13 ms·

Details emerge of Air France B777 landing incident

170 points by jtc331 4y ago

rmk 4y ago
Echoes of AF447 here. I thought that Airbus makes the only airliners with no feedback when there are dual inputs applied, and Boeing takes a decidedly different approach. Can someone experienced with this explain how this could have happened?
- 8b16380d 4y ago
  Does sound like 447, and a result of the airbus’ dual stick system. Boeing’s yoke system is connected between the pilot and copilot, so much easier to detect opposite inputs. Also the yoke is right in front of each pilot, instead of on the opposite sides as is the case with the dual sticks in airbus planes, which could be a source of confusion/opposite input problems.
  - venj 4y ago
    the plane involved in a Boeing 777. That's right in the title of the article.
- hkwerf 4y ago
  I've repeatedly heard stated that after a sufficient amount of force is applied to controls, "the link" between the controls is severed or deactivated, without any details regarding how this is done or what the actual effect is. Here's an article stating exactly that: https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/04/28/Pilots-pulled-controls-in-opposite-directions-in-Air-France-landing-scare-Report https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/04/28/Pilots-p... > If opposing forces on the two columns pass a certain limit, the link between them is deactivated or “desynchronized” to prevent accidents in the case of one side getting jammed.
  - deleted 4y ago
    [deleted]
  - herendin 4y ago
    In the 777 it's a direct mechanical linkage between the controls, with a torque-driven breakout which temporarily severs the link if there's too much difference in the two pilots' inputs That still leaves the question of how to interpret opposing inputs for the physical control surfaces, though
  - WalterBright 4y ago
    On the 757, the two control columns are linked with a roller bearing in a detent (notch). With enough torque applied, the bearing will come out of the notch and the columns can move independently.
  - Animats 4y ago
    It's a purely mechanical linkage. I've been trying to read the patent (US 5782436A). The USPTO has a new single-page web app. It's awful for finding by patent number, and worse when you want a full screen image of a drawing. It's clear that if one yoke is jammed and the other is moved with enough force, a spring loaded pin is forced out of a notch and the connection between the two yokes releases. What's not clear is how the linkage still connects to the flight controls. The idea seems to be that the one which is moving wins. What is clear is that, if your side becomes disconnected, your yoke doesn't do anything. No wonder one pilot was frantic. It seems that you get reconnected by moving the disconnected yoke to agree with the one in control. Then the pin falls into the notch and the yokes are connected again. Not sure about that. You can see the pin and notch in the patent drawings. This is independent of the fly-by-wire system. That's downstream from these mechanical devices. I wonder if pilot training includes knowledge that yoke disconnection is possible.
    - hkwerf 4y ago
      > I wonder if pilot training includes knowledge that yoke disconnection is possible. Probably, I've heard https://www.youtube.com/c/MentourPilotaviation https://www.youtube.com/c/MentourPilotaviation talk about it as well.
- willidiots 4y ago
  Entirely speculating, but it sounds like the fundamental problem is that they had a confused Captain and First Officer who both thought they were the Pilot Flying. Human factors / psychology issue. Sure, on a Boeing you'll feel the other pilot's input, but if you're tired enough, or panicking because the plane's not doing what you expected, you might not get the hint. Task saturation - followed by loss of situational awareness - is a very real problem in today's airliners, particularly during takeoff and approach/landing. You're trying to do a ton of things in a small amount of time, while dealing with a dynamic situation outside, and in this case after a long, tiring flight over the Atlantic. There are a great series of (dated but still good) videos from American Airlines about automation dependency, human factors and the simple but very real problems that develop as a result - often leading to panic and disaster when things go wrong. Search YT for "children of the magenta".
  - cryptonector 4y ago
    > my airplane > your airplane [lets go controls] Those are the words to be exchanged to avoid confusion.
    - willidiots 4y ago
      Yeah, simple enough. Also simple enough to go-around when you're obviously slow and going to be short of the runway, but look at Asiana 214. I do wonder if there's some training deficiency or cultural issue that leads to this scenario in Air France flights.
      - cryptonector 4y ago
        This makes me think of Loic Suberville's videos on language...
    - Retric 4y ago
      Sure, just make sure that happens exactly that way 1,000,000 times without any failures… And that’s the root of many issues in aviation. It works 99.99% of the time is not always good enough.
- gerdesj 4y ago
  AF447 was (I read the WP article on it) at 38,000 feet and ice seems to be implicated and quite a few other things. This incident was at 1670 ft. My reading of the article is a P and CP being twats: "During the go-around on the Air France flight, the captain was making nose-down inputs, while the first officer was pulling back on the controls." I'm just a simple civvy but I was an air cadet and learned enough about flying in a single engine trainer to know that only one person should have control. You literally say "I have control" - "You have control" - "I have control". These muppets didn't seem to do that: "It took until 07:52:06, for the captain to become the only person making control inputs." In the very guarded language of accident review I would say that is a damning indictment of the behaviour of the pilot and co-pilot as being completely reckless and bloody stupid.
  - alistairSH 4y ago
    That’s all correct, but AF447 was exacerbated by the pilot and copilot (actually 2 copilots, IIRC, the senior pilot was on break) fighting each others controls as the plane flew towards the ocean. The pitot tube was giving bad readings (frozen over), but from what investigators can tell, one control was trying to pull up and even out and the other was still pitching down to gain speed (per the warnings given by the faulty pitot tube).
    - gerdesj 4y ago
      A car, plane or whatever should only have one driver/pilot. Planes have dual controls by default but this sort of nonsense should not be allowed to happen. This was not AF447 so what on earth happened? I'm guessing inadequacy of some sort and that's on the industry as a whole.
      - phil21 4y ago
        In cases like this it's almost always some variation of normalization of deviance. If company culture doesn't strictly enforce callouts 100% of the time, it's easy to get into a routine of everything being just fine 100's of times until it isn't. Really these sorts of things show there should be a failsafe mechanism that provides tactile/haptic feedback to the pilots if the other inputs are "fighting" theirs. Even an audible alarm isn't enough, as you'll likely get more than a few of those during events where it matters. Proper CRM of course should make this "impossible" - but in high stress moments any more layers of swiss cheese you can add the better.
- ncmncm 4y ago
  Nowadays planes will yank on the controls on their own initiative, most destructively e.g. in the case of a certain pair of 737MAXs. They probably assumed that is what was going on. That the other pilot was doing something obviously wrong is not a natural assumption, when there is an alternative. It seems like Air France has got some procedural drills to work on. One would have hoped that happened already. Somebody should check, this time.
  - tyingq 4y ago
    Technicality, but the 737MAX MCAS was rolling a trim wheel, not moving the yoke.
    - ncmncm 4y ago
      Exerted force on the yoke via the elevator, driven by the trim tab. But they also yank directly on the yoke, for lots of reasons.
- exidy 4y ago
  > I thought that Airbus makes the only airliners with no feedback when there are dual inputs applied This factoid will not die on HN. Conflicting inputs on an Airbus are handled by averaging and an audible "DUAL INPUT" cockpit warning.[1] In the case of AF447, the co-pilot used his "Priority Takeover" button which meant only his control inputs were in effect. If you wanted to say there is no physical feedback, then you would be correct. [1] https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/documents/archives/dual-side-stick-inputs.pdf https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/docume...
  - rmk 4y ago
    Yes, that is what I meant. And any other type of feedback would be likelier to be ignored. That's why there's a stick shaker in addition to auditory and other warnings when the plane stalls, even in fly-by-wire planes.
_whiteCaps_ 4y ago
Interesting to read this, as I have some experience sailing - and that sometimes involves people changing control of the tiller/wheel. The procedure that was drilled into my head at an early stage was this: A: B, take the helm B: I have the helm or for tacking: Skipper: Prepare to tack Crew: Ready to tack Skipper: Helm's a lee Skipper tacks, crew does their stuff If you don't get a response at any point don't continue. Communicate.
- tjohns 4y ago
  That's standard procedure in flying as well, drilled into pilots' heads from their very first flight lesson: A: "You have the flight controls." B: "I have the flight controls." A: "You have the flight controls."
  - chrisseaton 4y ago
    It’s weird I’d thought they use different terms for A’s two phrases, because it’s the same words but the first is an instruction and the second a statement! Different meanings but same words - why’d you do that in designing a protocol!
    - frutiger 4y ago
      Just like TCP, it’s a stateful protocol.
      - chrisseaton 4y ago
        Seems like a terrible idea - what if you’re mistaken about the other person’s understanding of the current state?
        SteveNuts 4y ago
        I'm trying to think how this could possibly be misconstrued
tempnow987 4y ago
As soon as I heard the plane was "unresponsive" to controls I immediately though pilot error just because how unlikely a plane is to be actually unresponsive to controls. Edit: Wow - reading the report I see they got to a 24 degree pitch angle on go around? That seems high, I thought you topped out at 15 or so. This is Air France stuff all over again with the pitch up into a stall etc. I'd love to know how experienced the FO was. "Eventually a point is reached whereby any further increase in angle of attack does not produce an increase in lift, and this point is called the stalling, or critical, angle of attack. Each airfoil has a different critical angle of attack, but with typical general aviation airfoils it is roughly 16 to 20 degrees. " Pitch and AoA are different, but during a landing / go around you are in a low speed regime and it just seems like pitching to nearly 30 degrees nose up is excessive. Is that Air France's standard go around vs 10-15? The true story might be that the captain saved this plane with his nose down inputs.
- ineedasername 4y ago
  >The true story might be that the captain saved this plane with his nose down inputs. Or the AoA was a product of the other pilot over correcting from what they thought was unintended nose down behavior. Hard to say, clearly bad procedure either way though. It's why there's clear protocol regarding who is in control of the plane.
  - tempnow987 4y ago
    The issue is that the REALITY was the plane was going very nose up at low speed. That is THE situation that gets you into a stall / spin situation. Close to the ground in the pattern most folks in the US are taught to be very careful about this. Ie, when you are low and slow, don't go for a big pitch up or a steep bank. There isn't time to recover. That said, I've got NO clue about 777's, so maybe a 25 degree pitch up on takeoff / go around is normal. Hard to imagine aerodynamically that working.
    - roelschroeven 4y ago
      > Close to the ground in the pattern most folks in the US are taught to be very careful about this. What makes you think it's taught differently outside of the US?
kurupt213 4y ago
- smcl 4y ago
  What do you mean? They landed this one safely
yawnxyz 4y ago
Maybe this is a UX issue? If you're trying to fly the plane, but your buddy is also doing it — it should light up / make noise "hey y'all can't fly the plane at the same time"
- dataflow 4y ago
  Yeah, that was my first thought too. Why wouldn't it do that?!
- renox 4y ago
  Yes, this UX issue killed before (AF447) I was told at the time that this was an AirBus issue and that Boeing doesn't have the issue, but apparently both have bad UX.. That's surprising: this seems to be a simple check to implement and a very useful one too!
  - jhugo 4y ago
    To some extent, Boeing doesn't. The controls are physically linked; you can feel the other pilot moving them. In order to make opposing inputs you have to physically fight each others' inputs. It seems in this case there was maybe some additional confusion about automation thrown into the mix; the pilots perhaps thought they were fighting the aircraft rather than each other. This is worrying, since if you want the autopilot disconnected, it would be typical to disconnect it, rather than try to override it (the autopilot will disconnect if manual inputs are made beyond a threshold, but that's not a typical way to disconnect it).
- amelius 4y ago
  Or perhaps train pilots better so they actually provide the same inputs, not opposing ones.
f3rnando 4y ago
Related links: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_eight https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_eight https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/05/14/the-navys-probe-into-sky-penis/ https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/05/14/the-navy...
worik 4y ago
"AeroTime columnist and pilot Captain Michel Treskin commented that the update shows there was no problem with the aircraft but does paint a scene of confusion in the flight deck. " It shows there is a huge problem with the control systems. Am I the only one who sees it? It used to be (did it? I am not an engineer) that the controls were hydraulic and connected. So if you tried opposing moves it was immediately apparent. With "fly by wire" not so much. A good thing the aeroplane landed safely. Others have not
- jhugo 4y ago
  You're the only one who "sees" it because you are mistaken. The controls are still connected, as per the Boeing philosophy. Moving one moves the other, unless so much force is applied that the link opens (by design, to allow controlling the aircraft if one set of controls is stuck for some reason). This is a pretty clear example of pilot error; they had all the information needed to understand what was going on (and, unlike on an Airbus, the additional information of needing to fight each other physically through the controls), and failed to process that information into a correct understanding of the situation. The fact that these type of events keep happening at Air France tells you it's not the individual pilots, but rather a training / company culture issue.
deleted 4y ago
[deleted]
elromulous 4y ago
Why does this sound so similar to Air France 447[1]? Iirc a major difference between Boeing and airbuses, was specifically the control inputs. In Boeing, the pilot and copilot controls were physically linked. In Airbus, they each fed into the autopilot and were averaged. This horrendous functionality was later deemed a contributing factor in the Air France 447 crash. Did Boeing at some point switch to similar controls as Airbus? (I.e. average pilot and copilot controls?) [1]https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 P.s. Tangent: apropos the air france 447 flight, 99% invisible did a solid episode on it some years back, including a bunch of discussion on the terrible HMI: https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/children-of-the-magenta-automation-paradox-pt-1/ https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/children-of-the-magen...
pseingatl 4y ago
You would think that after AF 447, AF would have mandated clear "I have the airplane" procedures in the cockpit. This sounds like a near replay of that accident, and it was a miracle they didn't crash because they were so near the ground.
MomoXenosaga 4y ago
Is it normal for ATC and pilots to converse in French? I thought everything in aviation had to be in English after some lost in translation accidents...
- kwhitefoot 4y ago
  I expect that French was the first language for all concerned since it was a French flag carrier landing at a French airport.
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
Hypergraphe 4y ago
Do we have an explaination why the pilot flying applied that much roll on the left side before go around ?

170 points by jtc331 4y ago

rmk 4y ago

Echoes of AF447 here. I thought that Airbus makes the only airliners with no feedback when there are dual inputs applied, and Boeing takes a decidedly different approach. Can someone experienced with this explain how this could have happened?

8b16380d 4y ago
Does sound like 447, and a result of the airbus’ dual stick system. Boeing’s yoke system is connected between the pilot and copilot, so much easier to detect opposite inputs. Also the yoke is right in front of each pilot, instead of on the opposite sides as is the case with the dual sticks in airbus planes, which could be a source of confusion/opposite input problems.
- venj 4y ago
  the plane involved in a Boeing 777. That's right in the title of the article.
hkwerf 4y ago
I've repeatedly heard stated that after a sufficient amount of force is applied to controls, "the link" between the controls is severed or deactivated, without any details regarding how this is done or what the actual effect is. Here's an article stating exactly that: https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/04/28/Pilots-pulled-controls-in-opposite-directions-in-Air-France-landing-scare-Report https://english.alarabiya.net/News/world/2022/04/28/Pilots-p... > If opposing forces on the two columns pass a certain limit, the link between them is deactivated or “desynchronized” to prevent accidents in the case of one side getting jammed.
- deleted 4y ago
  [deleted]
- herendin 4y ago
  In the 777 it's a direct mechanical linkage between the controls, with a torque-driven breakout which temporarily severs the link if there's too much difference in the two pilots' inputs That still leaves the question of how to interpret opposing inputs for the physical control surfaces, though
- WalterBright 4y ago
  On the 757, the two control columns are linked with a roller bearing in a detent (notch). With enough torque applied, the bearing will come out of the notch and the columns can move independently.
- Animats 4y ago
  It's a purely mechanical linkage. I've been trying to read the patent (US 5782436A). The USPTO has a new single-page web app. It's awful for finding by patent number, and worse when you want a full screen image of a drawing. It's clear that if one yoke is jammed and the other is moved with enough force, a spring loaded pin is forced out of a notch and the connection between the two yokes releases. What's not clear is how the linkage still connects to the flight controls. The idea seems to be that the one which is moving wins. What is clear is that, if your side becomes disconnected, your yoke doesn't do anything. No wonder one pilot was frantic. It seems that you get reconnected by moving the disconnected yoke to agree with the one in control. Then the pin falls into the notch and the yokes are connected again. Not sure about that. You can see the pin and notch in the patent drawings. This is independent of the fly-by-wire system. That's downstream from these mechanical devices. I wonder if pilot training includes knowledge that yoke disconnection is possible.
  - hkwerf 4y ago
    > I wonder if pilot training includes knowledge that yoke disconnection is possible. Probably, I've heard https://www.youtube.com/c/MentourPilotaviation https://www.youtube.com/c/MentourPilotaviation talk about it as well.
willidiots 4y ago
Entirely speculating, but it sounds like the fundamental problem is that they had a confused Captain and First Officer who both thought they were the Pilot Flying. Human factors / psychology issue. Sure, on a Boeing you'll feel the other pilot's input, but if you're tired enough, or panicking because the plane's not doing what you expected, you might not get the hint. Task saturation - followed by loss of situational awareness - is a very real problem in today's airliners, particularly during takeoff and approach/landing. You're trying to do a ton of things in a small amount of time, while dealing with a dynamic situation outside, and in this case after a long, tiring flight over the Atlantic. There are a great series of (dated but still good) videos from American Airlines about automation dependency, human factors and the simple but very real problems that develop as a result - often leading to panic and disaster when things go wrong. Search YT for "children of the magenta".
- cryptonector 4y ago
  > my airplane > your airplane [lets go controls] Those are the words to be exchanged to avoid confusion.
  - willidiots 4y ago
    Yeah, simple enough. Also simple enough to go-around when you're obviously slow and going to be short of the runway, but look at Asiana 214. I do wonder if there's some training deficiency or cultural issue that leads to this scenario in Air France flights.
    - cryptonector 4y ago
      This makes me think of Loic Suberville's videos on language...
  - Retric 4y ago
    Sure, just make sure that happens exactly that way 1,000,000 times without any failures… And that’s the root of many issues in aviation. It works 99.99% of the time is not always good enough.
gerdesj 4y ago
AF447 was (I read the WP article on it) at 38,000 feet and ice seems to be implicated and quite a few other things. This incident was at 1670 ft. My reading of the article is a P and CP being twats: "During the go-around on the Air France flight, the captain was making nose-down inputs, while the first officer was pulling back on the controls." I'm just a simple civvy but I was an air cadet and learned enough about flying in a single engine trainer to know that only one person should have control. You literally say "I have control" - "You have control" - "I have control". These muppets didn't seem to do that: "It took until 07:52:06, for the captain to become the only person making control inputs." In the very guarded language of accident review I would say that is a damning indictment of the behaviour of the pilot and co-pilot as being completely reckless and bloody stupid.
- alistairSH 4y ago
  That’s all correct, but AF447 was exacerbated by the pilot and copilot (actually 2 copilots, IIRC, the senior pilot was on break) fighting each others controls as the plane flew towards the ocean. The pitot tube was giving bad readings (frozen over), but from what investigators can tell, one control was trying to pull up and even out and the other was still pitching down to gain speed (per the warnings given by the faulty pitot tube).
  - gerdesj 4y ago
    A car, plane or whatever should only have one driver/pilot. Planes have dual controls by default but this sort of nonsense should not be allowed to happen. This was not AF447 so what on earth happened? I'm guessing inadequacy of some sort and that's on the industry as a whole.
    - phil21 4y ago
      In cases like this it's almost always some variation of normalization of deviance. If company culture doesn't strictly enforce callouts 100% of the time, it's easy to get into a routine of everything being just fine 100's of times until it isn't. Really these sorts of things show there should be a failsafe mechanism that provides tactile/haptic feedback to the pilots if the other inputs are "fighting" theirs. Even an audible alarm isn't enough, as you'll likely get more than a few of those during events where it matters. Proper CRM of course should make this "impossible" - but in high stress moments any more layers of swiss cheese you can add the better.
ncmncm 4y ago
Nowadays planes will yank on the controls on their own initiative, most destructively e.g. in the case of a certain pair of 737MAXs. They probably assumed that is what was going on. That the other pilot was doing something obviously wrong is not a natural assumption, when there is an alternative. It seems like Air France has got some procedural drills to work on. One would have hoped that happened already. Somebody should check, this time.
- tyingq 4y ago
  Technicality, but the 737MAX MCAS was rolling a trim wheel, not moving the yoke.
  - ncmncm 4y ago
    Exerted force on the yoke via the elevator, driven by the trim tab. But they also yank directly on the yoke, for lots of reasons.
exidy 4y ago
> I thought that Airbus makes the only airliners with no feedback when there are dual inputs applied This factoid will not die on HN. Conflicting inputs on an Airbus are handled by averaging and an audible "DUAL INPUT" cockpit warning.[1] In the case of AF447, the co-pilot used his "Priority Takeover" button which meant only his control inputs were in effect. If you wanted to say there is no physical feedback, then you would be correct. [1] https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/documents/archives/dual-side-stick-inputs.pdf https://safetyfirst.airbus.com/app/themes/mh_newsdesk/docume...
- rmk 4y ago
  Yes, that is what I meant. And any other type of feedback would be likelier to be ignored. That's why there's a stick shaker in addition to auditory and other warnings when the plane stalls, even in fly-by-wire planes.

_whiteCaps_ 4y ago

Interesting to read this, as I have some experience sailing - and that sometimes involves people changing control of the tiller/wheel. The procedure that was drilled into my head at an early stage was this: A: B, take the helm B: I have the helm or for tacking: Skipper: Prepare to tack Crew: Ready to tack Skipper: Helm's a lee Skipper tacks, crew does their stuff If you don't get a response at any point don't continue. Communicate.

tjohns 4y ago
That's standard procedure in flying as well, drilled into pilots' heads from their very first flight lesson: A: "You have the flight controls." B: "I have the flight controls." A: "You have the flight controls."
- chrisseaton 4y ago
  It’s weird I’d thought they use different terms for A’s two phrases, because it’s the same words but the first is an instruction and the second a statement! Different meanings but same words - why’d you do that in designing a protocol!
  - frutiger 4y ago
    Just like TCP, it’s a stateful protocol.
    - chrisseaton 4y ago
      Seems like a terrible idea - what if you’re mistaken about the other person’s understanding of the current state?
      - SteveNuts 4y ago
        I'm trying to think how this could possibly be misconstrued

tempnow987 4y ago

As soon as I heard the plane was "unresponsive" to controls I immediately though pilot error just because how unlikely a plane is to be actually unresponsive to controls. Edit: Wow - reading the report I see they got to a 24 degree pitch angle on go around? That seems high, I thought you topped out at 15 or so. This is Air France stuff all over again with the pitch up into a stall etc. I'd love to know how experienced the FO was. "Eventually a point is reached whereby any further increase in angle of attack does not produce an increase in lift, and this point is called the stalling, or critical, angle of attack. Each airfoil has a different critical angle of attack, but with typical general aviation airfoils it is roughly 16 to 20 degrees. " Pitch and AoA are different, but during a landing / go around you are in a low speed regime and it just seems like pitching to nearly 30 degrees nose up is excessive. Is that Air France's standard go around vs 10-15? The true story might be that the captain saved this plane with his nose down inputs.

ineedasername 4y ago
>The true story might be that the captain saved this plane with his nose down inputs. Or the AoA was a product of the other pilot over correcting from what they thought was unintended nose down behavior. Hard to say, clearly bad procedure either way though. It's why there's clear protocol regarding who is in control of the plane.
- tempnow987 4y ago
  The issue is that the REALITY was the plane was going very nose up at low speed. That is THE situation that gets you into a stall / spin situation. Close to the ground in the pattern most folks in the US are taught to be very careful about this. Ie, when you are low and slow, don't go for a big pitch up or a steep bank. There isn't time to recover. That said, I've got NO clue about 777's, so maybe a 25 degree pitch up on takeoff / go around is normal. Hard to imagine aerodynamically that working.
  - roelschroeven 4y ago
    > Close to the ground in the pattern most folks in the US are taught to be very careful about this. What makes you think it's taught differently outside of the US?

kurupt213 4y ago

smcl 4y ago
What do you mean? They landed this one safely

yawnxyz 4y ago

Maybe this is a UX issue? If you're trying to fly the plane, but your buddy is also doing it — it should light up / make noise "hey y'all can't fly the plane at the same time"

dataflow 4y ago
Yeah, that was my first thought too. Why wouldn't it do that?!
renox 4y ago
Yes, this UX issue killed before (AF447) I was told at the time that this was an AirBus issue and that Boeing doesn't have the issue, but apparently both have bad UX.. That's surprising: this seems to be a simple check to implement and a very useful one too!
- jhugo 4y ago
  To some extent, Boeing doesn't. The controls are physically linked; you can feel the other pilot moving them. In order to make opposing inputs you have to physically fight each others' inputs. It seems in this case there was maybe some additional confusion about automation thrown into the mix; the pilots perhaps thought they were fighting the aircraft rather than each other. This is worrying, since if you want the autopilot disconnected, it would be typical to disconnect it, rather than try to override it (the autopilot will disconnect if manual inputs are made beyond a threshold, but that's not a typical way to disconnect it).
amelius 4y ago
Or perhaps train pilots better so they actually provide the same inputs, not opposing ones.

f3rnando 4y ago

Related links: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_eight https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_eight https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/05/14/the-navys-probe-into-sky-penis/ https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/05/14/the-navy...

worik 4y ago

"AeroTime columnist and pilot Captain Michel Treskin commented that the update shows there was no problem with the aircraft but does paint a scene of confusion in the flight deck. " It shows there is a huge problem with the control systems. Am I the only one who sees it? It used to be (did it? I am not an engineer) that the controls were hydraulic and connected. So if you tried opposing moves it was immediately apparent. With "fly by wire" not so much. A good thing the aeroplane landed safely. Others have not

jhugo 4y ago
You're the only one who "sees" it because you are mistaken. The controls are still connected, as per the Boeing philosophy. Moving one moves the other, unless so much force is applied that the link opens (by design, to allow controlling the aircraft if one set of controls is stuck for some reason). This is a pretty clear example of pilot error; they had all the information needed to understand what was going on (and, unlike on an Airbus, the additional information of needing to fight each other physically through the controls), and failed to process that information into a correct understanding of the situation. The fact that these type of events keep happening at Air France tells you it's not the individual pilots, but rather a training / company culture issue.

deleted 4y ago

[deleted]

elromulous 4y ago

Why does this sound so similar to Air France 447[1]? Iirc a major difference between Boeing and airbuses, was specifically the control inputs. In Boeing, the pilot and copilot controls were physically linked. In Airbus, they each fed into the autopilot and were averaged. This horrendous functionality was later deemed a contributing factor in the Air France 447 crash. Did Boeing at some point switch to similar controls as Airbus? (I.e. average pilot and copilot controls?) [1]https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_France_Flight_447 P.s. Tangent: apropos the air france 447 flight, 99% invisible did a solid episode on it some years back, including a bunch of discussion on the terrible HMI: https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/children-of-the-magenta-automation-paradox-pt-1/ https://99percentinvisible.org/episode/children-of-the-magen...

pseingatl 4y ago

You would think that after AF 447, AF would have mandated clear "I have the airplane" procedures in the cockpit. This sounds like a near replay of that accident, and it was a miracle they didn't crash because they were so near the ground.

MomoXenosaga 4y ago

Is it normal for ATC and pilots to converse in French? I thought everything in aviation had to be in English after some lost in translation accidents...

kwhitefoot 4y ago
I expect that French was the first language for all concerned since it was a French flag carrier landing at a French airport.
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Hypergraphe 4y ago

Do we have an explaination why the pilot flying applied that much roll on the left side before go around ?