4 ms·
This is not an equilibrium; the down-winders would not vote unless they thought that vote mattered. In any case we have a nominating process to avoid this sort
by glenweyl 11y ago
This is not an equilibrium; the down-winders would not vote unless they thought that vote mattered. In any case we have a nominating process to avoid this sort of manipulation; see http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321904 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2321904 or http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343956 http://ssrn.com/abstract=2343956.
- jmount 11y agoMy point is: it is a bad situation, equilibrium or not. And some down-winders have to vote if the factory votes a little bit each time. Or even if the factory threatens to vote (and then doesn't). If all the magic is in the nominating process- then we really don't need the voting mechanism.
- glenweyl 11y agoAgreed, but what I mean is it can't happen.
- savanaly 11y agoIf it's not an equilibrium then it can't happen! That doesn't make the claim foolproof or anything-- maybe it's not actually an equilibrium for one reason or another we didn't foresee, but the phrase "it is a bad situation, equilibrium or not" is nonsensical.
- infinity0 11y agoAssuming that the proofs make perfect assumptions that exactly match real life, sure. "the down-winders would not vote unless they thought that vote mattered." - this decision requires mental resources to make, and if the rational choice is too complex then many people wouldn't make it, breaking your assumptions. Is there any research that tries to model the economic cost of coming to a "rational" decision (as defined by the voting game)?
- glenweyl 11y agoYes, in this paper (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2571012) I also consider the case where people make mistakes. You can study equilibrium even in models where people are not perfectly rational.
- deleted 11y ago[deleted]