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A Schism in the OpenPGP World
- 1letterunixname 3y agoIf they want to jump the shark by crashing GnuPG into a compatibility reef, I won't be upgrading. "Don't break shit" is the first rule. PS: Photon hosting private keys is, to me, a nonstarter. It makes their entire platform and investment in GPG pointless.
- dale_glass 3y ago> "Don't break shit" is the first rule. It's not an important rule if security is your primary concern. Because if you "don't break shit", the first thing any adversary will do is to try downgrade things until an old, insecure state. The way to counteract that is to refuse to downgrade, which obviously breaks shit if one of the sides can't speak the new protocol.
- LtWorf 3y agoThey want to change the protocol, for no clear advantage, not add bits to the encryption or change algorithm.
- dale_glass 3y agoOpenPGP is in general an awful format, it needs a huge refresh. The whole format for encapsulating PGP data is extremely complex and in some parts insecure. That's an excellent reason to rethink the problem. In my understanding, this is not about "adding bits" or changing algorithms, it's about the level above. The packet format that says "This is the algorithm, this is the hash being used, this is the data, etc, etc".
- LtWorf 3y agoDestroying compatibility for a new protocol that isn't really proven to be more secure…
- 1letterunixname 3y agoExactly. Small changes and a transition plan, not throwing everything that's established away.
- dale_glass 3y agoI don't think you still understand what the conversation is about. It's not about things like AES, where there might be some hidden flaw in the crypto scheme. It's about basic, glaringly visible issues. Eg, from https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/ https://www.latacora.com/blog/2019/07/16/the-pgp-problem/ "The PGP MDC can be stripped off messages –– it was encoded in such a way that you can simply chop off the last 22 bytes of the ciphertext to do that. To retain backwards compatibility with insecure older messages, PGP introduced a new packet type to signal that the MDC needs to be validated; if you use the wrong type, the MDC doesn’t get checked. Even if you do, the new SEIP packet format is close enough to the insecure SE format that you can potentially trick readers into downgrading; Trevor Perrin worked the SEIP out to 16 whole bits of security . And, finally, even if everything goes right, the reference PGP implementation will (wait for it) release unauthenticated plaintext to callers, even if the MDC doesn’t match." TL;DR, the packet format has "${DATA}${SIGNATURE}", in such a way that you can strip $SIGNATURE, do whatever you like with $DATA, and it'll go through because this is a backwards compatibility mechanism. Former versions didn't have $SIGNATURE, so any attacker can just get rid of it, and problem solved. This is I repeat not a case of "maybe there's some PHD level math we're unaware of", but absolutely glaring issues. You don't need a genius to write a formal proof of why allowing people to strip signatures is a bad thing. And it's a problem solvable by throwing out the compatibility scheme and adding a hard requirement.
- jwr 3y agoOn a somewhat related note: GnuPG gets plenty of hate from the crypto crowd for being "obsolete" and insecure. I would humbly propose that before you go telling everyone to stop using gpg, implement something that works, builds, and that doesn't break after 6 months or so. I've been using gpg for what, 20 years now? And recently (as in, three or four years ago) started using it with private keys stored on YubiKeys (using drduh's excellent guide). I also use it for symmetric encryption. It works. It doesn't break. It gets things done, and while I'm not secure from state-sponsored hackers, all this is infinitely better than no encryption. Rage for example, is not in that category — I added it to my ansible automation as a test, and it broke after several months.
- OfSanguineFire 3y agoWhen the crypto crowd complains about PGP being obsolete, they don’t just knock PGP, they very often mention alternatives. One of the most frequent recommendations is instead of using ordinary email and trying to bolt PGP onto it with individual contacts, use an encrypted messenger. I have been using Signal for four years now with the same install moved from phone to phone, and it has worked just fine. I can chat with my friends and relatives with E2E encryption, while I could have never got them to use PGP at all. [0] https://moxie.org/2015/02/24/gpg-and-me.html https://moxie.org/2015/02/24/gpg-and-me.html
- phone8675309 3y agoAre you aware of any other widely deployed, stable tools that meet the other uses cases from the parent comment?
- dig1 3y ago> When the crypto crowd complains about PGP being obsolete, they don’t just knock PGP, they very often mention alternatives Those alternatives have different use cases compared to (open)PGP. So, Moxie said GPG is too complicated? If Signal goes down, how long will it take you to spin up your instance of server and clients, ready for delivery? How much would cost running reliably that infra? For email and GPG, I can get everything in 15-20 minutes, including registering the DNS name, DKIM, and SPF. I can also sign documents, images, and invoices with GPG; in short, I can do business. What can I do with Signal: chat, send nice emojis, and make calls? Proper security and encryption isn't a toy, and let's not kid ourselves by skinning apps with shiny buttons and cool claims that everything people have done before sucks.
- henriquez 3y ago“Merge and decist” - these are some strong words. Particularly when the previous paragraphs called for a de-escalative approach and a meeting of minds. I don’t see how public admonishment could possibly be productive towards the stated goals.
- sleepless 3y agoDid you read through the linked issue in total?
- robertlagrant 3y agoIt's obviously hard to judge from the outside, but the linked issue conversation definitely casts the reviewer in a bad light.
- sumtechguy 3y agoFrom what I can tell there are some new changes that may break backwards compat with stuff. One group wants that resolved the other does not think it is that big of deal. Something like this that goes back to the early 90s and thousands of random unknown number of installed clients/servers. backwards compat is probably something to look into and properly deal with?
- robertlagrant 3y agoSure, but I'm not talking about that. I mean the one sentence responses to carefully thought out messages, the feet-dragging, etc etc, and each response being Brazil[0]-like nothing to do with the previous ones which were responded to. [0] https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0088846 https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0088846
- sleepless 3y agoNice writeup. It is a serious problem that the ecosystem is held back by wasting resources on personal disputes with immediate consequences for end users. Hate on OpenPGP all you want, it still is an important technology with unrealized potential and growth.
- femiagbabiaka 3y agoIt’s not actually clear from reading through this document or others, or the linked email threads, etc. that there is a personal dispute at play, or what that might be. I’m also not sure who the target of this document is, or who wrote it. It’s also not clear what the forcing function behind the strong recommendations at the end is — will the author fork GnuPG in the event a resolution can’t be reached?
- freedomben 3y agoIt doesn't sound like a personal dispute to me, it sounds technical. One camp (Open) wants to move faster and break backward compatibility, the other (Libre) wants to move slower and maintain backwards compatibility
- daveguy 3y agoIt seems like maintaining backwards compatibility would be important for something that otherwise irreversibly encrypts your data.
- woodruffw 3y agoThe correct way to maintain backwards compatibility in those contexts is to decrypt and re-encrypt, not support broken ciphers or weak modes of encryption indefinitely. The latter is security theater.
- b112 3y agoNo. There is 100% value in being able to decrypt a 20 year old email. It doesn't matter if it is a broken cypher. A 20 year old email has very little actionable in it, but can have value in other ways. It is absolutely vital that a project like this, supports some means for a modern machine/stack to access older data.
- exabrial 3y agoThe most valuable feature of PGP is establishment of a long term online identity bound to a set of keys. That is perhaps what all of these replacement schemes fail to realize. I really wish "Login with PGP" was a thing and use a subkey for each website, with optional ability to hide the identity of a particular website in my own keychain. You know, sorta like passkeys, but I don't have to have Google/Apple/etc involved and I can actually inspect the magic behind the scenes.
- tptacek 3y agoThis is a perfect encapsulation of the gulf between PGP enthusiasts and cryptography engineers, because this "long term online identity" attribute is not only one of PGP's biggest misfeatures just in an implementation and design sense, but also a devastating weakness of the system for its most important intended application (exchanging messages between humans). PGP's key management system is literally the last thing you want in a messaging system.
- rodlette 3y ago> also a devastating weakness of the system for its most important intended application (exchanging messages between humans). PGP's key management system is literally the last thing you want in a messaging system. Strong words, but why?
- exabrial 3y agoIt's a devastating weakness only if you use it in a very certain manner.
- woodruffw 3y ago> The most valuable feature of PGP is establishment of a long term online identity bound to a set of keys. PGP doesn't do this: PGP key has a claimant identity, but actually verifying that claimant is left to the end user. That's why the WoT and strong set were important (before they violently collapsed, revealing that they weren't load bearing after all). Other schemes do realize this, and it's why they make tradeoffs around trusted parties (CAs in the Web PKI performing domain validation, EV for code-signing, etc.).
- picadores 3y ago[flagged]
- ametrau 3y agoIdealists?
- chimeracoder 3y ago> Is this a - the NSA made a offer to backdoor nobody can refuse and the idealists abandon the "standard"- situation? Why would the NSA bother to target PGP, when the biggest threat to their surveillance is the use of other encryption mechanisms with better usability (and therefore lower chance of misuse)? If anything, the NSA would want to encourage people using PGP, because it's far easier to break PGP using the default settings than any modern tool, even before you account for the extremely high likelihood of "user error".
- N19PEDL2 3y ago> Why would the NSA bother to target PGP, when the biggest threat to their surveillance is the use of other encryption mechanisms with better usability (and therefore lower chance of misuse)? Could you give an example of such encryption mechanisms please?
- maleldil 3y agoWhatsApp, Signal, Messenger, and other much more commonly used communication methods with E2EE.
- ISV_Damocles 3y agoIs anyone else kinda hoping that GPG/PGP loses enough respect in the tech community that something fresh comes along that really solves a lot of the UX and security issues they have? (Acquiring keys, rotating keys, identifying compromised keys, and most importantly either reaches a large enough percentage of emails sent that usage of it is not in itself an immediate flag to monitor or can be implemented as a side channel not directly including the signature in the email payload itself.)
- Avamander 3y ago> Acquiring keys, rotating keys, identifying compromised keys, and most importantly either reaches a large enough percentage of emails sent that usage of it is not in itself an immediate flag to monitor or can be implemented as a side channel not directly including the signature in the email payload itself. You are describing S/MIME?
- ISV_Damocles 3y agoKinda. But S/MIME has its own problems[0], mostly related to you as a recipient being unable to choose who is authorized to send you encrypted email (and so spam and malware filters don't work). On top of that, GPG and S/MIME's support of encrypted-at-rest email is, imo, a fool's errand. Handing a payload of data to a third party that the recipient can eventually query to retrieve makes it much easier to grab a hold of and try to decrypt in the future. The same is true of SSL to an extent, but SSL traffic is much more voluminous, such that saving all of it to eventually crack and decide if there's anything worthwhile in it is unlikely. The only real way to transfer private data between two users is to do it live with an ephemeral channel, whether that's in-person or via SSL or etc. The only value I see in GPG and friends is in verifying authenticity of the contents - signing the email - not encrypting those contents. Email has, and always will be, an open protocol, for better or worse. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME#Obstacles_to_deploying_S/MIME_in_practice https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/MIME#Obstacles_to_deploying_...
- Avamander 3y ago
- Tistron 3y agoI've been using GPG to symmetrically encrypt most of my secrets, like OPT seeds and stuff like that, and then save it in some accessible places. Just yesterday I was frustrated that gpg didn't work very well in my terminal for some reason (the barrier between entering the data and the password was weirdly permeable, i.e. sometimes some of my password ended up in the data, and more often a lot of what I pasted ended up in the password prompt). So I found openpgp.js and made a little website where i can encrypt and decrypt my secrets. I used that particular library because it feels safe that the things I have encrypted can be decrypted with a tool that is accessible everywhere... as long as I can remember the passwords :) But I wonder, are the defaults for symmetric encryption in openpgp not considered safe anymore, or how should i interpret some of the other comments here?
- upofadown 3y ago...are the defaults for symmetric encryption in openpgp not considered safe anymore, ... That would be AES. The traditional OpenPGP authenticated encryption (OCFB-MDC) is secure. There has been some widespread misunderstanding, I wrote a rambling editorial against the idea of superseding the block cipher mode: * https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:no_new_ae https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:no_new_ae
- 0xDEAFBEAD 3y ago>OPT seeds What's that?
- Tistron 3y agoSorry, meant OTP
- woodruffw 3y agoSerious question: does this matter? The PGP key ecosystem is microscopic in 2023, and is actively atrophying. Consensus among cryptographers is that PGP hasn’t reflected anything close to acceptable cryptographic design in decades, and its lack of adoption in serious tools and products reflects that. Without a serious use case hanging in the balance, this is just OSS drama.
- computerenjoyer 3y agoYes, it does matter. PGP is by far the most common standard for signatures used in software distribution (Git tags, RPM packages, Yum repos, Deb repos, ad-hoc signature schemes, etc.), and nothing else is particularly close in terms of number of signatures verified per day. While the absolute number of verifications is a lot lower than it could be, there is still substantial inertia behind these current standards, including US government standards. I am also aware that you are actively involved in moving ecosystems away from PGP and towards solutions in the Sigstore ecosystem, so this is definitely not news to you. I understand you want the situation to change, but for now it's disingenuous to pretend like GPG in particular doesn't have the super majority of "market" share around signatures and that drama like this wouldn't have potential impact to a lot of folks.
- tptacek 3y agoHow, exactly, would this (waves around at current drama) impact a lot of folks? Can you be specific about it?
- woodruffw 3y ago> Yes, it does matter. PGP is by far the most common standard for signatures used in software distribution No, that would be bespoke PKIs on various proprietary OSes. PGP is miniscule compared to any of these; it's not even a rounding error. This is true even when you juice the numbers with things like git signing (which is not only ignored by 99.9% of clients but doesn't even sign the relevant software artifact for end users). > I understand you want the situation to change, but for now it's disingenuous to pretend like GPG in particular doesn't have the super majority of "market" share around signatures and that drama like this wouldn't have potential impact to a lot of folks. If you know me, then you know I've run the numbers here[1]: even ecosystems that encouraged PGP use for decades have all the hallmarks of the signatures being completely unused. End users do not verify PGP signatures, signers do not maintain their keys; PGP's tooling encourages this behavior. I won't deny that workflows will be broken by moving away from PGP. But those workflows are (1) a tiny, tiny minority, and (2) overwhelmingly security theater, especially now that PGP's principle feature (the WoT) is dead. [1]: https://blog.yossarian.net/2023/05/21/PGP-signatures-on-PyPI-worse-than-useless https://blog.yossarian.net/2023/05/21/PGP-signatures-on-PyPI...
- dosman33 3y agoThis sucks. At the same time, only experts use OpenPGP so I guess maby it's not a big deal? I've been using PGP for decades at this point and I'm still somewhat surprised when I encounter security professionals that either can't figure out how to use PGP or just ignore it because "its too complicated, and I already have Signal". I have no beef with encrypted messenger services but it's not the same use case as PGP for email and other needs. This also hints at a separate cultural divide. Young people only know email as that thing you need in order to setup other accounts. They use IM for the bulk of their real communication and at best consider email something they only use for work. Only old farts think of email as something they use for personal correspondence. And frankly, most of the people I interact with are younger than me so most of my communication has shifted to where the people are that use it, which is IM services.
- tptacek 3y agoExperts avoid PGP like the stomach flu. It'd be interesting if you could find a single cryptography engineer of note that has spoken up for it in the last 10 years.
- LtWorf 3y agoExperts like certificate authorities, which have proven themselves to be completely unreliable several times.
- akerl_ 3y agoI'm not aware of any experts who like individual certificate authorities. Are there some that I'm missing? I think perhaps what you mean to say is that experts like the x509 PKI. Which again, isn't quite true. You'll find plenty of experts pointing out that major parts of x509 and the PKI ecosystem, and of TLS and HTTPS, are garbage: ASN.1 parsing is a trashfire, protocol/cipher negotiation has had numerous critical flaws, things like compression have allowed traffic to be decrypted. What I think is more accurate to say is that experts have invested heavily in finding ways to augment web infrastructure to remove broad categories of these, and the result is a generally recommendable system. This includes things like moving to TLS 1.3, enforcing that CAs participate in Cert Transparency logs, delisting CAs that misbehave, and adjusting browser behavior to avoid security pitfalls like mixed content that compromise users. The problem with doing that for GPG is partly that its fundamental nature is not well aligned with making those kinds of changes, and partly that (as we see in the original post) GnuPG is resistant to making changes that would leave behind users of insecure codepaths and cryptography.
- upofadown 3y agoThere is no crisis here. Everybody can just keep using the existing standard and everything will work. It turns out that the existing stuff is actually cryptographically secure. So far the only practical incompatibility I have seen seems to be associated with the GnuPG OCB cipher mode. Newer versions of GnuPG generate keys that show OCB compatibility. So encrypting messages/files to that particular PGP identity will result in the use of the non-backwards compatible OCB mode. That will prevent a non GPG OCB compatible from decrypting the message/file. The GnuPG project should document the issue and make it clear how one could disable the GPG OCB mode.
- tptacek 3y agoYou've been saying for years on Hacker News that (a) authenticated encryption is overrated, and (b) that the PGP MDC is as secure as an authenticated cipher mode.
- upofadown 3y agoSpecifically, I have been saying that in normal PGP usage, the PGP MDC is not relevant. Since each message is self contained (no ongoing connection), it is better to authenticate the plaintext directly with a signature. For an unsigned message an attacker can replace the whole thing. For the case of symmetrical encryption, the PGP MDC is relevant. So it depends... More: https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:authenticated https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:authenticated (my article) >the PGP MDC is as secure as an authenticated cipher mode. It is. It turns out there is a class of authenticated encryption that involves first hashing the plaintext and then encrypting the plaintext and the hash. OCFB-MDC seems to be an instance of that class. That seems to defy conventional wisdom and as a result is interesting. More: https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:mdc https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:mdc (my article)
- upofadown 3y agoThe politics here as I perceived them... Way back, there was a rambling and expansive process to update the OpenPGP standard. Years. So eventually it was decided to do a more focused "crypto refresh" that would be restricted to just important cryptography concerns. The GnuPG program was part of this. During the process the head of the GnuPG project (Werner Koch) spent a lot of time pushing back against what he considered pointless or wrongheaded changes. Eventually things seemed to stabilize and there seemed to be a consensus and people started paying less attention. Koch was one of those people. The process then wound up again and a bunch of stuff that Koch opposed ended up in the standards draft. Koch eventually noticed and ended up taking the position that the GnuPG project would not follow the new changes and would instead stay where they were. I think the very best outcome here would be if the various entities would accept that the process is working to the extent of clearly showing that consensus has not been reached and can't be reached from this point. The process will have to start yet again. The root cause here seems to be that there is no real serious issue with the existing standard, so attempts to update it lack a focus. As a result there is a tendency to try to change everything.
- twiss 3y agoThe IETF aims for rough consensus [1][2], rather than full consensus. The OpenPGP Working Group chairs have deemed that GnuPG is "in the rough" of the rough consensus [3], and that there is sufficient consensus on the crypto refresh to publish it as an RFC. If GnuPG disagrees with that outcome, they can appeal it. That would be the normal "process" to follow, which - to my knowledge - hasn't happened yet. As for lacking focus, I'm obviously biased as one of the authors of the document, but the charter of the crypto refresh [4] was rather narrow, and aimed at modernizing the cryptographic primitives in OpenPGP. That's what the crypto refresh focused on; e.g. see [5]. [1]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8789.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8789.html [2]: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7282.html https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7282.html [3]: https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/yz6EnZilyk_90j569KDPu4I3muY/ https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/openpgp/yz6EnZilyk_90j... [4]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-openpgp/03/ https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/charter-ietf-openpgp/03/ [5]: https://proton.me/blog/openpgp-crypto-refresh https://proton.me/blog/openpgp-crypto-refresh
- aborsy 3y agoIt better be quantum safe at this point. Otherwise, another update would be needed soon.
- OhMeadhbh 3y agoI have a friend whose observation about many FLOSS projects is "Drama == Fork." I'm trying not to be uncharitable about Libre vs Open here, but it seems to have the aroma of drama. I chartered an IETF WG in the 2000s and there was quite a bit of drama there, though it was sort of important to allow people to be dramatic to express what they wanted the WG to work on for a while. Eventually when they realized there was consensus for something other than what they wanted us to work on, the drama started to recede. It might be useful to wait three months and revisit LibrePGP and the OpenPGP WG and see what progress has been made.
- threatofrain 3y agoRelated discussion. https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38554943 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38554943
- jandrese 3y agoWake me up when they finally offer a scalable key management system. PGP always punted on key management, and as a result has been a perpetual market flop. It always seemed to cater to people who were very willing to give up all convenience for perfect security, like can't trust keys unless they were handwritten on paper and you verified their photo ID in person before accepting them levels of paranoid. It's really frustrating for people who want a system that's good enough to always be there and providing passive benefits even if there is a theoretical case where a nation state might MITM your communications if they got there before you knew the person.
- sillysaurusx 3y agoAnd yet, without it, the Snowden leaks wouldn’t have happened. I mostly agree with you, but it’s worth pointing out that they achieved their goals; rare for a security product.
- 0xDEAFBEAD 3y agoYeah, I dislike the idea of prioritizing a crypto standard that doesn't work against nation-states. Some of us like our privacy. That said, I agree with jandrese's point about key management -- low-security key management solutions shouldn't prevent people from taking a high-security approach. Seems like the ideal situation would be if the really paranoid people end up naturally testing the low-security infrastructure as a side effect of doing their paranoia stuff. E.g. if the gpg client was set up to automatically report discrepancies between a user's personal web of trust and a presumed-authoritative keyserver. That said, it's unclear to me why Signal wouldn't have worked for Snowden -- interested to explore details here.
- throw0101c 3y ago> Wake me up when they finally offer a scalable key management system. PGP always punted on key management, and as a result has been a perpetual market flop. What is the alternative KM architecture in a distributed system? Remember that for e-mail there is no central authority to handle assigning keys to individuals, unless perhaps you want Gmail and Outlook.com to handle that. The other e-mail security system is S/MIME (which uses X.509).
- fl0ki 3y agoReally, we're still only hearing two sides of the story. I for one will wait for the Critique Critique Critique. Though really, ...
- exabrial 3y agoI really appreciate the ending. I think that is good leadership.
- dang 3y agoRelated: https://blog.pgpkeys.eu/critique-critique.html https://blog.pgpkeys.eu/critique-critique.html (via https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38554943 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=38554943, but we merged most of those comments hither)
- ysofunny 3y agoregretably I'm too ignorant to know any better, so this is a very wild guess: I wonder up to which extent this has to do with the Mochizuki v. Scholze and Stix disagreement? I say this because as far as I know: elliptic curves are the state of the art in crypto, and the IUT theory (mochizuki's) has a lot to do with elliptic curves
- kazinator 3y agoIt looks like a no brainer to me. If you have some program based on a standard, any non-incremental changes to the standard mean spell hard work: you have to read the updated and old spec side by side to just to determine whether something is now broken in your program, never mind what needs to be done. Of course that guy is opposed to that. Assurances that, don't worry, it's all gonna be backward compatible, are neither here nor there, from that perspective.
- charles_f 3y agoI love the concept of PGP. It's too complex for non tech people to put in place ; but it saddens me to think there's an alternative reality where a google or a Microsoft has put it in place and activated it by default, and solved a solid chunk of spams, scams, and made emails secure. This kind of governance issues make it pretty clear that won't ever happen