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Announcing Keyless SSL
- vader1 12y agoWhile this is a cool feature, I wouldn't say the improvement is more than marginal: all potentially sensitive customer data is still available to Cloudflare in plain text. And after all, with a Business plan you can already use your own ("custom") SSL certificate which you can then revoke at any time. Why not offer a "pass through" mode where the proxying is done on the network layer rather than the application layer? Of course in such a modus all CDN-like functionality could no longer be offered, but it could still do a fair amount of DDOS protection, no?
- cbhl 12y agoWell, for the use case given, with "Keyless SSL", if Cloudflare is compromised, then the bank doesn't need to report the incident to the Federal Reserve. But yes, users' plaintexts would still be compromised. "Security theatre" indeed.
- willvarfar 12y agoIt seems harsh to call it theatre, and I expect all cloud services will adopt it. It means people can use a cloud service without giving them private keys. This seems much better than giving them keys. I too was hoping there would be some clever math to make it so some part of the conversation between client and back end was an encrypted tunnel that cloudfare can route but not read. This doesn't seem to be the case. But all the same, however small a step, its not theatre.
- dfc 12y agoI am not sure that a Cloudflare compromise would not rise to the level of a reportable event. In my experience/opinion "users' plaintext compromise" is certainly an instance of unauthorized access to customer information. I understand the whole framework here is risk-based so it is a matter of interpretation; but I do not want to be the person who has to explain to the nice folks from the OCC the intricacies of Cloudflare's implementation and why I deemed the compromise low risk. > An institution should notify its primary Federal regulator as soon > as it becomes aware of the unauthorized access to or misuse of > sensitive customer information or customer information systems. FDIC: Supervisory Insights https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/siwin06/article01_incident.html https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/in...
- otterley 12y agoKeyless SSL is basically an analogue of ssh-agent(1) for OpenSSL. It's a nice feature that you no longer have to trust CloudFlare with your private key, but there's a huge tradeoff: if your keyserver is unavailable (ironically, due to any of the things CloudFlare is supposed to protect you from or buffer you against -- DDoS, network/server issues, etc.), they can no longer authenticate requests served on your behalf and properly serve traffic.
- motoboi 12y agoPlease remember that CloudFlare is a sort of reverse proxy with some network protections and enhancements. If your infrastructure is unavailable, users won't get content anyway, SSL or not.
- otterley 12y agoCloudFlare can serve cached responses in the event that your origin server is unavailable. This is particularly useful for static websites, but that's not the most common use case.
- jonknee 12y agoIn the use case for keyless SSL the caching is pretty useless. Banks (what the article described as the reason this was created) are interactive. They want CloudFare to block the DDOS while letting their customers through. The DDOS attackers aren't firing legit requests (sign-in attempts or whatever) and would never make it through to the SSL handshake.
- peterwwillis 12y agoIf your origin server can be found on the internet, it can be DDoS'd/attacked, and your (dynamic) site will go down. This is true of all CDNs. The way to avoid this is to either have the CDN host your app servers or provide a private connection from your origin to the CDN. I guess technically the TLS-secured static content would now be at more risk than it was before, when the cached content would have been served. But existing session tickets would probably be honored, so only new clients would get rejected. Still, it's a tradeoff some people would probably be fine with.
- kathrinalewis 12y agoTo clarify, is this is a separate offering than the lazy loaded certificates that are slated to appear in the next month or so? This new solution is very elegant, so I'm just wondering whether keyless ssl and lazy loaded certificates are two different solutions that we will be able to choose from. Thanks!
- EGreg 12y agoWow, what a great read!
- teddyh 12y agoSo the communication between Cloudflare and the actual SSL key holder is secured by… what? Another key? In that case, any compromise of Cloudflare’s key is the same as a compromise of the original SSL key (at least in the short term).
- spacefight 12y agoSame thought here. And what if that connection breaks? Another single point of failure?
- jgrahamc 12y agoMultiple connections between CloudFlare and the Keyless SSL Server running at the customer site. Connections are reused, pipelined, load balanced etc.
- spacefight 12y agoInteresting. Multiple connections AND multiple servers?
- jgrahamc 12y agoYes.
- ch 12y agoWon't this approach increase the cap-ex investment on the part of the customer, and the complexity to scaling? Do you require the customer to size their key services to some theoretical peak, or can you offload so much of the process that the customer just needs to make a one time investment? (Full disclosure. I work for a competitor, but not on problems like this).
- peterwwillis 12y agoThe customer site now is responsible for providing key signing in a highly available fashion. It makes sense they would need to spend more (probably no more than for an hsm) to ensure the connection never goes down. If you can take down the connection from Cloudflare to the customer site, their website goes down.
- kcbanner 12y agoInteresting, but what about the latency issues of having to always contact the key server?
- jgrahamc 12y agoThere's a very technical blog post coming on this tomorrow, but that problem is addressed by session tickets and by the fact that most of the TLS handshake is occurring with a CloudFlare server typically nearer the web browser than before.
- Rapzid 12y agoDo you guys have a "global" session ticket cache shared amongst endpoints? Or do you ensure the same user gets routed back to the same termination node? I'm quite curious about this.
- eastdakota 12y agoSession Tickets are shared globally. Session IDs are shared intra-data center (so regionally). The former works with Chrome/Firefox. The latter with all other browsers.
- personZ 12y agoAfter reading the beginning of the piece, I was expected something more...profound. Some deep mathematical breakthrough or something. Instead they separate the actual key signing, delegating it to the customer's device. That's nice and useful, but isn't quite what I was expecting.
- spacefight 12y agoYes - and it's nowhere near "keyless" - it's just that the key is somewhere elseTM.
- Rapzid 12y agoMaybe they should have said "keyless termination"? I can see that as they are still terminating the connection and they don't have the key.
- rlpb 12y agoIndeed; what they are doing seems to be pretty much the same thing as any (RSA) hardware crypto device. Except that it's over the Internet instead.
- Mawaai 12y ago"Tomorrow, we'll publish a full post on the nitty, gritty techical details of how, what has come to be called Keyless SSL™, works."
- dsl 12y agoCloudFlare has learned their lesson from past experiences and how makes the big media announcement one day with a smaller less publicized announcement later covering the technical details. This prevents reporters from stumbling across a HN thread tearing the "new internet saving technology" apart and reporting on weaknesses or flaws.
- jldugger 12y agoBut it's already fairly obvious how it works. They essentially MITM with the keyserver to receive the SSL nonce. Of course, it's pretty silly to expect cloudflare to have some special mathematical revolution to solve the stated problem. In fact I figure if you could terminate SSL without an online private key, the encryption scheme is simply broken.
- blibble 12y agoisn't this completely missing the point, i.e. banks being able to say 'no third parties can see our clients identifying information/balances/etc?' yes, the SSL key doesn't leave the bank, but everything it is protecting is..
- spacefight 12y agoBanks will typically do what the regulations require and then, what the cost of doing it is. Sometimes, that order flips ;)
- indutny 12y agoIt only protects one thing - server identity. The best ciphers do you use DHE for negotiating the key, so the conversation between bank and the client is secure anyway.
- jtgeibel 12y agoUnder this scheme, the DHE is between the client and CloudFlare, not the client and the true end-point. CloudFlare still sees the full plaintext of the HTTPS session (as it must in order to do it's magic). The encryption is not end-to-end.
- keyme 12y agoIt's a matter of trust. You do trust Intel corp to not place an RF transmitter inside your CPU, right?
- praseodym 12y agoSo CloudFlare won't get your private key, but will still get to see unencrypted plaintext for all traffic? Sounds like a huge improvement...
- jgrahamc 12y agoWhat threat are you concerned about?
- praseodym 12y agoI don't really see the security improvement. Actually the key server would be an new attack vector, although one that could be firewalled pretty well.
- sarciszewski 12y agoUsing CloudFlare implicitly requires trusting CloudFlare. With this, CloudFlare cannot impersonate you without your endpoint's active consent. As soon as you terminate the service that solves this puzzle for CF, they cannot impersonate you any longer. So, yes, it is better. Maybe not "great" if your threat model includes CF getting 0wned, but definitely better than giving over your RSA key. ;)
- marcosdumay 12y agoAnd that's why regulations make it almost impossible for banks to use CloudFare. But CloudFare sees that as a problem, and makes some effort to create a loophole. You can't claim that this improves the bank clients' security. It's clearly worse than doing nothing.
- sarciszewski 12y agoThink of it as a compromise: You can leverage CloudFlare's CDN to mitigate DDoS and other sorts of nasty attacks AND assure TLS is used with every connection, without giving up your RSA key. "It's clearly worse than doing nothing." It's not very clear to me. Please explain.
- indutny 12y agoAnd my patch for OpenSSL that does the same thing: https://gist.github.com/indutny/1bda1561254f2d133b18 https://gist.github.com/indutny/1bda1561254f2d133b18 , ping me on email if you want to find out how to use it in your setup.
- haberman 12y agoNo disrespect meant, but from a security perspective the idea of patching security-critical software with a patch from a stranger on the Internet is kind of crazy, isn't it?
- peterwwillis 12y agoAll open source software is made up of patches from strangers on the internet.
- indutny 12y agoIndeed :) On a serious note, I'm waiting for a reviewal from OpenSSL team.
- twistedpair 12y agoI think I heard that quote on XKCD once.
- haberman 12y agoNot really. Gatekeepers of important open-source software are usually people who are known in the community and often employed by companies who work in the area.
- mzs 12y agoThough Fedor isn't just some complete stranger online.
- haberman 12y agoMaybe that's the part I was missing. There was no link to more information in his (her?) HN profile.
- sarciszewski 12y agoThat is amazing. I can't wait to play with this code :D
- diafygi 12y agoIs this the free SSL announcement that CloudFlare said it was going to announce in October?
- jgrahamc 12y agoNo.
- sarciszewski 12y agoIs it related? ;)
- xxdesmus 12y agonot really -- only in that they are both SSL-related. Free SSL is still in the works. More info soon-ish.
- diafygi 12y agoI, for one, can't wait. StartCom desperately needs some competition. My money is on AOL as the CA[1]. [1] http://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000618.html http://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2014/000618.h...
- sarciszewski 12y agoMy question was more to the point of: will Keyless SSL work with Free SSL? :)
- eastdakota 12y agoNot how you're likely thinking. That said, we will use the Keyless technology to expand our data center footprint into locations that we wouldn't feel comfortable storing customers' keys. That will end up benefiting even Free customers who will be faster around the world.
- mhandley 12y agoThis seems to only slightly reduce the threat to the banks. Currently, if someone compromises the Cloudfare servers, they gain the bank's private key and can impersonate the bank until the bank revokes their keys. With this solution, if someone compromises the Cloudfare servers, they can impersonate the bank by relaying the decryption of the premaster secret through Cloudfare's compromised servers back to the bank. They can do this until Cloudfare notices and closes the security hole. It's not clear that the difference is all that great in reality, as most of the damage will be done in the first 24 hours of either compromise.
- Xylakant 12y agoSince key revocation is fundamentally broken it's the difference between having a limited time period where you're exposed and being exposed until the cert actually expires.
- chetanahuja 12y ago"Since key revocation is fundamentally broken" Do you mean SSL key revocation in general broken or in this proposed solution by cloudflare. If it's the former, would you care to elaborate how it's broken?
- agwa 12y agoWhy the former is broken: https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/04/19/revchecking.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/04/19/revchecking.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/04/29/revocationagain.html https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/04/29/revocationagain.ht...
- chetanahuja 12y agoAhh... now I remember reading/hearing about the OSCP ineffectiveness and stapling etc. a few weeks ago (after watching Ilya Grigorik's talk "is ssl fast already" or something like that). Thanks for the reminder.
- 12y ago
- windexh8er 12y agoAll other technicalities aside it's rather interesting. From an HSM perspective it either makes that hardware now very useful or very useless. Think of a large organization - you've been there (or not), there are 30 internal applications with self-signed certificates. Fail. The organization had purchased an HSM, but never really got it deployed because - well, that was too complex and it didn't integrate well with 3rd party network hardware and failed miserably in your *nix web stack. This could be interesting - and I'm not commenting with regard to the efficacy or security concerns around this, but mainly the workflow simplicity it provides to large organizations who end up in self-signed-cert-hell because HSMs don't interoperate easily in a lot of use cases. But to my original statement - this is a very good thing or a very bad thing for Thales and the like. The only requirement for an actually certified HSM, really, is certification against some hardware and software standard you have a checkbox to fulfill. Beyond that this would be a killer in the middleground for those who want an HSM like functionality but don't have any requirements to meet other than housing a secure segment where key management can be done in a more controlled manner.
- reconbot 12y agoThat's Hardware Security Module.
- windexh8er 12y agoHSM = Hardware Security Module, yes, that was implied and my point.
- bdamm 12y agoHSM technology and their vendors are doing fine and will continue to do well in the cloud. Physical control of identity keys is actually one of the few ways to link the cyber world with the physical world, and proxying key access is certainly one reasonable way to do it.
- xorcist 12y agoThe article is somewhat light on content. There are standard protocols for HSM use. What is the reason you didn't use these? There are clear risks involved with inventing your own security related protocols.
- jgrahamc 12y agoWe have a really long technical blog post coming tomorrow. Agree that inventing protocols is dangerous so we got iSEC Partners/Matasano to evaluate.
- zameericle 12y agoSounds like Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman is used between client/server to establish a private key. Not sure how this is new.
- sarciszewski 12y agoAt a glance, it appears that the non-ephemeral RSA signature is handled in the network, but the key exchange occurs at the endpoint. What's new is the whole "edge calls home with a signing request" piece.
- delinka 12y agoInstead of keeping the key in a potentially vulnerable place, they're putting it in an oracle: pass ciphertext to the oracle, get plaintext back. I'm interested in the authentication between CloudFlare and the oracle. Cryptographic examples involving an oracle tend to refer to the oracle as a black box that just blindly accepts data, transforms it, and replies. Of course, then the oracle's content (a key, an algorithm) risks exposure through deduction if an attacker can submit limitless requests. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chosen-plaintext_attack http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chosen-plaintext_attack I'm not at all suggesting that CF hasn't thought of this; rather I want to see their mitigation of the risk.
- zobzu 12y agoone of the issues with that is latency, i wonder how they work around that. or maybe they just dont care for latency
- agwa 12y agoThe handshake is probably not much slower than it would be if the web browser were connecting directly to the bank, since there is only one round trip with the key server per handshake, and the latency between Cloudflare and web browsers tends to be pretty low since Cloudflare has so many POPs.
- zobzu 12y agoyes, but over thousand of connections its significant. what was a millisecond or less becomes 20ms. so 20x slower. not sure how much impact this has in real life, but this is one of the issue with this design (also one of the reason is rarely implemented like this but with HSMs instead)
- davis_m 12y agoWould it be enough to simply only allow connections from Cloudflare IP addresses?
- 12y ago
- _pmf_ 12y agoAre we reinventing Kerberos again?
- mback2k 12y agoSo, this is not actually keyless SSL but SSL using something like a Hardware Security Module over networked PKCS#11. Did I miss something?
- ilaksh 12y agoThis is a discussion about cyberwarfare in a literal sense. The technical discussion shouldn't really be separated from the economic, political, social and human health concerns because all of those parts of the system interact deeply and directly. A goal of total political cooperation or submission leads to economic sanctions leading to serious human health effects leading to defensive denial of service attacks. This accelerates the need to decentralize the financial network systems to make them more robust. How can we imagine though that even after a complete transition to next generation systems that are ground-up distributed designs (not just stop-gap tweaks like this) that we won't have new types of attacks to deal with. The starting point is the belief system that provides such fertile ground for conflict. We have to promote the idea that human lives have value and that lethal force is not an acceptable way to resolve conflict. As long as decision makers are living in a sort of 1960s James Bond fantasy world we will all be subject to the insecurity of that type of world. Its largely built upon a type of primitive Social Darwinism that is still much more prevalent than most will acknowledge. Its much easier to accept a compartmentalization of these problems and focus on a narrow technical aspect, but that does not integrate nearly enough information.
- ilaksh 12y agoWould be interested to hear from people who are burying my comment if they have any kind of explanation for why they are doing it, such as counterpoints to my statements. In case there is some insight that I might gain from them, since apparently there is a strong disagreement.
- wmf 12y agoAlmost every sentence of your comment contains non-obvious yet unsupported conclusions. I don't think a HN comment is the appropriate venue for your thinking; maybe a 20-page paper would be better.
- ilaksh 12y agoThe people thinking about this topic are my audience. That they don't want to hear it or bother trying to understand it doesn't mean that it shouldn't be available for them to view.
- lucb1e 12y agoFor those who want to understand how it works (it took me a minute, so I'll try to explain it simpler): In simplified terms, the server usually stores a public and private key, and sends the public key to the client. The client generates a random password, encrypts it with the server's public key, and sends it to the server. Only anyone with the private key can decrypt the message, and that should only be the server. Now you don't want to hand over this private key to Cloudflare if you don't need to, because then they can read all traffic. Up until now, you needed to. What they did was take the private key and move it to a keyserver, owned by your bank or whomever. Every time the Cloudflare server receives a random password (which is encrypted with the public key) it just asks the keyserver "what does this encrypted message say?" After that it has the password to the connection and can read what the client (the browser) is sending, and write data back over the same encrypted connection. Without ever knowing what the private key was. The connection from Cloudflare to your bank's webserver and keyserver can be encrypted in whatever way. It could be a fixed key for AES, it could be another long-lasting TLS connection (the overhead is mostly in the connection setup)... this isn't the interesting part and can be solved in a hundred fine ways. Edit: Removed my opinion from this post. Any downvotes for my opinion would also push the explanation down (which I hope is useful to some). I mostly agree with the other comments anyway.
- personZ 12y agoNow you don't want to hand over this private key to Cloudflare if you don't need to, because then they can read all traffic. Generally the key you would give them is for, and limited to, the resources that they cache/reverse proxy, so the same "read all traffic" concern exists. What Cloudflare did is essentially, as others have mentioned, PKCS11 over the internet. PKCS11 is an existing, very well proven technique of sequestering the key in a hardware device, that hardware device doing what Cloudflare is moving to the client location here. It's neat enough, but they seem to kind of exaggerating the innovation a bit.
- willvarfar 12y agoIt is very obvious... In hindsight?
- yk 12y agoSo the problem is, how to get a cloud in the middle while keeping the green lock in the browser? Just yesterday I read Douglas Adam's phrase "technologies biggest success over itself."
- yusyusyus 12y agoHow does this architecture address PFS? I'm guessing a future version would require the exchange of DH private key to make it work...
- agwa 12y agoNothing that complicated is required. When the server needs to sign the DH handshake, it sends the value to be signed over to the key server, and the key server replies with the signature. Although the diagrams in the blog post show the non-PFS RSA handshake, I'm sure the architecture already supports the PFS DH handshake too.
- bjornsing 12y ago> World-renowned security experts Jon Callas and Phil Zimmermann support CloudFlare's latest announcement sharing, “One of the core principles of computer security is to limit access to cryptographic keys to as few parties as possible, ideally only the endpoints. Application such as PGP, Silent Circle, and now Keyless SSL implement this principle and are correspondingly more secure.” Ehh... I'd say Keyless SSL implements the opposite of that principle: encryption terminates with CloudFlare but authentication terminates in some bank.
- general_failure 12y agoWell, cloudfare can still read all the traffic. I thought that problem had been solved somehow.
- zaroth 12y agoSee: Secure session capability using public-key cryptography without access to the private key. https://www.google.com/patents/US8782774 https://www.google.com/patents/US8782774
- deleted 12y ago[deleted]
- ivanr 12y agoAnd here's a similar patent from Akamai (via @cloudpundit) http://www.google.com/patents/US20130156189 http://www.google.com/patents/US20130156189
- zaroth 12y agoLooks like the Akamai patent for basically the exact same process, filed 2012-12-14, priority date 2011-12-16 is still being examined... yet the CloudFlare patent filed 2013-03-07 was granted 2014-07-14. That's a really fast turnaround for CloudFlare, and not sure how the Akamai filing isn't prior art. Actually, the Akamai filing is referenced in the CloudFlare patent.
- makomk 12y agoFrom what I can tell, the main difference is that the claims in CloudFlare's patent describe more of the SSL handshaking process and the subsequent handling of requests (all of which is exactly the same as in standard HTTPS proxying). They both claim exactly the same technique for a web proxy to handle SSL connections without having the private key, but I guess the USPTO decided the fact that CloudFlare described more of that process in their patent claims constituted a improvement on Akamai's invention for some weird reason.
- ambrop7 12y agoI don't like to sound hateful, but this is an obvious solution that any competent person knowing how TLS works would find. If someone tried to patent it, I suppose every smart card would be considered prior art. The only "novelty" is that the connection to the "smart card" is the network. Not to say that it's not useful, but the article describes it as some grand invention.
- pilsetnieks 12y agoThen again, do you know of anyone else who has actually implemented and are using this commercially, at scale? They say it themselves in the article, a prototype is one thing but actually making it into a commercially viable product is something else.
- sslalready 12y agoHere are a few similar solutions from April and May, 2014: Privilege Separated Key Handling added to relayd(8) and smtpd(8) http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20140430155940 http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20140430155940 OpenSSL private key in separate process https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/protecting_the_openssl_private_key_in_a_separate_process https://www.agwa.name/blog/post/protecting_the_openssl_priva...
- liricooli 12y agoIt seems that the correct title should have been "all your keys are belong to us".