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Is “KAX17” performing de-anonymization Attacks against Tor Users?
- jerheinze 5y agoInstead of messing with your path selection a better strategy would be just run your own guard nodes that you trust (a guard node is the first node that you connect to in a Tor circuit) and to stick with them. Remember, de-anonymization attacks require the attacker to control both the guard node and the exit node at the same time.
- pstrateman 5y agoThat only works if the attacker doesn't know the guard node is you. If they do all you've done is made the middle mode the guard.
- jerheinze 5y ago> That only works if the attacker doesn't know the guard node is you. That's not how Tor nodes work. Once you setup a guard node (and it got enough reputation) you won't be the only person using the guard node. Also de-anonymization attacks require you to know the traffic coming to the guard node (and if you run a trustworthy one yourself and you're not dealing with a global passive adversary then there's no way the attacker will be able to see the incoming traffic to the guard node).
- pstrateman 5y agoIf the node is yours there's a good chance the standard list of adversaries know that you run it.
- VWWHFSfQ 5y agoRunning your own node and "sticking with it" is not a great idea especially if you're the only one using it. You will be spotted and identified pretty much instantly
- jerheinze 5y ago> especially if you're the only one using it That's not how Tor nodes work. Once you setup a guard node (and it got enough reputation) you will NOT be the only person using it.
- yardstick 5y ago> > just run your own guard node that you trust I guess this approach works fine for an individual, but if everyone has to run their own guard node to be safe, why would anyone connect to your guard node (given it would be risky from their perspective since they aren’t running it themselves). In other words, if you accept you can’t trust anyone else, why would anyone else trust your node too? (Edit: Sorry I’m wording it poorly but I hope you get the idea)
- jerheinze 5y agoThe overwhelming majority of people don't customize their path selection in Tor, so you will always get traffic to your new guard node.
- p_j_w 5y agoI think what GP was getting at is that your solution is not a global one. Not everyone can employ it.
- JasonFruit 5y agoMost people don't need to. Most people use Tor when it's a) completely unnecessary, b) not interesting to the sort of well-funded attacker that could run this many nodes, or c) only needed to avoid identifying them to the service they're requesting from.
- sildur 5y agoI use tor to update my machines, to generate noise, mostly.
- int0x2e 5y agoIf you want your guard node to be helpful in anonymizing your traffic, you should really make sure it's public and used by some % of the global user base (so that your traffic blends in the noise). Once you do that though, you will always have to trust that node a little less than you could if it was walled-off so it would only serve you, just because it is another machine serving connections on the internet that will likely be targeted by adversaries who would benefit from turning many of the guard nodes into part of their Tor de-anonymization service. If I had endless resources and was truly paranoid, what I'd do is build my set of public guard nodes, make sure they're serving Tor traffic, etc. But then, I'd "borrow" those IPs occasionally for trusted nodes which will only accept connections from me (ideally both sets of machines will be live and routing traffic simultaneously). In theory, you could apply the same tricks with similar success to exit nodes of course (though as usual, running an exit node is generally a slightly riskier / harder thing to do)
- 74B5 5y agoWouldn't it be a far easier solution to run a regular relay node that can also be guard node but only for you? So nobody except you knows.
- tga_d 5y agoWhich relays are guard relays is public knowledge (by necessity, it's how clients know which hops to select). If you operate a middle relay, and you see traffic coming from a relay not known to be a guard, you know it's from a non-standard Tor config, since you should only see circuits being built through guards (ignoring onion service traffic, which is small enough that we can do so in the limit). If you mean "get your relay listed as a guard, but don't accept traffic from anyone else", 1. you're going to lose your guard flag pretty quickly trying that, and 2. you ultimately have the same problem, since the adversarial middle will see that this guard is relaying suspiciously little traffic (relays only get flagged by auths as guards if they can handle above a certain amount of traffic, since they are designed to change infrequently, so a bad one will give you a bad Tor experience for a long time).
- rlt 5y agoGrab bag of questions: Does an attacker only need to control the guard and exit nodes, or the middle relay node(s) as well? If the latter, can you configure Tor to use more than one middle relay node, depending on your threat model? Could Tor do something like overlay a fixed-throughput circuit-switched network on top of the packet-switched network to prevent correlation attacks? Obviously at the expensive of efficiency. Also: If KAX17 is running nodes on 50+ AS's "including non-cheap cloud hosters like Microsoft" shouldn't it just take one insider at one of those hosts to leak the identity of one or more of these node operators? Come on, guys...
- jerheinze 5y ago> Does an attacker only need to control the guard and exit nodes, or the middle relay node(s) as well? No, only controlling the guard and exit nodes is necessary. > If the latter, can you configure Tor to use more than one middle relay node, depending on your threat model? Tor makes dozens of circuits in a typical use. You never stick to a single circuit. In the Tor Browser you have first party stream isolation so you get a different circuit (and hence different middle and exit nodes) for each first party domain that you visit.
- fdhfdjkfhdkj 5y agoThis author going to either get recruited by or murdered by this malicious actor
- trhway 5y agogiven that running Tor relay (god forbid - node) is risky for a regular citizen, i suspect that majority of Tor is run these days by the ones immune to such risks, ie. the law enforcement (and the ones made to collaborate). In such a situation the correlation should be pretty easy.
- tn890 5y agoSurprised to see a quality post on Medium. I'd be interested to know why the author chose Medium?
- drugones 5y agoMedium was good when it started, then got overhauled by low quality; you can still find good content here and there.
- tantalor 5y agoWeird how this article has a "hashtag" but its not a link, so its not actually a hashtag. Medium actually has a "tag" feature, but this ain't it: https://medium.com/tag/KAX17 https://medium.com/tag/KAX17 (404 Page Not Found)
- russh 5y agoOf course, it's Medium.com policy never to imply ownership in the event of a hashtag. We have to use the indefinite article, "a hashtag," never ... your hashtag.
- analognoise 5y agohttps://youtu.be/GfqEBVFHnTg https://youtu.be/GfqEBVFHnTg
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- sp332 5y agoTwitter users started using hashtags well before the Twitter platform automatically turned them into links. The important part of a hashtag is the syntactic # and not the HTML <a> tag.
- wlesieutre 5y agoThat's useful if you can do exact text searches, which are increasingly not supported
- amatecha 5y agoLightweight frontend alternative: https://scribe.rip/is-kax17-performing-de-anonymization-attacks-against-tor-users-42e566defce8 https://scribe.rip/is-kax17-performing-de-anonymization-atta...
- nabakin 5y agoFront ends are getting more common around here. I like this change. If they reach mainstream, maybe websites will finally become more responsive
- amatecha 5y agoyeah! scribe.rip, teddit, invidious... I'm all for it!
- zaik 5y agoIf they reach mainstream their backends will get blocked by the main site operators
- amatecha 5y agoDo you mean that the service (YouTube) will block the operators of Invidious instances? If so, this already happens, thus the constantly-updated open source projects. If you meant something else, ignore me, haha
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- hereforphone 5y agoQuestion from someone outside the Tor loop: how do they know that these various nodes are correlated with one another / belong to the same entity?
- mmastrac 5y agoIt's not specified, but related to the software they are running: "In autumn 2019 I stumbled on something odd: Tor relays doing something that the official tor software is unable to do." [1] [1] https://nusenu.medium.com/the-growing-problem-of-malicious-relays-on-the-tor-network-2f14198af548 https://nusenu.medium.com/the-growing-problem-of-malicious-r...
- rsync 5y ago"... how do they know that these various nodes are correlated with one another ..." The OP alludes to this: "... and the fact that someone runs such a large network fraction of relays “doing things” that ordinary relays can not do (intentionally vague), is enough to ring all kinds of alarm bells." ... and the OP is "intentionally vague". I, also, am very interested to know how they correlated them and what the interesting behavior was that they exhibited ...
- password4321 5y agoIn very small part: > Some of KAX17's relays initially had used that email address in their ContactInfo but soon after these relays were setup the email address got removed from their configuration.
- qeternity 5y agoNice try, KAX17
- doomjunky 5y agoThey don't need correlation. Operating large numbers of nodes gives them a high enough probability that all three hops may be under their control thus they can observe the entire route.
- kingcharles 5y agoWhat was the email address they were using?
- saurik 5y agoFWIW, as much as people love to rag on cryptocurrencies, I feel like this is where they shine. (Of course--as someone like me always shows up--I work on Orchid, a cryptocurrency market for bandwidth that is intended to support various use cases including those similar to Tor.) The issue is that no one entity should be able to just sit around and dominate the directory of nodes by claiming "I'm a million nodes, wheee!!!", and so that needs to be "expensive". However, for it to be expensive, they also need a way to make money running the nodes. In our case, people have to lock some money up in a shared pile in order to gain control over percentages of the directory, and what you get in return is that you randomly will get people using you to relay their traffic, for which they will pay you fees (likely close to cost). (Essentially, instead of Tor's mechanism where, when you want to find a relay node, you randomly select between all entries with equal weight, you would select between market participants linearly weighted by the amount of money they have locked up in the directory.) And that's really what most of these cryptocurrencies are doing in this generation of new decentralized protocols (which I've seen people hate on): dealing with the reality that there are bad actors and not everyone is going to run the software without evil changes. This is also the core of Ethereum: you want a decentralized database capable of transactions? OK, well, the order of operations matters (as transactions can preclude the ability for later incompatible ones) and so we need to limit the influence that any one operator has... ...so you build a system where nodes have to spend something--either doing some silly math constantly (proof of work) or locking some money up in a pile (proof of stake)--to gain control over percentages of the directory, and in return they get to charge fees to commit transactions. (There is additionally often an inflation-based "rewards" component, in the case where not enough people are yet paying fees. I'm honestly not for these and have a way-too-complex-for-here argument for why they might even be "evil" in most cases, but that's kind of irrelevant anyway.) The reality is that, if you want to build a decentralized system, and you want to figure out how to make it hard for bad people to do bad things, you have to raise the cost of doing said bad things; but, to do that will require programmable money... leading you to crypto.
- NikolaNovak 5y ago>>"The issue is that no one entity should be able to just sit around and dominate the directory of nodes by claiming "I'm a million nodes, wheee!!!", and so that needs to be "expensive". However, for it to be expensive, they also need a way to make money running the nodes. " I always feel either I'm stupid or I'm missing something when it comes to crypto, Because I understand words and I feel I understand concepts but I don't understand linkages others take for granted, as it pertains to problem at hand of anonymous communication. If nodes are expensive, doesn't nsa have more money than any given privacy focused individual or organizing? If they make money how is it expensive in a useful way I genuinely don't understand how that solution solves a problem, unless they problem is "we need another way to transfer money (ideally to ourselves and early adopters from late adopters)."
- hammock 5y agoNot having that great a grasp on tor, can i blacklist kax17 or otherwise avoid them somehow?
- jchw 5y agoWhile running exit nodes definitely seems undesirable due to the volume of abusive traffic that is likely to go through the exit node, I bet other kinds of relays would be a lot less cumbersome. Obviously a very well-funded attacker will always have the upper hand, and obviously, if you were to always use your own node as the guard node, it would lose some of the properties of Tor, but I bet it wouldn't hurt for more of us to run nodes. I am interested.
- testesttest 5y agoI have ran a node for years. I gave up running exit nodes because of mentioned abuse. It is very easy to run non exit nodes.
- vmception 5y agoOr just use onion services and don't worry about exit nodes
- netsec_burn 5y agoThe guards are most of the concern here.
- noident 5y agoKAX17 also employed middle relays. It's not out of the question that they are attacking onion services in some way, like the 2014 "relay early" attack. For example, if you run a relay chosen as a guard for an onion service, there are a number of clever tricks (sending heavy traffic to the onion service + observing which IP suddenly has lots of activity + eliminating other relay IPs) that can be done to find the IP of an onion service. There are also "sniper" DDoS attacks that can force an onion service to use your node as a guard. I would imagine that many or most onion operators haven't bothered to enable the Vanguard addon that makes this attack a little more expensive. I really wonder about the feasability of keeping onion service IPs globally secret. It may not be possible. I would certainly not stake my freedom on it. End user traffic to onion services is considerably harder to compromise, though.
- wolverine876 5y ago> I really wonder about the feasability of keeping onion service IPs globally secret. It may not be possible. I would certainly not stake my freedom on it. Me either. KAX17 is visible. There are exceptionally well-resourced organizations with I think the motivation to unmask a seemingly target-rich collection of users, and the money and skill to simply infiltrate most relays, probably without being noticed. I also wouldn't stake my freedom on it because it is simple to detect that you are using Tor, and that puts you in a tiny group, one that is (again) seemingly target-rich.
- sneeeeeed 5y agoLuckily Tor is set to keep the same guard relay basically forever so attacks are much easier.
- zxcvbn4038 5y agoI believe the guard nodes get changed periodically but remain the same for weeks unless you clear the state. If you use bridges they take the place of a guard node and you will want to share otherwise it’s easy for an observer to associate inputs and outputs. Using a vpn to connect to a bridge can provide some additional protection of your origin IP even if your bridge/guard mode is discovered.
- c7DJTLrn 5y agoTor is not as secure as it is often thought. It needs to be redesigned and/or adopt some modifications from I2P's "garlic routing". I suggest a complete end-to-end rethink of how anonymous Internet services are done. Instead of it being a tunnel for generic traffic, think of a specialised private protocol for input/output of information. Throw away the highly complex, insecure HTML5 that most hidden services are interacted through. Instead of slow, bloated HTTP requests, think of sockets that stay alive meaning traffic can be high bandwidth and low latency. We could even throw in some modern cryptography like ED25519 which would give some performance benefit. I had an idea for 'heartbeat groups' too which would prevent timing attacks at the ISP/wider Internet level. If it weren't for the fact that I have a full time job and don't want the Five Eyes on me, I'd build it myself.
- dannyw 5y agoYou're speaking to a browser that enables JavaScript by default and refuses to bulge.
- noident 5y agoThat's a reasonable default for 99% of Tor users. For that last 1%, there is the safe/safer/safest slider bar that is a single click away. Javascript also has nothing to do with these attacks. Even if you turn off Javascript, KAX17 can still attempt end-to-end correlation attacks. This is much scarier than a Javascript browser exploit.
- dannyw 5y agoif you're using Tor you are the 1%.
- Sirened 5y agoNot sure what you mean by heartbeat groups, but if I'm guessing correctly this sounds fairly similar to chaffing and winnowing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaffing_and_winnowing https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaffing_and_winnowing which lets information from multiple senders (or even bogus, non-existent senders) to be clumped together and broadcast in such a way that every destination is able to pick out only the messages intended for them and cannot distinguish messages not meant for them from uniformly random garbage.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- im3w1l 5y ago> They make use of the biggest Tor hosters (OVH and Hetzner) to blend in with the rest Uhh, that sounds like another problematic thing. Forcing their cooperation surely wouldn't be too hard.
- krageon 5y agoHetzner is German, which has actually strong privacy laws. In terms of coordination it is easier, but in terms of actually getting to the cooperation it is much more difficult than any alternatives you are likely to be using.
- vadiml 5y agoThere are news coming from russian Twitter bloggers that Tor is blocked in Russia.
- southerntofu 5y agoDmitry Bogatov, a Debian developer, famously spent time in jail for running a Tor exit node a few years back.
- gentleman11 5y agoWill apples upcoming vpn like service be vulnerable to this as well?
- noident 5y agoNo, Tor and a VPN are not compareable services. The Apple VPN is a closed network run on servers run by Apple, so you have to put 100% of your trust in Apple, as opposed to the open network of Tor, where trust is (ideally) distributed among many different actors.
- 4ad 5y agoThat's not how iCloud Private Relay works, and it's not a VPN. The ingress nodes are currently ran by Apple, the eggress nodes are ran by other providers, mostly Cloudfare, Akamai and Fastly. The ingress nodes who you are[1], but they can't see who you're connecting to, the egress nodes see the traffic, but they don't know who you are. You still have to trust Apple, but not because iCloud Private Relay is ran by Apple, but because the client is proprietary software running on a proprietary operating system that Apple has control of. But this is true if you chose to use macs in general, using iCloud Private Relay doesn't add new requirements to the level of trust. As for correlation attacks from a 3rd party, they can be both easier and harder compared to Tor depending on the attacker. For a global attacker they are harder, because the circuit is geographically limited in scope and the attacker would have to have access to your particular network, and of course the attacker can't install new exit nodes. However, for a local attacker that for whatever reason has visibility into the network hosting the circuit, they are easier since there are only two nodes in the circuit. And of course, for a government iCloud Private Relay would pose no problem whatsoever, since all operators are commercial entities and you need a paid account[1] to use iCloud Private Relay... But even in that case, it requires the collusion of both the exit node provider and Apple to unmask you. [1] Certain type of traffic is always sent unauthenticated through the relay, even when iCloud Private Relay is not enabled.
- noident 5y ago> But even in that case, it requires the collusion of both the exit node provider and Apple to unmask you. So it takes two national security letters to unmask you instead of one?
- lngnmn2 5y agoIt should be some state actor, since such activities are costly and wasteful. It could be US, China or Russia. US to fight "terrorism" (tax evasion), the later - their own critics and residents.