glenweyl

5 ms·

1.
by glenweyl 11y ago
I couldn't agree more. Lots of social institutions would have to be built up around it to make it work. That is why we are starting on a small scale with market research.
2.
by glenweyl 11y ago
That is the point of the software!
3.
by glenweyl 11y ago
This is why there is a nominating procedure. I don't think this is a great forum for hashing this all out without a white board, but I would be happy to do it with a whiteboard. I think I could persuade you that there is no case wher
4.
by glenweyl 11y ago
For a long time I thought this too. But then Ken Arrow started working on QV and while he agrees that in spirit QV gets around the theorem, it does not to the letter. The reason is that there can be multiple equilibria given income effect
5.
by glenweyl 11y ago
Look above; I address this extensively in the paper.
6.
by glenweyl 11y ago
Exponential voting would be too close to 1p1v in effect, as we argue in the paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531
7.
by glenweyl 11y ago
As Marty Gillens argues in his book Affluence and Influence ( http://press.princeton.edu/titles/9836.html ), on almost every issue there is a sub group within those who feel a particular way on an issue that is highly in
8.
by glenweyl 11y ago
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14282
9.
by glenweyl 11y ago
We are actively working on the identifiability issue; Ron Rivest (of RSA encryption) is writing a paper for a conference on the topic trying to solve this: http://bfi.uchicago.edu/events/quadratic-voting-and-public-g...
10.
by glenweyl 11y ago
Buying votes is not accepted. Using the system would be accepted, but not buying separately. Why couldn't we create a norm where buying outside the system is just as punished then as buying outside the system is now?
11.
by glenweyl 11y ago
This is a great question and one of the central ones my analysis addresses ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245 ). You can read the results in details for the general guarantees, but a few observ
12.
by glenweyl 11y ago
As we prove in this paper ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245 ), a small group can never beat out a large population with an overall preference in the opposite direction in equilibrium, regardles
13.
by glenweyl 11y ago
You are absolutely right that QV can create speculative dynamics like a market place. Almost everything about QV is similar to the market mechanism. But do you really think that there are many cases where you would prefer rationing, effec
14.
by glenweyl 11y ago
I cannot completely follow this scenario, but if you can write it up as an actual equilibrium analysis I would be fascinated to see this. I have worked very hard to come up with cases where QV does worse than one-person-one-vote and have n
15.
by glenweyl 11y ago
Yes, in this paper ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012 ) I also consider the case where people make mistakes. You can study equilibrium even in models where people are not perfectly rational.
16.
by glenweyl 11y ago
I completely agree. This is a crucial feature of QV with multiple alternatives. QV also has a nominating process to ensure the right things are on the ballot.
17.
by glenweyl 11y ago
pas on vote buying, linear vote buying is bad according to the same theory that predicts QV is good. The only equilibrium under linear vote buying is that the single most intense (or wealthiest) individual has her way at everyone else&#x27
18.
by glenweyl 11y ago
But it only grows with the square root of the number of wealthy individuals. See the paper with Posner; we go through many such calculations: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956
19.
by glenweyl 11y ago
What Lalley and I ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2003531 ) prove is that QV is provably the only system of vote pricing that gives you efficiency always, so in some sense it is the best possible imp
20.
by glenweyl 11y ago
This is a great point. We address it in great depth in the paper with Posner, Voting Squared ( http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956 ). QV helps here, a lot we hope, because most current expenditur
21.
by glenweyl 11y ago
Fantastic question. QV does not really address this much; at a quantitative level you are right that it reduces the problem a bit, but you can't beat those asymptotic properties you highlight. The right solution is representative bo
22.
by glenweyl 11y ago
Agreed, but what I mean is it can't happen.
23.
by glenweyl 11y ago
This is not an equilibrium; the down-winders would not vote unless they thought that vote mattered. In any case we have a nominating process to avoid this sort of manipulation; see http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321904 or http
24.
by glenweyl 11y ago
Two sets, in very controlled laboratory settings, have turned out well: https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&c... and http://rangevoting.org/GoereeZhangMar2013.pdf
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by glenweyl 11y ago
I deal with this in another paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012
26.
by glenweyl 11y ago
We decided to follow the advice of a leader in the field, Rory Sutherland, and pursue the application to market research surveys first: http://www.research-live.com/impact-magazine/the-shape-of-th... . My start-up, Col
27.
by glenweyl 11y ago
As paper describes, quadratic is the unique function with linear derivative and thus the only one that reveals true preferences.
28.
by glenweyl 11y ago
The equity issues you all are raising are very important, but death with in detail here: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2343956 . The simplest solution is just to use an artificial currency that ever