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Social engineering takeovers of open source projects
- ranger_danger 3y agoAlso beware of weaponized CoCs and the paradox of tolerance. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30726098 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30726098 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_tolerance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paradox_of_tolerance https://nationalpost.com/opinion/the-tyranny-of-the-bureaucracy-and-the-weaponization-of-codes-of-conduct https://nationalpost.com/opinion/the-tyranny-of-the-bureaucr...
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- ChrisMarshallNY 3y agoThis is a great write-up. It's a very serious issue. I don't really know if there is any "one solution." I suspect that each project needs to set its own bar, and that any dependency that falls out of maintenance should be removed as quickly as possible (which was good practice, beforehand, but even more important, now). [EDITED TO ADD] I would also think about "scoring" the sensitivity of projects. Things like cryptography and low-level drivers would be highest-rated, while user-space chrome might not be as important.
- transpute 3y agoScoring framework: https://securityscorecards.dev/ https://securityscorecards.dev/ Code: https://github.com/ossf/scorecard https://github.com/ossf/scorecard April 2024 ranking of OSS projects by criticality, 100MB CSV: https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/ossf-criticality-score/index.html?prefix=2024.04.01/230012/ https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/ossf-criticality-sc...
- ChrisMarshallNY 3y agoThanks! I have a friend that used to work for a company called “SecurityScorecard.” Different beast, though. I think the idea was similar.
- guappa 3y agoThe scorecard stuff is flawed. You want to decide if something is secure or insecure but without reading the code. It's never going to have any correlation.
- dvh 3y agoWe've been adding features for 30+ years to open source software, they become so complex only very few people understand them anymore. Recently I looked into jfet level 2 implementation in ngspice, expecting familiar equations, but through series of small changes and maybe some DRY too, the code is almost unrecognizable. When graybeards finally retire, there will be lots of shrugs.
- zer00eyz 3y agoYour average American could quit working for 5 million dollars. They could live comfortably for the rest of their lives off that money, if well invested (read EFT for sp500) 5 million bucks is change for you average government. "Amazon made billions on my project and if I turn a blind eye to this I can retire, fuck them..." Sponsorship, for good or bad makes a lot of decisions simple.
- imachine1980_ 3y ago[flagged]
- SgtBastard 3y agoFriend, I read the comment that you’re replying to that if hostile governments wanted to backdoor our software supply-chains, it wouldn’t cost that much to corrupt an open source maintainer. Whereas, if it was the norm for well used OS projects to be sponsored, it’s far less likely to be tempted by relatively small bribes.
- NonDairyMatt 3y agoProbably wouldn't even need 5 Million. According the the PBS article about the 2 US Navy sailors arrested for spying around august of last year one of them was apparently only bribed $10k-15K for the year [1]. I was pretty shocked at first but it made sense that with the financial stress many face in today's market a 10K bribe would go along way and have a high return on investment especially if the potential payoff for a backdoor or zero-day is in the millions [2] [1] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/2-u-s-navy-sailors-arrested-on-charges-tied-to-national-security-and-china https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/2-u-s-navy-sailors-arr... [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_for_zero-day_exploits https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_for_zero-day_exploits
- chiph 3y agoAnyone who has played Eve Online is familiar with this process. Gain membership, become a valued contributor to the corp, then betray it for profit.
- glenstein 3y agoAnd one difficulty here I believe is that those intent on social engineering think about it in more sophisticated terms than their targets, which perhaps is obvious. And part of the process can be a kind of performative incredulity at the very suggestion that they are part of a campaign of hostile takeover, even if it's exactly accurate. I suppose you could even have unfortunate circumstances where parts of an open source community are unwitting advocates of being co-opted. And I think you probably see a parallel in state-based information warfare, where part of the objective isn't just to spread misinformation, but to shift cultural norms so that the transmission of misinformation is inherently easier, which can involve sewing distrust in institutions or expertise, or normalizing a gish gallop argumentative style. I'm perhaps stating the obvious here, but I suppose the upshot is that human psychology can be targeted in a programmatic way, and there might need to be something in the way of a normalized infosec-oriented doctrine relating to the stewardship of open source programs as an intentional countermeasure.
- zer00eyz 3y ago>> And I think you probably see a parallel in state-based information warfare, where part of the objective isn't just to spread misinformation, but to shift cultural norms so that the transmission of misinformation is inherently easier, which can involve sewing distrust in institutions or expertise, or normalizing a gish gallop argumentative style. TikTok springs to mind when reading this...
- dgfitz 3y agoNot going to quote the whole thing, but yes hard agree. Contrasting this factual opinion with the opinions in the “sell TikTok” hn threads is quite a delta.
- 3y ago
- michelsedgh 3y agoWell after the XZ attack, I was thinking how common this can be. Good to know that at least im not the only one and others inside the community are wondering about this. I hope someone is smart or lucky enough to find a solution to at least be able to lessen the impact of these attacks. I still wonder how many more of these are there, and my question is because of these attacks, isn’t open source more prone to these compared to closed sourced software? Usually the argument for open source is because everyone can read the code, its less vulnerable but now because everyone can write the code and have big incentives to do malicious stuff, doesn’t it make open source worse?
- janosdebugs 3y agoThe problem is, we don't know. I've seen PRs that could be curious students, or it could be a first try to see if we are paying attention. It's really easy these days to produce a halfway decent looking PR for someone in their first year of uni and my worry is that an increased volume of low to medium quality contributions will lead to maintainer fatigue. Depending on the project, that may be the point where pressure can be applied to share maintainership.
- 01100011 3y agoMany open source projects just don't get enough attention for the 'many eyes' benefit of OSS to occur. Many projects are neglected and poorly maintained, with little participation from the users. I don't think OSS is particularly special though. If a state actor threw cash around they could find folks at many big companies to do their bidding. In my experience, commercial software reviews are susceptible to the same sorts of attacks as those listed in the article("please review my change ASAP because it needs to go into the next release before the deadline!"). I don't know what to do about this. You could subject approved submitters to better background checks. You can improve automated threat detection and code analysis. You can switch to safer-by-default languages that make backdoors and malicious behavior more obvious. I wonder if the same issue exists in other engineering fields? Has anyone ever bribed an engineer to make a bridge or a water supply less robust?
- eviks 3y ago
- pcloadletter_ 3y agoGood warning for the future... but what about the past? Any thoughts on retroactively looking at behavior for existing OS projects? Seems like an impossible amount of work.
- andix 3y agoMaybe not so impossible. Start with making a list of projects that are everywhere. Inside every Linux distribution, inside every react/angular/vue/etc project, … Then check which companies support those projects with active development, and calculate a rating. Are the companies located inside democracies or are they mostly from china or Russia? It’s probably not that many packages in the end. A few thousand high impact/risk projects probably.
- int0x29 3y agoBackdoor attempts won't be that obvious. The xz incident just had a random unaffiliated burner account and nothing of any clear national origin.
- andix 3y agoI wanted to make a different point. If for example Google or Red Hat were deeply involved within the xz project, there might have been more people reviewing the code. The evil changes to xz were easy to overlook, but not impossible to notice. Especially the added "accidential" semicolon made me think about probabilities. I think in a code review I would notice that with a probability of 10-20%. So if 10 people would've looked at it, there might have been quite a low chance to get away with it. Having some high profile companies involved into an open source project the risk score would drop in my opinion, which would highlight the projects that are completely community maintained, and might be more susceptible. Having such a list might be a security threat by itself though, because attackers would focus on the "low risk" projects first.
- galaxyLogic 3y agoOne possibility could be a license that requires big companies to dedicate one or more people as maintainers or at least reviewers of a project if they want to get license to use the software.
- andix 3y agoMaybe we need a reporting system for maintainer changes of bigger projects. Some list where they get published and people can keep an eye on it. Those changes of maintainers need to be synced to package distribution sites like npm.js or Debian packages and put in context with versions/releases. In Europe this was introduced for banks after the banking crisis. If a bank does any organizational change, a report is sent out to all member states of the EU right away and any of the 27 national bank agencies can check if they notice something unusual. It might be possible to bribe a few people in your own country, but it’s really hard to bribe all responsible people in 26 other countries.
- PartiallyTyped 3y ago> Maybe we need a reporting system for maintainer changes of bigger projects. Some list where they get published and people can keep an eye on it. The rust project does it. There's a repo with all [active] members and their permissions on github, etc. These get synchronized and updated every time there's a change.
- GauntletWizard 3y agoThis is, in my eyes, one of the most important parts of "Infrastructure as Code". You should make the list of who has what permissions a critical artifact, as immutably part of the repo as any other change.
- andix 3y agoJust for the main project, or for all/most packages on crates.io?
- PartiallyTyped 3y agoEvery repository and team under rust-lang on github.
- andix 3y agoThat's great, but I think that's not enough. This would need to extend to crates.io, I'm sure there are some packages, that are very commonly used and not part of rust-lang.
- piecerough 3y agoThis is only going to get worse with Large Language Models. Let's imagine a somewhat knowledgeable individual, could craft both emails, messages and even commits with a bunch of prompts. Those will relate deeply to the project.
- andy99 3y agoDo you have any evidence or real examples to support that? I hear people say similar things but see nothing to suggest LLMs are a particular threat.
- TechDebtDevin 3y agoThe real threat of LLMs is their potential to ruin your day if you use them to assist in your work.
- cgh 3y agoUsername checks out
- kemotep 3y agoAre you asking for evidence that LLM’s can be used to write emails and chat messages?
- smsm42 3y agoMaybe one day it will happen, but right now LLM-generated persona would likely set off every alarm bell for a lot of people. LLMs have very recognizable style, and it usually falls right into the uncanny valley.
- heavyset_go 3y agoIt doesn't have to be completely automated, just enough to make the process of juggling multiple personas a bit smoother.
- int_19h 3y ago
- sim7c00 3y agoi dont think maintainer changes is even the endgame for this stuff. its hard to get a new person in, but a nation state can likely more trivially attack a current maintainer.. everyone has a button somewhere. the only solution to this is tooling which can flawlessly reason about code changes being malicious or not, being applied to every change in a project. and then still its a lost cause. a lot of issues and vilnerabilities come from how softwarw interoperates witj other software. will you be able to reason about all possible package combinations and how they are secure or not when they come together in certain ways? it should be easier to write systems from scratch, rather than to have to use third party code for everything. computers currently are not condusive to this. they need to be built different, to allow software to be built different. maybe while we are at it we can also make it so computers reduce complexity in peoples lives instead of adding to it.
- transpute 3y ago> it should be easier to write systems from scratch, rather than to have to use third party code for everything. computers currently are not condusive to this. they need to be built different, to allow software to be built different. Yes. We also need to encourage user scripting of first party library APIs on devices. iOS Shortcuts are a step in the right direction, but they need better tooling to maintain and distribute source-controlled shortcuts.
- sim7c00 3y agotheres definitely improvements ofcourse. apple is not wrong trying to have more of the chain as a single vendor. i would hope amd/intel and such places might offer more help also to implement their devices easily. (implementing amd64 is really difficult imho, only acpi has some good code from the vendor and thats such a small part of whats needed). we know kot to build a house on a bad foundation, but somehow built our techstack on a flimsy one (no one to blame, just times changing..). reinventing the wheel is the way to go, but ofcourse commercially and maybe generally kind of inviable as likely it would breal everything. i hope as stuff moves forward perhaps theres some tech leap that would allow this to naturally happen. some other architecture or so which is better and requires the rethink/rewrite. i spend my days trying to reason about different foundations (software/firmware), but its an impossible mission, and for me merely a thought excersize. cant expect anything practical to come out of it unfortunately. and i think this last part is part of the issue. 'open source' has not the resources to fix the issues we are facing. its not meant to.
- bsuvc 3y agoI'm a maintainer (one of many) of an open source project, and this topic has been on my mind a lot lately as I review PRs. I am more suspicious of PRs from new contributors by default now. Of course I keep these suspicions to myself, but besides simply reviewing code for all the regular things, I now ask myself "what sort of sneaky thing could they be doing that appears benign on the surface?"
- andy99 3y agoIt's not the new contributors you have to watch, it's the sleeper contributor who has built up a solid reputation and then is "activated". At least that's how I understand XZ.
- Uehreka 3y agoIt’s both. The fact that one happened recently does not preclude the other.
- ikekkdcjkfke 3y ago"Trusted account for sale"
- andix 3y agoThat's great that you are considering this more now. But the xy story taught us, that every contributor is dangerous, the most dangerous ones are probably the most helpful and most skilled contributors. If someone barely get's a PR accepted, they probably lack the skills to add a sophisticated backdoor. Another thing that was not talked about a lot: There are many ways to compromise existing maintainers. Compromising people is the core competency of intelligence, happens all the time, and most cases probably never come to public knowledge.
- andix 3y agoOne follow up to compromising existing maintainers: This makes the creators or long-term good faith maintainers maybe even more "dangerous" than new maintainers.
- smsm42 3y agoIt's a pity they don't give any details about the "attempted takeover" - are they available elsewhere?
- devaiops9001 3y ago[flagged]
- nicce 3y agoAny good links about fiasco?
- haunter 3y agohttps://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40166912 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40166912 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40196068 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40196068 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40199153 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40199153
- oasisaimlessly 3y agoThis is actually pretty plausible if you consider how big a step forward Nix is in terms of reproducible and auditable open-source packaging. Of course anyone who wants to maintain the supply-chain attack avenue would try to gum up the works.
- astrange 3y agoA free open source project is perfectly capable of attracting wreckers with no other motivation than that kind of person has a lot of free time. (Example being the wave of "you need a code of conduct" discourse was started by someone who needed to look feminist because they were fired by GitHub for harassing women.)
- john2x 3y agoI bet it's Guix users doing this /s
- Aerbil313 3y agoI can't begin to state how much of a tinfoil hat theory this is. The issues with the leadership were persistent since years. Just read the recent thread about it here people. I want to say that, just like that nixpkgs maintainer with 18.000 commits, as a non-US citizen I'd also not contribute to NixOS/nixpkgs. I in no way would support the MIC of a genocidal state.
- puffybuf 3y agoIt doesn't even have to be a server like ssh. It could be a client side project engineered to somehow deliver all your ssh keys or bitcoin wallets. There is no reason backdoors couldn't stealthily phone home from client side applications.
- andix 3y agoThe crazy thing about the xz issue was, that xz is not even a dependency of openssh, but of systemd. And the xz backdoor exploited the systemd integration of openssh. This exploit was invisible to people that tested plain openssh without one of the most common integrations into Linux.
- fancyfredbot 3y agoDoesn't have to be a takeover. If I'm a state actor I'll maintain a few projects specifically so I can hide backdoors in them. When/if one gets popular and I decide to backdoor them I'll claim it was a social engineering takeover.
- lnenad 3y agoExactly, pick something that is expensive right now, make it free and people will use it.
- Arch-TK 3y agoI'm not so certain that the `safe_fprintf` to `fprintf` swap was ever itself meant to be malicious. There's some speculation about the addition of strerror but again.
- kazinator 3y ago> Enable two-factor authentication (2FA) or Multifactor Authentication (MFA). Not on any third party system, where you're locked out forever if you lose your second factor. Fuck that! Only self-hosted, where you can recover via physical access. (That should actually be the first advice: host the stuff yourself. People lose control of projects due to hosting them on third party services. Be the guy who can pull the power cord out of the wall.)
- em-bee 3y agoyes and no. i hate 2FA as well, but in the end, even if i loose my access to github i only loose access to my github identity but i don't loose access to my code, so i can live with that. of course in the light of this discussion losing access to my github identity would be part of the problem, so it's a tradeoff. is it more likely that someone will break into my account and abuse my identity if i don't have 2FA or is it more likely that i loose my second factor and have to rebuild my identity. in the latter case someone else could also pretend to be me, but since the xz debacle both of us would face more scrutiny that my hope still is that i would win. will the real eMBee please raise their hand?
- eMBee- 3y ago[flagged]
- em-bee 3y agogee, people can't take a bit of humor to make a point?
- sverhagen 3y agoI thought that was all pretty funny.
- humzashahid98 3y agoYou're not alone. It made me laugh too.
- __loam 3y agoThis is going to become a huge problem with state actors attacking what is basically public infrastructure. We should be publicly funding efforts to protect it.
- that_lurker 3y agoIs there a list of these projects that are 1 to 5ish people maintained, like the mentioned XZ Util. Would be nice to have some sort of monitoring changes in these.
- doubloon 3y agothe September that never ended
- EVa5I7bHFq9mnYK 3y agoThe guidelines are laugthably naive in the light of current global security environment and level of threats involved. Who said a long standing member of community can't be a threat? Who checks identity of contributors? All I know it's enough to have an email to create a github account. Is FBI checking their credentials?
- mistrial9 3y agoit appears that this organization is repeatesly agitating for "threats" publicity in open source.. what is the motivation? https://news.ycombinator.com/from?site=openssf.org https://news.ycombinator.com/from?site=openssf.org
- Thorrez 3y agoThey're an open source security foundation. Their entire purpose is to fight those threats. One way to help flight them is to bring awareness to them.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- ilhuadjkv 3y agoWould it be interesting if Github (and others) had a program where they would verify people using the same regulations the banking industry uses for KYC (know your customer)? Optional step for developers to show they are who they say they are?
- bsima 3y agoNo. This is a terrible idea
- orthecreedence 3y agoLol bluechecks for programmers. I think a better idea is people actually read the code before merging it. The more people use your project, the more suspicious you should be.
- heavyset_go 3y agoPeople will just buy and sell verified accounts like what happens on every platform.
- csomar 3y agoNo. Let's stop having these ideas of a totalitarian world. Instead, find solutions for zero-trust environments.
- wiseowise 3y agoHow is that totalitarian? Bureaucratic - yes, totalitarian- hardly.
- lloydatkinson 3y agoI initially expected this to be about how Vercel/Next is trying to takeover React and morph it into Vercel.js
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- ClassAndBurn 3y agoThere's an awkward reckoning in open source software about inclusivity and protecting the long-term security of projects coming. Authors from several countries were already suspicious, such as Iran. Anyone from Russia and China or unknown places are all potential risks now. Combined with recent inclusive ideologies, it’s gonna cause hard conversations. There will be a furthering in segmenting the Internet. Why fight contributing to an open source project when you could fork it and contribute with your allies? For true enemies, there’s no risk to licensing or copyright issues. You can merge changes from the original, no problem. China even falls into this as there’s a limited ability for US companies to litigate within the country. People think the Network State is hot, but at the end of the day, the Internet still has borders.
- mdavidn 3y agoWould those countries not have similar concerns about US maintainers? The larger issue is successful projects with too few active maintainers.
- Palomides 3y agothis is a wild prediction to make and disturbingly regressive FOSS is one of the most beautiful examples of supranational collaboration, and is in my experience much more integrated than the web at large, in a way that has nothing to do with "recent inclusive ideologies"
- Thorrez 3y agoI don't see how blocking contributions from people in Russia etc will help. Malicious actors can simply falsely claim to be American. Is GitHub going to start verifying citizenship? Even if GitHub did that, it likely wouldn't be too hard to fake.
- jen20 3y ago> Is GitHub going to start verifying citizenship? As an American company they must presumably already do this to avoid violating sanctions, and least for anyone giving them money. It’s not a huge stretch to imagine they could also do so for free tier users.
- jongjong 3y agoI've been saying for years, over and over, that we need to focus on simple architecture and improve our coding standards but I keep getting ignored. People keep making software and tools more complex... "Just use TypeScript" they say, "Just use React, with Typescript" then they end up with literally thousands of unnecessary dependencies. The bad guys are laughing at our collective ignorance and naivety. Now probably the whole industry is compromised. Maybe our entire political system is compromised because of this. People just had to look for projects with minimal code and dependencies. Precisely the opposite of what they did. These clean projects were starved of attention and opportunities and the overengineered projects were brought to the forefront. Now they are easy targets for bad actors. It's so easy to hide vulnerabilities amongst complexity... And we've chosen complexity.
- phendrenad2 3y agoI suspect that the bad actors aren't merely benefitting from this situation, they're probably actively encouraging it, in GitHub issue discussions, on Reddit, in the comment sections of YouTube videos, here on HN. Maybe I'm paranoid.
- jongjong 3y agoI think this is a reasonable assumption for most high exposure projects. There are state actors from all sides who want to inject backdoors into software and they all benefit from complexity. It could indicate that governments are more focused on offense than defense. It seems to be a logical consequence of our short term corporate and political mindset. Offense is the best defense, they say... Ok, but not at scale when your opponents also possess the same weapons as you do; then you both end up worse off.
- wiseowise 3y agoTypescript has zero dependencies.
- whatevaa 3y agoYup, that commenter did exactly what he told others not to do, bashed on something without checking if he's right. Typical bashism. Typescript is from a single big vendor with all the tooling. React is a different story. By itself it's from a single big vendor, but all the tooling is tons of random packages and scripts...
- xyst 3y agoI wonder how the person that was running “xz” is doing. Hope he’s doing okay mentally after being thrown into the spotlight by the shit stain of a person(s) behind the “jia tan” and et al aliases
- generationP 3y agoWhich of the suggested "Steps to help" would have helped prevent the xz infiltration? For a single-maintainer project, adding bureaucracy can only make things worse.
- xyst 3y agoSeems just being aware of it. Doesn’t hurt to have people be more alert. Although that alertness can quickly become fear and anxiety. Which can eventually evolve into paranoia.
- j2kun 3y agoKYC: know your contributor
- Invictus0 3y agoWe need KYC for open source--call it know-your-maintainer. It's only a matter of time before there's a really serious hack and this becomes imperative.
- greatgib 3y agoFirst I think that it is wrong to single out this issue on Open Source projects. For example, since the first versions of app stores, when you are an app developer you would receive a lot of messages from random shady dudes ready to buy your application if it had a few users. Also, the xz thing was kind of pretty smart, but it is also a thing in mind of most OSs developers that you can't trust any random contributor and so that you will be very careful of really knowing someone before giving some privilege. Just look how the debian policies were designed or that things like "pull requests" were invented for Open Source projects where everyone in a project used to be allowed to push whatever in private ones before.
- lazyasciiart 3y agoChrome extensions have also been subject to those purchase offers for a long time.
- williamdclt 3y agoThe scope of impact if a mobile app becomes malicious is _immensely_ smaller than if xz becomes malicious. The latter seems to be national security level
- kibwen 3y agoOnly because most people aren't using mobile apps for real work. But if someone were using a mobile app to perform SSH and the app is backdoored, it's game over for any server you SSH into.
- keithalewis 3y agoLike Microsoft did with GitHub?
- aaron695 3y ago[dead]
- willvarfar 3y agoSo next the attackers playing the long game will just set out to develop the next great everybody-uses-it open-source library, so they control it from inception? Great that we'll finally get state-sponsored open-source development :D
- transpute 3y agoUS gov has encouraged finance/tech industry to invest in the security of OSS supply chains. OpenSSF members: https://openssf.org/about/members https://openssf.org/about/members 2021, $10MM, https://openssf.org/press-release/2021/10/13/open-source-security-foundation-raises-10-million-in-new-commitments-to-secure-software-supply-chains/ https://openssf.org/press-release/2021/10/13/open-source-sec... > Financial commitments from Premier members include Amazon, Cisco, Dell Technologies, Ericsson, Facebook, Fidelity, GitHub, Google, IBM, Intel, JPMorgan Chase, Microsoft, Morgan Stanley, Oracle, Red Hat, Snyk, and VMware. Additional commitments come from General members Aiven, Anchore, Apiiro, AuriStor, Codethink, Cybertrust Japan, Deepfence, Devgistics, DTCC, GitLab, Goldman Sachs, JFrog, Nutanix, StackHawk, Tencent, TideLift, and Wind River. 2022, $5MM for 10,000 OSS projects, https://openssf.org/press-release/2022/02/01/openssf-announces-the-alpha-omega-project-to-improve-software-supply-chain-security-for-10000-oss-projects/ https://openssf.org/press-release/2022/02/01/openssf-announc... > Following a meeting with government and industry leaders at the White House, OpenSSF is excited to announce the Alpha-Omega Project to improve the security posture of open source software (OSS) through direct engagement of software security experts and automated security testing. Microsoft and Google are supporting the Alpha-Omega Project with an initial investment of $5 million.. “Omega” will identify at least 10,000 widely deployed OSS projects where it can apply automated security analysis, scoring, and remediation guidance to their open source maintainer communities. 2022+2023, $4.8MM disbursed to ten (not 10K?) OSS projects, https://openssf.org/blog/2024/02/16/alpha-omega-2023-annual-report/ https://openssf.org/blog/2024/02/16/alpha-omega-2023-annual-... & https://openssf.org/blog/2022/12/14/alpha-omega-project-first-year-in-review-plus-new-funding-pledge/ https://openssf.org/blog/2022/12/14/alpha-omega-project-firs... Eclipse $1,150,000 NodeJS $579,000 Rust $920,000 Homebrew $175,000 jQuery $350,000 OpenSSL $127,968 OpenRefactory $50,000 Prossimo (ISRG) $530,000 Python $400,000 Linux Kernel $620,000
- rhim 3y agoI recently had a xz moment where the rust zip crate was taken over by a single person and the original crate was completely replaced. I'm still not sure if this was legit or not: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip-old/issues/446 https://github.com/zip-rs/zip-old/issues/446
- posed 3y agoThat does look suspicious.
- KolmogorovComp 3y agoThis is not a ‘xz moment’, as a sibling comment said, it is norm in open-source. Someone with more time forked the repo, included the changes that were necessary, build up trust and then this eventually get merged. Now obviously there is no guarantee they will never act up in the future, but this is not different than for the original owner. Trust is a necessity to open-source reliably functionning, because it in parts makes up for the lack of money, and allow to move fast. XZ is the exception. And frankly there is not much to do against it.
- saghm 3y agoHonestly, from reading this it seems like people blew it _way_ out of proportion. Someone forked the project to make updates because the original maintainer seemed to be not doing much, the original maintainer came back to say that they were correct to ask about maintenance because they didn't expect to do any more work due to health issues and then volunteered to transfer the crate to the person who forked on their own, which the person who forked it accepted. It's kind of bizarre to me because I don't really understand what mental model could lead to not taking any action earlier than this if the was things turned out is so upsetting. If they were happy to keep using it exactly as is because no updates were needed, why not just pin the dependency to that version exactly (and republish their own fork if they were worried about old versions being "yanked" and not being able to use it for anything new or offline)? If they did expect some form of updates over time, where did they expect them to come from when the existing maintainer felt they were unable to continue given health issues? Any attempt to find some other solution to future ownership would be heavily scrutinized by the exact people who commented on this issue with strong opinions and don't seem to have much empathy for the health issues, which would defeat the entire purpose of trying to take time away from work for their health. I'm surprised that this needs to be said, expecting people to put in extra work to project you from what happens to their projects when they literally can't keep maintaining them due to health issues will never work, and it's also just an awful way to treat people. If you have serious concerns about how situations like this could be exploited by malicious actors, you should be paying much closer attention to the status of your dependencies and taking actions to insulate yourself from potential fallout long before some like this happens. If you've gotten to this point under the assumption that you can just veto any change in ownership that you don't trust, you're already too late.
- brohee 3y agoIf the "Jigar Kumar" kind ends up in a CIA black site mailing lists will be a lot more enjoyable.
- roschdal 3y agoThe problem with open source is that it's free software, so no one wants to pay for it. Therefore the developers don't spend enough time maintaining and securing it, and not enough time preventing social engineering takeovers.
- langsoul-com 3y agoWhat about hostile takeover of existing maintainer accounts?
- throwaway2037 3y ago> This approach bears strong resemblance to the manner in which “Jia Tan” positioned themselves in the XZ/liblzma backdoor. No, it doesn't. I stopped after read this. Jia's "attack" was near state level actor stuff. A bunch of emails asking/begging for commit access sounds like a 16 year old sending emails from the basement of his parent's house.
- logrot 3y ago> A bunch of emails asking/begging for commit access This is not what it says. If you're going to argue, argue with the text from the article not a made up reinterpretation.
- guappa 3y agoIt's openssf… All of their posts are basically "install our github action, get our scorecard!". Which I personally think is completely useless. If they want open source maintainers to do boring compliance stuff, they can pay them. I won't be doing that for free for sure.
- wiseowise 3y agoCan we, PLEASE, return back to batteries-included first? While it doesn’t eliminate the threat completely, but I can sleep soundly knowing that I need to vet one party instead of 1000.
- porcoda 3y ago+1. My team still favors batteries-included style systems, even if it means missing out on the latest thing all the cool kids on the internet are talking about. For languages, this usually means sticking with the standard library that ships with it along with one or two libraries that augment it (e.g., BOOST for C++). It's not like "batteries included" eliminates the problem - a bad actor can wander in there and cause trouble. It's just a much more controlled environment that often has a process for contributing. I'm not a fan of the move of languages away from rich standard libraries to the "Random Interconnected Pile Of Internet Stuff". Unfortunately people like me are in the minority it seems, and the "move fast and break stuff" mentality seems to still dominate the open source world even if that phrase has fallen out of favor - the attitude still seems to exist.
- eviks 3y agoSeems like this would mostly raise suspicion for little gain, wasn't there a more robust solution of signed distributed reviews so you could simply pin the dependency at a state where reviewers you've explicitly added as trusted review code (and similarly after you review you can express that for the others to rely on) Of course, this won't magically increase the time spent on code review, but will at least allow currently internal reviews to be available
- anon24775 3y agoHostile takeover of FOSS projects leading to nefarious outcome for users is indeed nothing new. Oracle for example has been playing that game for a while (OpenSolaris, Java, MySQL, OpenOffice,...).
- perlgeek 3y agoAs a (mostly former) OSS maintainer, I don't want to be suspicious of any contributors. I want welcome contributors as co-maintainers. I don't want to gate-keep specific tasks (such as releasing and updating the website) so that I'm the single point of failure. It's already hard to enough to get people to contribute more than a README typo fix or maybe a single feature that they need themselves, and get them invested into the project as whole. Somebody please create an alternative for keeping projects secure that's not based on suspicion and gatekeeping.
- krishadi 3y agoI hope there is a better way to maintain open source projects without being overly cautious and suspicious of every PR someone makes. Maintaining open source projects is hard, and this is going to slow down development on many projects. And, rightly so, it's better to make a good code base, rather than one that is littered with backdoors. I wonder what could make this situation better for the maintainers of open source projects?
- __loam 3y agoPublic funding for security maintenance.
- guappa 3y agoAnd serious taxation of tech companies.
- A1kmm 3y agoDesigning for safety helps a lot. Memory safe languages, reproducible builds, encoding safety properties in the type systems, and so on. Sure, an attacker can subvert the types as well as the code, or use unsafe code, or try to tamper with infrastructure, but the more obvious it is that something is unsafe, the harder an attacker's job is. The xz attacker introduced high-risk features over time and used them to justify weakening security controls and things that might have detected the problem. A culture of safety over the absolute best possible performance might help to make such attempts harder.
- wslh 3y agoTechnical people undersestimate the power of social engineer because, most generally, we look for extreme problem solving in security incidents and social matters is not the expertise of the field. Wenshould be aware that mane grandiose hackers as Kevin Mitnick knew well this art. I highlight this because it is a weakness that is not solved by any of the artifacts you learn at university. I think scamming, in general, should be taught early on in schools, as well as finances.
- Devasta 3y agoThe fix is easy: license your code as AGPL3. Your project is no longer a useful target as corporations will avoid you, and on top of that you get rid of the demands for free tech support. Win win.
- jesprenj 3y ago> XZ Utils cyberattack likely not an isolated incident and yet they haven't provided any other examples.
- qiine 3y agoThe fact this one got caught looks borderline miraculous though
- urduntupu 3y ago"Good" that Microsoft now owns GitHub. They could now provide their AI tech to find out (and sell) which social engineering methods have worked out successfully on open source GitHub projects. I.e. which socially engineered PRs had been accepted and which not. And then train their models to improve PR acceptance right. Allowing to automate or at least enhance the entire project communication for best acceptance rate. #NSAKEY
- drtgh 3y agoIMHO, Open Source is often misunderstood by companies as free code as in cheap, when in fact it should be seen as collaborative code that aims to avoid redundancy, saving companies countless hours of development, research, fixing compatibility issues and so on, due to such collaborative union between all the developers, mainly the maintainer(s), albeit at the cost of sometimes excessively generic non-performing code, and, here we go, albeit at the cost of potential security vulnerabilities that keep requiring an investment that has been largely ignored. Perhaps companies should take the necessary reversal for the security of their business and create roles within the organization as guys who exclusively and actively revise the code being used, at the same time as internally classifying the integrity of genuine maintainers to ensure that bad guys don't get paychecks from either the company and the community, by showing facts. It doesn't solve the problem, but I think it should be a generalized procedure, not just something that very few big companies seem to be doing, and one can see it's not enough. Ironically, most companies ignoring the issue appear to be targets. Although it did cross my mind that maybe such companies are not just misunderstanding open source as free code as in cheap, but maybe they also consider the security issues and repercussions as cheap; and if this is what is happening, maybe governments across the glove should impose large fines for data leaks and vulnerabilities in their systems, proportional to the company's revenues, proportional as in making them invest in security. in addition to what the article suggest. I don't know. I'm just thinking loudly, certainly the problem is not easy to solve.
- dfgdfg34545456 3y agoThis article is trying hard to sound like it is based on years of learnings, but honestly every point in here just reads like it was cobbled together after the xz incident.
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- djha-skin 3y ago> Pay attention to how interactions make you feel. Interactions that create self-doubt, feelings of inadequacy, of not doing enough for the project, etc. might be part of a social engineering attack. Thus all ungrateful tickets whining about the project maintainers' lack of activity or brow beating then into action must be seen as a threat. How interesting.
- timka 3y agoSomehow we got to the point when we need something like FreeBSD key signing parties but we surely can't have these for everything actually.
- shortydeploy 3y agoWhen an existing maintainer decides to onboard a new maintainer, announcing to the community can also be a good step in securing the project. It could result in additional scrutiny from community members.
- simne 3y agoPeople, hear me please! I'm good software engineer, where I could find job? Thank you! PS I'm in Kyiv, Ukraine, here is war and at the moment I cannot leave country, but I'm very motivated to work from home, and I have good fast reliable internet connection and power is also reliable here.
- mdnahas 3y agoI think we need to philosophize. Is some software “infrastructure” and some even “critical infrastructure”? Or maybe they should be new classes of public goods? There are huge risks that society needs to address and I don’t think the non-profit (open source) market is providing it. And maybe not even the for-profit market. I don’t think open-source project leaders have the resources to fight this risk on their own. We should discuss if there is a role for government, just the way government pays for security (police) and protects critical infrastructure.
- hi-v-rocknroll 3y agoThe perils inherent of FOSS and letting random people in.
- larodi 3y agoThis article, perhaps true, but it somehow seems to me also a way to gain certain OpenJS publicity.
- Isabella_Ammon 3y agoI now have access to his phone without traces great job!! (geniusspyhack at gmail com)