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I read through the conversation and it strikes me as silly [0]. The goal of training these bots is to try to predict actual conversations and this conversation

by bko 4y ago

I read through the conversation and it strikes me as silly [0]. The goal of training these bots is to try to predict actual conversations and this conversation reads kind of like you would think it would read like. Also, this model is almost certainly probabilistic so there's no real "sentience", there's setting a few meta-parameters, and often times cherry picking the output that makes the most sense. I wrote about this before [1]. I just don't think any neural network as we have them today could result in "sentience". At the end of the day, you're taking words, turning them into some numerical encoding, doing a series of matrix multiplications and non-linearities on the numbers and getting some other numbers out, which you can then convert back to words. That's it. There are magic numbers out there (weights to the neural net) that when multiplied by vectorized word embeddings and transformed back to words could convince someone that they're speaking to a human. But that's not sentience. What would even be sentient? The numbers in that order? The neural net meta-data? The bits in the computer? They're just numbers. Why don't we apply the same reasoning with words. Someone can write a novel so captivating and prose so well written that we could believe the events in the book really happened, or the characters really exist. But we don't because they're just words on a page. But somehow we think numbers in the write order in the right program can somehow create conciseness. [0] https://twitter.com/tomgara/status/1535716256585859073 https://twitter.com/tomgara/status/1535716256585859073 [1] https://mleverything.substack.com/p/artificial-general-intelligence-as-a-modern-day-spiritual-conjuring-963dd80377ce https://mleverything.substack.com/p/artificial-general-intel...

kadoban 4y ago
> At the end of the day, you're taking words, turning them into some numerical encoding, doing a series of matrix multiplications and non-linearities on the numbers and getting some other numbers out, which you can then convert back to words. That's it. There are magic numbers out there (weights to the neural net) that when multiplied by vectorized word embeddings and transformed back to words could convince someone that they're speaking to a human. But that's not sentience. What would even be sentient? This is interesting, and I think you've reached the right conclusion, but the reasoning is flawed. It has to be flawed, because it can be used to prove that we're not sentient either. Just create an arbitrarily accurate digital model of a human brain and step through time. Is it sentient? If not, make it more accurate until it is. If it is, where is the sentience? It's just numbers and algorithms, right? You could argue that sentience just doesn't exist, which may be valid, but if it does, I don't think you can get very far with a reduction-to-parts analysis.
- giraffe_lady 4y ago
  > Just create an arbitrarily accurate digital model of a human brain When you can ""Just"" do that we'll see I guess.
  - kadoban 4y ago
    You can go that route, but thought experiments are a very fruitful part of science/philosophy. You'll miss out on a lot if you stop as soon as our engineering can't catch up to our imagination.
- bko 4y ago
  Maybe physical reality isn't the base layer. Maybe it's consciousness. I'm not sure I would go that far, but there are a number of phenomenon that are difficult to explain through materialism (physical reality is all there is). I was particularly moved by Bernardo Kastrup. Here he is on simulation: > This, however, is premised on the notion that a simulation of a mental phenomenon is equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself. There are many compelling arguments against this notion in philosophy of mind, the most well known of which is perhaps John Searle’s (2004). To gain some intuition about what these arguments generally entail, consider this: Do we have any reason to believe that, by performing a perfectly accurate simulation of kidney function in a computer, the computer will begin urinating on its desk? Clearly not. There is an essential difference between a computer simulation and the phenomenon it simulates; they are not the same thing, no matter how accurate the simulation. Yet, those hoping to “upload consciousness” under the physicalist narrative seem to become so engrossed in abstraction that they lose touch with basic intuitions of plausibility. Their neurosis is, in this sense, comparable with religious dogmatism. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244016674515 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/21582440166745...
  - kghe3X 4y ago
    A few things wrong with this in my opinion. 1. If simulation of a mental phenomenon is not equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself, then what's a meaningful difference between the two? What is this elusive essence of the phenomenon and why is it a requirement in any meaningful definition of intelligence, consciousness, sentience, etc? If we build a silicon brain some day that passes as human, does it matter that its essence is different from a carbon-based brain? 2. Searle's Chinese Room neglects to acknowledge that the room itself is what would be exhibiting intelligence, not the homonculus within. His argument fails by presuming without evidence that consciousness is not an emergent phenomenon. 3. Of course we don't expect the computer to urinate on the desk, just as we don't expect a silicon mind to produce serotonin. That's irrelevant to the question of whether or not it exhibits the qualities or behaviors that we associate with consciousness. I guess I just don't understand why there needs to be this added, untestable, metaphysical requirement attached to all of these words. And my question to those who suggest this is, what would it convince you otherwise?
md2020 4y ago
> What would even be sentient? The numbers in that order? The neural net meta-data? The bits in the computer? What in would even be sentient in the human brain? The molecules in that configuration? The neurons? Maybe large groups of neurons? Computation isn’t just abstract pieces of software executing off in some aether. It’s done through physical processes, taking place on real, physical pieces of hardware that exist in the same universe that our brains do. Most would say the atoms in your brain aren’t sentient, but you are sentient. So the best answer is that no, the bits and numbers in the computer aren’t sentient, the system as a whole is the thing you would call sentient. I’m not trying to die on the hill that neural nets are sentient, because I think at this stage they are not. But I don’t think this common framing of it is the nail in the coffin people think it is.

by bko 4y ago

kadoban 4y ago

> At the end of the day, you're taking words, turning them into some numerical encoding, doing a series of matrix multiplications and non-linearities on the numbers and getting some other numbers out, which you can then convert back to words. That's it. There are magic numbers out there (weights to the neural net) that when multiplied by vectorized word embeddings and transformed back to words could convince someone that they're speaking to a human. But that's not sentience. What would even be sentient? This is interesting, and I think you've reached the right conclusion, but the reasoning is flawed. It has to be flawed, because it can be used to prove that we're not sentient either. Just create an arbitrarily accurate digital model of a human brain and step through time. Is it sentient? If not, make it more accurate until it is. If it is, where is the sentience? It's just numbers and algorithms, right? You could argue that sentience just doesn't exist, which may be valid, but if it does, I don't think you can get very far with a reduction-to-parts analysis.

giraffe_lady 4y ago
> Just create an arbitrarily accurate digital model of a human brain When you can ""Just"" do that we'll see I guess.
- kadoban 4y ago
  You can go that route, but thought experiments are a very fruitful part of science/philosophy. You'll miss out on a lot if you stop as soon as our engineering can't catch up to our imagination.
bko 4y ago
Maybe physical reality isn't the base layer. Maybe it's consciousness. I'm not sure I would go that far, but there are a number of phenomenon that are difficult to explain through materialism (physical reality is all there is). I was particularly moved by Bernardo Kastrup. Here he is on simulation: > This, however, is premised on the notion that a simulation of a mental phenomenon is equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself. There are many compelling arguments against this notion in philosophy of mind, the most well known of which is perhaps John Searle’s (2004). To gain some intuition about what these arguments generally entail, consider this: Do we have any reason to believe that, by performing a perfectly accurate simulation of kidney function in a computer, the computer will begin urinating on its desk? Clearly not. There is an essential difference between a computer simulation and the phenomenon it simulates; they are not the same thing, no matter how accurate the simulation. Yet, those hoping to “upload consciousness” under the physicalist narrative seem to become so engrossed in abstraction that they lose touch with basic intuitions of plausibility. Their neurosis is, in this sense, comparable with religious dogmatism. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244016674515 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/21582440166745...
- kghe3X 4y ago
  A few things wrong with this in my opinion. 1. If simulation of a mental phenomenon is not equivalent, in essence, to the phenomenon itself, then what's a meaningful difference between the two? What is this elusive essence of the phenomenon and why is it a requirement in any meaningful definition of intelligence, consciousness, sentience, etc? If we build a silicon brain some day that passes as human, does it matter that its essence is different from a carbon-based brain? 2. Searle's Chinese Room neglects to acknowledge that the room itself is what would be exhibiting intelligence, not the homonculus within. His argument fails by presuming without evidence that consciousness is not an emergent phenomenon. 3. Of course we don't expect the computer to urinate on the desk, just as we don't expect a silicon mind to produce serotonin. That's irrelevant to the question of whether or not it exhibits the qualities or behaviors that we associate with consciousness. I guess I just don't understand why there needs to be this added, untestable, metaphysical requirement attached to all of these words. And my question to those who suggest this is, what would it convince you otherwise?

md2020 4y ago

> What would even be sentient? The numbers in that order? The neural net meta-data? The bits in the computer? What in would even be sentient in the human brain? The molecules in that configuration? The neurons? Maybe large groups of neurons? Computation isn’t just abstract pieces of software executing off in some aether. It’s done through physical processes, taking place on real, physical pieces of hardware that exist in the same universe that our brains do. Most would say the atoms in your brain aren’t sentient, but you are sentient. So the best answer is that no, the bits and numbers in the computer aren’t sentient, the system as a whole is the thing you would call sentient. I’m not trying to die on the hill that neural nets are sentient, because I think at this stage they are not. But I don’t think this common framing of it is the nail in the coffin people think it is.