4 ms·

You have been saying this sort of stuff on the Qubes forum and a bunch of other places for awhile now. Hardware kill switches are nice-to-have, but they are si

You have been saying this sort of stuff on the Qubes forum and a bunch of other places for awhile now. Hardware kill switches are nice-to-have, but they are significantly less important than the OS actually protecting the mic. With your Librem/PinePhone, you cannot even reasonably expect your calls with end-to-end encrypted apps like Signal and Element to be protected. Any app with access to the PulseAudio socket (which happens to be anything that you want to have audio playback with) can snoop on your mic at any moment in time. This does not even require an OS compromise. This has been pointed out to you repeatedly and yet you choose to ignore it, and instead you just do character assassination whenever a post regarding GrapheneOS or Daniel Micay shows up because what Micay says goes against your favorite ideological products...

fsflover 5mo ago
> Any app with access to the PulseAudio socket (which happens to be anything that you want to have audio playback with) can snoop on your mic at any moment in time. I said multiple times that I exclusively run trusted apps on the phone. I use Qubes for untrusted staff. Do you understand that threat models can vary? > Hardware kill switches are nice-to-have, but they are significantly less important than the OS actually protecting the mic. I never said they were more important. I only said they could reliably protect in sensitive cases. > instead you just do character assassination I choose to dispute false information. I don't care about any personalities. And I would be happy to be proven wrong, too.
- TommyTran732 5mo ago
  > I said multiple times that I exclusively run trusted apps on the phone. I use Qubes for untrusted staff. Do you understand that threat models can vary? By that logic, you might as well just not have the killswitch at all. Everything is magically "trusted", right? Yes, I do understand that threat models can vary. Please give an example of a threat model where it makes more sense to use a phone which cannot protect any private calls over a functioning phone that has real protection. If you are going to say "oh, when you never talk on the phone at all" then you might as well just remove the mic. It's not hard. As usual, there is nothing that GrapheneOS or Micay says regarding the Librem or Pinephone that is inaccurate. You are just saying stuff that doesn't even remotely make any sense. Perhaps you are being deliberately disingenuous. Perhaps you are just so blinded by an ideology that you cannot see that what you say is just nonsense. I wouldn't know. > I choose to dispute false information. I don't care about any personalities. Doesn't seem to be what you are doing here.
  - fsflover 5mo ago
    > there is nothing that GrapheneOS or Micay says regarding the Librem or Pinephone that are inaccurate. This is completely false: > Their microphone kill switch also doesn't prevent audio recording
    - TommyTran732 5mo ago
      > Their microphone kill switch also doesn't prevent audio recording It doesn't prevent audio recording in the super paranoid "oh, the whole phone has been compromised" scenario because it is bypassable via the sensors. In fact, it doesn't even protect the phone in normal operation, because apps with device=all can access the sensors without the whole phone being compromised. It doesn't prevent audio recording with any normal usage either because the OS is incapable of protecting private conversations thanks to the PulseAudio socket. "Exploiting" this is significantly easier than any of the stuff involving the sensors.
      - fsflover 5mo ago
        > because it is bypassable via the sensors. Did you even look in my link, which we are discussing? My quote from there: > Sensors are also switched off on Librem 5 by the three kill switches: https://puri.sm/posts/lockdown-mode-on-the-librem-5-beyond-hardware-kill-switches/ https://puri.sm/posts/lockdown-mode-on-the-librem-5-beyond-h...
        TommyTran732 5mo ago
        And what good is the phone when 3 switches are off? You think that people buy a phone with a "mic killswitch" expects to have to turn off practically everything including internet to make sure that their mics aren't snooped on? Does that really sound like a functioning "killswitch"?
        handedness 5mo ago
        The mind, it boggles. On a long enough timeline he'll probably cite this comment chain as proof you were unable to respond to his concerns, like everyone else who's ever tried.

fsflover 5mo ago

> Any app with access to the PulseAudio socket (which happens to be anything that you want to have audio playback with) can snoop on your mic at any moment in time. I said multiple times that I exclusively run trusted apps on the phone. I use Qubes for untrusted staff. Do you understand that threat models can vary? > Hardware kill switches are nice-to-have, but they are significantly less important than the OS actually protecting the mic. I never said they were more important. I only said they could reliably protect in sensitive cases. > instead you just do character assassination I choose to dispute false information. I don't care about any personalities. And I would be happy to be proven wrong, too.

TommyTran732 5mo ago
> I said multiple times that I exclusively run trusted apps on the phone. I use Qubes for untrusted staff. Do you understand that threat models can vary? By that logic, you might as well just not have the killswitch at all. Everything is magically "trusted", right? Yes, I do understand that threat models can vary. Please give an example of a threat model where it makes more sense to use a phone which cannot protect any private calls over a functioning phone that has real protection. If you are going to say "oh, when you never talk on the phone at all" then you might as well just remove the mic. It's not hard. As usual, there is nothing that GrapheneOS or Micay says regarding the Librem or Pinephone that is inaccurate. You are just saying stuff that doesn't even remotely make any sense. Perhaps you are being deliberately disingenuous. Perhaps you are just so blinded by an ideology that you cannot see that what you say is just nonsense. I wouldn't know. > I choose to dispute false information. I don't care about any personalities. Doesn't seem to be what you are doing here.
- fsflover 5mo ago
  > there is nothing that GrapheneOS or Micay says regarding the Librem or Pinephone that are inaccurate. This is completely false: > Their microphone kill switch also doesn't prevent audio recording
  - TommyTran732 5mo ago
    > Their microphone kill switch also doesn't prevent audio recording It doesn't prevent audio recording in the super paranoid "oh, the whole phone has been compromised" scenario because it is bypassable via the sensors. In fact, it doesn't even protect the phone in normal operation, because apps with device=all can access the sensors without the whole phone being compromised. It doesn't prevent audio recording with any normal usage either because the OS is incapable of protecting private conversations thanks to the PulseAudio socket. "Exploiting" this is significantly easier than any of the stuff involving the sensors.
    - fsflover 5mo ago
      > because it is bypassable via the sensors. Did you even look in my link, which we are discussing? My quote from there: > Sensors are also switched off on Librem 5 by the three kill switches: https://puri.sm/posts/lockdown-mode-on-the-librem-5-beyond-hardware-kill-switches/ https://puri.sm/posts/lockdown-mode-on-the-librem-5-beyond-h...
      - TommyTran732 5mo ago
        And what good is the phone when 3 switches are off? You think that people buy a phone with a "mic killswitch" expects to have to turn off practically everything including internet to make sure that their mics aren't snooped on? Does that really sound like a functioning "killswitch"?
        handedness 5mo ago
        The mind, it boggles. On a long enough timeline he'll probably cite this comment chain as proof you were unable to respond to his concerns, like everyone else who's ever tried.