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The Federal HTTPS-Only Standard: Necessary and Overdue
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- sneak 12y agoIf only Apple undertook this for OSX. In latest Yosemite, three-finger-click definition lookups, map tiles, and even some geod location communications are still unencrypted in flight. The whole Starbucks knows what words you look up, what map locations you view, et c. Added bonus: definition lookups happen for every Spotlight search now, too. It is amazing that in 2015 this is not standard policy everywhere people care about security (which should be any organization that touches PII or develops software for use by more than 10 people).
- amelius 12y agoI'm amazed that in 2015 every application has to implement its own encryption. Why doesn't the OS let us open "encrypted sockets"?
- MichaelGG 12y agoHow would that differ from opening up a TLS connection?
- nothrabannosir 12y agoIt is now user space, so every app needs to reinvent the wheel. Updates to the security layer are per-app. At best, they use a good library (something we hopefully trust the OS will do, too). It's like the OS not providing TCP but only UDP. Sure, every app can include its own TCP stack. But I'd rather the OS do it.
- antientropic 12y agoHow does using a library qualify as reinventing the wheel? Not everything needs to be done in kernel space. User space is a lot more flexible - for instance, an application can decide to use LibreSSL instead of OpenSSL, but it can't change the IPsec implementation in the kernel.
- sneak 12y agoShow me a widespread OS that doesn't have a TLS library.
- lmm 12y agoYou can't separate encryption from authentication, and the application is the only thing that can tell you what qualifies as authentication. With IPSec you can tell the OS "open an encrypted connection to 69.231.14.52" and the OS will verify that you're actually talking to 69.231.14.52 and no-one else can read your messages. But that's not actually terribly helpful, because what you want to ensure is that only Bob can read your messages. And only the application knows who Bob is.
- nothrabannosir 12y agoOk, what am I missing? Now: Application: Hey OS, what is example.com's IP? Okay, now give me an unencrypted connection to example.com's port 80. Desired: Hey OS, give me an encrypted connection to example.com's port 443. (+ optional encryption params like minimum key strength) Why can't encryption be an OS level task, exactly?
- lokedhs 12y agoBut what if you get a reply "I am example.com, here's the encrypted socket". How do you know that the entity that replied isn't in fact something that is MiTM you connection?
- nothrabannosir 12y agoSame as now. What is inherently anti-OS the way we use certificates? In fact, most apps already use OS-wide root ca lists.
- omphalos 12y ago> Same as now. Along similar lines, I think it's strange that I now see warnings in Chrome for SHA-1 certificates but no warnings at all for http.
- leni536 12y agoAnd firefox happily offers to save your password when you enter it into a http login window but yells at you if you try to connect to a self signed https webpage.
- realityking 12y agoNot sure what you mean. OS X has Secure Transport (https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Security/Reference/secureTransportRef/ https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Securi...) What are you missing?
- rimantas 12y agoOk, next time look something up on maps and then go to barista and ask them, what were you looking at. May give some credibility to "the whole starbucks knows" claim.
- jon-wood 12y agoUgh. The whole Starbucks could know. This sort of pedanticism adds nothing to the conversation.
- IanCal 12y ago> Added bonus: definition lookups happen for every Spotlight search now, too. You can set your queries to stay local if you disable "spotlight suggestions" and "bing web searches" in the spotlight settings. Definitions, based on the what the info on the settings page says, should be just local. Hopefully this helps someone else, I've just disabled them.
- sneak 12y agoI've disabled them, too. But it is just plain negligent of Apple to transmit these unencrypted in the first place.
- nowarninglabel 12y agoOur community has to shoulder part of the blame for the lack of adoption of HTTPS in many governments both federal and local. In my jobs at two different universities they both expressed vague concerns of "We heard that it hinders performance" as a reason to nix doing it. This should never have been a conversation about performance and it was the technical folks making it one of performance. The only issue raised should have been about proper certificate management. Fortunately at the university we pushed through https on the product despite the pushback, but it never would have even been a struggle in the first-place if not for the focus on the wrong metric.
- adventured 12y agoI still run into technical people very regularly that believe HTTPS is a big performance hit. I'm not sure what's perpetuating that myth (present day myth, 15 years ago it was true). I build everything side-wide HTTPS, and have rarely run into a situation where it caused even a 1% performance loss, and at those levels it's simply irrelevant in comparison to the benefit.
- belorn 12y agoIn 2010, google switched to https for gmail and publishes the performance cost for it. On our production frontend machines, SSL/TLS accounts for less than 1% of the CPU load, less than 10 KB of memory per connection and less than 2% of network overhead. Many people believe that SSL/TLS takes a lot of CPU time and we hope the preceding numbers (public for the first time) will help to dispel that.
- Dylan16807 12y agoWas it true 15 year ago? Are you sure?
- acdha 12y agoYes. Remember that 15 years ago doesn't mean only that processors were much slower but also that you don't have the heavily-optimized software implementations and hardware acceleration for the most common implementations. You can run OpenSSL today on an embedded processor which might appear to be as slow as a 90s server processor but it's still likely to have things like AES support in the CPU, an optimized bignum library, tuned assembly implementations for the most common algorithms and at least the very least the compilers in use now generate much better code. I'd be surprised if you wouldn't see a significant benefit taking some 90s crypto code and compiling it with a current version of clang/gcc.
- joelcollinsdc 12y agoWhile it seems easy, there are lots of challenges with this where I work. We have 10+ different 'top level' domains (*.example.org), lots of sub-sub domains example.example.example.org, and route everything through an external CDN. Rough back of the napkin calculations for 100% SSL coverage with our current setup and provider is $10k/month, and that doesn't cover maintenance overhead expenses (my salary) which adds up probably to more than anything we'd pay to a SSL cert provider or CDN provider.
- falcolas 12y agoTen wildcard certificates would run you in the $1-5000 range a year. A few CDN specific certificates another grand or so a year. Maintenance costs shouldn't change, unless you're contract only (and SSL only adds one additional bottleneck per year or two over running the base web servers). I'd be curious to hear how yoru costs would change, as well as where the $10k per month figure comes from. The benefits of encrypting (or at least offering encryption) to your customers would be very fairly significant.
- joelcollinsdc 12y agothe certificates themselves are a small fraction of the cost, our cdn provider's monthly costs for hosting the certificates are the lions share.
- captn3m0 12y agoWon't alternative hostnames field help you out with that?
- joelcollinsdc 12y agoyes 40-50 alternate hostnames can be added per cert. There is significant overhead to managing these and that still means in the most extreme case we could require several SAN certs to get full coverage.
- Dylan16807 12y agoI've never understood why there isn't a true wildcard method that can support naked domains and multiple levels of subdomain.
- ck2 12y agoYeah but have you seen all the SSL caveats lately? If you passed ssllabs last year, give it a go this year and you may be shocked to see all the new known problems. https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ HTTPS-ONLY is useless if it is not done right. and MITM is still too easy
- vtlynch 12y agoAgreed. SSL is a pain to set up and its hard to get right. But in my (limited) experience, SSL is simple compared to other aspects of your network's security. "At rest" data storage, network intrusions, DDOS attacks, etc, all seem like MUCH more difficult problems.
- adricnet 12y agoNot saying anything really about EFF's efforts or publication, however the topic is common now ... Please don't senselessly "encrypt all the things". May I encourage some requirements gathering and threat modelling? Who are you trying to keep out (in?) of your application communications? Why? The unfortunate requirement of common business systems is that we need visibility into what these systems are doing for troubleshooting, audit, and incident detection. Logs are good, but packets and flows are better. Trust, but verify. Driving to encrypt all traffic, all the time may be a noble goal^1, but please understand that there are good people who need to adapt requirements to their organizations and projects. This is one of the points, along with firewall policies, user privileges, useful remote logging, and ... well, have a look at the CC20[1] for more. http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls http://www.sans.org/critical-security-controls ^1 though doing it effectively may be much more difficult and expensive than you imagine.
- konklone 12y ago> Logs are good, but packets and flows are better. Trust, but verify. shrug You're not wrong, but it's more important to have wires that can be trusted than to have wires that can be perfectly audited.
- adricnet 12y agoYou trust wires? To me this sounds like the debate over WEP. I think it is still not commonly understood how secure wires are. I think that the WEP protocol and successors do a good job of fulfilling the desire for "wired equivalent privacy", but many people expect something very different from encrypting wireless networks ... and I find the arguments for HTTPS everywhere to have similar gaps. And who said anything about perfect? :D I'm just trying to do what I can to cut away at the Fog of War, plus maybe save IT and NetEng a great deal of work.
- halviti 12y agoAny business can look into https traffic, and if you don't have that ability, then you either don't care about half your traffic, or you don't know what you're doing/have the proper tools. Allowing anyone on your network (or your destination's network) to inject whatever they want into your datastream is not an acceptable tradeoff for "I want my job to be easier"
- PaulHoule 12y agoI dunno, I think this means that when you visit a government web site, half the time you will get a box that says the certificate is expired.
- ceequof 12y agoIn somewhat related news, the .trust gTLD is HTTPS-only: https://whodoyou.trust/globalassets/documents/trust-technical-policy.pdf https://whodoyou.trust/globalassets/documents/trust-technica... (As well as having a bucket of JS restrictions (no eval() can be used, apparently ever) Adam Langley said something about enforcing secure TLD restrictions in Chrome a while ago, not sure if that ever got done.
- bougiefever 12y agoFirst reaction: What!? They're not already doing this? Second reaction: If they start doing this, they will be hypocrites if they try to pass laws banning encryption. Not that the White House cares about looking hypocritical.