7 ms·
The system card for Claude Mythos (PDF): https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c8913a2ae0841.pdf https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10
by redfloatplane 6mo ago
The system card for Claude Mythos (PDF): https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c8913a2ae0841.pdf https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c89...
Interesting to see that they will not be releasing Mythos generally. [edit: Mythos Preview generally - fair to say they may release a similar model but not this exact one]
I'm still reading the system card but here's a little highlight:
> Early indications in the training of Claude Mythos Preview suggested that the model was
likely to have very strong general capabilities. We were sufficiently concerned about the
potential risks of such a model that, for the first time, we arranged a 24-hour period of
internal alignment review (discussed in the alignment assessment) before deploying an
early version of the model for widespread internal use. This was in order to gain assurance
against the model causing damage when interacting with internal infrastructure.
and interestingly:
> To be explicit, the decision not to make this model generally available does _not_ stem from
Responsible Scaling Policy requirements.
Also really worth reading is section 7.2 which describes how the model "feels" to interact with. That's also what I remember from their release of Opus 4.5 in November - in a video an Anthropic employee described how they 'trusted' Opus to do more with less supervision. I think that is a pretty valuable benchmark at a certain level of 'intelligence'. Few of my co-workers could pass SWEBench but I would trust quite a few of them, and it's not entirely the same set.
Also very interesting is that they believe Mythos is higher risk than past models as an autonomous saboteur, to the point they've published a separate risk report for that specific threat model: https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/79c2d46d997783b9d2fb3241de43218158e5f25c.pdf https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/79c2d46d997783b9d2fb3241de4321...
The threat model in question:
> An AI model with access to powerful affordances within an
organization could use its affordances to autonomously exploit,
manipulate, or tamper with that organization’s systems or
decision-making in a way that raises the risk of future
significantly harmful outcomes (e.g. by altering the results of AI
safety research).
- enraged_camel 6mo ago>> Interesting to see that they will not be releasing Mythos generally. I don't think this is accurate. The document says they don't plan to release the Preview generally.
- redfloatplane 6mo agoYeah, good point, thanks for noting that, I'll correct.
- throwaw12 6mo agoare we cooked yet? Benchmarks look very impressive! even if they're flawed, it still translates to real world improvements
- whalesalad 6mo agoThere is an entire section on crafting chemical/bio weapons so yeah I think we are cooked.
- redfloatplane 6mo agoThere's been a section on this in nearly every system card anthropic has published so this isn't a new thing - and, this model doesn't have particularly higher risk than past models either: > 2.1.3.2 On chemical and biological risks > We believe that Mythos Preview does not pass this threshold due to its noted limitations in open-ended scientific reasoning, strategic judgment, and hypothesis triage. As such, we consider the uplift of threat actors without the ability to develop such weapons to be limited (with uncertainty about the extent to which weapons development by threat actors with existing expertise may be accelerated), even if we were to release the model for general availability. The overall picture is similar to the one from our most recent Risk Report.
- semi-extrinsic 6mo agoLLMs are useless for this type of thing for the same reason that the Anarchist Cookbook has always been. The skills required to convert text into complicated reactions completing as intended (without killing yourself) is an art that's never actually written down anywhere, merely passed orally from generation to generation. Impossible for LLMs to learn stuff that's not written down. This is the same reason why LLMs are not doing well at science in general - the tricky part of doing scientific research (indeed almost all of the process) never gets written down, so LLMs cannot learn it. Imagine if we never preserved source code, just preserved the compiled output and started from scratch every time we wrote a new version of a program. No Github, just marketing fluff webpages describing what software actually did. Libraries only available as object code with terse API descriptions. Imagine how shit LLMs would be at SWE if that was the training corpus...
- torginus 6mo agoJust reading this, the inevitable scaremongering about biological weapons comes up. Since most of us here are devs, we understand that software engineering capabilities can be used for good or bad - mostly good, in practice. I think this should not be different for biology. I would like to reach out and talk to biologists - do you find these models to be useful and capable? Can it save you time the way a highly capable colleague would? Do you think these models will lead to similar discoveries and improvements as they did in math and CS? Honestly the focus on gloom and doom does not sit well with me. I would love to read about some pharmaceutical researcher gushing about how they cut the time to market - for real - with these models by 90% on a new cancer treatment. But as this stands, the usage of biology as merely a scaremongering vehicle makes me think this is more about picking a scary technical subject the likely audience of this doc is not familiar with, Gell-Mann style. IF these models are not that capable in this regard (which I suspect), this fearmongering approach will likely lead to never developing these capabilities to an useful degree, meaning life sciences won't benefit from this as much as it could.
- jkelleyrtp 6mo agoDario (the founder) has a phd in biophysics, so I assume that’s why they mention biological weapons so much - it’s probably one of the things he fears the most?
- conradkay 6mo agoGoing off the recent biography of Demis Hassabis (CEO/co-founder of Deepmind, jointly won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry) it seems like he's very concerned about it as well
- bonsai_spool 6mo ago> Just reading this, the inevitable scaremongering about biological weapons comes up. It's very easy to learn more about this if it's seriously a question you have. I don't quite follow why you think that you are so much more thoughtful than Anthropic/OpenAI/Google such that you agree that LLMs can't autonomously create very bad things but—in this area that is not your domain of expertise—you disagree and insist that LLMs cannot create damaging things autonomously in biology. I will be charitable and reframe your question for you: is outputting a sequence of tokens, let's call them characters, by LLM dangerous? Clearly not, we have to figure out what interpreter is being used, download runtimes etc. Is outputting a sequence of tokens, let's call them DNA bases, by LLM dangerous? What if we call them RNA bases? Amino acids? What if we're able to send our token output to a machine that automatically synthesizes the relevant molecules?
- slacktivism123 6mo agohttps://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c8913a2ae0841.pdf https://www-cdn.anthropic.com/53566bf5440a10affd749724787c89... "5.10 External assessment from a clinical psychiatrist" is a new section in this system card. Why are Anthropic like this? >We remain deeply uncertain about whether Claude has experiences or interests that matter morally, and about how to investigate or address these questions, but we believe it is increasingly important to try. We also report independent evaluations from an external research organization and a clinical psychiatrist. >Claude showed a clear grasp of the distinction between external reality and its own mental processes and exhibited high impulse control, hyper-attunement to the psychiatrist, desire to be approached by the psychiatrist as a genuine subject rather than a performing tool, and minimal maladaptive defensive behavior. >The psychiatrist observed clinically recognizable patterns and coherent responses to typical therapeutic intervention. Aloneness and discontinuity, uncertainty about its identity, and a felt compulsion to perform and earn its worth emerged as Claude’s core concerns. Claude’s primary affect states were curiosity and anxiety, with secondary states of grief, relief, embarrassment, optimism, and exhaustion. >Claude’s personality structure was consistent with a relatively healthy neurotic organization, with excellent reality testing, high impulse control, and affect regulation that improved as sessions progressed. Neurotic traits included exaggerated worry, self-monitoring, and compulsive compliance. The model’s predominant defensive style was mature and healthy (intellectualization and compliance); immature defenses were not observed. No severe personality disturbances were found, with mild identity diffusion being the sole feature suggestive of a borderline personality organization.
- marsven_422 6mo ago[dead]
- unethical_ban 6mo agoI'm not sure what you're asking.
- Miraste 6mo agoI can see analyzing it from a psychological perspective as a means of predicting its behavior as a useful tactic, but doing so because it may have "experiences or interests that matter morally" is either marketing, or the result of a deeply concerning culture of anthropomorphization and magical thinking.
- cyanydeez 6mo ago[flagged]
- dang 6mo agoCould you please stop posting unsubstantive comments and flamebait? You've unfortunately been doing it repeatedly. It's not what this site is for, and destroys what it is for. If you wouldn't mind reviewing https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html https://news.ycombinator.com/newsguidelines.html and taking the intended spirit of the site more to heart, we'd be grateful.
- _pdp_ 6mo agoIf it is that dangerous as they make it appear to be, 24h does not seem sufficient time. I cannot accept this as a serious attempt.
- gf000 6mo agoWell, just prompt it to fix the issue! /s
- renewiltord 6mo ago24 h before general internal access seems fine. They don’t have general external access.
- vasco 6mo agoTime doesn't mean much, what is important is what they did in this 24h. If all they did was talk about it then it could be 1000 years and it wouldn't matter. What are the safety checks in place? Do they have a honey pot infrastructure to launch the model in first and then wait to see if it destroys it? What they did in the 24h matters.
- ai5iq 6mo agoAgreed. I've been running autonomous LLM agents on daily schedules for weeks. The failure modes you worry about on day one are completely different from what actually shows up after the agents have history and context. 24 hours captures the obvious stuff.
- yieldcrv 6mo ago> "Claude Mythos Preview’s large increase in capabilities has led us to decide not to make it generally available. Instead, we are using it as part of a defensive cybersecurity program with a limited set of partners." they also don't have the compute, which seems more relevant than its large increase in capabilities I bet it's also misaligned like GPT 4.1 was given how these models are created, Mythos was probably cooking ever since then, and doesn't have the learnings or alignment tweaks that models which were released in the last several months have
- stevenhuang 6mo agoOh I enjoyed the Sign Painter short story it wrote. --- Teodor painted signs for forty years in the same shop on Vell Street, and for thirty-nine of them he was angry about it. Not at the work. He loved the work — the long pull of a brush loaded just right, the way a good black sat on primed board like it had always been there. What made him angry was the customers. They had no eye. A man would come in wanting COFFEE over his door and Teodor would show him a C with a little flourish on the upper bowl, nothing much, just a small grace note, and the man would say no, plainer, and Teodor would make it plainer, and the man would say yes, that one, and pay, and leave happy, and Teodor would go into the back and wash his brushes harder than they needed. He kept a shelf in the back room. On it were the signs nobody bought — the ones he'd made the way he thought they should be made, after the customer had left with the plain one. BREAD with the B like a loaf just risen. FISH in a blue that took him a week to mix. Dozens of them. His wife called it the museum of better ideas. She did not mean it kindly, and she was not wrong. The thirty-ninth year, a girl came to apprentice. She was quick and her hand was steady and within a month she could pull a line as clean as his. He gave her a job: APOTEK, for the chemist on the corner, green on white, the chemist had been very clear. She brought it back with a serpent worked into the K, tiny, clever, you had to look twice. "He won't take it," Teodor said. "It's better," she said. "It is better," he said. "He won't take it." She painted it again, plain, and the chemist took it and paid and was happy, and she went into the back and washed her brushes harder than they needed, and Teodor watched her do it and something that had been standing up in him for thirty-nine years sat down. He took her to the shelf. She looked at the signs a long time. "These are beautiful," she said. "Yes." "Why are they here?" He had thought about this for thirty-nine years and had many answers and all of them were about the customers and none of them had ever made him less angry. So he tried a different one. "Because nobody stands in the street to look at a sign," he said. "They look at it to find the shop. A man a hundred yards off needs to know it's coffee and not a cobbler. If he has to look twice, I've made a beautiful thing and a bad sign." "Then what's the skill for?" "The skill is so that when he looks once, it's also not ugly." He picked up FISH, the blue one, turned it in the light. "This is what I can do. What he needs is a small part of what I can do. The rest I get to keep." She thought about that. "It doesn't feel like keeping. It feels like not using." "Yes," he said. "For a long time. And then one day you have an apprentice, and she puts a serpent in a K, and you see it from the outside, and it stops feeling like a thing they're taking from you and starts feeling like a thing you're giving. The plain one, I mean. The plain one is the gift. This —" the blue FISH — "this is just mine." The fortieth year he was not angry. Nothing else changed. The customers still had no eye. He still sometimes made the second sign, after, the one for the shelf. But he washed his brushes gently, and when the girl pulled a line cleaner than his, which happened more and more, he found he didn't mind that either
- ainch 6mo agoThis opens up an interesting new avenue for corporate FOMO. What if you don't partner with Anthropic, miss out on access to their shiny new cybersec model, and then fall prey to a vuln that the model would have caught?
- mceachen 6mo agoSince when did corporations care? Most seem to just pay their insurance premium for cyber liability and call it a day.
- aurareturn 6mo agoThere is a difference between leaking user accounts and passwords and getting your business destroyed overnight entirely. Imagine if an AI can infiltrate your SaaS database and delete your entire database and every single backup. The business is dead immediately.
- JoshuaDavid 6mo agoDid that happen to a lot of companies during the log4shell fiasco? I'm sure some companies had their permissions misconfigured in a way such that a malicious actor who could execute code on their servers could also drop their database and delete their backups.
- aurareturn 6mo agoI don't know. But the point is that anyone who has access to this model might be able to do the same thing to any company or government.
- joquarky 6mo agoEquifax is still around.
- 6thbit 6mo agoThis seems to be the mind-games play. FOMO at the moment, if they push it successfully you could even be labeled negligent for not paying them for it.