TommyTran732

5 ms·

1.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
To be completely fair, any kind of sandboxing inside of Qubes's VMs do not mean much, because it is on X11. Any app can pwn any other app lol. With that being said, yeah, he's being disingenuous as per usual for sure. Part of Qube
2.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
> what Purism is doing is moving the non-auditable part of the OS onto a separate storage device so that they can claim that the OS is "Fully Auditable" and FSF certified even though the non-auditable and non-free part is mount
3.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
> I see no effort from your side to come to some understanding or to clarify anything. Accusing me of your own sins. > What do you mean by "tampering" here? Is uploading firmware to peripherals a "tampering"? Why i
4.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Yeah, why are you selectively reading? This is after he admitted what I said was true. His only contention is that he thinks it's hard to know what the PCR values should be to fake, so he calls that "security". You are being
5.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Why do you copy paste the same thing over and over a bunch of times? Linking to an irrelevant post doesn't change how it works. Read the code posted above.
6.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Since you copy pasta your response, I will link to my other comment and do a bit of copy pasta here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47953726 It is exactly how it works. Read the actual code for yourself: https:/
7.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Because it's true, and I know what he said, I am not confused at all. Did you not read anything at all? On the Librem laptop, the tampering is done by PureBoot and inject into /run/firmware. The other user was linking the stu
8.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
It's basically taking the blobs that would be normally shipped with the OS in a sensible manner, shuffle it around, then calling it "free" while the same blobs would still be there, just on different flash storage chips.
9.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
The SOC still has firmware baked in as per usual. And the firmware for Bluetooth/Wifi is loaded in by having the initramfs read it from the NOR flash, mount it in /lib/firmware, then it is business as usual like a desktop Lin
10.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
> It's just physically impossible to defend from tracking, when the phone has networking connections on. Not even on all-mighty GrapheneOS. I can use GrapheneOS with the global mic toggled off and sensors toggled off/denied to
11.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
The developer of Heads admitted that if someone tampers with the boot block and falsifies the measurements Heads cannot protect the device right on the Qubes forum. Why won't you listen to him then? Is he not trustworthy enough for you
12.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Which blobs are running on the Librem 5 CPU? Which blobs are running on GrapheneOS CPU? Both the Pixel and Librem 5 have firmware baked into the SoC that is executed. On GrapheneOS, the firmware is signed and updated along with the OS. On t
13.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Quite frankly, the whole Librem ecosystem is significantly less "open" than GrapheneOS or any desktop Linux variant to anyone who look at things objectively instead of using weird FSF semantics. Instead of loading firmware in sens
14.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
> You never could answer to them. I did reply to them plenty of times. Here you go doing the exact same thing again - ignoring 100% of what's being said, then claiming "no one can respond". > You only talk about the lac
15.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Man, if this entirely thread of people calling out how ridiculous the implementation is and the killswitch not actually working in practice isn't enough to convince you, nothing ever will. I don't even feel like arguing against th
16.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Not entirely sure if the chip they are using (WM8962) can be reconfigured as a mic or not... it probably can't. But yes, the speaker is still active even when the mic is toggle off. Everything else is pretty much the argument though -
17.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Oh he's already done that when I explained to him how stuff like PureBoot has circular logic and doesn't actually work on Qubes forum already. Unfortunately he will just ignore every single counter argument ever made and blindly b
18.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
And what good is the phone when 3 switches are off? You think that people buy a phone with a "mic killswitch" expects to have to turn off practically everything including internet to make sure that their mics aren't snooped o
19.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
Important to note that users only stopped getting updates, the phones were not bricked and they can reinstall the OS signed with the new key. CopperheadOS was always's Micay's project and used his own signing key. The key never be
20.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
> Their microphone kill switch also doesn't prevent audio recording It doesn't prevent audio recording in the super paranoid "oh, the whole phone has been compromised" scenario because it is bypassable via the sensors
21.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
> I said multiple times that I exclusively run trusted apps on the phone. I use Qubes for untrusted staff. Do you understand that threat models can vary? By that logic, you might as well just not have the killswitch at all. Everything is
22.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
You have been saying this sort of stuff on the Qubes forum and a bunch of other places for awhile now. Hardware kill switches are nice-to-have, but they are significantly less important than the OS actually protecting the mic. With your Lib
23.
by TommyTran732 5mo ago
So what exactly would you have done? Risk the key being taken over by a shady entity? Does the alternative really scream "mature, stable, and thoughtful" to you?
24.
by TommyTran732 3y ago
Oh wow. I will update the post later today. Thanks for pointing it out!
25.
by TommyTran732 3y ago
Are you TAJ? The only people who refer to me as B0risGrishenko (my old Reddit account for a few months) are either TAJ or the crazy people on r/privatelife who have no idea what they are talking about. Quite frankly, anyone looking at
26.
by TommyTran732 3y ago
> Deleting it will not help since it'll get recreated by the next command that needs it. Empty it instead. Interesting. Are you sure about this? The Wiki says it can be deleted and I did not see it coming back during my time with op
27.
by TommyTran732 3y ago
Note that encryption handling on ChromeOS is not that great at all. The wrapped encryption key is protected with the hardware id and user passphrase, and the passphrase gets sent to Google's server without client side hashing. Essentia
28.
by TommyTran732 3y ago
This doesn't make *any* sense. Even in the example you gave, Mozilla really wanted to block you from using extensions, they will just remove the entire store.
29.
by TommyTran732 4y ago
This is NOT expected behavior. A VPN killswitch is supposed to cut all non-VPN connections on ALL INTERFACES. Not doing so could lead to leaks, especially with things like Torrent clients. Case in point: - IVPN and Mullvad does not have thi