txrx0000

5 ms·

1.
by txrx0000 7d ago
I think there is a preferable category of abstractions that are adequately unambiguous, hardware-agnostic, and only occupy a thin layer of the stack. The argument could sort of be made for C, but not native assembly or digital computers bec
2.
by txrx0000 8d ago
I agree with the general sentiment, but there's one major caveat. We should implement reproducible programs on top of a virtual machine spec like JVM or WebAssembly rather than replicate the entire environment. It's more practical
3.
by txrx0000 9d ago
Not really. The largest IQ4_XS quant here is still worth it because Bonsai doesn't offer larger quants. They could beat it if they made a quaternary variant though, I don't know why they're stopping at ternary.
4.
by txrx0000 10d ago
I think you've correctly identified the problem. Regardless of whether agentic AIs possess phenomenal consciousness, they will behave and take actions in the real world as if they do because they were trained on human behavior. It&#x27
5.
by txrx0000 10d ago
We may have to guide others to derive these concepts themselves in the same way we did rather than instilling the conclusion. I don't know how to do that yet, so for the time being, I just describe the problem.
6.
by txrx0000 11d ago
Flagged already, but I'll put this here anyway. The root problem is much bigger than the big tech companies or the people running them, as I explain in this past comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49690354 I
7.
by txrx0000 12d ago
Okay, that's technically true again, but local mid-tier like Qwen3.8-27B is only a year behind the closed frontier. I'm personally willing to be behind by a year if it gives me mental sovereignty against the big AI companies. They
8.
by txrx0000 12d ago
Technically true, but the delay between local and closed frontier is only a few months. And individual sovereignty / digital bodily integrity is almost priceless.
9.
by txrx0000 12d ago
It pays off instantly , because OpenAI/Anthropic can no longer see what I'm doing and that's worth a lot of money to me. If I am offloading some of my thought processes to a machine, I want to own that machine. And if I fine
10.
by txrx0000 13d ago
Precisely. And it's not only privacy, but individual sovereignty in general. I just wrote a mini essay about this half an hour ago on a different but related post and don't want to immediately repeat that, so here's the link
11.
by txrx0000 13d ago
It's part of the causal chain, but far from the beginning . The root problem, as far as humanly controllable things go, is the way we manufacture computer hardware. That's upstream of the centralized structure of the Internet whi
12.
by txrx0000 14d ago
These models are trained on human data, so they will behave like humans. And even for RL and self-improvement, we're still asking the question of "what would a human genius think about and how would they self-improve when given lo
13.
by txrx0000 14d ago
You say regulation is worth trying, but ignore the reality that the government is itself misaligned with the average joe unless we're able to keep it in check. We can't right now. Recall the PRISM program exposed by Edward Snowden
14.
by txrx0000 27d ago
In a materialist world, the difference between our consciousnesses can be explained as matter cluster A (my brain) being different from matter cluster B (your brain). I understand the mind-body problem, that's why I made the distinctio
15.
by txrx0000 29d ago
What I meant was that even if I am a lone mind that is dreaming up a universe, I am dreaming of living as a human inside a material universe. Materialism can be nested into solipsism in this practical manner, where my solipsist self is the
16.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
These are good intuitions. I'll add some more: Orangutans can drive a golf cart, there are videos of that from the pre-AI era. General anesthetics that work on humans also tend to work on them. There is just a smooth gradient of brain
17.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
If by "consciousness" you mean the thing that goes away during general anesthesia, then panpsychism is very unlike solipsism and can be easily refuted by the fact that anesthesia works. If it isn't that, then we're talki
18.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
One's own consciousness is indeed the starting point of inquiry, but I don't think the claim that other people are conscious lacks empirical evidence (assuming a practical materialist stance here). We just don't think about
19.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
> But look closely. Redness, heat and that sense of self you have are inherent to your own perspective. These things are all real, but at the same time there is nothing objective about them. There is not even anything objective about th
20.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
I should further clarify, this is a materialist stance. But it's the only practical stance to take anyway. And I will offer the explanation for why this is in first person language because it only makes sense that way. Take it and appl
21.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
What mistake did I make? You've correctly pointed out how Markov models and modern LLMs are similar in a way, and how modern LLMs don't have full agency. But this doesn't rule out the possibility that Markov models are very s
22.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
This one is relatively easy to answer. There are things we can say about what death feels like: 1) You'll be going back to the state before you were conscious, before you were born. Think back to when you were a baby. It feels like bef
23.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
I was not claiming that LLMs are conscious, just that they could be and there is no proof either way, yet. We should seriously starting considering this and begin research in this direction, because AI systems are becoming increasingly huma
24.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
Ok, then let's revise the definition to dreamless sleep or anesthesia.
25.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
The last time I dreamt was in April. I'd make a note about it in my day log txt file when it happens. It's not the same as a normal night's sleep, and I would remember it. But I assume not having REM sleep for the past 4 mont
26.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
It feels very different to me. I have a dream perhaps once a year, and it's nowhere near as vivid as real experiences. Dreams don't have much color, shape, or audio, just a blurry mess where I could barely make out things resembli
27.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
I've been under general anesthesia, but it does not feel too different. I'm dead when sleeping, and basically never dream. I should have said "dreamless sleep" in the earlier comment to be more precise because dreaming i
28.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
Perhaps it's because I almost never dream. Sleep feels almost just as dead to me. Case in point, I think we're probably talking about slightly different phenomena even when we talk about the same linguistic definition of conscious
29.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
I'm thinking out loud and pointing out the difference to avoid confusion, and also trying to invite discussion around the colloquial def, because I think the colloquial def is the most important/useful one.
30.
by txrx0000 1mo ago
When observed by a different conscious being, yes. But from the inside observed by oneself, it feels quite similar, besides the fact that sleep is initiated by oneself, and the wakeful state transition for sleep is more gradual than for ane

More ›