7 ms·

I really don't see why the scanning would ever be done on the phone instead of on iCloud if it only affects iCloud images. But I do have guesses why.

czzr 5y ago
Only semi-good reason is it would enable E2E encryption in the cloud while still allowing detection of CSAM.
- roody15 5y ago
  Except despite this being repeated over and over… Apple has not said anything about E2E
  - czzr 5y ago
    As I said, the design enables this, if Apple chose to do it. It remains to be seen if they will.
    - zionic 5y ago
      The design more plausible enables total device surveillance than questionable iCloud Backups. (I refuse to call a backdoored setup E2EE)
      - zepto 5y ago
        That’s silly. The design is so narrowly tailored to scan for CSAM that nobody can use it for anything else.
        FabHK 5y ago
        It all depends on what perceptual hashes you use. If Apple can institute a process whereby those are tied to the OS version, but not to the region, then it would be impossible to impose jurisdiction-specific exceptions.
        zepto 5y ago
        > It all depends on what perceptual hashes you use. I’m talking about the mechanism as described, not a hypothetical. > If Apple can institute a process whereby those are tied to the OS version, but not to the region, then it would be impossible to impose jurisdiction-specific exceptions. As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction.
        FabHK 5y ago
        > As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction. That is very worrisome. How do they want to withstand political pressure then to make the database of "bad hashes" dependent on the jurisdiction if they've already made the feature dependent on the jurisdiction?
        zepto 5y ago
        Presumably they’ll just say, we built a child abuse prevention mechanism and we have no intention of using it for anything else.
        fsflover 5y ago
        > As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction. How do you know? I think it's just implemented in the US. Nothing stops Apple to implement it elsewhere.
        shuckles 5y ago
        They have said the mechanism is global in both their FAQ and in an interview with Tech Crunch. They have no way to target a database to a region or device.
  - macintux 5y ago
    Apple almost never talks about features like that until they’re ready, so while you’re correct, it doesn’t mean much.
    - wyager 5y ago
      It's been leaked before that Apple folded under pressure from the FBI not to add iCloud encryption for images.
      - ummonk 5y ago
        That would seem to back up the theory that they plan to roll out E2EE and are adding on-device scanning first to enable that.
    - Clubber 5y ago
      With all this backlash, now would probably be a tactically good time.
  - zepto 5y ago
    It’s also being repeated over and over that apple is doing this so they can later do some more evil scanning. They haven’t said anything about that either.
- nullc 5y ago
  Apple is free to enable E2E encryption today, without the backdoor.
AlexandrB 5y ago
That's the crux of it. Why bother with on-device identification, unless one of: a. Apple intends to E2E encrypt iCloud data. b. This is intended to extend to all photos on the device in the future. I'm hoping it's (a), but it's probably (b). And in either case it sets a bad precedent for other companies to follow. Edit: This also turns every jailbreak into a possible CSAM detection avoidance mechanism, giving the government plausible cover to treat them as serious, criminal actions. Apple would probably love that.
- still_grokking 5y ago
  Where is this stance coming form that Apple needs to break E2E crypto to be "able" to "E2E encrypt iCloud data"? That makes absolutely no sense. There is nowhere such a requirement. They could just E2E encrypt iCloud data. Point.
  - FabHK 5y ago
    They could E2E iCloud, of course. Question is whether they could while still staying on the right side of the law.
    - still_grokking 5y ago
      Is there a law requiring device manufactures to search (without any warrant!) the devices of all their customers? How do for example hard drive manufacturers comply?
  - matwood 5y ago
    There is no requirement right now, but you only need to look at what's happening in the US, UK, and EU to see the battle setting up around E2EE. Apple may see this feature as a way to quiet critics of E2EE. Hard to know if it will be enough. But, I think it's safe to say if Apple did turn on E2EE w/o any provision for things like CSAM, it would help drive legislation that is likely more heavy handed.
    - 5y ago
deleted 5y ago
[deleted]
pvarangot 5y ago
This article speculates that that's because Apple is not scanning on iCloud to respect their privacy policy: https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-One-Bad-Apple.html https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-On... Apple's report count to the NCMEC is really low so it's probably true that they are not scanning on iCloud unless they receive a warrant.
- wyager 5y ago
  "In order to respect our privacy policy, we need to even more egregiously violate your privacy in a weird lawyer-y way"
outworlder 5y ago
In-device scanning is used for the feature that warns teens (and if =< 12yr old, their parents). Biggest mistake Apple has ever done was to roll out three different features at once and announce at the same time. This is creating all sorts of confusion.
- FabHK 5y ago
  And CSAM detection as well.

czzr 5y ago

Only semi-good reason is it would enable E2E encryption in the cloud while still allowing detection of CSAM.

roody15 5y ago
Except despite this being repeated over and over… Apple has not said anything about E2E
- czzr 5y ago
  As I said, the design enables this, if Apple chose to do it. It remains to be seen if they will.
  - zionic 5y ago
    The design more plausible enables total device surveillance than questionable iCloud Backups. (I refuse to call a backdoored setup E2EE)
    - zepto 5y ago
      That’s silly. The design is so narrowly tailored to scan for CSAM that nobody can use it for anything else.
      - FabHK 5y ago
        It all depends on what perceptual hashes you use. If Apple can institute a process whereby those are tied to the OS version, but not to the region, then it would be impossible to impose jurisdiction-specific exceptions.
        zepto 5y ago
        > It all depends on what perceptual hashes you use. I’m talking about the mechanism as described, not a hypothetical. > If Apple can institute a process whereby those are tied to the OS version, but not to the region, then it would be impossible to impose jurisdiction-specific exceptions. As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction.
        FabHK 5y ago
        > As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction. That is very worrisome. How do they want to withstand political pressure then to make the database of "bad hashes" dependent on the jurisdiction if they've already made the feature dependent on the jurisdiction?
        zepto 5y ago
        Presumably they’ll just say, we built a child abuse prevention mechanism and we have no intention of using it for anything else.
        fsflover 5y ago
        > As it is the mechanism they have built only works in the US jurisdiction. How do you know? I think it's just implemented in the US. Nothing stops Apple to implement it elsewhere.
        shuckles 5y ago
        They have said the mechanism is global in both their FAQ and in an interview with Tech Crunch. They have no way to target a database to a region or device.
- macintux 5y ago
  Apple almost never talks about features like that until they’re ready, so while you’re correct, it doesn’t mean much.
  - wyager 5y ago
    It's been leaked before that Apple folded under pressure from the FBI not to add iCloud encryption for images.
    - ummonk 5y ago
      That would seem to back up the theory that they plan to roll out E2EE and are adding on-device scanning first to enable that.
  - Clubber 5y ago
    With all this backlash, now would probably be a tactically good time.
- zepto 5y ago
  It’s also being repeated over and over that apple is doing this so they can later do some more evil scanning. They haven’t said anything about that either.
nullc 5y ago
Apple is free to enable E2E encryption today, without the backdoor.

AlexandrB 5y ago

That's the crux of it. Why bother with on-device identification, unless one of: a. Apple intends to E2E encrypt iCloud data. b. This is intended to extend to all photos on the device in the future. I'm hoping it's (a), but it's probably (b). And in either case it sets a bad precedent for other companies to follow. Edit: This also turns every jailbreak into a possible CSAM detection avoidance mechanism, giving the government plausible cover to treat them as serious, criminal actions. Apple would probably love that.

still_grokking 5y ago
Where is this stance coming form that Apple needs to break E2E crypto to be "able" to "E2E encrypt iCloud data"? That makes absolutely no sense. There is nowhere such a requirement. They could just E2E encrypt iCloud data. Point.
- FabHK 5y ago
  They could E2E iCloud, of course. Question is whether they could while still staying on the right side of the law.
  - still_grokking 5y ago
    Is there a law requiring device manufactures to search (without any warrant!) the devices of all their customers? How do for example hard drive manufacturers comply?
- matwood 5y ago
  There is no requirement right now, but you only need to look at what's happening in the US, UK, and EU to see the battle setting up around E2EE. Apple may see this feature as a way to quiet critics of E2EE. Hard to know if it will be enough. But, I think it's safe to say if Apple did turn on E2EE w/o any provision for things like CSAM, it would help drive legislation that is likely more heavy handed.
  - 5y ago

deleted 5y ago

[deleted]

pvarangot 5y ago

This article speculates that that's because Apple is not scanning on iCloud to respect their privacy policy: https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-One-Bad-Apple.html https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/929-On... Apple's report count to the NCMEC is really low so it's probably true that they are not scanning on iCloud unless they receive a warrant.

wyager 5y ago
"In order to respect our privacy policy, we need to even more egregiously violate your privacy in a weird lawyer-y way"

outworlder 5y ago

In-device scanning is used for the feature that warns teens (and if =< 12yr old, their parents). Biggest mistake Apple has ever done was to roll out three different features at once and announce at the same time. This is creating all sorts of confusion.

FabHK 5y ago
And CSAM detection as well.