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We don't. If we did, we'd have it by now. It's been over 25 years of making appeals like this. It's a fun site! I'm not entirely sure why the protagonist is a
by tptacek 1y ago
We don't. If we did, we'd have it by now. It's been over 25 years of making appeals like this.
It's a fun site! I'm not entirely sure why the protagonist is a green taco, but I can see why a DNS provider would make a cartoon protocol explainer. It's just that this particular protocol is not as important as the name makes it sound.
- deleted 1y ago[deleted]
- immibis 1y agoWe need a lot of things we don't have. Note that without DNS security, whoever controls your DNS server, or is reliably in the path to your DNS server, can issue certificates for your domain. The only countermeasure against this is certificate transparency, which lets you yell loudly that someone's impersonating you but doesn't stop them from actually doing it.
- tptacek 1y agoIn this case, there's an avalanche of money and resources backing up the problem domain DNSSEC attempts to make contributions in, and the fact that it's deployed in practically 0% of organizations with large security teams is telling.
- iscoelho 1y agoI would say it is more a testament to the unfortunate state of cybersecurity. These "theoretical" attacks happen. Everyone just thinks it won't be them.
- tptacek 1y agoMy rebuttal is that the DNSSEC root keys could hit Pastebin tonight and in almost every organization in the world nobody would need to be paged. That's not hyperbole.
- avidiax 1y agoYou are mostly right, but I would hope that certain core security companies and organizations would get paged. Root CAs and domain registrars and such should have DNSSEC validation. Unfortunately, DNSSEC is a bit expensive in terms of support burden, additional bugs, reduced performance, etc. It will take someone like Apple turning DNSSEC validation on by default to shake out all the problems. Or it will take an exploitable vulnerability akin to SIM-swapping to maybe convince Let's Encrypt! and similar services reliant on proof-by-dns that they must require DNSSEC signing.
- tptacek 1y agoSIM-swapping is a much more important attack vector than on-path/off-path traffic interception, and are closer to how DNS hijacking happens in practice (by account takeover at registrars).
- immibis 1y agoLet's not fix anything other than the most popular attack, that'll be great for security. (The biggest problem in this thread is that you can bypass the rate limit but nobody else can)
- tptacek 1y agoIt does in fact make sense to address the most important attacks before the exotic ones, especially when addressing the exotic attacks involves drastically more work than the common ones. I think you're making my case for me.
- saurik 1y ago(Click the comment to bring it up to the top-level; AFAIK, the "rate limit" you are talking about is more related to tree depth.)
- immibis 1y ago
- theamk 1y agoIf the problem is path between registrar and CA, then deploying the fix to clients seems like an absolute overkill. Just create a secure path from CA to registrar. RDAP-based or DoH-based, or something from scratch, does not really matter. It will only need to cover few thousand CAs and TLDs, so it will be vastly simpler that upgrading billions of internet devices.
- iscoelho 1y agoIt is important. This is unfortunate rhetoric that is harming the safety of the internet. "For instance, in April 2018, a Russian provider announced a number of IP prefixes (groups of IP addresses) that actually belong to Route53 Amazon DNS servers." By BGP hijacking Route53, attackers were not only able to redirect a website to different IPs, globally, but also generate SSL certificates for that website. They used this to steal $152,000 in cryptocurrency. (I know I know, "crypto", but this can happen to any site: banking, medical, infrastructure) Also, before you say, RPKI doesn't solve this either, although a step in the right direction. DNSSEC is a step in the right direction as well. [1] https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/security/glossary/bgp-hijacking/ https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/security/glossary/bgp-hi...
- tptacek 1y agoBGP attacks change the semantic meaning of IP addresses themselves. DNSSEC operates at a level above that. The one place this matters in a post-HTTPS-everywhere world is at the CAs, which are now all moving to multi-perspective validation.
- iscoelho 1y agoAs you should be aware, multi-perspective validation does not solve anything if your BGP hijack is accepted to be global. You will receive 100% of the traffic. DNSSEC does greatly assist with this issue: It would have prevented the cited incident.
- tptacek 1y agoA BGP attacker doesn't need to alter the DNS to intercept traffic; they're already intercepting targeted traffic at IP selectivity.
- iscoelho 1y agoThere are 2 ways to pull off this attack: 1. Hijack the HTTP/HTTPS server. For some IP ranges, this is completely infeasible. For example, hijacking a CloudFlare HTTP/HTTPS range would be almost impossible theoretically based on technical details that I won't go through listing. 2. Hijack the DNS server. Because there's a complete apathy towards DNS server security (as you are showing) this attack is very frequently overlooked. Which is exactly why in the cited incident attackers were capable of hijacking Amazon Route53 with ease. *DNSSEC solves this.* If either 1 or 2 work, you have yourself a successful hijack of the site. Both need to be secure for you to prevent this.
- throw0101d 1y ago> We don't. If we did, we'd have it by now. It's been over 25 years of making appeals like this. See also IPv6. ;) Edit: currently at "0 points". People, it was a joke. Chill.
- tptacek 1y agoWe very definitely do have IPv6. I'm using IPv6 right now. Last numbers I saw, over 50% of North American hits to Google were IPv6. DNSSEC adoption in North America is below 4%, and that's by counting zones, most of which don't matter --- the number gets much lower if you filter it down to the top 1000 zones.
- throw0101d 1y ago> We very definitely do have IPv6. I'm using IPv6 right now. I'm not. Neither is my home wireline PON ISP, even though they have it on their mobile network (but my previous ISP did). Also, every time there's an IPv6 article on HN there are entire sub-threads of people saying it's never going to come along. ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ * https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44306792 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44306792
- JdeBP 1y agoOne can hope that someone will give the ISPs in my country a metaphorical hefty kick up the arse, especially as some of the more niche ones have been happily providing IPv6, and business customers can get IPv6, and of course other countries are happily embracing IPv6. So I wouldn't say never. But the clear evidence is that past promises of it arriving at those major ISPs are very hollow indeed. It's not the same with DNSSEC in the U.K., though. Many WWW hosting services (claim to) support that right now. And if anything, rather than there being years-old ineffective petition sites clamouring for IPv6 to be turned on, it is, even in 2025, the received wisdom to look to turning DNSSEC off in order to fix problems. * https://codepoets.co.uk/2025/its-always-dns-unbound-domain-signing-stuff/ https://codepoets.co.uk/2025/its-always-dns-unbound-domain-s... * https://www.havevirginmediaenabledipv6yet.co.uk https://www.havevirginmediaenabledipv6yet.co.uk One has to roll one's eyes at how many times the-corporation-disables-the-thread-where-customers-repeatedly-ask-for-simple-moderen-stuff-for-10-years is the answer. It was the answer for Google Chrome not getting SRV lookup support. Although that was a mere 5 years.
- TZubiri 1y agoReminds me of: https://serverfault.com/questions/1018543/dns-not-resolving-in-all-locations-after-a-week/1107868#1107868 https://serverfault.com/questions/1018543/dns-not-resolving-... Unfortunately the basic thought process is that "it is a security feature, therefore it must be enabled" it is very hard to argue against that, but it is pretty similar to "we must have the latest version of everything as that is secure" and "we should add more passwords with more requirements and expire it often". One of those security theatres that optimizes for reducing accountability, but may end up with almost no security gains and huge tradeoffs that may end up even compromising security through secondary effects (how secure is a system that is down?)