7 ms·
CVE-2024-9956 – PassKey Account Takeover in All Mobile Browsers
- vlovich123 2y agosince not stated in the article and I started to get worried, this was reported last year. Safari: fixed in 18.3 (Jan 2025) Firefox: fixed in 136 (March 2025) Chrome: fixed in 130.0.6723.58/.59 (Oct 2024) Wow - only Google seemed to really prioritize fixing this / had the processes and manpower to get a fix out quickly. Mozilla’s bug report is still locked down but Google’s is open: https://issues.chromium.org/issues/370482421 https://issues.chromium.org/issues/370482421
- protimewaster 2y ago> Wow - only Google seemed to really prioritize fixing this / had the processes and manpower to get a fix out quickly. I would have guessed they'd be the quickest, but I wouldn't have guessed they'd be months ahead of the others.
- jbverschoor 2y agoPerhaps they had the info before it was disclosed to the others?
- crtasm 2y agohttps://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2025-14/#CVE-2024-9956 https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2025-1... links the bug https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1922357 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1922357 but it's not public, perhaps someone can tell us when it was opened.
- jbverschoor 2y agoThe next issue, https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1922358 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1922358 is from October 2nd 2024
- gavinsyancey 2y agoReading through the Chromium bug report, it looks like the reporter wasn't able to get in contact with Mozilla until February, so after they were aware it only took a month to fix the bug in Firefox. It's unclear when they started trying, and who's fault the delay is.
- mastersplinter 2y agoI can't speak to the prioritization differences between the different browser teams, Chrome was definitely the best which isn't surprising considering their resources. Apple was also quite swift but I imagine it took them some time to decide where to deliver the fix, I myself wasn't sure if this is something that should be blocked at the OS level (the Authentication checking the intent origin) or browser. Mozilla is usually the slowest out of the three but they were still very professional.
- bflesch 2y agoThe involved engineers are most likely running around with a blushed-red face to this day, claiming "phishing resistance" in all the marketing materials but then having such a bug. I'd say the cover-your-ass (CYA) reflex was a big incentive for google engineers to fix it quickly.
- lxgr 2y agoPhishing resistance isn't a binary property, it's a spectrum, and even with this vulnerability, that of passkeys is orders of magnitude higher than that of most other alternatives (including passwords, SMS OTP, TOTP etc.)
- acdha 2y agoThis attack requires physical presence and visiting an attacker-controlled page. It’s absolutely a real threat and great work, but there are multiple orders of magnitude more people getting phished using weak MFA than by an attacker with control of a BLE device in their home or office.
- verst 2y agoMicrosoft Edge had a release based on the relevant Chromium version on Oct 17, 2024. That is release 130.0.2849.46: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-relnote-stable-channel#version-1300284946-october-17-2024 https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployedge/microsoft-edge-... https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2024-9956 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/...
- programmarchy 2y agoI’m missing something. If WebAuthn is “ssh for the web” then why would it matter if Bob was phished and logged into the fake crypto portal running on the raspberry pi? It’s not like the attacker now knows his private key. Is the danger that Bob also would share his crypto wallet keys with the fake site or something?
- chc4 2y agoThe attacker controlled proxy is the one that logged in, and so captured a valid session for the user account that they can use afaik
- vlovich123 2y agoThe attacker has access to whatever the passkey was protecting. It's like asking who cares about password phishing. And FWIW a crypto portal in front of something like Coinbase can obviously do a lot of damage since most people do not keep their crypto in their own personal cold storage.
- garaetjjte 2y agoAttacker is now logged in on the real crypto portal as Bob. SSH equivalent would be like connecting to malicious server with SSH agent forwarding enabled.
- programmarchy 2y agoOkay, that makes sense. I thought they could just log in to a dummy site, not that it was proxying requests through to a real site. Yikes.
- reportgunner 2y agoI suppose you can completely skip dummy sites when phishing for passkeys since the user doesn't know the password and therefore you don't need him to enter said password anywhere (which is why you needed a dummy site in the first place).
- 2y ago
- chc4 2y agoI don't use BLE PassKeys, but wouldn't the user also have to be paired with the attacker controlled BlueTooth device to get the connection request? Does the "The victim’s Authenticator connects to the attacker’s Client" step's authorization include pairing to a new device and not only allow a log-in with an already connected one?
- lxgr 2y agoThe QR code initiates pairing (at the FIDO level; I believe at the Bluetooth level there is actually no pairing required here).
- chc4 2y agoThe diagram in the post has the user device talking to the attacker device over Bluetooth, and the bug description explicitly says "An attacker within bluetooth range" - which heavily implies to me your device actually is pairing with the attacker device somehow! If already being paired with the attacker Bluetooth device is a prerequisite for this attack that's much less of a concern imo.
- lxgr 2y agoAs far as I can tell, no pairing (or indeed any kind of logical Bluetooth connection) is required in the protocol used. The (device containing the) authenticator broadcasts a Bluetooth LE advertisement, and the "client platform" (i.e. usually the browser) has to be able to receive its contents to prove physical proximity. Such a (by definition unidirectional) Bluetooth LE advertisement can easily be received and relayed over arbitrary distances.
- warp 2y agoIIRC caBLE ("cloud assisted bluetooth low energy") sidesteps the usual bluetooth pairing process by using out-of-band channels (QR codes, NFC) to exchange initial pairing information.
- 3np 2y ago"range" here refers to physical distance (adjusting for interference). No prior pairing required.
- _23sd 2y agoThe subheading "Phishing PassKeys credentials using browser intents" is inaccurate. The attacker does not get a credential, only a session.
- vlovich123 2y agoWhich can be used to register your own passkey credentials obtaining an account takeover?
- _23sd 2y agoSure, if you assume the session is scoped to allow registering a new passkey. Depends on how the application is configured. Regardless, getting the credential is different from getting a session.
- lxgr 2y agoArguably, "phishing a credential" doesn't necessarily have to mean full compromise of the credential itself. For example, in the case of SMS-OTP, the credential is (access to) the registered phone number, yet I'd still call an attack that successfully intercepts one OTP in time to use it a successful phishing attack.
- mastersplinter 2y agoAuthor of the blog here, I actually agree with you the subheading is quite misleading, any tips on what would be more appropriate? "Phishing PassKeys sessions using browser intents" doesn't make much sense to me
- cjcampbell 2y agoMaybe “phishing passkey protected sessions …” or “phishing passkey protected accounts”. I also echo some of the other critiques, which are that passkeys are advertised as phishing resistant and not phishing proof. I do understand that the average user may not grasp the nuance, but you leaned pretty hard into the idea that phishing them should be impossible. One last recommendation. While I do think this is quite clever and a plausible attack scenario, this relies on the out-of-band authentication scenario. Assuming I’m sitting in the coffee shop or airport and click your link, I’m not going to reach for my phone to scan the QR. I’m going to investigate deeper why the passkey isn’t working directly. If you’re lucky, I’ll assume the site has a bug in passkey authentication and fall back to more phishable creds (if the site has both). I don’t necessarily think of this as a flaw in your attack, rather that it might muddy the waters for readers that are less familiar and don’t realize that this mode is most commonly used when you are authenticating from a non-default device or made the conscious choice not to use a synced passkey.
- gradientsrneat 2y agoThis would be a nice ublock origin filter for Firefox Android. I installed one that blocks sites requesting localhost addresses, after I noticed some websites portscanning my localhost for "security".
- GTP 2y agoInteresting, can you share which kind of websites you noticed doing this?
- Scoundreller 2y agohttps://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ebay-port-scans-visitors-computers-for-remote-access-programs/ https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ebay-port-sca...
- lxgr 2y agoI wonder why browsers even allow cross-origin access to localhost in that way, given all the risks involved.
- ghxst 2y agoLocalhost is typically uniquely trusted, generally speaking, even when loading a localhost page on HTTP it behaves like a page served over HTTPS would (in terms of the browser APIs you have access to for example). Also for a port scan it's not all that unusual since you can do it without loading any resources, so CORS alone wouldn't protect you from it. Maybe an extension that injects / modifies CSP rules could protect from this but it might also end up breaking websites.
- lxgr 2y ago> it might also end up breaking websites That's what I was trying to get at: Are any websites using this legitimately to communicate with local applications? If so, isn't that a pretty big fingerprinting and attack vector (how are websites authenticating themselves to these local applications and vice versa)?
- teeray 2y agoI wonder if this will enable creating a Firesheep-equivalent.
- lxgr 2y agoThis attack is very active, in contrast to Firesheep. The attacker needs somebody physically close to their Bluetooth device to additionally visit a site they control. Definitely not impossible, but still a very different threat level.
- bflesch 2y agoNice find. To me it seems that WebauthN/PassKey was a significant project where all of the clever and highly paid engineers from the big corporations took part. How can they overlook such an attack vector? Especially when the main selling point for the new technology is "resistance against phishing"? Even MS has in their FAQ: Are "Q: passkeys phishing resistant? A: Yes, passkeys are phishing resistant" [1] [1] https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/passkeys-frequently-asked-questions-faq-0782c301-4b25-4a26-b7fd-3a7637d5fdd3 https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/passkeys-frequen...
- lxgr 2y agoSecurity engineers aren't infallible. This is a really clever channel confusion attack that presumably just nobody considered. It happens, unfortunately.
- bflesch 2y agoClever attack indeed - wouldn't have expected for this to be possible. I trusted the claims of Webauthn / Passkey being "phishing proof" without much consideration, because these claims came from highly respected companies. Unfortunately this is yet another example for "trust, but verify".
- sunshowers 2y agoI'm curious if folks tried to use a model checker. Seems like a model checker might be able to identify cases in the spec where invariants are violated.
- lxgr 2y agoI don't think that that would have helped here: The invariant ("URLs purportedly resulting from a QR code scan must only result from an actual QR code scan") essentially follows directly from a specific threat scenario that was missed.
- sunshowers 2y ago
- amluto 2y agoWhat prevents essentially the same attack from being done by making a (desktop / tablet or even wall-mounted-display) web page that shows a QR code that, when scanned by a victim device, triggers the authentication flow?
- charcircuit 2y agoThe fix blocks fido links from anywhere, including QR code scans. https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/5906286 https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/59... Edit: QR code scans are actually allowed to open such links.
- amluto 2y agoIs there some handshake over BLE that allows a browser that speaks BLE and shows a QR code to trigger the FIDO flow but does not allow a QR code by itself to do so? If so, how? Remember, the attacker is presumed to control a BLE device in range of the victim’s authenticator.
- charcircuit 2y agoI was mistaken. I'm not sure what would prevent a proxied QR code + proxied Bluetooth signal.
- lxgr 2y agoNothing, by definition. If an attacker can successfully proxy all channels designed to frustrate proxying attacks, it's game over, at least without a distance bounding protocol being used (and I don't think Bluetooth has one).
- WorldMaker 2y agoSignal Power affects readable distance (signal to noise radius) and the specs for this do suggest the lowest power Bluetooth LTE packets for the shortest "personal area network" distance we can get for these FIDO requests. (It doesn't entirely solve it, you can be extremely unlucky with a radio bounce or a surprisingly quiet Bluetooth radio band at transmission time. Surprising because Bluetooth is somewhat intentionally in one of the noisiest radio bands we've allowed to be extremely noisy.)
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- rvz 2y agoWhat an excellent write up. Adding a Web Bluetooth API to the browser to then be later used for "secure" actions like passkeys or logins never made any sense to begin with. How much was this bounty if there was any? Looks like a 7.8 severity CVE [0]. [0] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9956 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9956
- lxgr 2y agoFIDO is explicitly blocked in Web Bluetooth for exactly that reason: https://github.com/WebBluetoothCG/registries/blob/master/gatt_blocklist.txt https://github.com/WebBluetoothCG/registries/blob/master/gat... This is similar to how you can't access HID (and by extension CTAP2 or U2F) or CCID (and by extension smart cards such as OpenPGP cards) over Web USB.
- rcxdude 2y agoThis issue is mostly seperate from Web Bluetooth: it'd be an issue even if that API didn't exist at all (though, of course, these APIs make it a little harder to use those interfaces for validating anything, though thankfully not that much harder because it's fairly easy to add some 'hey, this is really a browser and not a web page making this request' signal, as opposed to with QR codes, which are ultimately just a collection of pixels and it's the very-hard-to-evaluate context in which it appears on the device's screen which makes for that seperation.)
- mastersplinter 2y agoSo grad you enjoyed it! Chrome awarded 6000 USD, very grateful for it and will fuel some more security research for a while :)
- lxgr 2y agoIf I understand it correctly (I had some trouble wrapping my head around the exact attack vector): The problem here is that browsers allow redirecting users to the installed passkey implementation/"backend" in the same way that camera and dedicated QR scanner apps legitimately use to initiate cross-device authentication via (what used to be called) caBLE, right? In other words, the attacker primes the user for an upcoming authentication on-device authentication, but in reality initiates an off-device authentication to their own device. And the fix is presumably to not accept off-device authentication intents over anything that's not a QR scan, or at least filter them out in the browser?
- tadfisher 2y agoCorrect, the Chrome fix at least was to block fido:/ URL navigation, so the victim can't get redirected to their passkey application with the phished URL.
- greatgib 2y agoI think that we can easily say that it is a huge "epic fail" for the whole ecosystem of people that pushed for "Passkey" with the argument that "this was more safe than password that need to be deprecated"...
- jiveturkey 2y agoI wouldn't dance on the grave yet.
- lxgr 2y agoIt's worth keeping in mind that if you enter your password in an attacker-controlled website, you lose your entire credential, not just one malicious authentication/signature using it such as here. Also, this vulnerability is very patchable; password phishing is incredibly hard to prevent.
- otterley 2y agoAnd, in fact, has already been patched in all major browsers.
- mastersplinter 2y agoAlthough this is an attack that can be carried out in practice, it is not quite as scalable as phishing passwords of potentially millions of users across the world. Passkeys are still in general more phish-proof than passwords.
- lostmsu 2y agoHow can I disable Passkeys over Bluetooth? Given the severity of vulnerability and the "fix" just plugging one hole of potentially many more, I'd rather have it permanently disabled.
- cjcampbell 2y agoYou don’t necessarily have to disable anything, but choose not to use the secondary device authentication flow. Let’s say that you rely on the passkey implementation in your password manager and have that installed directly on your laptop. When you hit the legitimate site, your password manager prompts for user verification and to approve the login. When you hit the phishing site and have the QR code pop up, it’s the first indication that something is wrong but the attacker doesn’t have your session yet. Your laptop is not listening for a BLE connection. That only occurs when you scan the QR from your phone and complete the authentication flow there. In other words, it’s totally opt-in at log in time to use BLE and protecting yourself just means deciding it’s not a feature you trust. If you still aren’t comfortable though, the next move would probably be to just disable Bluetooth on one side or the other.
- lostmsu 2y agoIt is hard to remember which websites have passkeys on laptop, and which only on the phone.
- burnte 2y agoEverything I hear about passkeys makes me glad I've stuck to strong passwords in a password manager and 2fa via tokens.
- shepherdjerred 2y agoI've had a _really_ good experience with passkeys + 1Password. I vastly prefer it over a password + TOTP 2FA. It was a little rough at first, but support is pretty good now. The only real concern is I don't know how to export passkeys out of 1Password if that were needed.
- rkagerer 2y agoThe only real concern is I don't know how to export passkeys out of 1Password if that were needed. That'd make it a non-starter for me.
- autoexec 2y agoThis is just one more reason to keep bluetooth disabled on mobile devices. There have been other vulnerabilities with bluetooth itself, and bluetooth is constantly used to track people. What's the point of leaving it on all the time when most of the time it's just going to drain your battery and open you up to being tracked or exploited.
- latentcall 2y agoI have BT headphones in all the time and my phone doesn’t have a headphone jack.
- reportgunner 2y agoYeah I also have a phone without a headphone jack, I just bought a pair of usb-c wired headphones today for that reason. Bluetooth was a mistake.
- latentcall 2y agoHm, I will look into those!
- reportgunner 2y agoEventually your usb-c port will get clogged up with pocket lint. The SIM card extractor that comes with your phone works really well at cleaning it, or you can also use a toothpick to get the lint out, just be gentle so you don't bend stuff inside the port.
- theragra 2y agoFor tiny amount of users who care to this extent. To everyone else, bt is awesome. Headphones, hr sensors, smartwatches and fitness trackers etc etc
- lxgr 2y ago> bluetooth is constantly used to track people How so? Unless you grant Bluetooth permissions to apps (that then start broadcasting identifiers) or explicitly make your device discoverable, this shouldn't really be a thing. > What's the point of leaving it on all the time when most of the time it's just going to drain your battery and open you up to being tracked or exploited. Just people with a wearable have at least one Bluetooth device connected to their phone at all times. Bluetooth headphones are also very popular. We need hardened and privacy-protecting Bluetooth stacks, not blaming people for using their phones as designed and advertised.
- cjcampbell 2y agoOne devious thing about this attack is that the phishing site doesn’t even need to impersonate the site it’s attacking. I have password based logins on hundreds of sites and it’s plausible that I’ll eventually have passkeys on enough sites that I can’t keep track. Consider the airport attack. Rather than trick me to log with my social credentials, you could prompt me to sign up for a new account on hotspot.xyz. After I enter my email, tell me that the account exists and prompt to log in with passkey. Now the attacker kicks off the connection targeting my Google credentials. Rather than a fake login screen, they present me with a QR code. From the user perspective, there’s nothing obvious to tell me this is a passkey flow with Google and so I wrongly assume that my passkey must be in my mobile keychain. I scan the QR code and get prompted to approve the login. If I read the block of text on my phone, I will see a mention of the RP (Google.com) but I’d guess most users aren’t looking that closely. When all is said and done, my hotspot login attempt failed and I’m completely unaware that I just logged into Google on your behalf.
- snvzz 2y agoI take it as a lesson not to be an early adopter for security tech. Applies to cryptography, authentication and so many things.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]