As we prove in this paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245), a small group

As we prove in this paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2264245), a small group can never beat out a large population with an overall preference in the opposite direction in equilibrium, regardless of what they announce. The reason is that any small individual or group can never really buy very many votes. $10 billion buys only 100,000 votes. Do you think this could really deter others from voting? Now a large group could deter other from voting, but of course this can happen under one-person-one vote as well. If you think Obama is the overwhelming favorite you do not show up. But that is not really how things work out in practice and I doubt they would under QV. To begin with, the members of the large group would have no incentive to show up either. It requires assuming a very strong asymmetry across groups which will mess up any system.