14 ms·
Mathematician warns US spies may be weakening next-gen encryption
- diogenes4 3y agoWhy does anyone take a US-based seriously as a standards authority? It seems like a transparent conflict of interest.
- gustavus 3y agoBecause your options are Beijing or DC. We like to pretend the age of empires is past but realistically we still live in a time of where there are two major world powers and everyone gets to decide which side of the line they want to fall on, accept American hegemony or submit to Chinese control.
- garba_dlm 3y agoso essentially: "because you only have worse choices"
- marcyb5st 3y agoExcept that in one I can say "my president is an idiot. We need a leadership change" without wiping my credit score or being detained.
- cscurmudgeon 3y agoHa, you can say that in China too (about the US president lol).
- kube-system 3y agoA classic joke! https://youtu.be/9qh-1_tXeuQ?t=30 https://youtu.be/9qh-1_tXeuQ?t=30
- lsofzz 3y agoUnited States of China. Peoples Republic of United States. Sounds the same.
- keepamovin 3y agoTrue. But it's important to note that it is likely that, given the requirements of creating large, functioning systems of administration, it might be true that all governing systems are trying to solve the same types of problems. And it's worth remembering that, even in the US there exist examples of people who pushed for real change to these systems, and ended up detained, dead or simply disappeared. It might also be worthwhile to consider the following well known allegations: revolving door appointments between bureaucracy and companies that it interfaces with and regulates; compromise of politicians by various interest groups using bribery or blackmail; the effects of corporate lobbying and donations to distort the legislative and electoral processes; the powers of unelected career bureaucrats whose tenures often outlast elected officials. It's important to recall that the US is not alone is allegedly suffering from these maladies, but that it might suffer from them ought be a cause for concern. Such considerations seem to raise the question of whether the president (and associated democratic and elected apparatuses) are in some way figureheads designed to provide a focus and an outlet, but may also function to protect the overall system against substantial reforms. Such a description may help explain why processes in democracies often stagnate. The is not to say that the Chinese system is "better" in any sense (our first consideration indicates that perhaps all large governing systems must essentially be the same), but it might be more honest about what it is. This gives rise to the sense that democracy, at least in part, may be a deception that usefully provides people the illusion of a voice for change, while at the same time protecting the governing system by ensuring people do not seek more disruptive methods to alter it. Of course, the flipside is, without such less disruptive avenues, people are then without peaceful recourse. This means that in the Chinese system, the government knows it faces the threat of revolution, which, while it could be thought to function as a kind of guidance of, or check-and-balance on, its power, is also responded to by the system itself becoming more draconian and authoritarian, in order to protect itself, if that makes sense? So in the US, the system protects itself with what may be described as a generally more peaceful and free society, with what be a somewhat deceptive democracy (of course more authoritarian exceptions are occasionally made to neutralize true rabble rousers), whereas in China, the system protects itself more overtly, with a generally more authoritarian and restrictive society, which is more open about what it is. The point of this comparison is to foster more mutual understanding and less false-differences that fuel unnecessary divisions and distort discussions with fallacies, in an attempt to try to guide discussions along more productive directions, based on realities.
- friendzis 3y agoHalf seriously, what's the difference between your career ruined via social credit being wiped by government or your career ruined via social credit being wiped on Twitter?
- pgeorgi 3y agoIt's pretty simple to not be on Twitter. It's comparably hard to evade governments.
- Detrytus 3y agoJust because you are not on Twitter (or Facebook, or whatever) won't stop other people from tweeting lies about you. And the public image that you have on social media matters a lot in this society. See also: "Cancel culture".
- mschuster91 3y ago> or your career ruined via social credit being wiped on Twitter? Whose career got ruined actually? Johnny Depp is still making movies, Rammstein just announced a 2024 tour, JKR still is making millions upon millions every year with Harry Potter, Trump is likely to be the Republican candidate in 2024. "Cancel culture" isn't real.
- xcdzvyn 3y agoOne's a repressive government and one's some number of people choosing not to like you very much anymore?
- garba_dlm 3y ago"due process"??? but we've gotta update this now that the law will turn to software
- mardifoufs 3y agoSo I guess the op was right, why does the rest of the world use American standards, since we can't choose your president either (I don't actually believe that we shouldn't use NIST standards, but my point is that's a pretty weak argument for non Americans. )
- monero-xmr 3y agoThere is plenty of non-backdoored cryptography to use. It’s just the US forces various entities to use their backdoored crypto in order to get grants and government contracts and regulatory approvals. For example, Satoshi Nakamoto chose a very interesting, lightly used elliptic curve secp256k1 for Bitcoin because for various reasons he was very confident it wasn’t backdoored, and obviously it has stood the test of time https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Secp256k1 https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Secp256k1
- Roark66 3y ago>Because your options are Beijing or DC. We have plenty of standards in Europe too :-) However, with cryptography historically the best crypto has been invented in the US and it made much more sense for allies to just use ready made solutions than to roll their own. Do countries on the US crypto exports ban lists have their own incompatible crypto? I dont know, they might, but they for sure don't share it as freely available standards.
- denton-scratch 3y ago> historically the best crypto has been invented in the US ENIGMA?
- jcranmer 3y agoThe Enigma machine was probably the weakest of its kind of machines. It had a critical security flaw in that it could never encipher a letter to itself, and most of its security came from the IV settings, which were communicated in such poor fashion that the Poles cracked it long before WW2 even started. By contrast, the US and British rotor machines were never cracked by the Axis powers in WW2, and the other two German rotor ciphers were less thoroughly cracked by the Allies.
- denton-scratch 3y agoAccording to Wikipedia, rotor cyphers were probably invented in the Netherlands, not the US. It says an american tried to commercialize the idea, but went bust. The only patents they mention were issued to Europeans. They don't seem to mention these spiffy US and UK rotor cyphers; any pointers?
- pgeorgi 3y ago> but they for sure don't share it as freely available standards. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8891 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8891 (GOST Magma) is a russian standard block cipher. https://www.gsma.com/aboutus/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/eea3eia3zucv16.pdf https://www.gsma.com/aboutus/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/eea3... is a Chinese stream cipher. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-10 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ribose-cfrg-sm4-... Chinese block cipher. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-oscca-cfrg-sm3-02 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-oscca-cfrg-sm3-0... Chinese hash function. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4269 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4269 (SEED) is from South Korea (aligned, but still worth a mention)
- diogenes4 3y ago> Because your options are Beijing or DC What kind of mental contortions do you have to go through to think like this? It comes off like gung-ho ignorance at best, and reeks of some of the most obvious american military propaganda I've ever read.
- tptacek 3y agoNIST refereed a competition among the best-regarded academic cryptographers in the world. It didn't design any of these constructions, and practically all of the inputs into the competition, including the critiques of the submissions, came from academics (many of them not American). One of the annoying things about how Bernstein is communicating about this is that he is counting on his audience not knowing this.
- diogenes4 3y agoThis is all nice and well, but it doesn't actually address the inherent untrustworthiness of a state-associated (and known to be penetrated) organization.
- tptacek 3y agoThe entire point of the competition is for the state to select a state standard, so "state-associated" is not the smoking gun people suggest it is. If you don't care about state standards, hey, I'm right there with you. But: they obviously exist.
- Nursie 3y agoWhere else are you going to go? The EU, UK and Australia are all bad for this in various ways, having key-disclosure laws or trying to ban e2e or whatever else. I don’t know about you but I don’t consider China or Russia to be valid places to look for un-backdoored crypto either. It seems (to this non-American) like one of the least-worst options. Maybe we could trust a Scandinavian country or Switzerland? (Yes, I have missed out huge swathes of the world, which I mostly know little about…)
- nocoiner 3y agoWasn’t Crypto AG - the Swiss company that was, oops, secretly owned by the CIA and West German intelligence - established by a Swede?
- diogenes4 3y ago> Where else are you going to go? I don't know, but I'd start with getting buy-in from any interested country with an emphasis on not too much from any one. Where it's physically located is irrelevant, the issue is the clear commitment to the interests of the american state.
- riffraff 3y agoNIST promotes open competitions with many non-US based participants, e.g. AES was designed by Belgian researchers. These is somewhat better than not having such a system at all. If nothing else, you get to benefit from public analysis and pick another of the algorithms that get proposed in the competition, even if it's not the NIST-blessed one.
- diogenes4 3y agoThe issue is not AES of course, it's the NIST being associated with a government that can't be trusted when it comes to developing reliable and trustworthy encryption schemes. They've clearly demonstrated this time and time again.
- mcpherrinm 3y ago[flagged]
- ozr 3y agoDJB has a historical record of being correct on crypto. His 'tantrums' led to Bernstein v. United States, which established source code as speech.
- mcpherrinm 3y agoDJB is obviously a talented cryptographer, but he’s also clearly got a big ego. He’s drawing unfounded conclusions to discredit the work of other cryptographers whose work was chosen over his own.
- olliej 3y agoThat's not fair. NIST has a documented history of working with the NSA, intentionally hiding that interaction, and the outcome was a major security problem. So it seems DJB believes that NIST has not provided sufficient documentation, and given their history it's reasonable to take a position that if they don't do that, the outcome cannot be trusted. So the issue is that once NIST did that the irrevocably destroy any basis to say "you can trust us". Hence they cannot have anything that they cannot document the source for. e.g. any non-trivial numbers have to have a documented generation path, and any non-trivial numbers in those steps also have to have a documented generation path. Let's assume for now NIST is being 100% honest, and there's no attempted subterfuge. How can we distinguish that from them intentionally hiding subterfuge? Even though in this hypothetical where we're assuming no corruption, we have no way to know unless we have everything. It's not reasonable for anyone at this point to have an algorithm that has any unexplained numbers, but for an organization that is again documented as having sabotaged standards it's absurd.
- tptacek 3y agoThis is a comment that only makes sense if you believe NIST designed CRYSTALS-Kyber, or had a significant hand in its design. But nothing of the sort happened. The CRYSTALS team is overwhelmingly academic and overwhelmingly European. It's frustrating that Bernstein has communicated about this without making that clear, because it's obvious that lots of people believe NIST went off in a room and came up with a scheme, and your first responsibility in discussing this honestly is to dispel that misconception.
- nonrandomstring 3y ago"All we can do is tell people that NIST are the ones in the room making the decisions, but if you don't believe us, there's no way you could verify that without being inside NIST" says Moody. There's our problem - right there! If a body as important as NIST is not so utterly transparent that any random interested person cannot comb through every meeting, memo, and coffee break conversation then it needs disbanding and replacing with something that properly serves the public. We have bastardised technology to create a world of panopticonic surveillance, and then misused it by scrutinising the private lives of simple citizens. This is arse-backwards. If monitoring and auditing technology has any legitimate use the only people who should morally (though willingly) give-up some of their privacy are those that serve in public, in our parliaments, councils, congress, government agencies and standards bodies. > All we can do is tell people No. You can prove it, and if you cannot, step aside for leadership better suited to serving the public interest.
- devmor 3y agoThe fact that NIST is not transparent is enough to assume that anything related to cryptography that NIST touches is compromised. Frankly, I would assume any modern encryption is compromised by default - the gamble is just in who compromised it and how likely it would be that they want access to your data.
- tptacek 3y agoNIST standardized AES and SHA3, two designs nobody believes are compromised. The reason people trust AES and SHA3 is that they're the products of academic competitions that NIST refereed, rather than designs that NSA produced, as was the case with earlier standards. CRYSTALS-Kyber is, like AES and SHA3, the product of an academic competition that NIST simply refereed.
- gmerc 3y agoThe man walked into a bank many times over his life, no way he could decide to rob it one day.
- pword 3y agoI believe the push for passkeys is another avenue for this.
- heavyset_go 3y agoYou don't need to weak cryptography to work towards that end with passkeys. For key pairs that can be transferred, it's no different than the threat of password managers stealing your keys to the castle. You just have to trust the cloud and your entire hardware and software stack your password and passkey manager run on, and/or that nothing in that stack gets swapped out without you noticing. Similarly, I've yet to see a hardware security key that you can verify doesn't have backdoors compiled or soldered in. All the cryptography in the world doesn't matter if a government/whoever can just pop your Yubikey in a machine that does whatever magic incantation is needed to dump your keys. That magic incantation can even be secured with strong cryptography to ensure only the US government/whoever can use it.
- Borealid 3y agoI believe the Solokey meets your definition. The hardware schematics are open, as is the software running on it. The Precursor is also open hardware and software. If you trust any smartcard at all running a Javacard-compatible operating system, there's also https://github.com/BryanJacobs/FIDO2Applet https://github.com/BryanJacobs/FIDO2Applet . And of course if you're truly paranoid you can get a FPGA and implement a hardware security key on that. The overall security posture would likely be weaker, but you could be confident, hopefully, that nobody has put some kind of backdoor into the hardware you designed yourself to run atop a generic array of logic gates.
- willis936 3y agoYou'd have to choose your FPGA judiciously. The truly paranoid see the attack surface area of 100 GB of black box libraries needed to synthesize designs and appreciate the possibility of gateware trojans.
- 3y ago
- tptacek 3y agoI've been in rooms watching cryptographers trying to figure out what exactly it is Bernstein was saying with that blog post for the past week, and I do not believe that Matthew Sparkes at The New Scientist understands it any better than they do. Since Sparkes doesn't have any direct reporting from Bernstein, and nobody here cares about the NIST quotes, the right thing to do here is to treat this story as a dupe.
- samdcbu 3y ago> that blog post for the past week https://blog.cr.yp.to/20231003-countcorrectly.html https://blog.cr.yp.to/20231003-countcorrectly.html
- riffraff 3y agoThanks for sharing. That's a long and tough read (in his style) but pretty interesting.
- tptacek 3y agoIs it? Can you summarize it? I'm asking seriously. This is not his style, for what it's worth, at least not for standalone long-form writing. His most influential cryptography writing is concise and lucid.
- 112233 3y agoHe is basically being super nice about Kyber, and flames on NIST for selection being loose and tilted.
- mfru 3y agoNot exactly sure if explicitly declared output of the Kagi Universal Summarizer is allowed (will delete again if not, but I did not see a guideline for it), but I think this could be a start sparking further curiosity. (I don't know how accurate the output is, as I am not a domain expert in PQC or cryptography in general, for that matter) Kagi Universal Summarizer output for "Summary": This web page discusses the selection of the Kyber and NTRU cryptosystems as the quantum-resistant digital signature algorithms by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). It analyzes NIST's claims about the security levels of Kyber-512 compared to AES-128. While NIST argued Kyber-512's security level is boosted enough by memory access costs to meet the AES-128 threshold, the text raises uncertainties around accurately modeling such costs and argues NTRU may have advantages in flexibility and performance. Overall, the page questions whether NIST fully justified selecting Kyber-512 over NTRU given the uncertainties in quantifying the security of lattice-based cryptosystems against future attacks. Kagi Universal Summarizer output for "Key moments": - There is debate around whether Kyber-512 provides adequate security compared to the AES-128 benchmark. NIST claims it meets this level factoring in memory access costs, but others argue the analysis is uncertain. - NIST's analysis added 40 bits of estimated security to Kyber-512's post-quantum security level due to memory costs, bringing it above the AES-128 threshold. Critics question this calculation. - NTRU provides greater flexibility than Kyber in supporting a wider range of security levels. At some levels it also has better performance and security than Kyber options. - The security of lattice-based cryptosystems like Kyber and NTRU is not fully understood, and there is a risk of better attacks being discovered in the future. - Standardizing a system like Kyber-512 that may have limited security margin could be reckless given lattice cryptanalysis uncertainties. - Critics argue NIST has not clearly explained its security evaluations and claims about Kyber-512's margin above AES-128. - Memory access costs are important to lattice security but are not fully quantified in their impact on Kyber versus classical attacks on AES. - Removing Kyber-512 could make NTRU the strongest candidate given its flexibility at multiple security levels. - One paper argued multi-ciphertext attacks on Kyber may be as difficult as single-ciphertext attacks. - There are calls for NIST to be transparent about its analysis and decision making regarding Kyber-512.
- peppermint_gum 3y agoWhenever the topic of DJB vs NIST comes up, there are always people saying "this may look petty, but he has a spotless track record, so we have to trust him". I want to push back on this a little by linking this Twitter thread: https://nitter.net/FiloSottile/status/1555669786826244096 https://nitter.net/FiloSottile/status/1555669786826244096 It shows that there's a pattern of Bernstein and his associates threatening fellow cryptographers. It's entirely possible to be a brilliant cryptographer and also a petty person, those things aren't mutually exclusive.
- moefh 3y agoI did not dig through all the links in that twitter thread, but the first few tweets are pretty misleading. The tweets say DJB implied that scientists who submitted algorithms were bribed by the NSA. That's a complete misunderstanding of that DJB wrote: he argued that the NSA wouldn't need to bribe those scientists, because they hired the top experts in the field years ago, so it might be the case that they're so far ahead of what's being submitted that all they have to do is push NIST to pick an algorithm they know how to break. Now, I have no knowledge of any of this, so I have no idea if DJB's argument is insanely paranoid like the author of the thread implies (with the GIF in the 3rd tweet). All I can see is that the author's claim is a gross mischaracterization of what DJB wrote.
- denton-scratch 3y ago> no idea if DJB's argument is insanely paranoid Isn't paranoia an essential job requirement for cryptographers?
- Aachen 3y agoCryptography: <reference> is incorrect because <logic> and should therefore be <statement>. This allows a ciphertext produced by X to be breakable in 2²¹ operations when 2¹¹ messages are known to the attacker. Paranoia: NSA bribes the independent reviewers and is backdooring the whole thing because everyone knows the military and intelligence services are two decades ahead of public research and we just don't know what the algorithm flaw is yet, but I'm telling you, they're keeping something behind! I am not saying djb (or anyone) does the latter, example is given exaggerated for illustrative purposes only. The cryptographer's example is also exaggerated, as it does matter how algorithms are chosen and there's a measure of subjectivity involved. Still, I would not say that paranoia is the job of a cryptographer.
- mcmoor 3y agoFor a subject as mathematical as encryption, the debate is surpisingly... subjective. Are we seriously at the mercy of non open-source geniuses for this? Was RSA this much unprovable objectively in its security?
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- 22c 3y agoPrevious discussion: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37756656 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37756656
- d-z-m 3y agoIronically, the style and substance of DJB's engagement with his peers and with NIST is likely to sour both against his claims[0], credible though they(might) be. DJB's impression of NIST "stonewalling" could very well be their reluctance in engaging with an adversarial and increasingly deranged private citizen. > We disagree with his analysis,” says Dustin Moody at NIST. “It’s a question for which there isn’t scientific certainty and intelligent people can have different views. We respect Dan’s opinion, but don’t agree with what he says. That's great for a PopSci article, but I(and many others, I'm sure) would like to see the details of this analysis hashed out. DJB had his chance at making this happen, and blew it. However, that doesn't mean his questions[0] should go unanswered. [0]: specifically talking about the calculation of the Kyber-512 security level here. Not his more conspiratorial claims.
- marcosdumay 3y ago> It’s a question for which there isn’t scientific certainty and intelligent people can have different views. WTF is that? No, it's not a question where intelligent people can have different views. DJB is literally claiming the NSA is claiming something similar to "3 + 3 = 9". That claim is either correct or not. There's a paywall in front of the article that I have no intention to deal with after seeing what's on the comments. But a phrase like (and I could find it before the paywall rits) this is absolutely dishonest.
- d-z-m 3y ago> DJB is literally claiming the NSA is claiming something similar to "3 + 3 = 9". Nit: DJB is claiming that NIST is doing that, not NSA. > There's a paywall in front of the article turning javascript off gets around the paywall.
- jongjong 3y agoSuch a sad time for science. We really seem to be entering the new dark ages. There is no room for curiosity or intellect anymore. The institutions cannot be trusted and people rightly do not trust them.
- galangalalgol 3y agoThe dark ages are called dark, partly because little history was recorded. That period saw more technological innovation than the well documented imperial period before it which was technologically stagnant in comparison. We live in the best documented period in history, but our technology could stagnate independently of that, or even due to it.
- BoppreH 3y agoThe article is a bit weird, so here's my summary of the situation, as someone in the security field: - Berstein, an extremely esteemed security researcher[0], published a long blog post last week[1] criticizing NIST's standardization process for new Post-Quantum-Crypto algorithms. He is focusing on the selection of Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (think TLS key exchange). Two big options are Kyber and NTRU (coauthored by Berstein). - His main complaint is that NIST is playing fast and loose with the selection process, and had disqualified a fast NTRU variant due to barely not meeting a certain security threshold. The missing variant makes NTRU look slower and less flexible than it actually is. - Meanwhile, NIST accepted a similar fast Kyber variant based on shaky assumptions. Berstein argues at length that it doesn't meet the security threshold either and should be disqualified. Funnily, NIST used Berstein's own research in (seemingly) incorrect fashion to argue for Kyber's security. - There's an air of impropriety, as if NIST was favoring one algorithm over the other, for unknown reasons. And in the beginning of the post, Berstein shows the results of his recent lawsuit to reveal more information about the internal NIST process: it seems that NIST and NSA met more often than previously thought. My interpretation leans more towards NIST making an internal mistake in evaluating the algorithms, rather than NSA pushing its agenda. One could argue that Berstein is sour that his algorithm might not be picked, and is trying underhanded tactics. On the other hand, he does have excellent reputation, and convincingly argues that NIST made an important mistake and is not transparent enough. [0] https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2016-March/028824.html https://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2016-March/0... [1] https://blog.cr.yp.to/20231003-countcorrectly.html https://blog.cr.yp.to/20231003-countcorrectly.html
- fitblipper 3y ago> My interpretation leans more towards NIST making an internal mistake in evaluating the algorithms, rather than NSA pushing its agenda. Why do you say this? The NSA has done this exact thing in the past[1], so why give them the benefit of the doubt this time? [1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_EC_DRBG
- BoppreH 3y agoBecause Dual_EC_DRBG was very heavy handed. It was driven by NSA itself (and based on a paper named "Kleptography"!); the backdoor was obvious; and they had to ~bribe~ monetarily incentivize companies to actually implement and use it. Meanwhile, both NTRU and Kyber are lattice-based, and their designs came from honest attempts. To be an NSA effort, there would need to exist an exploitable flaw in Kyber, but not NTRU, known only to the NSA. And it's not like NTRU as a whole got disqualified; only the fastest variant did. That's the problem with spy agencies, you never know what they are capable of. But if it was an NSA effort, it would be, by far, the most subtle one uncovered so far.
- aaa_aaa 3y agoEncryption, like other things, is too important to leave at the hands of the state.
- PedroBatista 3y agoI’m not qualified enough to say who’s right or wrong but I’ve noticed a fair amount of comments invalidating the claims because of the author’s motives, ie. He’s a sore looser and has a big ego. I don’t see why that invalidates his claim that the algorithm is weaker than claimed. “Jerks” can be right too. People are people and they come and go, but these NIST standards stay a long time.
- JacobiX 3y agoRegrettably, while we are discussing the author's motives, we may inadvertently overlook the miscalculation by NIST. The crux of NIST's primary error lies in improperly multiplying two costs when they should have been added. If this assertion holds true, it would be prudent to at least revisit and revise their draft !
- zteppenwolf 3y agoNo news there. NSA is not to be trusted. It's been a decade since serious cryptographers stopped using primitives researched @ NSA.
- lawrenceyan 3y agoThis is a question I've asked before, but I'm wondering if there's an updated perspective. Given the human brain is unencryptable, it seems like keeping secrets is going to be impossible. I guess maybe with the advent of AI, you just have device to device communication with no man in the middle in the future?
- leokeba 3y agohttps://archive.is/zFlVi https://archive.is/zFlVi
- deleted 3y ago[deleted]
- jgalt212 3y agoNever roll your own crypto, but maybe sometimes ...
- Vecr 3y agoDJB (the mathematician in the title) is the guy who rolled the crypto in the first place, at least where Ed25519 and ChaCha20 are concerted.
- zug_zug 3y agoWe should have 4 standards bodies in 4 non-allied nations each define an encryption standard and apply all 4 on top of each other in a bolstering fashion for all encrypted traffic
- acd 3y agoDan bernstein wrote Qmail, DJBDNS and Cryptography algorithms https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernstein_v._United_States https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bernstein_v._United_States Qmail https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qmail https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qmail Djbdns https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Djbdns https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Djbdns https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_J._Bernstein https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daniel_J._Bernstein
- oalae5niMiel7qu 3y agoThe open-source community will continue adopting "next-gen" "encryption" even though it has back doors, just like they didn't question elliptic curve encryption even after the NSA got caught putting out a compromised algorithm.
- mjx0 3y ago> The open-source community will continue adopting "next-gen" "encryption" even though it has back doors, just like they didn't question elliptic curve encryption even after the NSA got caught putting out a compromised algorithm. The NSA put out a known compromised elliptic curve encryption algorithm? Or are you referring to Dual_EC_DRBG, a probably compromised random number generator?