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Dev rejects CVE severity, makes his GitHub repo read-only
- joshka 2y agoIf I was getting spam from devs to fix a thing in a library like this, my response would be "sure, here's my rate $/h". This seems like a pretty fair put up or shut up response. The underlying issue here is that there are many libraries that a supported by solo devs like this. An idea I just had is that it would be reasonable to calculate a risk metric for every package in the various eco-systems that takes repo maintainer count (and other things) into consideration. Publishing this metric into the package metadata / package page on npmjs would probably gamify not having single points of failure in widely used libraries, and make it clear when this is happening at some point in your dependency chain (averting a future left-pad style debacle).
- mmastrac 2y agoI tried fighting a bogus CVE earlier on one of my libraries and it's impossible. GitHub doesn't care, there's no higher power to report them to.
- jstasiak 2y agoTangential, but thought I'd mention this > The CVE has to do with the utility not correctly identifying private IP addresses supplied to it in a non-standard format, such as hexadecimal. This would cause the 'node-ip' utility to treat a private IP address (in hex format) such as " 0x7F.1..." (which represents 127.1...) as public. Things aren't necessarily as simple as they appear. There's this thing called IANA IPv4 Special-Purpose Address Registry[1] and it lists some address ranges labeled Private-Use, it's the usual suspects: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16. The table also has a Globally Reachable column. Some special ranges, including but not limited to Private-Use above, have Globally Reachable set to false. Some others, like Direct Delegation AS112 Service (I don't know what it actually is), are listed as actually Globally Reachable. So I'd say there are at least three plausible interpretation of the word "private" in this context: 1. IPv4 or IPv6 address, listed as a special range and Globally Reachable = false (caveat: for some IPv6 ranges there can be N/A in that column[2], more choices to make) 2. These IPv4 ranges: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16 3. All special ranges from [1] and [2], we don't want to try to contact any of these For example Python's ipaddress mostly follows interpretation 1 while Rust standard library[3] and Python's netaddr[4] (disclosure: I maintain it) effectively follow interpretation 2. From the point of view of a library author the semantics of what's private, what's public, global, etc. needs to be documented very well and examples provided. From the point of view of a library user the documentation needs to be consulted (and tests performed) to make sure the library semantics match assumptions/expectations. It all gets complicated rather quickly. [1] https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/iana-ipv4-special-registry.xhtml https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv4-special-registry/... [2] https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/iana-ipv6-special-registry.xhtml https://www.iana.org/assignments/iana-ipv6-special-registry/... [3] https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/net/struct.Ipv4Addr.html#method.is_private https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/net/struct.Ipv4Addr.html#metho... [4] https://netaddr.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api.html#netaddr.IPAddress.is_ipv4_private_use https://netaddr.readthedocs.io/en/latest/api.html#netaddr.IP...
- nunez 2y agoI wrote a wall of text earlier. Some of my opinion was misinformed. The dev patched this bug when it was disclosed in 2022. The chief complaint was him getting tons of issues/PRs about _old_ versions of the library that still contained the bug. Knowing this now, I can understand why they decided to archive the thing. I still stand by package management being a huge problem within Node that just encourages shit like this to happen. --- OLD POST: From one of the sources [0] of the CVE: > Root Cause: > The root cause of this vulnerability is the ip.isPublic function's inability to correctly interpret and classify certain IP address representations. > Specifically, the function fails to recognize 0x7f.1 as a private IP address, which is actually a hexadecimal and shorthand notation for 127.0.0.1, a well-known loopback address. > This misinterpretation leads to the function erroneously categorizing a private IP as public, thereby opening up the potential for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. The core issue lies in the inadequate handling of non-standard IP address formats by the IP address validation mechanism. It then goes on to demonstrate that "ip.isPublic" would classify "0xf.1" as "globally-routable" 127.0.0.1. So instead of patching this very obviously huge security vulnerability in a package that has been downloaded 17 MILLION TIMES, the maintainer decides "screw it" and abandons the repo. (The PortSwigger academy has a course on SSRF, and their labs let you fool around with some exfiltration/remote code execution scenarios triggered by a PHP module doing essentially the same thing this CVE is warning about.) While someone will, of course, fork this project and provide a fix that others can reference in their "package.json" manifests, hoards of projects will probably see downtime due to security forcing them to scale down and fix this. While this can, for sure, happen with other languages (like how the requests module in Python had a serious vulnerability some time back), this risk is exponentially worse with Node since JavaScript doesn't really have a stdlib and every little thing (like a timer [1]) is just painful enough to make downloading some arbitrary library attractive. [0] https://cosmosofcyberspace.github.io/npm_ip_cve/npm_ip_cve.html https://cosmosofcyberspace.github.io/npm_ip_cve/npm_ip_cve.h... [1] https://stackoverflow.com/questions/29971898/how-to-create-an-accurate-timer-in-javascript https://stackoverflow.com/questions/29971898/how-to-create-a...
- mort96 2y agoWait is this about 'ip', the command from iproute2, or 'node-ip', some node.js library? Both? Why does one part of this article say 'ip' and another 'node-ip'?
- SloopJon 2y agoFrom the article: > The 'node-ip' project exists on the npmjs.com registry as the 'ip' package
- mort96 2y agoAlso from the article: > The popular open source project, 'ip' recently had its GitHub repository archived
- skybrian 2y agonode-ip is the name of the repository. The node package is apparently just named ‘ip’. https://github.com/indutny/node-ip https://github.com/indutny/node-ip
- minedwiz 2y agoIt's about https://www.npmjs.com/package/ip https://www.npmjs.com/package/ip
- abofh 2y agoIP the node module used regular expressions to validate 32 bit numbers and failed at it.
- kibwen 2y agoMy predisposition is that the people hounding open-source devs for unpaid urgent tech support are predominantly commercial users freeloading off the software, which, amusingly, means that a compelling argument in favor of licensing your software as GPL is to scare away these sorts of users.
- codetrotter 2y agoOr even AGPL just to be sure (Personally I’ll keep licensing my stuff ISC, but I have the luxury of having near zero external attention on any of my open source stuff :p)
- jmclnx 2y agoI would suggest GPL3, that would really scare away commercial users. For example, IBM, the owner of Red Hat, forbids the use of GPL3 software on their equipment by their employees.
- dvfjsdhgfv 2y ago> For example, IBM, the owner of Red Hat, forbids the use of GPL3 software on their equipment by their employees. This I can understand. But the fact that they joined the witch-hunt for Stallman after the slandering piece by Selam Gano, who knowingly presented untrue statements as facts, and these were later picked up by mainstream media (some of these lies are still out there uncorrected[0]), that is still beyond me. [0] Google for "Stallman defends Epstein", e.g. https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/16/computer-scientist-richard-stallman-who-defended-jeffrey-epstein-resigns-from-mit-csail-and-the-free-software-foundation/ https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/16/computer-scientist-richard...
- RobotToaster 2y agoAGPL for extra garlic.
- SAI_Peregrinus 2y agoI'd love an AGPL-ish license that's more like the LGPL. Only changes to the licensed code need to be opened, not anything linking against it, but they need to be opened even if the only distribution is by network access. And no need to send object files. Just a plain "if you modify my code, you MUST make your modifications publicly available".
- booleandilemma 2y agoGood for him.
- levinebw 2y agoI’m wondering why maintainers of open source projects don’t register as CNAs with Mitre for their projects and also why they don’t file a dispute on the CVE with Mitre which is the source for NVD and GHSA. This would help eliminate or reduce the impact of frivolous CVEs.
- jey 2y agoAt first blush based on the patch to fix this bug, I’d say the code looks terrible: https://github.com/indutny/node-ip/commit/32f468f1245574785ec080705737a579be1223aa https://github.com/indutny/node-ip/commit/32f468f1245574785e... Seems impossible to read and verify. Wouldn’t it be simpler and more consistent to have a first parse the IP into an internal format then perform all logic on that?
- jstasiak 2y ago> Wouldn’t it be simpler and more consistent to have a first parse the IP into an internal format then perform all logic on that? So not speaking about this library specifically but yes, separating the address parsing part (https://www.netmeister.org/blog/inet_aton.html https://www.netmeister.org/blog/inet_aton.html is a fun read) from the "is this address considered private?" part should make things much simpler. Vast majority of related code in this space that I've seen works like that. I'm actually struggling to come up with counterexamples.
- audiodude 2y agoI feel like the main reason someone uses a library like this is that they don't want to write or maintain such a regex. Don't tell me how the sausage is made!
- appplication 2y agoIt may be, but perhaps there is some performance concern? I’m not familiar with this domain and application so it’s not clear to me whether the decisions made are sensible just from reading the code.
- piva00 2y agoIt's testing using regex, which is much less performant than converting an IP address to some numeric representation and running comparisons on that.
- lelanthran 2y ago> It may be, but perhaps there is some performance concern? I'm skeptical of that concern: executing multiple regular expression matches on a string is never going to be faster than parsing the entire string once, into a 4-octet structure, and then performing integer comparisons on the octets.
- lowbloodsugar 2y agoTL;DR The CVE system has no authentication mechanism (to determine the authenticity of reported “bugs” or verify their reported level) resulting in a DDOS of maintainers. A good way to make developers not care about CVEs, and therefore allow attackers to introduce real vulnerabilities, is to post lots of fake CVEs so nobody pays attention.
- SpicyLemonZest 2y agoThis doesn't seem like a fake CVE? I'm sympathetic to the maintainer, and I don't know that I would have acted any differently in his shoes, but the report correctly describes a possible scenario where the issue could defeat a SSRF check.
- michaelt 2y agoAgreed that it's not fake. However, the severity score of 9.8 [1] Whereas a remotely exploitable remote code execution bug in a windows wifi driver only scores 8.8 [2] So the score seems very inflated to me. [1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42282 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42282 [2] https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-30078 https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-20...
- SpicyLemonZest 2y agoThe score is mechanically calculated from the reported properties of the vulnerability, and heavily weights the breadth of possible attack vectors. That RCE vulnerability reports that the attacker must be adjacent to the targeted system; this one would be an 8.8 as well if it had that limitation.
- aPoCoMiLogin 2y agothe CVE for the node-ip requires also few special conditions - very uncommon format (never seen IP in hex anywhere), use of `isPublic` function (this lib has more functions), and even if this two conditions were meet, there is still one more condition - the ability to do SSRF. 9.8 score in this case is crazy. don't get me wrong, it is an issue, but not critical, making everything critical, for frontend libs on npm creates fatigue and nobody takes these scores seriously anymore. in case of real issue, nobody will care enough to patch it, as everything is critical.
- skybrian 2y agoHere’s the Mastodon post: https://fosstodon.org/@indutny/112678415251316597 https://fosstodon.org/@indutny/112678415251316597
- proactivesvcs 2y agoFrom someone who I think works for GitHub: "We think that GHSA-78xj-cgh5-2h22 still has potential, albeit low, security impact. We believe it makes sense to keep the advisory but to lower the severity to low." https://github.com/github/advisory-database/pull/3504#issuecomment-2192393401 https://github.com/github/advisory-database/pull/3504#issuec...
- HL33tibCe7 2y ago> From someone whom I think works for GitHub It’s “who”, not “whom”, in this case. The “who” is in the nominative case here, i.e. it is the subject of the clause, not the object.
- 29athrowaway 2y agoThe package author has a point > the verification process of vulnerability reports doesn't involve maintainer at all, and it sounds like the commercial interest of advisory repositories is aligned with creating more vulnerabilities and proving themselves “useful" to companies that utilize them.
- ang_cire 2y agoFrankly, the end of the article where it says that CNAs don't have the time to verify the vulns being reported for new CVE issuance, is the real problem. If you're an authoritative entity over a system (CVEs) that can break production systems (and to be clear, NIST recommends blocking builds/deploys that contain high CVEs), then it's also on you to make sure you're not issuing bogus CVEs.
- throwaway_62022 2y agoHa ha. The part that isn't being discussed how it is more profitable for certain commercial interests to have more vulnerabilities even if they are bogus. There is something wrong with security industry and we are all paying the price. At my day job some tool automatically opens security bugs against 15 or so repos we maintain and now we are on the hook for arguing how the report was bogus or fix the vulnerability. Just PR and Jira dance one has to do is exhausting.
- patrakov 2y agoThe recommendation of "blocking builds/deploys that contain high CVEs" is nonsense. It should be conditional on not having exactly the same CVE in what is already deployed, as it is blocking unrelated fixes.
- betaby 2y agoMost of the CVEs I have to deal on my $DAY_JOB are regular bugs, not security issues. Nowadays CVEs are like bitcoin mining but for the security folks.
- RyJones 2y agoCompletely agree. I get a lot of "CVEs" that are "test code has a hardcoded key" or similar. Once or twice a year I get a real CVE.
- delusional 2y agoIt seems absolutely insane that this would get anywhere near a 9.8 severity considering that the windows RCE over wifi scored 9.8 as well. Who makes these scores?
- RyJones 2y agoHere is a calculator: https://cvss.js.org/ https://cvss.js.org/
- nostrademons 2y agoThere's an interesting point hiding in the article about security being an emergent property of the whole software system. Many libraries are flagged with CVEs because they can be used as part of the trust boundary of the whole software system, and they have corner cases that allow certain malicious inputs to give outputs that may be surprising and unexpected to the clients of the library. The library developers push back and say "Can you point to one real-world vulnerability where the library is actually used in the way that the CVE says constitutes a vulnerability?", effectively pushing the responsibility back onto the clients of the library. But that's exactly how real malware usually works. Individual components that are correct in isolation get combined in ways where the developer thinks that one component offers a guarantee that it doesn't really, and so some combination of inputs does something unexpected. An enterprising hacker exploits that to access the unexpected behavior. There isn't really a good solution here, but it seems like understanding this tradeoff would point research toward topics like proof-carrying code, fuzzing, trust boundaries, capabilities, simplifying your system, and other whole-system approaches to security rather than nitpicking individual libraries for potential security vulnerabilities.
- Ekaros 2y agoIf we keep this idea in mind. Couldn't we argue that any piece of software that communicates over internet might allow any type of exploiting, including arbitrary code execution at Ring 0. As technically simple open socket could be made to input data directly to be executed by kernel process?
- swatcoder 2y agoIndeed, and if that software can't point to some contract or license that suggests someone else is liable, then they are responsible. Funnily enough, almost all open source projects not only disclaim such liability in very large print at the top of their licenses, but they don't even complicate the relationship with some kind of purchase agreement and renumeration. They literally just say "Here's a thing. Use it if you want, change it if you want, but you're responsible for making sure it meets your requirements."
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- tmsh 2y agoIt seems like there should be some authority weight baked into CVEs based on history or upvotes from credible companies (with higher authority). Need some tree structure to manage the growing scale.
- icetank 2y agoI remember a Node.js library I worked on completely broke after a Node.js security update disabled a encyption feature. I don't think anyone could come up with a tangible exploit chain but the Node.js maintainers made the breaking change anyway because of the CVE. There was maybe one guy bringing attention to the CVE and 20 or so more people complaining about broken production applications. I wonder at what point people give up on CVE notices and just don't update for security patches when the majority of CVE reports are bogus anyway. I know the Node.js library we work with had about 10 security notices on npm audit. But none of them compromise the libraries security in any way. People still try to remedy them with npm audit fix but that just causes there dependencies to break completely.
- stefan_ 2y agoI mean, look at all these clowns: https://github.com/indutny/node-ip/issues/136 https://github.com/indutny/node-ip/issues/136 The stupidity is like a cancer that spreads and infects random other repositories with alarmist nonsense: https://github.com/JoshGlazebrook/socks/issues/93#issue-2128357447 https://github.com/JoshGlazebrook/socks/issues/93#issue-2128... "I didn't look through the code" yeah no shit sherlock, you didn't look through code in a while.
- teknopaul 2y agoIf the devs indicate that they aren't going to fix it, raising a cve is - Rude - Counterproductive - not going to result in a fix - not going to help users If someone does that in the full knowledge that it will cause a DoS on inocent party's build processes and their ability to shift fixes. It could be validly considered a deliberate denial of service via a supply chain attack. Maybe that should be policy, so these security bods are forced to accept responsibility for the work they cause. That would look good on their CVs.
- pheatherlite 2y agoCISO and people in his office (the so-called cyber security experts) are nothing but report pushers. They run vulnerability scans on code, and whatever comes back from packages like Tenable, they send to everyone to justify their own existence. They don't consider the severity, they don't consider snd differentiate between attack surfaces and attack vectors. They just hound you and your superiors in the name of insurance liabilities... they suck. They turn developers into hounds that harass other developers for fixes. Out goes the desire to work on a software because all you're doing is patching nonsense every day because some ciso somewhere is unsatisfied. To hell with each and every ciso. Security is important and having cyber folks that have programming background is even more important. Mindless lemmings otherwise.
- dogleash 2y agoYeah, they're risk analysts, not technologists. That's not inherently bad, you need those. In a previous life I worked in a domain with a lot of risk analysis, by the end I liked a lot of them and they were usually fairly easy to have as stakeholders. But security has a track record of failing to equip the rest of a business with process adequate for the inherent volatility in risk they're supposed to be managing. In the engine room it's still dashing from fire to fire, just with better fire alarms. The things you complain about are precisely the business problems that the security group should be solving. Cybersecurity is important enough that they can get away with overbearing demands without providing holistic solutions for the organization to reach them.
- prymitive 2y agoMost of this behaviour comes from the desire by many companies to by compliant with a lot of security regulations. Which in many cases means silly rule like “you must run and action a security scanning system”. Because a lot of these scanners are just dumb wrappers running any piece of software that pretends to be a security scanner, and because the more rules does one have the more “valuable” it is, you end up with a race to scan the most. And that sadly translates into rules and reports like https://hackerone.com/reports/191220 https://hackerone.com/reports/191220 - OPTIONS method can be used to check what methods does a web server accepts, therefore an attacker might use it to learn which methods to use for the attack. Except they can just try it with no effort. It’s this sort of “if you can see a lock then attacker will use that knowledge to know where the lock is” logic that must be followed by “let’s remove all locks so they cannot be attacked” response.
- hermannj314 2y agoIf the CVE pipeline has decided to blindly trust anyone who puts information into their system, then the only sustainable system is for the downstream processes to do the same thing. The solution therefore is to blindly accept any PRs from white knights that show up around the same time an obscure edge case CVE is reported. As the CVE reporting process teaches us, always accept unauthenticated input as valid without regard to how this impacts other people's lives.
- tomrod 2y agoI feel this is tongue in cheek, and recommend adding some kind of identifier as such. Sarcasm is hard to parse in text.
- hnthrowaway0328 2y agoThis kind of things might be the first step of a hostile takeover: push the developer to make some changes quickly and then offer help.
- PreInternet01 2y agoI think people should take a step back here, and meditate a bit on what "disclaimer of warranty" means. All of the popular open source licenses, GPL, MIT and BSD, quite plainly state that, to the extent permissible by law, there is no warranty about anything, whatsoever. There was a time when Linux users (in general) understood this. You want free? You pick any distribution you like. You want a warranty? You pick RedHat. But over time, it seems we've gotten to a point where "I imported your package, so that means you're obliged not to break my precious CI" has somehow become the norm. This is bad for open source, and, frankly, bad for everyone, and I think it's high time that people start taking responsibility for their dependencies, either by paying for support, or by maintaining their own bugfix branches...
- m3047 2y agoCI pipelines are worse than that. When a CI pipeline flags a vuln in a dependency it typically goes to the dev couched as a "defect" they need to remedy as part of their unrelated PR. Left entirely out of the consciousness horizon is the realization that the code is almost certainly <<running in production right now>>. Where is the check that it hasn't been exploited, or concerning what the attack surface is in the product (or even if continuing to embrace the dependency is worth the hassle)? Where is SecOps?
- tamimio 2y ago> recently growing pattern involves newbie security enthusiasts and bug bounty hunters ostensibly "collecting" CVEs to enrich their resume That's exactly the problem: they use automated vulnerability scanners and AI to "find" these vulnerabilities, flooding the system with useless reports.
- Avamander 2y agoIt doesn't even have to be a researcher running some tools, it might just be the CNA itself assigning bullshit CVEs. In the end it's quite clear that more verification and a trusted mediator is needed in this system.
- paiute 2y agoThe CVE industrial complex is real. The majority of CVE I’ve looked into are not really risks. It’s a sea of noise with the occasional super important exception. Good an on this dev.
- motohagiography 2y agoare there incentives where the credit for "discovering" a CVE is greater than the reputational consequences of reporting a false one? This situation gives reproducability-crisis vibes, where people are submitting junk research for some external reward. security is particularly vulnerable to garbage research, and this is a recipe for fraud. perhaps the hacker mindset is earnest and quaint compared to the layered deceptions of academic dishonesty.
- deleted 2y ago[deleted]
- WarOnPrivacy 2y agoThe CVE system...has lately attracted a segment of community members filing unverified reports. While many of the CVEs are filed in good faith ... a recently growing pattern involves newbie security enthusiasts and bug bounty hunters ostensibly "collecting" CVEs to enrich their resume The potential downward spiral: Projects that receive an inappropriate CVE get defended by their devs. Some devs have more success at this. Their language and methods are parroted by unscrupulous actors - like entities who buy/usurp control of a repository for malicious means. If we get here, the likely outcomes seem to be: 1) CVE reporting authorities recognize the problem and tighten up reporting procedures (to mostly good ends) or 2) The people who properly depend on CVEs become increasingly exhausted trying to validate their integrity; they devalue and depend on them less. This further accelerates CVE's lack of trustworthiness and gives bad actors wider room to operate.
- spankalee 2y agoWe've had a few dubious or outright indirect GitHub security advisories opened by people obviously trying to boost their resume or push their automated scanning tools. It's concerning because you don't want to become insensitive to security reports, but also some of the proposed fixes involve security sensitive project setup and this could be an avenue for exfiltrating secrets.
- r3trohack3r 2y agoReading this article I’m left wondering why it’s considered socially acceptable for a security researcher to frequently open reports against open source software projects without accompanying those reports with a diff fixing the vulnerability? Maybe we should start expecting accompanying patches as a “proof of work” scheme for CVEs? I understand that finding vulnerabilities is a different skillset than fixing them, but as Offensive Security says: “Try Harder”
- cratermoon 2y agoHaving your name on a severe CVE is the new having your name on a patent. The incentives are set up not to improve security, but to generate reports. Companies will pay bounties to their employees for finding CVEs, even if they aren't the owners of the code. Result: thousands of meaningless CVEs that drown out real security issue in the noise.