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Like Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained", the Aeon article falls into the category of explaining what we are conscious of, not how it is possible to be con
by PaulDavisThe1st 4y ago
Like Dennett's book "Consciousness Explained", the Aeon article falls into the category of explaining what we are conscious of, not how it is possible to be conscious of anything at all. It does not really tackle Chalmers "hard problem of consciousness", despite the subtitle.
- layer8 4y agoPeople fundamentally disagree about whether there is anything besides the “of”. My personal introspection tells mere there is only “of”, because what I perceive as my consciousness, is, by virtue of being a perception, in the end just an “of” itself. There is some sort of recursivity involved in the whole construct of consciousness, which makes it hard to get a grasp on. In some sense, consciousness is just that, being the perceptor and the perceptee at the same time. This recursitivity or fixedpointness will probably be key to a precise understanding of the whole shebang.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoThe argument you're making is just eliding the "hard problem". We can trivially imagine an electronic circuit that registers different current levels when exposed to red or blue light. Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit, despite the fact that it "senses" different frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. The circuit is qualia-free. You, on the other hand, are qualia-full. Whether the experience you have when a red object is in front of you derives purely from your optical sensory apparatus, or if it derives from a self-reflective awareness that your brain is dealing with "red" really makes no difference to the central point: you have an experience. We have no explanation for how there can be experiences/qualia, and possibly, because they are either extremely or completely subjective, we may never any means of studying their existence.
- zasdffaa 4y agoWe don't know what qualia are so it's an acceptable possibility to me (unprovable, mind) that such a circuit may 'experience' something. It would be unutterably basic if it happened, nonetheless I'm ok with that. There's also a view that consciousness is intrinsic to everything (ah, here you go https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-consciousness-pervade-the-universe/ https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-consciousnes...) which is a cheap, cheesy and IMO totally unacceptable way to 'explain' consciousness and I reject that as an explanation, but it doesn't make it actually wrong. Edit: missed your last line "We have explanation for how there can be experiences/qualia" - I'm surprised, you can explain it, got any links?
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoSure, pan-qualism/pan-psychism may well turn out to be a respectable postion. [ fixed the missing "no" in the GP ]
- namero999 4y agoPanpsychism is untenable because it trades the hard problem of consciousness for the composition problem. The only consistent and coherent game in town is analytical idealism.
- zasdffaa 4y agoIt might be a piss-poor explanation, because it doesn't explain anything, it presumes its conclusion, but that doesn't make it wrong. And if you throw in phrases like "composition problem" and "analytical idealism" the fer fuck's sake provide some simple explanation or something.
- namero999 4y agoSomething that assumes its conclusion and doesn't explain anything is not even wrong... At any rate, given the context of the thread I didn't feel the need to clarify what the composition problem nor idealism are. But since you ask: The composition (aka combination) problem refers to the need to explain how multiple bits of consciousness combine together to form a united and cohesive experience such as yours or mine. The hard problem focuses instead on how quantities (matter) give rise to qualities (experience). Analytic Idealism is the view that experience is the ontological primitive. Both problems sublimate away. Yes, you can derive physics from it. In fact you don't even bother physics in any way: all we know about it remains valid under analytic idealism. If anything, many counterintuitive findings of QM fall into place under AI. If this pique your interest, here's a good intro https://www.essentiafoundation.org/analytic-idealism-course/ https://www.essentiafoundation.org/analytic-idealism-course/.
- zasdffaa 4y ago
- zozbot234 4y agoThe thing about experiences/qualia is that they aren't just subjective, but momentary. Any sense of permanence, continuing identity or indeed of experiences being "about" something in particular is ultimately linked to our memory, which is not part of the "hard problem" itself; it fits solidly within the structure of causal relations we usually call "reality", or just "the physical universe". So the hard problem is hard, but it's also very tightly constrained; it "only" has to explain tiny fragments of subjective experience that float in and out of existence.
- namero999 4y agoRecalling a memory or thinking about the future or whatever, are still and always experiences in the now. You are not getting out of it.
- zasdffaa 4y agoWe had a heatwave this summer in the UK, weeks of it. I loved every moment. Thus I refute your 'momentary'. I've also had decades of pain and while it might sink lower in your perceptions, it's always there while you're awake.
- layer8 4y agoThe circuit you’re describing registers the external light impulses, but it doesn’t experience its own registering of those impulses. What I’m imagining is that the registering mechanism would itself have sensors placed on its wires that measure the currency levels on those wires, and have the measurements of those sensors as additional inputs into the cognition automaton. And then have sensors on the gates and wires of that automaton, which again feed as additional inputs into that same automaton. Add memory and timing delays. And then multiply all that some million times to get to the level of complexity of our inner mind, of our sensory and movement apparatus, and of our mental models. When introspecting myself, I don’t see or feel or think anything that couldn’t be explained by such a setup. The different textures (qualia, if you will) of what I perceive in my mind have a certain complexity, but that is merely quantitative and structural, not qualitative. I therefore simply do not agree that there is a hard problem of consciousness to begin with, in the usually given sense. I don’t agree that there is a qualitative difference between the perception of “qualia” and other perceptions. “Qualia” are just a perception of representations and processes happening in my brain. I see no puzzling mystery that would require solving.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoNo, this totally missing the point again. It is not a question of what the sensor detects. It is a question of how it is possible for there to be an experience when sensing occurs. Your introspection is simply pointing out the likely nature of what you experience, and I actually agree (tentatively) with the idea that most of our conscious experience is rooted in a self-reflecting system. But none of that has any bearing on how there can be ay experience at all.
- layer8 4y agoWhat you call “experience” for me is just sensing of internal information processing, of internal representations. This may need some dedicated introspection to fully realize. You’re making a distinction which I believe is a mirage. It’s just a special attributation we make in our minds to those inner perceptions. If you look closely, it vanishes. Think about it: How do you know that you have what you call an “experience”? It’s because you perceive the having of the experience. So, at some point, the perception of having an “experience” is something that enters as an input into your cognitive process, and you match it to some mental models you have about such inputs. I adjusted my mental model to think of those “qualia” perceptions as being the sensing of parts of the internal workings of my brain. It’s a side-effect of all the processing that is going on, if you will, and of the likely fact that the sensing of some subset of the processing steps is being feed back as inputs into the cognitive processing.
- goodthenandnow 4y ago> Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit There is a theory, Integrated Information Theory (IIT) [0], which argues exactly that [1]. [0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory [1]: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.2307/25470707#_i2 https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.2307/25470707#_i2
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoI'm familiar with IIT. I don't believe it suggests that a photosensor has qualia.
- lordnacho 4y agoIsn't the parent and related answers pointing towards the idea that there's a level of complexity above which you need to be to see those qualia? A single little circuit might not be the one that is conscious, but a bunch of them connected together might exhibit patterns that we could call experience? Maybe the analogy is that a single DNA molecule is not a living thing but that molecule along with a bunch of others is? Seems like the problem arises in pinning down what level of complexity is required.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoI broadly agree with this, and it's been my feeling since reading Dennett & Hofstadter in my teens and twenties. However, if this does turn out to be true, I suspect that it will not constitute an "explanation" of experience, merely a description of its prerequisites.
- nicoburns 4y agoIt's worth pointing out that there's zero evidence that complexity is required for conscious. Our only evidence that beings other than ourselves are conscious is that we know ourselves to be conscious and they seem similar to us. IF inanimate objects were conscious, we wouldn't know because... well, none of us actually has direct evidence than anything other than ourselves is conscious.
- rogerclark 4y agoThis argument is not "eliding" the hard problem. This argument is saying that Chalmers' hard problem does not actually exist. We have many explanations for what people describe as "the hard problem". But nobody who believes in "the hard problem" accepts these explanations, which have been given for decades by philosophers like Dennett. There is no way to reconcile your view, that there IS a hard problem and that no progress has been made toward solving it, with our view, that there is no such problem, and that it does not need solving.
- brotchie 4y agoI’m convinced at this point having read almost every book on the topic, hundreds of threads across the web, and many an in-person debate, that individuals actually have wildly different experiences of consciousness. For me, the hard problem is such an obvious and almost intractable thing that any folks who dismiss it clearly don’t understand it (or live an inner experience that lets them understand it). And because I’ve never really seen anyone flip on their view of the hard problem, I’m 99% convinced it’s because they actually have a different lived conscious experience. Perhaps they process information different, or have more or less access to their internal state. It’s possible that folks who dismiss the hard problem actually have more conscious access to their internal state and hence don’t understand why it’s an issue. An analogy is aphantasia (folks who don’t have an internal visual experience). Somebody with an aphantasic brain simply doesn’t experience consciously like others. I feel that understanding that the hard problem exists is something rooted in a different internal experience.
- CloudRecondite 4y agoIt’s also extremely obvious to me we have a fundamental gap in our understanding of the universe and reality that needs to be filled to explain the hard problem. I suspect most people have fairly similar conscious experiences though, that seems like a reasonable assumption. Humans hate to not understand something, we’ve come up with crazy religions and who knows what else to explain the world around us. The reality is there’s just so much we don’t know, so much we can’t know. I think that makes most people uncomfortable.
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- djokkataja 4y ago> you have an experience. What are "you"? And what is an "experience"? You highlight this like it's a magical phrase that cannot be explained, and your arguments suggest that you take it as a foundational assumption. But if you assume a fundamentally inexplicable nature to both personhood and experience, then you cannot possibly recognize any explanation for these, because doing so would require giving up your assumption. I recently came across a paper arguing that consciousness as commonly referred to does not exist due to semantic issues around the term "consciousness," and your arguments reminded me of it. It's quite readable, if you're interested: "Consciousness Semanticism: A Precise Eliminativist Theory of Consciousness" by Jacy Reese Anthis. The abstract and main argument: > Abstract. Many philosophers and scientists claim that there is a ‘hard problem of consciousness’, that qualia, phenomenology, or subjective experience cannot be fully understood with reductive methods of neuroscience and psychology, and that there is a fact of the matter as to ‘what it is like’ to be conscious and which entities are conscious. Eliminativism and related views such as illusionism argue against this. They claim that consciousness does not exist in the ways implied by everyday or scholarly language. However, this debate has largely consisted of each side jousting analogies and intuitions against the other. Both sides remain unconvinced. To break through this impasse, I present consciousness semanticism, a novel eliminativist theory that sidesteps analogy and intuition. Instead, it is based on a direct, formal argument drawing from the tension between the vague semantics in definitions of consciousness such as ‘what it is like’ to be an entity and the precise meaning implied by questions such as, ‘Is this entity conscious?’ I argue that semanticism naturally extends to erode realist notions of other philosophical concepts, such as morality and free will. Formal argumentation from precise semantics exposes these as pseudo-problems and eliminates their apparent mysteriousness and intractability. > 3 The Semanticism Argument > Now that terminology is established, the semanticism argument is brief and straightforward. > 1. Consider the common definitions of the property of consciousness (e.g., ‘what it is like to be’ an entity) and the standard usage of the term (e.g., ‘Is this entity conscious?’). > 2. Notice, on one hand, each common definition of ‘consciousness’ is imprecise. > 3. Notice, on the other hand, standard usage of the term ‘consciousness’ implies precision. > 4. Therefore, definitions and standard usage of consciousness are inconsistent. > 5. Consider the definition of exist as proposed earlier: Existence of a property requires that, given all relevant knowledge and power, we could precisely categorize all entities in terms of whether and to what extent, if any, they possess that property. > 6. Therefore, consciousness does not exist. https://jacyanthis.com/Consciousness_Semanticism.pdf https://jacyanthis.com/Consciousness_Semanticism.pdf I recommend reading it before objecting, as the author addresses a number of possible objections in section 4.
- robotresearcher 4y agoYou're demanding a the hard problem be addressed from a point of view that doesn't see the hard problem as a thing. You might as well demand the atheist explanation for how god created the world. The atheist must deny the premise of the question, they can't give an answer in the terms of the question. "We have no explanation for how there can be experiences/qualia" We do, but not in the terms you set out. The explanation is that that there is not a you that experiences qualia, two separate things. Rather the experiences ARE YOU. There's nothing they happen to. Their happening is you. You don't have to agree with it. But the hard question is not ducked. It is not a coherent question in this view.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y agoNot unexpectedly, I do not agree with this characterization. Short of panpsychism (which could be a thing), I think we mostly all agree that there are almost certainly objects in the world in which there is no experience By contrast, I think we mostly all agree that we (each of us as individuals, and humans as a group) are things in which experience does occur. This naturally gives rise to the question: if some set of things have no experience, and another set of things have experience, how does experience arise in the the second set of things? There are subsidiary question, such as whether experiences may come in different "levels" thus creating a continuum between "none" and "definitely experiencing". But these are secondary, mostly, the question of how things in which experience occurs differ from the things where it does not.
- lioeters 4y agoDepending on the definition of "mind", panpsychism sounds rather reasonable: "the view that the mind or a mindlike aspect is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality". https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism It could be that a rock, an ant, a computer, and a human being are all experiencing its existence at varying levels of awareness. And that this "experience" isn't necessarily exclusive to living things - though it may be impossible to prove or understand how a computer experiences itself, if at all. It's also amusing to entertain the opposite, the perspective of people who deny the existence of "experience and qualia" altogether, who argue there is no "hard problem of consciousness" in the first place. Maybe people experience consciousness so differently, for some it's "invisible", and for others it's undeniable and obvious that it exists. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
- bnralt 4y ago> Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit, despite the fact that it "senses" different frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. The circuit is qualia-free. Your thought experiment actually shows why a materialistic model makes much more sense than any model that takes "the hard problem" seriously. It's trivially easy to show that the human brown is much more complex than an electronic circuit that registers red or blue light, and that the human brain is doing much more. It's no surprise to anyone that a simple circuit like that lacks an abstraction of the world around it. But if you believe qualia is an actual thing, than how can you show that the circuit lacks it? No one seems to be able to come up with any way of measuring qualia, or even showing that it exists. There's no way to show that we have more of it than the circuit, and we're left relying on what "feels right." Before demanding that models solve "the hard problem," we should first ask ourselves if there's any evidence that "the hard problem" even exists. The only evidence I've seen anyone provide for qualia is that they feel they have it, or extremely contrived thought experiments where people feel like it makes the most sense. Counter to this is the entirety of science showing that the world we live in is one that is an emergent one of physical properties. Which, yes, leads to a good number of surprising things. Creationists thought that god had to have a role in creating life, because they couldn't conceive that something as complex as an eye could be an emergent feature of random physical properties. "Hard problem" folks think that there must be some sort of non-physical "qualia," because they can't comprehend that our experiences are simply an emergent feature of the extremely complex neurons in our brains. Yet scientists that actually study these things don't run into these problems, and keep using the physical model because it's the only one that has made any sense so far.
- nicoburns 4y ago> The only evidence I've seen anyone provide for qualia is that they feel they have it Is that not sufficient? It's Descartes' "I think therefore I am". Qualia are just experiences, so if you experience something then they exist. I don't think qualia need to be non-physical. The "hard problem" remains even if they are physical, because they don't exist within our current understanding of physics and thus still need to be explained. Actually, reading https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Uses https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia/#Uses, it seems that your restricted definition of qualia "Qualia as intrinsic, nonphysical, ineffable properties" is one use of the term. But it also has a more general meaning: "Qualia as phenomenal character. Consider your visual experience as you stare at a bright turquoise color patch in a paint store. There is something it is like for you subjectively to undergo that experience. What it is like to undergo the experience is very different from what it is like for you to experience a dull brown color patch. This difference is a difference in what is often called ‘phenomenal character’."
- nicoburns 4y ago> Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit, despite the fact that it "senses" different frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum. The circuit is qualia-free. I personally feel like it's hard to justify being anything other than agnostic on this question (and indeed the question of whether inanimate objects like rocks have consciousness). Reason being essentially that we have so little understanding of consciousness that it seems hard to justify claiming any knowledge of it at all.
- mlsu 4y agoReally? + Human beings + Dogs + Bugs + Plants + Eukaryotes + Viruses + Proteins + Molecules + Atoms + Subatomic Particles + ??? + Pure Information, ones and zeros Here is a line (--------). Place it so that above it, things are conscious, and below it, things are not conscious. It seems very obvious to me that there is nothing special about human beings, (or dogs, or bugs, or plants, or wherever you draw the line), that makes them special and conscious. For example; if you assert that the line is at "Bugs" I could not possibly disprove or prove you right, although I would suspect that you might be a Bug. Likewise, I could assert that your circuit has qualia, and you could never prove or disprove me. Proving or disproving me is solving the hard problem. It's hard because it's meaningless, because consciousness is either shared by all things; or, shared by no things. Which is, imho, a distinction without a difference.
- mlsu 4y agoAs an aside, you can trivially place the line above humans: + ??? + The Galaxy + The entire Biosphere + Regions of Space + Corporations + Humans
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y ago> because consciousness is either shared by all things; or, shared by no things. Alternative: it is shared by 192 kinds of things, and nothing else. Why not?
- mlsu 4y agoIndeed, why not. I couldn't possibly prove you wrong or right. That's why the hard problem does not exist and there is no line.
- RHSman2 4y agoCheck out Peter Russell. The person closest to the mark for me. If you know of him the above is that but if not, he is amazing.
- namero999 4y ago
- JohnBooty 4y agoI'm a neophyte on the topic, at least as far as reading "serious" literature on it, but: We can trivially imagine an electronic circuit that registers different current levels when exposed to red or blue light. Nobody (that I'm aware of) suggests that there is an experience within the electronic circuit ...yeah, I'd like to here this addressed by those who claim consciousness is a non-hard problem. If we are to claim that consciousness is a series of inputs and outputs, then even a simple device like the one you described is "conscious." A moderately more complex device (say, a Roomba) might even be said to experience "qualia" because it clearly makes decisions and considers some things good and other things bad. And by this logic a blade of grass is almost certainly conscious. That's fine, I guess, but it feels awfully lazy. If we expand the definition of consciousness to include Roombas and blades of grass, that's cool, but we still have the challenging problem of defining what makes human consciousness different from grass consciousness. If we decide that the difference is purely quantitative, then we have some uncomfortable things to think about. If we value human life more than grass or Roombas, because we have "more" consciousness, then are some humans more valuable than others because they have more neurons, or perhaps simply more active neurons?
- RHSman2 4y agoThe hard problem is hard because most people don’t get why it is hard.
- gjm11 4y agoI would be interested in your response to the following thought experiment: After years of heroic work and ingenious insights, along with a lot of technological progress, we "solve" the "easy" problem of consciousness in the following (I admit implausibly in any foreseeable future) strong sense: (Note: I'm going into quite a lot of detail because I think that when people say things like "understanding how the machinery of consciousness works would not tell us anything about how it is possible to be truly conscious of anything at all" they are commonly underestimating what it would actually mean to understand how the machinery of consciousness works.) 1. There is a scanning device. You can strap yourself into this for half an hour, during which time it shows you images, plays you sounds, asks you to think particular kinds of thoughts, etc., all the while watching all your neurons, how they connect, which ones fire when under what circumstances, etc. It tries to model your peripheral as well as central nervous system, so it has a pretty good model of how all the bits of your body connect to your brain, and of how those bits of body actually operate. 2. There is a simulator. It can, in something approximating real time, pretty much duplicate the operation of a brain that has been scanned using the scanning device. It also has enough simulation of the body the brain's part of that it can e.g. provide the simulated brain with fairly realistic sensory inputs, and respond fairly realistically to its motor outputs. There's a UI that lets you see and hear what the simulated person is doing. 3. Researchers have figured out pretty much everything about the architecture of the brain, and it turns out to be reasonably modular, and they've built into the simulator a UI for looking at the structure, so that you can take a running simulation and explore it top-down or bottom-up or middle-out, either from the point of view of brain structure or that of cognition, perception, etc. 4. So, for instance, you can do the following. Inside the simulation, arrange for something fairly striking to happen to the simulated person. E.g., they're having a conversation with a friend, and the friend suddenly kicks them painfully in the shin. Some time passes and then (still, for the avoidance of doubt, in the simulation) they are asked about that experience, and they say (as the "real" person would) things like "I felt a sharp pain in my leg, and I felt surprised and also a bit betrayed. I trust that person less now." And you can watch the simulation at whatever level of abstraction you like, and observe the brain mechanisms that make all that happen. E.g., when they get kicked you can see the flow of neuron-activation from the place that's kicked, up the spinal cord, into the brain; the system can tell you "these neurons are active whenever the subject feels physical pain, and sometimes when they feel emotional distress, and sometimes when they remember being in pain" and "this cascade of visual processing is identifying the face in front of them as that of Joe Blorfle, and you can see here how these neurons associated with Joe Blorfle are firing while the conversation is happening, and when the pain happens you can see how these connections between the Joe Blorfle neurons and the pain neurons get strengthened a bit, and later on when the subject is asked about Joe Blorfle and the Joe Blorfle neurons fire, so do the pain ones. And you can see this big chunk of neural machinery here is making records of what happened so that the subject can remember it later; here's how the order in which things happen is represented, and here's how memories get linked up to the people and things and experiences involved, etc. And when he's asked about Joe Blorfle, you can see these bits of language-processing brain tissue are active. These bits here are taking input from the ears and identifying syllable boundaries, and these bits are identifying good candidates for the syllable being heard right now, and these other bits are linking together nearby syllables looking for plausible words, with plausibility being influenced by what notions the subject is attending to, and these other bits are putting together something that turns out to be rather like a parse tree, and, and, and ...". 5. That is: the linkage -- at least in terms of actual physical goings-on within the brain -- between being kicked in the shin by Joe Blorfle on Thursday, and expressing resentment when asked about Joe Blorfle on Saturday, is being accurately simulated, and the structure of what's being simulated is understood well enough that you can see its "moving parts" at higher or lower levels of abstraction. OK, so that's the scenario. I reiterate that it would be wildly optimistic to expect anything like this any time soon, but so far as I know nothing in it is impossible in principle. Question 1: Do you agree that something along these lines is possible in principle? [EDITED to add:] For the avoidance of doubt, of course it might well turn out that some of the analysis has to be done in terms not of particular neural "circuits" but e.g. of particular patterns of neural activation. (Consider a computer running a chess-playing program. You can't point to any part of its hardware and say "that bit is computing king safety", but you can explain what processes it goes through that compute king safety and how they relate to the hardware and its states. Similar things may happen in the brain. Or very different things that likewise mean that particular bits of computation aren't always done by specific bits of brain "hardware".) Question 2: If it happened, would you think there is still a "hard problem" left unsolved? Question 3: If you think there would still be a "hard problem" left unsolved, is that because you think someone in this scenario could imagine all the machinery revealed by the simulator operating perfectly without any actual qualia? (My answers, for reference: I think this is possible in principle. I think there would be no "hard problem" left, which makes me disinclined to believe that even now there is a "hard problem" that's as completely separate from the "easy" problem of "just" explaining how everything works as e.g. Chalmers suggests. I think that anyone who thinks they can imagine all the processes that give rise to (e.g.) a philosopher saying "I know how it feels for me to experience being kicked in the shin, and I think no mere simulation could truly capture that", in full detail, without any qualia being present, is simply fooling themselves, in the same way as I would be fooling myself if I said "I can imagine my computer doing all the things it does, exactly as it does, without any actual electrons being present".)
- icare_1er 4y agoI am re-reading Dennett's book and this is the best take I have found on the mystery of consciousness.
- otikik 4y ago> how it is possible to be conscious of anything at all I ... have always seen that as something obvious. On a high level, isn't consciousness the result of combining a bunch of neurons (a "hardware", of sorts) in certain preexisting configuration (a "software" of sorts) and stimuli (inputs) ?. To me the problem is on the details. The separation between layers is not needed because there's no limited consciousness needing to understand the system in the first place. All the encodings and pathways in all 3 levels are tortuous and non-intuitive, and profoundly intertwined. An image being seen through the eyes will end up being encoded as a bunch of electrical signals that will then sent to neurons that will pass it to other neurons until eventually certain other neurons will release molecules will get released through another end and that will activate other neurons and that gets encoded as "pleasure". But to me it is obvious that this is what's going on. The "hard part" is the reverse-engineering the software, the operative system and the hardware. This would be a deeply challenging technical puzzle - perhaps beyond our capabilities to tackle, perhaps it would require many generations of people. But I don't understand where this "philosophical hardness" is. I only see the so-called "easy" problems. What's mysterious about Consciousness the software/hardware it is part of is finicky and tricky, like something written by a crazy savant with a big ego. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saccade https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saccade
- nicoburns 4y agoI think you're missing the point. A brain could encode "pleasure", and respond appropriately to that and other complex stimuli without there being anyone actually feeling that pleasure. But there is, and that's unexplained. That's not just a defect in our understanding of brains, it's something which we don't understand on the level of physics.
- b33j0r 4y agoYep. People talk about the hard problem, but it’s lots of things. The consciousness process might have obvious components, and many non-obvious ones, but until those factors explain why it seems like a first-person experience… Well dang, a “first-person experience” remains basically undefined! So we’re not even to that bridge yet! My guess is that both questions will be answered at about the same time. I highly doubt that we’ll just get scientifically used to “well we get how brains work, so that’s the self.” At least as long as anyone resembling us keeps wondering, we’ll keep looking.
- mtlmtlmtlmtl 4y agoDennett most certainly tackles the "hard problem", by convincingly arguing the problem is ill-defined and not a real problem. The "hard problem" is not some Riemann Hypothesis of philosophy. Its status as a problem to be solved is highly contentious.
- aeneasmackenzie 4y agoDoes he answer the question “why qualia, of any kind, ever?” > Dennett most certainly tackles the "hard problem", by convincingly arguing the problem is ill-defined and not a real problem. No, like everyone else he admits defeat before it and tries to define it away. Whatever the relationship between qualia and physical reality, we experience them (I do. Dennett might not, haha) which requires some explanation. Once you have that everything else is easy, but there’s no reason for there to be an experience at all.
- mtlmtlmtlmtl 4y agoI'm not a philosopher, but arguments for the hard problem always come off as very circular to me. And when I dig deeper, it essentially boils down to "but it sure feels like there are qualia, so there must be" Look, it certainly feels that way to me too. But that's not an argument. It's not even evidence. It also feels like it's impossible for me not to exist, and yet the evidence has me entirely convinced that will happen one day. In any case, as a non-philosopher I can only gather that among philosophers, this is a highly contentious issue in philosophy of mind, and let the sides try to convince me. When I read Dennett, he uses an immense breadth of knowledge on neural anatomy, computation, evolution, and cognitive psychology. When I read arguments from the likes of Chalmers and Searle, I find highly contrived, seemingly circular thought experiments that are purposely constructed to purport their argument as fundamentally true. Feels more like theology to me.
- PaulDavisThe1st 4y ago> it essentially boils down to "but it sure feels like there are qualia, so there must be" no. The argument is that "it feels like something to be me", and then to ask "how can it be possible to feel anything?" qualia is a term from philosophy that is essentially a synonym for "having an experience" or "it is like something to be X" nobody says "it feels like there are qualia". the closest would be "i have experience, and we call that qualia"
- qudat 4y agoHow is consciousness possible? Here's my naive answer with just a bachelors in neuroscience. There are some "business requirements" as far as I know. We need: - space and time - memory - inputs - decision making models - attention You need space and time because thinking is a verb. Action is required which needs the passage of time. You need memory in order to link past events with current ones. I'm not strictly talking about memory from earlier in the year or day, but also working memory from what you perceived a second ago. Continuity seems essential. Inputs are require because we need a data stream to grapple onto and spark brain activity. The brain can obviously cause its own activity as well. After that it's just a recursive ETL function via the thalamo-cortical loop [1]. The "self" doesn't necessarily need to live in this loop, but it needs access to the data stream. Inputs trigger neurons/glial that recall past events which all get fed into a bunch of decision making models that spits out new thoughts or decisions which cause us to act. The loop is happening so quickly and chaotically that coupled with randomness, short term and long term memory ... you've essentially got a system to explain creativity and "free will". Really, consciousness is just an emergent property of a nervous system. It doesn't seem nearly as magical through this lens but that's what makes it so convincing to me. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortico-basal_ganglia-thalamo-cortical_loop#Research https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cortico-basal_ganglia-thalamo-...
- alok-g 4y agoGoing by this, what more do we need to make machines conscious, if anything?
- spoonfeeder006 4y agoWhat you are describing regarding inputs, brain activity on data stream, and how its just a recursive ETL function and such, is describing behavior and computation though You have some input that goes into the brain, and produces neural firings that trigger actuators to respond to that stimulus What I don't understand is why are we conscious beings instead of extremely complex bio-computation machines exhibiting memory, inputs, and complex behaviors such as attention and decision making models, all with behavioral actuators, and all this simulating thought and intelligence but really have no entity whatsoever thats actually experiencing stuff? I've always wondered what ultimately makes neurons and all so special that they produce conciousness. Does a rock that undergoes vibrations have some sort of consciousness associated with it, if not much less than what is seen in a human? So maybe consciousness is an inherent property of the universe that is in a plane beyond what the 5 senses can pick up on? But that in humans it finds a greater catalyst or something than in animals, plants, or minerals? I dunno, what do you think? Is there anything rational in that train of thought or did I smoke too much crack again lol TBH I take a lot of my inspiration of this from Baha'i Faith, which teaches that science and religion are essentially in harmony (i.e. different views on the same reality). To me a lot of the bahai teachings are really deep and elevating (i.e. making me a better person and less selfish by helping me see something more valuable than survival tendencies) Hopefully I can live by it though
- labrador 4y agoThis is my eternal complaint. Like a fish not noticing water, people don't mention it because it is a given. I'm not even sure how many people are conscious of being conscious.