quantum computing abilities? Given their budget and their ability to keep things under wraps (eg: consider the scope of PRISM and how they ran that for close to a decade), is it that crazy to think this is a debate they don't care about winning? Teams at universities made 16 qbit machines something like 5 years ago. D-wave claims 512 qubits today. I don't think it's out of the question that NSA is far ahead of both of them. D-wave employs "100+ people" according to Wikipedia. NSA is estimated to have upwards of 30,000. It makes a lot of sense, then. NSA got caught with their pants down, naturally backlash from it is still happening today. So if your opponents are going to be winning some ground back, the best PR move is to have them win ground that doesn't matter. (Or that won't matter in a couple years.) I think these debates about the necessity of key escrow and modified firmware are conversations they're having with the intention of losing, to prevent meaningful pushback but to still provide the illusion of it. It just doesn't make sense to me that they would invest billions into dragnet infrastructure with the knowledge that something as inevitable as letsencrypt or an iPhone passcode could make it all useless. Edit: wording and some additional comments

jay_kyburz 11y ago
> It just doesn't make sense to me that they would invest billions into dragnet infrastructure with the knowledge that something as inevitable as letsencrypt would make it all useless. Never underestimate the stupidity of massive bureaucracies.
mtgx 11y ago
We know that it isn't anymore advanced than everyone else's. How do you think they figure out most if not all of the quantum breakthroughs? By either stealing the information or reading the public papers themselves like all the other scientists. I think Google will be the first to have a small useful (but not crypto-breaking) quantum computer by 2020. D-WAVE can't break encryption.
- nickysielicki 11y ago
  You don't think they are doing independent research at NSA? When I look at the technical problems they solved 10 years ago when they were first setting all of this up, I'm nothing short of amazed. Say what we will about the ethics behind it, I have no doubt that they've got a handful of the best minds in the country over at NSA. Like I said, this is all conjecture on my part. They probably can't break all of our encryption. But the places that NSA is drawing lines seem a bit out of place to me.

jack9 11y ago

I'm a fan of snowden, but this is wrong on so many levels it's hard to understand why anyone thinks his points are valid? This is about privacy and technology - depending on the specifics. I'm not sure what these points are speaking to, because it's none of the relevant issues...I guess it's just to contradict the FBI? 1. Can't prove all when there's data that hasn't been retrieved (encrypted data). What they do have is irrelevant. 2. What they do have is irrelevant...is this a pattern? 3. What they do have is irrelevant. Also, coworkers aren't what they are looking for...wtf 4. Irrelevant...wtf 5. Unsubstantiated and unlikely that Apple has a way to break it's own strong encryption. Apple probably can disable the bricking-by-attempts. If the FBI are so damn confident the 256-bit AES key can be bruteforced, they can damn well do it themselves.

blazespin 11y ago
?? I think he's just saying that this is a pretty unlikely source of intel and not worth creating a massive security back door over. 5 isn't really unsubstantiated. I would be curious to know exactly what version of iOS the device has though

blazespin 11y ago

Does anyone know which version of iOS 9 the device is? Plenty of security updates just in 9.2.1 alone: https://support.apple.com/en-ca/HT205732 https://support.apple.com/en-ca/HT205732 I'm sure if must be an early version of iOS 9. Probably lots of zero days (that are no longer zero days) available.

ojbyrne 11y ago

It seems like "parallel construction." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction The FBI already have what they need, by illegal means. Unfortunately, due to security, they're stuck.

jonathankoren 11y ago
Plausible. However, they already have admitted to NSA intercepts[0](which inconveniently show how completely ineffective mass surveillance is). What's more plausible is that this is a CYA operation. The FBI fucked up, and let San Bernardino's Health Department change the password on a health department issued device. They got locked out, and fucked up the chain of custody. [0] http://www.npr.org/2015/12/09/459099478/investigators-say-san-bernardino-shooters-were-radicalized-years-before-attack http://www.npr.org/2015/12/09/459099478/investigators-say-sa... [1] http://www.buzzfeed.com/johnpaczkowski/apple-terrorists-appleid-passcode-changed-in-government-cust#.cuywX69QW http://www.buzzfeed.com/johnpaczkowski/apple-terrorists-appl...
krylon 11y ago
I used to think, in such moments, that I was on the way to getting paranoid. These days, I more often think that maybe I should be a lot more paranoid. It has become really hard to figure out what to believe and what not. The whole affair could simply be a PR stunt. Maybe the FBI wants to create a precedent so they can get an easy access to everybody's phones where they consider it convenient. But maybe, they actually do not want that phone at all and want to create precedent where people think, "Oh look, now I know for sure the Feds cannot get at my iPhone". At times, it all seems like plots within schemes within hidden agendas.
- macns 11y ago
  > It has become really hard to figure out what to believe and what not. This. Thankfully it is also becoming obvious to more people the necessity of end to end encryption and open source software. Then - depending on the level of paranoia - we would only need to deal with the encryption tech.

meowface 11y ago

There are allegations that the FBI could easily decrypt the phone if they actually wanted to, found here: https://www.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/46exkr/john_mcafee_ill_decrypt_the_san_bernardino_phone/d04tyzm https://www.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/46exkr/john_mca... https://www.reddit.com/r/news/comments/46np5t/san_bernardino_shooters_apple_id_passcode_changed/d06q9ff https://www.reddit.com/r/news/comments/46np5t/san_bernardino... Any truth to this?

cmurf 11y ago
In the government's filing, they claim Apple has exclusive technical means to gain access, and FBI is explicitly stated as being unable to. What are the implications of lying to the court in a legal filing?
- swang 11y ago
  absolutely nothing, the fbi lied to congress and no one is in jail.
citizensixteen 11y ago
If the government hacks the iPhone themselves, they don't get the legal precedent they are so desperate to establish in this case. This paves the way for legislation that forces technology companies to install backdoors in software/hardware. This case is not about the data on the phone itself, the government is simply continuing its march towards comprehensive surveillance systems. Secret Memo Details U.S.’s Broader Strategy to Crack Phones http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/secret-memo-details-u-s-s-broader-strategy-to-crack-phones http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-19/secret-mem... "Silicon Valley celebrated last fall when the White House revealed it would not seek legislation forcing technology makers to install “backdoors” in their software -- secret listening posts where investigators could pierce the veil of secrecy on users’ encrypted data, from text messages to video chats. But while the companies may have thought that was the final word, in fact the government was working on a Plan B. In a secret meeting convened by the White House around Thanksgiving, senior national security officials ordered agencies across the U.S. government to find ways to counter encryption software and gain access to the most heavily protected user data on the most secure consumer devices, including Apple Inc.’s iPhone, the marquee product of one of America’s most valuable companies, according to two people familiar with the decision."

cat-dev-null 11y ago

Does anyone have additional follow-up details of the supposed black SUVs at Apple Cupertino? VEEP, POTUS, TLA, etc. EDIT: Previous item: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11120365 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11120365

nitrogen 11y ago
Looking in that thread, it seems no pictures were ever posted (or if they were, they are there no longer).

ianamartin 11y ago

No tinfoil intended here, but it strikes me as very unfortunate that the Supreme Court Justice most likely to be opposed to this recently passed away last weekend. In my not-a-lawyer opinion, I think that Apple will absolutely take this as far as it can. With only an 8-member court, Anthony Kennedy becomes even more important than ever. We should be lobbying SCOTUS harder now than ever before. We need them to rule against this far more than we need to be calling congress people. We need the Supreme Court to act with the effect of precedent. But I'm not optimistic. We would need Roberts and Thomas to back off their national security platforms, and we need RBG and Kagan to understand the problem better. Kennedy is a wildcard, but if we can explain the issue in plain English to those key people and get them to agree, this is doable. Alito and Sotomayor will fall in line. If we do our jobs as members of the body politic, write amicus briefs, and hound the members of the court, this is doable. Thomas and Roberts can be swayed. So can RBG and Kagan. It would be an easier 5-4 decision with Scalia still around, but this is possible without him, and we need to focus our efforts. I'll be putting my money where my mouth is over the weekend and creating a website that submits comments to the individual justices. I'll also be asking for help/edits on the boilerplate I'm offering as a starting point.

lifeisstillgood 11y ago
I don't think you can lobby SCOTUS. Theoretically you could present an amicus brief but I think the bar is very high It's probably a good thing we can't lobby them
- ianamartin 11y ago
  You absolutely can write letters to the members individually. Perhaps lobby was a bad word for it. Perhaps my idea is broken on the face of it. But an amicus brief put together by the HN community doesn't seem completely unreasonable. My point here is that there are things we are capable of doing that might affect the outcome of such a court case. For those of us who care--in either direction--it seems reasonable to try. What I'm going to try to research and build this weekend is the most effective way of contacting the court and sharing your opinions. It could very well fail to be effective, but that's not going to stop me from trying.

tuyguntn 11y ago

Everytime I hear such stories remember about Overton window [1], its a way from unthinkable to policy, Around 10-15years ago privacy issues were almost unthinkable (phase #1) (average person didn't think about privacy too much), then wikileaks came out, then Snowden (phase #2, radical) and so on. Sure FBI has access to phone calls in San Bernardino case, but they are making buzz in news, in order to step to next level, probably from sensible phase into popular, then naturally next step would be `policy phase` and surveillance would be totally legal and everyone will accept this, if not we, then next generation would accept it. [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton_window

deleted 11y ago

[deleted]

musesum 11y ago

Senator Feinstein wants with compel Apple to put in a backdoor though legislation: http://www.mercurynews.com/politics-government/ci_29527867/trump-bashes-apple-over-privacy-fight http://www.mercurynews.com/politics-government/ci_29527867/t... Would suggest anyone living in California let her know what you think. I went to a RightsCon in the midst of the Arab spring. Talked to folks with friends that were being "disappeared" based on what was on their phone. Meanwhile, David Chaum is suggesting a secret sharing scheme: http://www.therebel.media/david_chaum_restoring_internet_privacy http://www.therebel.media/david_chaum_restoring_internet_pri... "Chaum’s proposed Privategrity system would use nine special servers in nine different countries to encrypt users' data. The theory is, the system would almost always prevent mass government surveillance but would allow government access to combat terrorism or child sex abuse."

alblue 11y ago
As I wrote in my InfoQ piece (linked from another of my comments elsewhere) he has since backed down from his stance and will not be filing that legislation.
- tamana 11y ago
  She.
tamana 11y ago
Everything is "terrorism" today, and the notion of having a subject matter exemption in an encryption system is utter nonsense anyway.
stcredzero 11y ago
If Feinstein is weighing in on any issue with any technical depth, look carefully at what she's proposing and what she's opposing. More often than not, she's wrong, and her true motivation is likely to pander to a knee-jerk emotional reaction, without careful regard to the technical implications.
- yompers888 11y ago

citizensixteen 11y ago

More on All Writs Act of 1789. The Dangerous All Writs Act Precedent in the Apple Encryption Case http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/a-dangerous-all-writ-precedent-in-the-apple-case?mbid=social_twitter http://www.newyorker.com/news/amy-davidson/a-dangerous-all-w... "Tim Cook, the C.E.O. of Apple, which has been ordered to help the F.B.I. get into the cell phone of the San Bernardino shooters, wrote in an angry open letter this week that “the U.S. government has asked us for something we simply do not have, and something we consider too dangerous to create.” The second part of that formulation has rightly received a great deal of attention: Should a back door be built into devices that are used for encrypted communications? Would that keep us safe from terrorists, or merely make everyone more vulnerable to hackers, as well as to mass government surveillance? But the first part is also potentially insidious, for reasons that go well beyond privacy rights. The simple but strange question here is exactly the one that Cook formulates. What happens when the government goes to court to demand that you give it something that you do not have? No one has it, in fact, because it doesn’t exist. What if the government then proceeds to order you to construct, design, invent, or somehow conjure up the thing it wants? Must you?"

madaxe_again 11y ago
You go to prison. For anyone familiar with what happened in Russia during the Stalinist era the US's current trajectory is clear. It doesn't matter that what the state is telling you to do is impossible - the only relevant fact is that you're not complying, and are therefore an enemy of the people (the state). We'll be finding out how Tim runs a secret paedophile ring, or how he has been laundering money, or how he has been supporting IS through action and/or inaction. HUAC will return, lazarus like, but you'll call it the centre for American improvement or some such shit. Remember Chaplin? Anyway. That's one potential future, an actual past, and while the apparatus is more subtle this time, it's the same old forces doing the same old things.
- sillysaurus3 11y ago
  That works for Qwest's CEOs, but probably not Apple's. If this is the endgame, it's good that computers exist. Without Twitter, the public might believe absurd lies. Nowadays, the lies would have to be pretty nuanced to have an effect. Of course, there's something to be said for overwhelming power. If those in the government really want their way, and all three branches refuse to yield, and none of us can control who are in those branches, is there really anything we can do to stop it? Luckily, this is roughly as likely as the moon disappearing. For now.

alblue 11y ago

I've written up a summary of the current situation for InfoQ here: http://www.infoq.com/news/2016/02/fbios-update http://www.infoq.com/news/2016/02/fbios-update Basically, the FBI shot themselves in the foot by changing the password for the iCloud account within a day or two of the incident, instead of consulting with Apple. This meant the phone couldn't auto backup data which is why the snapshot of the data is not necessarily the most recent. Had they not done this they would have been able to connect the phone to a power outlet and a wifi connection, and it would have uploaded the data to Apple's servers from which they could have asked Apple to acquire the data. Both Apple and the FBI have been requested to appear before a bipartisan committee to answer specific questions about the case.

kahirsch 11y ago
"The auto reset was executed by a county information technology employee, according to a federal official. Federal investigators only found out about the reset after it had occurred and that the county employee acted on his own, not on the orders of federal authorities, the source said."[1] [1]http://abcnews.go.com/US/san-bernardino-shooters-apple-id-passcode-changed-government/story?id=37066070 http://abcnews.go.com/US/san-bernardino-shooters-apple-id-pa...
- alblue 11y ago
  That's not the information reported by Reuters this morning [2] "San Bernardino County reset the password on the iCloud account at the request of the FBI, said county spokesman David Wert." Sounds like both sides are blaming each other for the event. [2] http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0VS2GC http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0VS2GC
  - toyg 11y ago
    That's actually the best piece of news coming out of the whole affair at this point: despite almost 10 years of practice, authorities still don't have a consistent procedure to deal with iPhones, not even relatively old models. Some groups here and there might know it, but it has not trickled down to average grunts.

Shivetya 11y ago

I am more concerned about the idea that the phone password was changed after the government obtained the phone. How is that story not gaining more traction?

MikeNomad 11y ago

The lies that so many of the citizenry buy into are far from nuanced. Rather, they are bald-faced. Often, the liars simply rely on Status Conferral, Ignorance, and Indifference to get by. I contend that Twitter is as much hindrance as help. It has been a long time since the citizenry last needed to fully engage the Check Boxes of Government: Soap, Jury, Ballot, Ammo. A lot of folks are having a hard time believing the last one is an option. Know Your Roots, indeed.

geographomics 11y ago

Snowden's analysis is rather lacking. He claims that the FBI already has all of the suspect's communication records as retrieved via service providers, but ignores the important detail that iMessage uses end-to-end encryption, rendering any such records unobtainable by the service provider. Yes, the last backup was six weeks prior to the phone being seized, but this only means that the phone may well include six weeks' worth of pertinent evidence. And there is nothing to suggest that the FBI is only interested in messages between co-workers. Ultimately, the phone's data would need to be decrypted and analysed to see if the first four assumptions that Snowden makes are actually true. The final assumption is that there are other feasible technical measures that could be taken to crack this phone. This would perhaps be the most interesting point, but Snowden chose to not expand upon it at all.

ianhawes 11y ago
Normally I don't like Snowden, but in this case I think he raises great points all around, the biggest being that the non-work phone (Operational Phone) was completely destroyed. Do you think with that sort of OPSSEC that they slip up and use a work phone? Doubtful. But hey, the FBI exists to turn over every stone. The real story here is that they specifically chose this case to go after Apple because they suspected the backlash if Apple tried to fight it would be more than they could handle.
- geographomics 11y ago
  Even if there's less likelihood of useful evidence on the suspect's work phone, it's still worth checking. The FBI's request isn't too bad really. It's not like they are requesting Apple to build a new mass surveillance tool or anything similarly far-reaching. This is limited to the domain of digital forensics, and how best to extract data in a criminal investigation, against firmware that is hostile to cracking. Given that, by design, the phone has been locked down to only accept Apple-signed firmware, then Apple is really the most feasible choice to assist in bypassing this.
  - Consultant32452 11y ago

draw_down 11y ago

I don't think the backups they got are viable because apparently the suspect's employer changed the iCloud password.

ryan606 11y ago

If Snowden's allegations are true, then it seems pretty clear that the FBI already has all information they claim they need, and doesn't need Apple's help. Rather, this seems to be a "land grab" by the DOJ/BHO Administration to secure government access to all communication devices, all in the name of "National Security". Not unlike the 2001 Patriot Act. Very sad.

free2rhyme214 11y ago
And a PR move from Apple.

augb 11y ago

This may have already been stated, but in case it hasn't ... If Apple, as a legal "person" [1], can be compelled against their will to create something that does not exist at the government's will, then what is holding the government from compelling an individual to do the same? [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_personality#United_States https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_personality#United_State...

markman 11y ago

I think apple should tell the court/gov to fk off!