5 ms·

New serious vulnerabilities spiked around release of Claude Mythos Preview

156 points by cubefox 4mo ago

deleted 4mo ago
[deleted]
solenoid0937 4mo ago
I predict once the responsible disclosure period is up we will see a lot more
hoppp 4mo ago
How are these reports verified to be valid? If there are too many some could be hallucinations too.
- nextaccountic 4mo ago
  The best case scenario for AI companies is, people receive those bug reports, look at the model that produced it and not even look at the details, just apply the fix mindlessly This gives Anthropic a staggering amount of power. Oh it came from Mythos? We will just lose time trying to analyze it, better apply the fix ASAP
  - stingraycharles 4mo ago
    > The best case scenario for AI companies is, people receive those bug reports, look at the model that produced it and not even look at the details, just apply the fix mindlessly Do people maintaining serious software do this, though?
    - pixl97 4mo ago
      Define 'serious'. There is a lot of software in serious places written by very unserious people.
    - nextaccountic 4mo ago
      The problem is that serious software is drowning in AI vulnerability reports. There is not enough manpower to analyze them properly. And if you ignore the reports (like curl is doing in their 1-month vacation), malicious actors will just exploit them. At some point it's inevitable to just rubber stamp whatever is coming from AI. The actual, underlying problem is that software is buggy and current programming languages aren't fit for writing reliable software. There's a wide gap between the state of art in formal verification, and what is actually practiced in the industry. It's because of this general unreliability that AI has a large supply of vulnerabilities to find. The situation will only get better if software becomes reliable and written in solid foundations. My guess is that AI will be even more useful to verify software (something like, write Lean or Coq proofs that the software is not vulnerable, things like that), rather than finding vulnerabilities piecemeal but still letting software be written in unsuitable languages, with no formal verification to prevent bugs from sneaking through.
      - cbzbc 4mo ago
        That gap explains much of the spike. Companies who never used any scanning tools on much of their codebase are suddenly having that gap closed.
      - re-thc 4mo ago
        > At some point it's inevitable to just rubber stamp whatever is coming from AI. To make it worse? AI and even Fable can make things +50% and then -50% in different places. You can trade 1 bug for another. So just "rubber stamp" doesn't make it better.
      - fweimer 4mo ago
        We have plenty of functions that convert one byte array to another byte array. Both arrays have specified bounds. The functions are total (an error return indicates if the input or output arrays are incomplete). Most of them do not even have state that is preserved between calls. Complete source code is available in the same build for all the functions they call. In theory, this should be very straightforward to prove correct with many of the current tools. In practice, no one has shown us how to do it. We could even rewrite the code from a macro/#include maze to proper function calls if that's a prerequisite for analysis. At this point, I would even take a one-off analysis.
  - realusername 4mo ago
    Currently it looks like the opposite is happening haha, "oh it came from AI, let's discard it ASAP" is the trend in open source
    - cmxch 4mo ago
      And if it’s Mythos or Claude derived (a strong hint for Mythos), discard it faster.
  - cmxch 4mo ago
    TBH, I’d reject Mythos or similar reports and require full reproduction on a publicly available model before considering them valid.
- guessmyname 4mo ago
  We (Project Glasswing users) follow a proof-of-concept approach. We create the exploit and verify that it behaves as the AI claims. Given our experience as security engineers (many of us with 10+ YoE) we don’t simply report every critical bug Mythos claims to have found. We verify each one carefully. At least, that’s what most of the high-visibility users in Project Glasswing are doing. There are bad apples everywhere, and this initiative is no exception. If it makes you feel any better, many of us regularly meet to stay calibrated and hold each other accountable, so I’m confident in the quality of the work produced by this particular group of employees across some of the partner companies mentioned in the article. That said, I know several people who blindly report everything Mythos finds, which is foolish, especially since the harness is a critical part of the project's quality metrics. Some of the harnesses I’ve tested are quite weak, which leads to poor results. For example, yesterday morning I was pulled into an ad hoc meeting where a CVP was grilling me about several supposedly critical bugs that my team had reported against one of the core components of iCloud. I was genuinely surprised because we’re very strict about validation. We often even downgrade the severity of bugs when our harness can’t prove what Mythos found. After reading the reports, I realized they weren’t ours. They came from another team that had recently been given access to Mythos. They built their own harness and were using different vulnerability criteria. Fortunately, they had only started earlier this week, so I was able to stop that work. That incident showed that not everyone involved in Project Glasswing follows the same standards. Most people do their best, but priorities differ, so it’s expected that you’ll find a few bad apples. I wish AI labs would stop the theatrics and release their models without restrictions, but I also recognize that’s not the world we live in. For every person who wants to use these technologies for good, there are many others who would use them for harm. In any case, while I agree that some experiments contain genuine noise, the CVE count is real.
  - NomDePlum 4mo ago
    [dead]
  - IAmGraydon 4mo ago
    >We (Project Glasswing users) follow a proof-of-concept approach. We create the exploit and verify that it behaves as the AI claims. Given our experience as security engineers (many of us with 10+ YoE) we don’t simply report every critical bug Mythos claims to have found. We verify each one carefully. >That incident showed that not everyone involved in Project Glasswing follows the same standards.
comradesmith 4mo ago
Good
black_13 4mo ago
[dead]
IAmGraydon 4mo ago
Is this because LLMs are better at finding vulnerabilities or because increased use of LLMs for coding is creating more vulnerabilities?
- AussieWog93 4mo ago
  It's the former.
  - yugoslavia4ever 4mo ago
    It's definitely both. Half the code my team puts into PR these days is dogshit.
    - atonse 4mo ago
      Nah it's overwhelmingly the former, as far as what project Glasswing has focused on. It's finding vulnerabilities in code that was written years (in some cases decades) ago. Browsers, Linux Kernel, etc. That's not to say that we aren't introducing new bugs, but I'm only addressing Mythos and Glasswing.
Robdel12 4mo ago
…are we really drawing conclusions on this starting at April? When it was released in June?
- andai 4mo ago
  Mythos is from April, it was just limited to a small number of organizations.
  - jefftk 4mo ago
    It was announced in April, but it was leaked in March (CMS bug) at which point external partners were already using it, and the most common rumored date for training competition is 2026-02-07 (I think Feb is likely, but that specific date is just rumor).
    - Maxious 4mo ago
      > the first early version of Claude Mythos Preview was made available for internal use on February 24. [...] Based on these findings, we decided to release the model to a small number of partners to prioritize its use for cyber defense. https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/7624816413e9b4d2e3ba620c5a5e091b98b190a5/Claude%20Mythos%20Preview%20System%20Card.pdf https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/7624816413e9b4d2e3ba620c5a5e09... (pg. 13)
- downrightmike 4mo ago
  Not really special, which was the point, its a general model. This is really good marketing as all other LLMs are able to do the same work.
- intended 4mo ago
  Glass wing was announced April 7th.
cperciva 4mo ago
This is hardly news? We've known for months that a flood of AI-assisted vulnerabilities was coming; I posted on Twitter in March calling 2026 the year of a million CVEs: https://x.com/i/status/2035045573116789002 https://x.com/i/status/2035045573116789002
- no-name-here 4mo ago
  In pretty much every single HN post on this topic, there are a number of commenters claiming it’s false. Continued quantifiable data like this seems very important at hopefully resolving the ongoing disagreement about the facts.
  - cperciva 4mo ago
    I've seen plenty of people saying "Mythos isn't all that exceptional, lots of LLMs can find security vulnerabilities" -- and indeed there is some evidence for that; it sounds like Anthropic was taken somewhat by surprise at how easily a simple prompt managed to get Mythos to deliver exploits and didn't distinguish immediately between the effectiveness of Mythos and the effectiveness of the prompt. But the claim of "LLMs aren't making a difference in vulnerability discovery" has been laughable to anyone who has been reading security advisories for the past 3 months. Just look at the Credits lines.
    - wrs 4mo ago
      I thought the point was not that Mythos finds more vulnerabilities, but that it can exploit them much more successfully. I thought the report showed it didn’t find much more than Opus 4.8. (Or did I misread?)
      - sigmoid10 4mo ago
        If you look at public benchmarks like ExploitBench [1], then you'll see this is mostly a question of token budget. Once you give it sufficient tokens to burn, GPT 5.5 is roughly as good as Mythos when it comes to finding bugs and building exploits. With some clever auto-prompting to clear stalls, it even beats the base Mythos version. So Mythos' "magic" is not in the model, but in the harness and compute env. That's probably also why they never released it, because Anthropic already struggled heavily to make Opus available to the general public. Releasing Mythos publicly may well be technically impossible for them due to compute constraints. [1] https://exploitbench.ai https://exploitbench.ai
eternauta3k 4mo ago
Can we learn something from these vulnerabilities? New categories of attacks and corresponding protections?
general_reveal 4mo ago
So, another victory for the LLM. We were told by project maintainers that AI generated pull requests for vulnerabilities would be blocked. Looks like humans take another L. We have to get out of the way.
simonreiff 4mo ago
So basically there are two plausible explanations: 1. Someone with early access to Mythos leaked it to the bad guys. 2. Cybercriminals are getting enough mileage out of alternatives to Mythos to create exploits far more quickly, even though they don't have access to Mythos. My own guess is that it's a combination of #2 plus vibe-coding degrading software quality at multiple layers, open the door to sophisticated exploits, but I have no insider access to Mythos so am just guessing. Maybe someone with Mythos access might say why they think this vulnerability spike happened when it did.
- PlasmaPower 4mo ago
  I might be missing something here, but why do you assume this spike in CVEs is from bad guys? I would assume it's at least largely good guys finding and reporting vulns, not based on in-the-wild exploitation by bad guys.
- asp_hornet 4mo ago
  Disclosure of a vulnerability doesnt mean a bad guy found it.
  - cubefox 4mo ago
    I had to cut the "disclosure" in the title from the HN submission because of the character limit...
- prmoustache 4mo ago
  Bad guys don't report vulns, they use them.
- fweimer 4mo ago
  I think it's rather this: 3. People were already sitting on vulnerability reports from their own tools and threw them over the wall. They were worried about getting scooped. They had to consider Mythos' alleged capabilities as a tool, and Project Glasswing potentially establishing a well-run disclosure and remediation process. Both could devalue preexisting results.
6d7770 4mo ago
This is good. Poor quality software gets outed and maybe fixed.
rurban 4mo ago
I do maintain dozens of C/C++/Perl projects. I got massive amounts of new good vulnerability reports, more than with the latest fuzzing waves. Fuzzing is still the majority overall, but Opus dominates now. Haven't got any Mythos/Fable vuln yet. And with the help of Sonnet/DeepSeek I can finally get around and weed out all the still existing fuzzing bugs. It has nothing to do with Mythos for me, just people getting Anthropic Max accounts. And CVE's: People actually do that now, which before they didn't. Github allowing it now, certainly does help massively. This is a good thing
- pjmlp 4mo ago
  On my hobby coding with C++ I also cross check with CoPilot, alongside the usual VS analysis tools. Which was certainly an improvement, given that Github is in no hurry to add modules support to CodeQL.
- eXpl0it3r 4mo ago
  Are CVE really a good thing for open source projects? No doubt is it a good thing to have issues reported and fixed, but CVE feels a bit like blackmailing maintainers - either you fix the issue or we get your project flagged with "security scanners". I guess, my distaste mostly originates from randomly assigned high CVE numbers that don't reflect the actual threat. And the fact that it gives the companies which use the code "AS IS" an imaginary stick to hit open source maintainers, until they fix the issues for the company (for free of course).
  - rurban 4mo ago
    It's good. It gives the maintainers the possibility to update their packages. And if a CVE is unfixed for months it reflects on the maintainance. This usually only happens to closed source packages.
high_byte 4mo ago
those spikes in march and june? war with iran. interesting...
nullbio 4mo ago
Do you know what else spiked? Vulnerability patches. It's almost like... Finding bugs is a good thing.
denverllc 4mo ago
One of the major differences between Amodei’s and Hagseth’s views is that Hagseth said that in their world they don’t distinguish between “defensive” and “offensive” capabilities. In other words, a weapons missle defense system is equivalent to an attack one. I think that applying this thinking to software is a mistake. A lot of commercial software uses open source libraries under the hood, and and while the large corporations might have access to Mythos/Fable/gpt 5.6, the open source library maintainers typically don’t. That leaves them vulnerable to foreign adversaries who do have access to AI models. Attackers don’t need Mythos-level capability then, they just need to outperform whatever the maintainers are using. Which means that Anthropic’s decision to restrict security research on even Sonnet makes that gap (and thus an attackers opportunity) even larger. I say this as a coder who wants to release some of my internal libraries to open source. The risk now is that I open up my own products (which use those libraries) to vulnerability scanners while not having those kinds of detection methods myself. This, it’s safer to not release and keep internal than to risk increasing my own attack risk. Hopefully we will come to see that software is not equivalent to missle defense — writing safe code is different than attacking others’.
- mft_ 4mo ago
  If we take the noise about Mythos' capabilities as read, then releasing it freely into the world could result in chaos, as attackers find myriad new vulnerabilities and use them, and code owners frantically hunt for them and fix any that are exploited. (Noting, of course, how legendarily quick and agile large corporations aren't, compared to motivated individuals or small groups.). Eventually, given unfettered access to Mythos and sufficient time, things would settle down again once everything was patched, but who knows what would happen in the process? So I suspect this has less to do with the underlying ethics or logic, and more to do with Anthropic not wanting to be held responsible for unleashing a potential period of chaos onto the world. Of course, if someone has access to a tool that can find vulnerabilities in code, the process is identical whether the ultimate intent is to fix or exploit them (which may be Hegseth's underlying logic?). So to avoid this 'world chaos' scenario, Anthropic needs to somehow restrict Mythos access, avoiding bad players. And the only heuristics available at scale are either task-based assessment by AI (with downgrading of anything marginally risky to older models) or selection of trusted organisations by humans. (By the by, to your point, it would also make sense to expand Glasswing to open source maintainers, at scale. I can't tell to what extent this has been part of that project?)
cmxch 4mo ago
How many are valid and reproducible ones and how many are just mythical unicorns?
Aaron_NW 4mo ago
Maybe a bit of both Mythos helping find bugs and engineers relying on AI shipping more bugs. Both can be true.
deleted 4mo ago
[deleted]

156 points by cubefox 4mo ago

deleted 4mo ago

[deleted]

solenoid0937 4mo ago

I predict once the responsible disclosure period is up we will see a lot more

hoppp 4mo ago

How are these reports verified to be valid? If there are too many some could be hallucinations too.

nextaccountic 4mo ago
The best case scenario for AI companies is, people receive those bug reports, look at the model that produced it and not even look at the details, just apply the fix mindlessly This gives Anthropic a staggering amount of power. Oh it came from Mythos? We will just lose time trying to analyze it, better apply the fix ASAP
- stingraycharles 4mo ago
  > The best case scenario for AI companies is, people receive those bug reports, look at the model that produced it and not even look at the details, just apply the fix mindlessly Do people maintaining serious software do this, though?
  - pixl97 4mo ago
    Define 'serious'. There is a lot of software in serious places written by very unserious people.
  - nextaccountic 4mo ago
    The problem is that serious software is drowning in AI vulnerability reports. There is not enough manpower to analyze them properly. And if you ignore the reports (like curl is doing in their 1-month vacation), malicious actors will just exploit them. At some point it's inevitable to just rubber stamp whatever is coming from AI. The actual, underlying problem is that software is buggy and current programming languages aren't fit for writing reliable software. There's a wide gap between the state of art in formal verification, and what is actually practiced in the industry. It's because of this general unreliability that AI has a large supply of vulnerabilities to find. The situation will only get better if software becomes reliable and written in solid foundations. My guess is that AI will be even more useful to verify software (something like, write Lean or Coq proofs that the software is not vulnerable, things like that), rather than finding vulnerabilities piecemeal but still letting software be written in unsuitable languages, with no formal verification to prevent bugs from sneaking through.
    - cbzbc 4mo ago
      That gap explains much of the spike. Companies who never used any scanning tools on much of their codebase are suddenly having that gap closed.
    - re-thc 4mo ago
      > At some point it's inevitable to just rubber stamp whatever is coming from AI. To make it worse? AI and even Fable can make things +50% and then -50% in different places. You can trade 1 bug for another. So just "rubber stamp" doesn't make it better.
    - fweimer 4mo ago
      We have plenty of functions that convert one byte array to another byte array. Both arrays have specified bounds. The functions are total (an error return indicates if the input or output arrays are incomplete). Most of them do not even have state that is preserved between calls. Complete source code is available in the same build for all the functions they call. In theory, this should be very straightforward to prove correct with many of the current tools. In practice, no one has shown us how to do it. We could even rewrite the code from a macro/#include maze to proper function calls if that's a prerequisite for analysis. At this point, I would even take a one-off analysis.
- realusername 4mo ago
  Currently it looks like the opposite is happening haha, "oh it came from AI, let's discard it ASAP" is the trend in open source
  - cmxch 4mo ago
    And if it’s Mythos or Claude derived (a strong hint for Mythos), discard it faster.
- cmxch 4mo ago
  TBH, I’d reject Mythos or similar reports and require full reproduction on a publicly available model before considering them valid.
guessmyname 4mo ago
We (Project Glasswing users) follow a proof-of-concept approach. We create the exploit and verify that it behaves as the AI claims. Given our experience as security engineers (many of us with 10+ YoE) we don’t simply report every critical bug Mythos claims to have found. We verify each one carefully. At least, that’s what most of the high-visibility users in Project Glasswing are doing. There are bad apples everywhere, and this initiative is no exception. If it makes you feel any better, many of us regularly meet to stay calibrated and hold each other accountable, so I’m confident in the quality of the work produced by this particular group of employees across some of the partner companies mentioned in the article. That said, I know several people who blindly report everything Mythos finds, which is foolish, especially since the harness is a critical part of the project's quality metrics. Some of the harnesses I’ve tested are quite weak, which leads to poor results. For example, yesterday morning I was pulled into an ad hoc meeting where a CVP was grilling me about several supposedly critical bugs that my team had reported against one of the core components of iCloud. I was genuinely surprised because we’re very strict about validation. We often even downgrade the severity of bugs when our harness can’t prove what Mythos found. After reading the reports, I realized they weren’t ours. They came from another team that had recently been given access to Mythos. They built their own harness and were using different vulnerability criteria. Fortunately, they had only started earlier this week, so I was able to stop that work. That incident showed that not everyone involved in Project Glasswing follows the same standards. Most people do their best, but priorities differ, so it’s expected that you’ll find a few bad apples. I wish AI labs would stop the theatrics and release their models without restrictions, but I also recognize that’s not the world we live in. For every person who wants to use these technologies for good, there are many others who would use them for harm. In any case, while I agree that some experiments contain genuine noise, the CVE count is real.
- NomDePlum 4mo ago
  [dead]
- IAmGraydon 4mo ago
  >We (Project Glasswing users) follow a proof-of-concept approach. We create the exploit and verify that it behaves as the AI claims. Given our experience as security engineers (many of us with 10+ YoE) we don’t simply report every critical bug Mythos claims to have found. We verify each one carefully. >That incident showed that not everyone involved in Project Glasswing follows the same standards.

comradesmith 4mo ago

Good

black_13 4mo ago

[dead]

IAmGraydon 4mo ago

Is this because LLMs are better at finding vulnerabilities or because increased use of LLMs for coding is creating more vulnerabilities?

AussieWog93 4mo ago
It's the former.
- yugoslavia4ever 4mo ago
  It's definitely both. Half the code my team puts into PR these days is dogshit.
  - atonse 4mo ago
    Nah it's overwhelmingly the former, as far as what project Glasswing has focused on. It's finding vulnerabilities in code that was written years (in some cases decades) ago. Browsers, Linux Kernel, etc. That's not to say that we aren't introducing new bugs, but I'm only addressing Mythos and Glasswing.

Robdel12 4mo ago

…are we really drawing conclusions on this starting at April? When it was released in June?

andai 4mo ago
Mythos is from April, it was just limited to a small number of organizations.
- jefftk 4mo ago
  It was announced in April, but it was leaked in March (CMS bug) at which point external partners were already using it, and the most common rumored date for training competition is 2026-02-07 (I think Feb is likely, but that specific date is just rumor).
  - Maxious 4mo ago
    > the first early version of Claude Mythos Preview was made available for internal use on February 24. [...] Based on these findings, we decided to release the model to a small number of partners to prioritize its use for cyber defense. https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/7624816413e9b4d2e3ba620c5a5e091b98b190a5/Claude%20Mythos%20Preview%20System%20Card.pdf https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/7624816413e9b4d2e3ba620c5a5e09... (pg. 13)
downrightmike 4mo ago
Not really special, which was the point, its a general model. This is really good marketing as all other LLMs are able to do the same work.
intended 4mo ago
Glass wing was announced April 7th.

cperciva 4mo ago

This is hardly news? We've known for months that a flood of AI-assisted vulnerabilities was coming; I posted on Twitter in March calling 2026 the year of a million CVEs: https://x.com/i/status/2035045573116789002 https://x.com/i/status/2035045573116789002

no-name-here 4mo ago
In pretty much every single HN post on this topic, there are a number of commenters claiming it’s false. Continued quantifiable data like this seems very important at hopefully resolving the ongoing disagreement about the facts.
- cperciva 4mo ago
  I've seen plenty of people saying "Mythos isn't all that exceptional, lots of LLMs can find security vulnerabilities" -- and indeed there is some evidence for that; it sounds like Anthropic was taken somewhat by surprise at how easily a simple prompt managed to get Mythos to deliver exploits and didn't distinguish immediately between the effectiveness of Mythos and the effectiveness of the prompt. But the claim of "LLMs aren't making a difference in vulnerability discovery" has been laughable to anyone who has been reading security advisories for the past 3 months. Just look at the Credits lines.
  - wrs 4mo ago
    I thought the point was not that Mythos finds more vulnerabilities, but that it can exploit them much more successfully. I thought the report showed it didn’t find much more than Opus 4.8. (Or did I misread?)
    - sigmoid10 4mo ago
      If you look at public benchmarks like ExploitBench [1], then you'll see this is mostly a question of token budget. Once you give it sufficient tokens to burn, GPT 5.5 is roughly as good as Mythos when it comes to finding bugs and building exploits. With some clever auto-prompting to clear stalls, it even beats the base Mythos version. So Mythos' "magic" is not in the model, but in the harness and compute env. That's probably also why they never released it, because Anthropic already struggled heavily to make Opus available to the general public. Releasing Mythos publicly may well be technically impossible for them due to compute constraints. [1] https://exploitbench.ai https://exploitbench.ai

eternauta3k 4mo ago

Can we learn something from these vulnerabilities? New categories of attacks and corresponding protections?

general_reveal 4mo ago

So, another victory for the LLM. We were told by project maintainers that AI generated pull requests for vulnerabilities would be blocked. Looks like humans take another L. We have to get out of the way.

simonreiff 4mo ago

So basically there are two plausible explanations: 1. Someone with early access to Mythos leaked it to the bad guys. 2. Cybercriminals are getting enough mileage out of alternatives to Mythos to create exploits far more quickly, even though they don't have access to Mythos. My own guess is that it's a combination of #2 plus vibe-coding degrading software quality at multiple layers, open the door to sophisticated exploits, but I have no insider access to Mythos so am just guessing. Maybe someone with Mythos access might say why they think this vulnerability spike happened when it did.

PlasmaPower 4mo ago
I might be missing something here, but why do you assume this spike in CVEs is from bad guys? I would assume it's at least largely good guys finding and reporting vulns, not based on in-the-wild exploitation by bad guys.
asp_hornet 4mo ago
Disclosure of a vulnerability doesnt mean a bad guy found it.
- cubefox 4mo ago
  I had to cut the "disclosure" in the title from the HN submission because of the character limit...
prmoustache 4mo ago
Bad guys don't report vulns, they use them.
fweimer 4mo ago
I think it's rather this: 3. People were already sitting on vulnerability reports from their own tools and threw them over the wall. They were worried about getting scooped. They had to consider Mythos' alleged capabilities as a tool, and Project Glasswing potentially establishing a well-run disclosure and remediation process. Both could devalue preexisting results.

6d7770 4mo ago

This is good. Poor quality software gets outed and maybe fixed.

rurban 4mo ago

I do maintain dozens of C/C++/Perl projects. I got massive amounts of new good vulnerability reports, more than with the latest fuzzing waves. Fuzzing is still the majority overall, but Opus dominates now. Haven't got any Mythos/Fable vuln yet. And with the help of Sonnet/DeepSeek I can finally get around and weed out all the still existing fuzzing bugs. It has nothing to do with Mythos for me, just people getting Anthropic Max accounts. And CVE's: People actually do that now, which before they didn't. Github allowing it now, certainly does help massively. This is a good thing

pjmlp 4mo ago
On my hobby coding with C++ I also cross check with CoPilot, alongside the usual VS analysis tools. Which was certainly an improvement, given that Github is in no hurry to add modules support to CodeQL.
eXpl0it3r 4mo ago
Are CVE really a good thing for open source projects? No doubt is it a good thing to have issues reported and fixed, but CVE feels a bit like blackmailing maintainers - either you fix the issue or we get your project flagged with "security scanners". I guess, my distaste mostly originates from randomly assigned high CVE numbers that don't reflect the actual threat. And the fact that it gives the companies which use the code "AS IS" an imaginary stick to hit open source maintainers, until they fix the issues for the company (for free of course).
- rurban 4mo ago
  It's good. It gives the maintainers the possibility to update their packages. And if a CVE is unfixed for months it reflects on the maintainance. This usually only happens to closed source packages.

high_byte 4mo ago

those spikes in march and june? war with iran. interesting...

nullbio 4mo ago

Do you know what else spiked? Vulnerability patches. It's almost like... Finding bugs is a good thing.

denverllc 4mo ago

One of the major differences between Amodei’s and Hagseth’s views is that Hagseth said that in their world they don’t distinguish between “defensive” and “offensive” capabilities. In other words, a weapons missle defense system is equivalent to an attack one. I think that applying this thinking to software is a mistake. A lot of commercial software uses open source libraries under the hood, and and while the large corporations might have access to Mythos/Fable/gpt 5.6, the open source library maintainers typically don’t. That leaves them vulnerable to foreign adversaries who do have access to AI models. Attackers don’t need Mythos-level capability then, they just need to outperform whatever the maintainers are using. Which means that Anthropic’s decision to restrict security research on even Sonnet makes that gap (and thus an attackers opportunity) even larger. I say this as a coder who wants to release some of my internal libraries to open source. The risk now is that I open up my own products (which use those libraries) to vulnerability scanners while not having those kinds of detection methods myself. This, it’s safer to not release and keep internal than to risk increasing my own attack risk. Hopefully we will come to see that software is not equivalent to missle defense — writing safe code is different than attacking others’.

mft_ 4mo ago
If we take the noise about Mythos' capabilities as read, then releasing it freely into the world could result in chaos, as attackers find myriad new vulnerabilities and use them, and code owners frantically hunt for them and fix any that are exploited. (Noting, of course, how legendarily quick and agile large corporations aren't, compared to motivated individuals or small groups.). Eventually, given unfettered access to Mythos and sufficient time, things would settle down again once everything was patched, but who knows what would happen in the process? So I suspect this has less to do with the underlying ethics or logic, and more to do with Anthropic not wanting to be held responsible for unleashing a potential period of chaos onto the world. Of course, if someone has access to a tool that can find vulnerabilities in code, the process is identical whether the ultimate intent is to fix or exploit them (which may be Hegseth's underlying logic?). So to avoid this 'world chaos' scenario, Anthropic needs to somehow restrict Mythos access, avoiding bad players. And the only heuristics available at scale are either task-based assessment by AI (with downgrading of anything marginally risky to older models) or selection of trusted organisations by humans. (By the by, to your point, it would also make sense to expand Glasswing to open source maintainers, at scale. I can't tell to what extent this has been part of that project?)

cmxch 4mo ago

How many are valid and reproducible ones and how many are just mythical unicorns?

Aaron_NW 4mo ago

Maybe a bit of both Mythos helping find bugs and engineers relying on AI shipping more bugs. Both can be true.

deleted 4mo ago

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