willseth

15 ms·

151.
by willseth 3y ago
Wow that’s a hell of a stretch, but A+ for effort I guess. By that logic, they’re only stealing 50% of Apple’s iMessage resources for iPhone users.
152.
by willseth 3y ago
Ahhh and to think all this time I thought I knew what a metaphor was. It’s literally any comparison! Silly me!
153.
by willseth 3y ago
> A correctly implemented end-to-end encrypted protocol would be safe for all participating clients. As long as the clients are closed source, this is a circular argument. The client itself is a vector. Not just for a good E2E implementa
154.
by willseth 3y ago
Agree. It shows off their technical chops and gets a lot of press attention and goodwill for their target market of Android users who mostly don’t like Apple.
155.
by willseth 3y ago
How are you going to make a case for tortious interference when the would be interferee is profiting by using the interferer’s resources without payment?
156.
by willseth 3y ago
There were a lot! Usually taking the form of: 1. They’ll have to do a major update to iMessage, 2. But what about Hackintosh?, or 3. EU regulators will stop it
157.
by willseth 3y ago
If you don’t trust Apple, then obviously you don’t use it. If you do, then it shouldn't be possible for a 3rd party client to break that trust. Users only see iMessage vs no-iMessage and have no other way to identify the client to deci
158.
by willseth 3y ago
What? Does a fire extinguisher connect to Apple servers? Does a fire extinguisher secretly being a bomb affect the security of others? I don’t know if you could have come up with a worse metaphor.
159.
by willseth 3y ago
Cool experiment. I suspect your version would be far more permissive in matching than Shazam, which makes sense for your test case. Shazam's fingerprints are a lot more specific, e.g. they would differentiate different mixes of the sam
160.
by willseth 3y ago
They have a patent, which IIRC should be expiring fairly soon (the original patent anyway)
161.
by willseth 3y ago
Doesn't Chromaprint have to compare the whole song? This is great for detecting duplicates, but Shazam's fingerprint design allows it to match a short snippet to the complete song.
162.
by willseth 3y ago
> they already implement an interoperable, open standard in their primary texting app (RCS) Yes, but Apple has announced they will do the same thing. That is not the same thing as interop with the actual iMessage protocol. Similarly, Goo
163.
by willseth 3y ago
Oh my god, they invented a worse XSLT
164.
by willseth 3y ago
If we’re going to be this pedantic about it: iPhone’s camera will not add or remove things that weren’t captured in its temporal window. It won’t change the semantic meaning of an image. It won’t make a sad face person look happy, make dayt
165.
by willseth 3y ago
I didn’t misunderstand what happened, and I know how the iPhone camera works. I was only noting a couple common cases where computational photography is really nice. I’m pretty picky about my photos and nothing I’ve shot with my iPhone has
166.
by willseth 3y ago
I know you’re pretending to be dense on purpose, but taking a dozen pictures at once and automatically picking the best one can obviously save a lot of shots. Same with combining exposures.
167.
by willseth 3y ago
Try to photograph a toddler without this feature. Good luck. Does the fact that the iPhone allows me to do this pretty reliably without any fuss mean I have more or less control?
168.
by willseth 3y ago
This is bland advice and only applies in trivial situations where the colleague has bad habits, quirks, etc., which is really most people. Everyone can be annoying if you look for that perspective, but most people are…fine. If someone is ac
169.
by willseth 3y ago
You'd think that, but in practice these ransomware groups are pretty reliable, and actually many rasomees have remarked on how good the customer service is! Their ability to make money is dependent on them maintaining a reputation for
170.
by willseth 3y ago
> This is really, really clearly incestuous tech media stuff as part of a pressure campaign. There’s no evidence of that, only your assumptions. Lots of comments from knowledgeable folks outside the media and who couldn’t care less about
171.
by willseth 3y ago
That's my understanding as well. My original reply was in response to your suggestion that iMessage differentiate RCS encrypted vs RCS unencrypted using colors, and it appears that wouldn't even be possible because Google is apply
172.
by willseth 3y ago
AFAICT Google Messages is simply encrypting the data sent over RCS, i.e. RCS is dumb pipes for the encrypted data, and the carries don't explicitly cooperate one way or another. The consequence would be that only users of Google Messag
173.
by willseth 3y ago
Does E2EE RCS even exist, or is that just Google bolting E2EE over RCS for users of their specific Messages app?
174.
by willseth 3y ago
Came here to say this. This is correct.
175.
by willseth 3y ago
And yet we all still use door locks, despite the fact that a skilled lock picker could break every standard door lock in minutes. This illustrates the importance of threat modeling.
176.
by willseth 3y ago
Can you give an example? Global DP systems generally offer excellent privacy protection for the analytical distortion cost. Global DP is often not implemented simply due to workflow inconveniences but otherwise it’s great for analytical use
177.
by willseth 3y ago
I designed our anonymization systems. You clearly have a misunderstanding of the threat model and the treatment methods.
178.
by willseth 3y ago
If you have a name, address, and phone number associated with a customer account, then you have collected PII. Good luck avoiding that. User tracking actually requires linking to associate online activities with user personas. Anonymization
179.
by willseth 3y ago
I just realized you wrote “de-anonymization”. We don’t do that, but we do a risk analysis that simulates an attack, making some pessimistic assumptions about what data an attacker may have for linkage, to estimate how risky data is to share
180.
by willseth 3y ago
My experience is no different and in fact it’s hard to convince anyone to treat indirect identifiers at all. Everyone wants the bare minimum, which is unfortunate, but understandable for someone trying to run a business. All of our current

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