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SSL certificate lifetimes are going down. Dates proposed. 45 days by 2027
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- hulitu 2y ago> SSL certificate lifetimes are going down. Dates proposed. 45 days by 2027 45 days ? So much ? Why not expire the next day ?
- systemvoltage 2y agoWe need more safetyism culture. We need to ban root access completely by 2030. 10-factor security for login. 256 digit OTP and you must insert a drop of blood to login. At least, we’ll be super secure!
- redrove 2y agoGotta think of the children! Children shouldn't root! ǝʞoɾ ǝᴉzzo uɐ s,ʇɐɥʇ sǝʎ
- xxs 2y ago>drop of blood... so cool, if there was some startup to give you a full health info with that. Imagine - with your login attempt it comes a proper analysis if you are fit for purpose.
- systemvoltage 2y ago:-D Nice. The future we deserve. Now only if there was a company that was into one drop blood testing!
- LinuxBender 2y agoIf we're going this route then maybe drop HTTPS all together, go back to port 80 and instead PGP encrypt each file with a different key and add the cool peoples public keys. This would keep malicious people and bots away from the content.
- Y_Y 2y agoFor extra security I always use already expired certs.
- bravetraveler 2y agoShow the certs who is boss, revoke them on issuance
- Etheryte 2y agoGenerate a new certificate for your connection for every round trip.
- bawolff 2y agoYou are being downvoted, but it is a reasonable question. If you can renew every 45 days, why not every, say, 3 days? OSCP stapling except without the oscp stapling part.
- cm2187 2y agoAnd passwords expiring every 48 hours…
- ndsipa_pomu 2y ago3 days is far too short. The certificate supplier could have a crucial piece of equipment or software stop working and 3 days might be too tight a timeline to get it fully resolved which then leads to lots of people having invalid certificates and the certificate supplier would be out of business shortly afterwards.
- castillar76 2y agoThere have been proposals about shortening much further: in fact, the long-standing practice in the PKI community is that renewing certificates every 7 days is short enough that no revocation service is necessary at all. However, trying to move the entire IT industry to a 7-day renewal window is a bridge too far at this point! Instead, I would surmise this is the first step in that process by introducing a window short enough to act as a forcing function on automating certificate issuance & renewal. It's short enough to strongly encourage leveraging automation everywhere possible, but not so short that one could argue it's impossible to do manually for things that still just can't do this automatically, of which there are still a disappointingly significant number. Once we begin to get below 30 days, however, I suspect there will be a lot more scrutiny around the data suggesting exactly how small a window is sufficient. From a risk standpoint, if we're arguing shorter-is-better, then we should go as short as possible: someone will need to pull together the data that suggest exactly how small a window appropriately balances the various risks involved. (And then 15 others will need to argue about the validity of the data, whether the data actually suggest that, whether the data were assembled with an agenda in mind, etc., etc., etc.).
- redrove 2y agoApparently this is coming from Apple, which makes sense considering their stance on security. I still think more enforcement and standards around IoT SSL are the way to go, with shorter timelines not necessarily more beneficial. Let's face it, whoever is renewing every 90d is going to be renewing every 45d just fine. It's the devices and companies that use yearly expiries (and still PAY FOR CERTS!) or don't use SSL at all that are the problem.
- xxs 2y ago>Apple, which makes sense considering their stance on security. How does it help? A lot of cert would expire prematurely and the folks will learn to accept expired cert as a norm.
- appendix-rock 2y agoThat is not at all what’s happened with shortened expiry date requirements so far. Industry has proven that it can largely put these systems in place.
- castillar76 2y ago> (and still PAY FOR CERTS!) People seem to be under the misapprehension that Let's Encrypt / ZeroSSL certificates are "free". They are not — it's that the consumer is not the one paying the bill. It costs tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars a year just to get the audits required to operate a public CA, much less pay for the infrastructure and staffing required. That bill has to get paid somehow. Yes, pricing on certs in the past has been questionable, but operating a public CA is -not- free, so CAs have sold certificates to pay for that service operation. That has introduced some issues of its own in terms of profit motives, although I would observe that for the majority of public CAs their public TLS certificates are frequently a loss-leader service and not a massive source of income. Put short (too late!), there's nothing wrong with the practice of paying for certificates in and of itself. What makes me very concerned about the current model funneling everyone to "free" CAs is that those bills are being paid at the moment through donations to ISRG and other organizations. I like that ISRG is making efforts to broaden their donation base to reduce reliance on single sources! However, I'd much prefer to be paying them a monthly subscription fee for their certificate service and not have my ability to leverage it be dependent on the largesse of large corporations that frequently abruptly decide services like this should either cost money or pay up in user data. (Note that I explicitly do not think the user-data thing is happening right now, only that I'm concerned it becomes a problem in the future.)
- indulona 2y agoi rather pay money and get a 1y or 2y certificate rather than use those ephemeral let's encrypt ones for free. The overhead of automatization(implementation, maintenance, support, patching, updating...) is not worth it.
- KnowtheRopes 2y agoCan you get a 2-year certificate now? I thought it was already gone. On the other hand, I love Let's Encrypt, especially when paired with go-acme/lego. It works flawlessly, and I don't need to worry about my certificate expiring or forgetting to renew it each year. I can always monitor my certificates too.
- kawsper 2y agoI think it is 13-months, at least that is the maximum I can buy here, GoGetSsl have a description and a list here: https://www.gogetssl.com/wiki/general/multi-year-subscription-ssl/ https://www.gogetssl.com/wiki/general/multi-year-subscriptio... This seems to have started around August 2020. So instead they will sell "subscriptions" where you get a new certificate on expiry. So technically they will still sell you multiple years, but as a subscription.
- bawolff 2y agoCerts longer than 398 days have been banned since sept 2020
- indulona 2y agoI have not checked for a while, always went for the 1y. But it seem to no longer be the case.
- bawolff 2y agoCAB rules apply to your fancy paid certs as well.
- ndsipa_pomu 2y agoThe overhead of automation? It's one script that can be set to run each day - exactly the kind of thing that is really easy to do with computers.
- tsimionescu 2y agoGiven that certificate issuance is the most vulnerable part of the process (DNS hijacking during the validation process), isn't it a bad idea to encourage renewing certificates so often? Plus, this is yet another blow to using TLS for networks not connected to the Internet. Asking users to go through some pain of accepting a new self-signed cert every three months, which was already worse than once a year, is going to get almost untenable at 45 days. And no one is offering any realistic alternatives.
- gruez 2y ago>Given that certificate issuance is the most vulnerable part of the process (DNS hijacking during the validation process), isn't it a bad idea to encourage renewing certificates so often? I don't get it, is the domain extra susceptible to misissuance during the renewal process? If not, I don't see how this is a relevant point.
- Dylan16807 2y ago> Given that certificate issuance is the most vulnerable part of the process (DNS hijacking during the validation process), isn't it a bad idea to encourage renewing certificates so often? If someone hijacks your domain they can get a certificate right away, no matter how long the existing certificate was valid for. > Asking users to go through some pain of accepting a new self-signed cert every three months, which was already worse than once a year, is going to get almost untenable at 45 days. Are you experiencing the former right now? I thought these policies had no impact on self-signed certs at all.
- nickf 2y agoThe domain verification process is indeed a weak point - but there's now the upcoming introduction of MPIC (Multi Perspective Issuance Corroboration) to help with that (essentially checking the domain challenges from multiple network perspectives to overcome the risk of BGP-hijacking and similar attacks). Also, if there's a non-internet connected network or device that uses TLS, it shouldn't be using public/webPKI certificates. Use a private CA, get the root on the managed devices that connect to it, and the problem goes away. That's always been an option.
- febusravenga 2y agoWhat is the problem with long lived certs? Is the cryptography behind PKI considered weak nowadays, that you can collect enough material on cert that you can derive privkey? Is there other fundamental cryptographic weakness? I understand problem of still-valid certs after domain expiration, but mere rotation strikes me as similar to password rotation ... which is currently discouraged.
- bawolff 2y agoThe main issue is lack of a working revocation mechanism. Servers get compromised sometimes, people do stupid things with keys, etc. We dont have a really good way of revoking keys after something bad happens. We have some bad ways, but they kind of suck. An additional reason might be making it easier to punish a misbehabing CA (CAs are often too big to fail, you cant ban them without breaking half the internet)
- rightbyte 2y ago> We dont have a really good way of revoking keys after something bad happens. Why would there be. If the key is 'revokable' that is a weakness in it self.
- gruez 2y ago>If the key is 'revokable' that is a weakness in it self. ??? Why?
- LegionMammal978 2y agoI'd read it primarily as censorship risk. If a CA is under a government that wants your website taken down, they can just lean on the CA to stop renewing any certificates for it, as opposed to futzing around with ISPs or DNS providers that can only have a local impact. Or alternatively, the CAs in the future might directly use their monopoly to decide who's good and evil (especially on "integrity of the network" grounds against those judged to be spammers et al.). At least perceived censorship risk is why the archive.is guy always uses HTTP links and not HTTPS links for his site, iirc.
- hsbauauvhabzb 2y agoWhat does reducing validity actually solve? The same private key is presumably used by all certificates and CSRs - if the private key is compromised then a renewed cert doesn’t solve anything. Am I missing something here?
- spacebanana7 2y agoThe only thing I can think of is domain expiry. Someone could get a certificate, sell their domain, then continue using the cert until the certificate expires.
- Arnavion 2y agoYou're supposed to use a new private key for the new CSR. There is no reason to reuse the previous key.
- hsbauauvhabzb 2y agoAnd what’s the value in that? If a system is breached then the keys should end up revoked by ocsp?
- chippiewill 2y ago> The same private key is presumably used by all certificates and CSRs That's a choice. Certbot changes the private key with every renewal by default. I suppose in principle CAB might start disallowing key reuse.
- ta8645 2y agoMy tinfoil hat says it's about control. Forcing people to return for another blessing from the central authority, more often. The same reason church is once a week, and not once a year.
- appendix-rock 2y ago[flagged]
- aestetix 2y agoWhat happened to personal freedom of letting people choose for themselves how long a certificate should last? Not really liking this trend of large companies making decisions for others and then forcing them on everyone.
- RedShift1 2y agoAnd making ourselves completely dependent on those certificate authorities handing out certs. Dystopian, a couple of mega corps deciding who gets a cert and who doesn't.
- bawolff 2y agoNothing is stopping you from using different certificate authorities or one you made yourself. Other than getting other people on board of course.
- eesmith 2y agoMy site is http-only because I prefer to not be dependent on those certificate authorities handing out certs, because it's been that way for 25 years, because there is zero confidential data on it, and because the issues concerning snooping and ad insertion by intermediates is not a real threat to my limited readership. However, there is the https-only movement to prevent web browsers from viewing my website, because it it not https and therefore not 'safe'. This movement overlaps pretty well with the people who don't accept other different certificate authorities.
- bawolff 2y ago> However, there is the https-only movement to prevent web browsers from viewing my website, because it it not https and therefore not 'safe'. Like i said, nothing is stopping you from doing whatever you want other than the fact that other people might not like it, and might choose to treat your website differently. Just like you can choose not to use https, other people can choose not to like sites that don't use https. Freedom goes both ways.
- inthebin 2y agoHonestly, why not make it expire after an hour or something? That way you're forced to deal with auto renewal.
- ndsipa_pomu 2y agoExcept that you'll hit an issue with the automated renewal at some point and it'll likely be when you don't have someone available to deal with it - cue several hours of downtime. A problem could occur with the cert issuer and then you've got all of their customers with hours of downtime - not really a good idea. 90 days is a good compromise between encouraging autorenewal and allowing services to be down for a couple of days without really impacting anyone. It's short enough so that the person who set up the automation is probably still employed and thus they have an incentive to fix any issues.
- remram 2y agoUntil it's too short that there's not a single worked day during the alerting period, I think it's fine. 45 days means 15 days between "it didn't renew on schedule" and "anything breaks".
- null0pointer 2y agoMixed comments in the github issue. I can definitely see how shorter lifetimes provide better security, but I have also run into my fair share of issues caused by cert expiry. Do we have good data around the lead time between someone’s signing keys being compromised and their use in an attack? The shorter that lead time the less useful this change is.
- gruez 2y ago>Do we have good data around the lead time between someone’s signing keys being compromised and their use in an attack? Given how fast it is to set up a phishing proxy, such "lead time" is probably measured in hours rather than days. Even something like a 1 week expiry will provide security benefits.
- panki27 2y agoI hope Honest Achmed's Used Cars and Certificates (the only CA that matters) will speak out against this.
- vbezhenar 2y agoWhy would he speak out against this? He will be able to sell much more certificates. I bet he lobbied it.
- gruez 2y agoOr the hassle will push people to use letsencrypt, which is free.
- teruakohatu 2y agonil certificati sine lucre
- zmmmmm 2y agoIt would be OK if browsers treated self-signed certificates a little better. There are lots of contexts where a self-signed, long or non-expiring certificate makes perfect sense. But browsers and security stacks in general react as if the whole application is broken, just because they didn't see the certificate before - even when they have no evidence the certificate is malicious. SSH does it nicely, with a prompt on first use and then detecting tampering after - why has this not been adopted for TLS?
- appendix-rock 2y agoOpenSSH does it “nicely” for you maybe. I’ll maybe even accept “for most users of an SSH client”. This behaviour implemented in a browser is utterly unacceptable. The average user is orders of magnitude less technically capable. You are not the only user of the software that you use.
- gruez 2y agoHow does this work when a user is visiting https://bank.example https://bank.example for the first time? Are we supposed to let granny eat the risk of a MITM when she gets a new device? Furthermore, how is such a system supposed to work in private browsing? You either have to introduce a fingerprinting vector (by which certificates are remembered/trusted), or expose users to MITM risk every time.
- zmmmmm 2y agoI'm not proposing this for everything and high security public facing contexts can definitely do the maintenance to manage frequent certificate rotation. I just don't want my garage door integration with my car to stop working because its certificate broke. I'd argue these privately deployed single use dedicated certificates are actually better off self-signed and issued on a TOFU basis than using public key infrastructure. It's how bluetooth and many other things work, so why on earth are browsers so bent against it.
- ziml77 2y agoTOFU is a pretty bad trust model. Even with SSH you're supposed to validate the fingerprint with some already known trusted source. Otherwise you're just assuming that the first time you connect you aren't being MITMed.
- Ekaros 2y agoI wish there was also some sufficiently long option in use cases where security is somewhat less critical and automatic renewal is much harder. This being devices with web interfaces in local network. Which in some cases might not even have internet connectivity. Getting new cert every 45 days there is real headache... For public internet yes, shorter is not entirely unreasonable.
- bravetraveler 2y agoAt that point, I feel self signed is entirely fine. Off the Internet, nobody outside of your control is trying to verify
- Ekaros 2y agoFor machine-to-machine sure. But once browsers start doing this and might even stop self-singed certs... Lot of outdated browsers will be around...
- bravetraveler 2y agoEh, even browsers. To my knowledge they still respect the OS trusts. Managing this is a standard part of any corporate deployment. Again, all of these devices are theoretically under your (intermittent) influence
- ndsipa_pomu 2y agoFor local services, you can get certificates with CAs that support DNS validation (e.g. LetsEncrypt support that). You'll likely want a DNS provider that has a suitable API so that the e.g. ACME script can post the relevant code to the DNS record, but then you're good to go. A proper public domain name that points at an internal only IP address. The other benefit of DNS validation is that you don't need to run it on the web server itself (e.g. if it doesn't have internet connectivity), but you can have an ordinary PC/laptop request the certificate and then copy it to where it's needed.
- olliej 2y agoReasons for short lifetimes: * there is no robust revocation mechanism, so just minimizing the validity of a compromised cert is the most effective - and technically simple - tool. OCSP is not viable for myriad reasons discussed over the years. OCSP stapling is optional and browsers have to consider it such explicit (opt in) policies. * extended lifetime means rolling certificates is a complex ceremony that means rapid response is off the table, and can take companies days if not weeks to do. * following from that: long lived certs also breaks distrust of CAs as they (or site owners) return with “we can’t perform the task we agreed to because we’ll break our customers” (CAs often fail to understand that their primary customers are end users not site owners).
- bigfatkitten 2y agoThis talk of automation is all well and good for systems that are permanently connected to the internet. Let's say I've got a system on a vessel that will be at sea for two months with unreliable, or no internet connectivity. I want to allow passengers and crew to use this system with their own devices. What do I do then? Use self signed certs, and just tell users to click through the warnings?
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- 854032295 2y ago[flagged]
- webprofusion 2y agoThis is largely a solved problem. On Windows https://certifytheweb.com https://certifytheweb.com has provided automated certificate management for the best part of a decade and we're now branching out into large scale cross-platform tools, for those interested. I was surprised by a customer yesterday who was looking to migrate thousands of manually renewed 1 year certs, I had no idea people were still using 1 yr certs to such a broad degree.