8 ms·
The first step is to actually encrypt your drives. Far too few people and places even do this step. Either use the OS-provided solution (Like LUKS, FileVault,
by teddyh 5y ago
The first step is to actually encrypt your drives. Far too few people and places even do this step.
Either use the OS-provided solution (Like LUKS, FileVault, or BitLocker), or use a cross-OS solution like Veracrypt <https://veracrypt.fr/ https://veracrypt.fr/>.
Secondly, to avoid the problem in this article, you should have an external password necessary to unlock the drive; not a TPM. This is, of course, not what most people do, since typing in passwords is tedious.
However, if you mostly need to boot up the laptop when connected to a specific network (e.g. on company premises), and it’s acceptable to require a manually typed password when the laptop is not present at that location, and if you use a Debian-based OS, there is a solution! Shameless plug: https://www.recompile.se/mandos https://www.recompile.se/mandos
- imwillofficial 5y agoIt's a sad state of affairs when Veracrypt is one of the top contenders for tools to use. We need a fresh batch of properly maintained privacy tools.
- teddyh 5y agoFeel free to recommend something else from this list: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_disk_encryption_software https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_disk_encryption_...
- codetrotter 5y agohttps://security.stackexchange.com/questions/242427/is-native-openzfs-on-freebsd-block-level-encryption-secure https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/242427/is-nativ... > [...] it appears that OpenZFS encryption is far stronger than LUKS or VeraCrypt encryption. > LUKS and VeraCrypt use the XTS mode of encryption, which is not authenticated, and is vulnerable to some limited recovery of information when an attacker can have access to the encrypted data at different times. On the other hand OpenZFS encryption is authenticated and at the state of the art. Also, you should take care to disable compression when encrypting with OpenZFS.
- buildbot 5y ago> Also, you should take care to disable compression when encrypting with OpenZFS. This is new to me, why?
- merlincorey 5y agoEncrypted data attempts to look like random binary data, generally. Random binary data doesn't compress very well, sometimes even negatively.
- unnouinceput 5y agoOP said the other way around. We all know encrypted data does not compress well, but why would you need to disable compression when encrypting? Compressed data should actually be a smaller dataset hence encrypting it should be even faster.
- teddyh 5y agoIn general, if the size is then visible after encryption, you can tell that the data, whatever is was, compressed well. This is information leakage, and can, IIUC, be exploited to surprising degrees.
- unnouinceput 5y agoThis doesn't make any sense. Here you have a disk. It's compressed or not, doesn't matter, the size stays the same. Then you use BitLocker on it. Again, compressed or not, after BitLocker encrypts it, the size is still the same. Your point?
- teddyh 5y agoLike I said, “if the size is visible after encryption”. I don’t know if this is a huge issue with block device encryption in general, but then again, OpenZFS isn’t really only a block-device-level driver, is it? I would not be surprised to hear that OpenZFS somehow encrypts on some higher level than the whole block device.
- urda 5y agoWhats' wrong with Veracrypt?
- bitwize 5y agoWasn't it originally written by that criminal mastermind hacker genius who probably is Satoshi?
- cyberpunk 5y agoThat was truecrypt
- rfd4sgmk8u 5y agoPaul Le Roux probably isnt satoshi, but he is a very interesting person. The article series "The mastermind" goes into some depth about what he was up to: https://magazine.atavist.com/category/Mastermind/ https://magazine.atavist.com/category/Mastermind/ Recommended reading!
- unnouinceput 5y agoAnd VeraCrypt is a fork of TrueCrypt
- aborsy 5y agoThis guy says veracrypt is tough, even tougher than LUKS: https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/06/breaking-veracrypt-obtaining-and-extracting-on-the-fly-encryption-keys/ https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2021/06/breaking-veracrypt-obtain... Disk encryption is generally in XTS mode, and not authenticated. That’s not limited to veracrypt.
- Spooky23 5y agoVeracrypt is not a contender for a commercial solution. There are several different products on the market, and a variety of ways that native solutions like Bitlocker can be configured.
- lupire 5y agoMy company requires a password every time laptop wakes from sleep. Is that an unreasonable burden on people?
- layoutIfNeeded 5y agoIt depends. Can you turn off auto-sleep?
- deathanatos 5y agoMy corp laptop auto-locks the screen (if that's what you mean), but can also be unlocked by biometrics, but only if it's already on. (And only for a limited time; I think after a week, the password is required again.) If the laptop is booting fresh, the password is required. I wouldn't call it a burden.
- jll29 5y ago> but can also be unlocked by biometrics I always switch off the biometric access of any machine, so you can save yourself the hassle of cutting off my thumb or trying to unlock a device when I am asleep.
- dividedbyzero 5y agoI guess anyone able to do either of these things could just torture you into surrendering your password, though.
- CRConrad 5y agoI guess you could hope for their decency to cut off bits only after they've killed you. Combine that with their possible (probable?) stupidity to assume you have biometrics enabled, and they might kill you without even asking for any password, so you'd die secure in the knowledge that they'll never crack your data. Though Idunno how happy that'll make you.
- 5y ago
- kryogen1c 5y ago> you should have an external password necessary to unlock the drive; not a TPM. i thought the whole point of hardware oracles like TPMs was to avoid loading a PSK into RAM, making removable RAM sticks simple non-destructive attack vectors.
- dathinab 5y agoIt's complicated. I.e. it's not uncommon for you password to be used to decrypt an encryption key which then lives in RAM and is used to decrypt data. So as long as you "just" have a TPM then it's not preventing that attack wrt. full disk encryption. For it to do so you need either a secure module on you hard-drive (and trust that module) or need to pipe all disk I/O through the TPM (and hope it's fast enough). Through there are (should be?) some hybrid models. Anyway you can combine both a TPM and a external password (in different ways depending on how the encryption is done). One additional common reason against using a TPM for full disk encryption is if you want to make data recoverable even if you TPM (motherboard/cpu) fires itself. I would say for most companies the benefits of requiring a password (or better HSK + PIN) for boot instead of only a TPM are outweighing the risk of a RAM removal attacks. Especially if combined with intrusion detection and short times between suspend and full (non hybrid) hibernation.
- azalemeth 5y agoOut of curiosity and to ameliorate my ignorance -- does LUKS on Linux keep the keys in the processor's SME all the time? How easy is it to just encrypt everything in ram?
- dathinab 5y ago> How easy is it to just encrypt everything in ram? It's a feature of modern server CPUs which have a AES-128 encryption engine directly embedded in the memory controller (and combine that feature with virtualization, i.e. different encryption keys for different VM). > does LUKS on Linux keep the keys in the processor's SME all the time? The LUKS mater key is kept in the Linux Kernel Keyring and while I'm 90% sure that at least when accessing a encrypted partition it's in RAM. I also would guess that the large majority (all?) of on-the-fly disk encryption software suites/libraries have this problem. The only way not to have this problems would be to pipe all disk (data) I/O through a fast encryption engine connected to the TPM. And as far as I know this is not part of the TPM feature set(1) (the fast, high throughput part). But then DRM has kinda similar requirements, so maybe I'm wrong. Through IMHO most companies and people in most situations don't have to worry about RAM extraction attacks as they are way to complicated and brittle, especially if combined with e.g. case intrusion detection and suspend-to-disk automatically after some time. Through as far as I remember it played a role in some "police extracts chats from locked iPhone" cases. (1): TPM is besides some features around attestation and early boot mainly a from of Hardware Key Store, so e.g. if you use it to sign a blob you don't pipe the blob through the TPM but you (cryptographically secure) hash the blob and then only sign the few bytes long hash by passing it through the TPM. Similar encryption is normally done by doing a AES encryption of a blob and then encrypt the few bytes long AES key using the TPM. But again, I'm not a expert in that area and thinks might have changed, but I guess they haven't (I would be surprised).
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- merb 5y ago> you should have an external password necessary to unlock the drive; not a TPM or tell microsoft to use tpm 2.0 features if they force us to use a tpm v2?
- belorn 5y agoIf you know of tpm 2.0 features that have the disk encryption and decryption occurring in the TPM chip itself then please enlighten me. I have not heard of that. Using a tpm without such features in order to improve a disk encryption setup to the same or above that of a password is difficult and full of problems, and there are some distinct drawbacks. There is a reason why Microsoft bitlocker is primarily intended to protect a users home directory after they have provided a password. If the pin to the tpm is in clear text on the disk, and all the tpm is doing is converting that pin to a password to unlock the disk, the benefits are generally small.
- lostmsu 5y agoI find it interesting that because they used SPI sniffer, CPU memory encryption features would not have prevented the attack. Looks like all communications between PC components need to be encrypted
- jnwatson 5y agoThe key doesn’t need to be kept in the TPM. It just needs to be encrypted between the CPU and the TPM.
- merb 5y agoactually tpm 2.0 can build a secure communication channel to send the key to the cpu and thus makes that a unlikely attack. of course there are many more attack vectors, but this possible one can be prevented with a correct communication channel. https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TSS_ESAPI_v1p0_r08_pub.pdf https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TSS_ESA...
- floatingatoll 5y agomacOS FileVault is also a good option for whole-drive encryption, as the hardware then requires the external password in order to unlock the drive to continue booting.
- com2kid 5y ago> Secondly, to avoid the problem in this article, you should have an external password necessary to unlock the drive; not a TPM. This is, of course, not what most people do, since typing in passwords is tedious. Back when I worked at MS, a PW was required on boot to deencrypt the drive. I am honestly shocked that isn't the default for bitlocker. But then again it does require people to have a unique bitlocker PW, and if they ever forget it, everything on the machine is gone for good. (Which I've actually been bitten by, oops!)
- redtexture 5y agoCare to desribe the experience, and what was lost to you?
- com2kid 5y agoNow that I remember, there is a separate key stored by the corporation that can also unlock the drive.
- 0942v8653 5y agoIt seems like it'd be possible to have a separate recovery key stored by the company in addition to the regular password.
- Osiris 5y agoThat's how my employer does it but it's for less than a hundred devices so we just provide security the key after turning on FileVault.
- JonathonW 5y agoI don't recall whether or not it's the default, but Bitlocker can do this on domain-joined machines-- they get automatically backed up into Active Directory where they can be retrieved from the computer account's properties (or there's a tool in RSAT that can find them).
- koyote 5y ago
- mackrevinack 5y ago> since typing in passwords is tedious i think passphrases are better for any situation where you might be typing them in multiple times a day. since you can use all lowercase letters, it makes it much quicker than having to press the shift key for capitals or symbols, and you can make up for the lack of those characters by using a longer words/passphrase https://www.useapassphrase.com https://www.useapassphrase.com on top of that i usually spend a bit of time choosing words that are quicker to type. like words that have letters that alternative between each hand seem to be quicker than typing a word that's only on one side of the keyboard. avoiding words that have double letters for the same reason. making sure the end of one word and the start of the next are typed with different hands. choosing words where most of the letters go in the direction of your pinky to your index finger if possible
- teddyh 5y agoThis is a whole other topic, but if you are choosing what words to use, the words are no longer random, and your password (sorry, “passphrase”) is no longer as secure as mere word counts might lead you to believe. If you insist on choosing words, you must compensate for this by choosing more words; i.e. having a longer passphrase. Exactly how many bits of entropy you lose by manually choosing words is hard to say without knowing your exact criteria for choosing, but it can be calculated exactly if these are known.
- 10000truths 5y agoPick 5 random words from the top 10,000 most common English words, and you have just a bit more entropy than a password composed of 8 random printable ASCII characters.
- teddyh 5y agohttps://xkcd.com/936/ https://xkcd.com/936/
- dredmorbius 5y agoLet a machine, or dice, do that for you and avoid common pitfalls. https://pypi.org/project/xkcdpass/ https://pypi.org/project/xkcdpass/ https://www.eff.org/dice https://www.eff.org/dice
- TacticalCoder 5y agoThat's what I do: LUKS and a (complicated) password needed to decrypt the drive. Now TFA says it took 30 minutes and that's within the timeframe of an "evil maid attack". If we take the same 30 minutes, then it's doable to: dupe the SSD and install a physical keylogger between the laptop's keyboard and the laptop's mobo, put back the laptop in place while looking like nothing happened. Then on the next login, when the person enter his password to decrypt the SSD, have the physical keylooger emit (radio?) the password. Some may say it's science fiction but in TFA in 30 minutes they opened the laptop and hooked an analyzer to the TPM. I guess what I mean to say is: it's hard to be safe in the face of an evil maid who has 30 minutes of access to your machine.
- mlosapio 5y agoThis is bad advice. You should use a PIN on your TPM and not a password protecting the drive header.
- raxxorrax 5y agoI don't think this is true, a decent password is as secure if not even more secure.
- Sanzig 5y ago> Secondly, to avoid the problem in this article, you should have an external password necessary to unlock the drive; not a TPM. This is, of course, not what most people do, since typing in passwords is tedious. TPM is fine, but you need to set a PIN to unlock the TPM. If you have a TPM without a PIN, somebody can just swipe the whole machine. PIN guesses are rate-limited by the hardware itself, so the PIN can generally be faster and easier to enter than a complex passphrase without compromising security. IMO: TPM+reasonably random PIN offers comparable security to a strong password without a TPM, and better security than a weak password without a TPM. I prefer TPM+PIN since it's easier to enter 5-6 digits at boot versus a big complicated passphrase, but it's personal preference. TPM without a PIN is pretty useless though.
- teddyh 5y agoYou could get almost the same benefits and none of the drawbacks of a TPM by using a password hash function with enough complexity to inherently limit the number of checks possible per second.
- Sanzig 5y agoI can't think of a key derivation function which would reliably make, say, a 6 digit PIN tough to crack while also not painfully impacting user experience waiting for the machine to unlock at boot. For a 6 digit PIN it's only 10 million iterations to exhaust all possible options, and the attacker gets to parallelize their guesses if they're willing to throw hardware or cloud resources at it.
- teddyh 5y agoI did say “almost”; one of the requirements is that you have to set an actually secure password; i.e. not a 6 digit PIN.
- Sanzig 5y agoTotally! And for a user that knows the importance of a secure password, that's fine. But the average user in an organization picks terrible passwords. A random 5 or 6 digit PIN generated by the IT department (to avoid the user picking their daughter's birthday) used to lock a TPM is generally easy to remember and secure, especially if a lockout policy is set on the TPM. I agree that for the user who would pick a secure passphrase, it's comparable security either way and thus really comes down to preference. I like tapping a quick PIN on the numpad rather than typing out a passphrase, but I can definitely see the advantages to the passphrase approach: you don't have to depend on a piece of hardware specific to the machine, and the attack surface for a potential backdoor is a lot smaller, especially if you're using FOSS full disk encryption software like Veracrypt.
- renonce 5y agoThe biggest issue I have with TPM is that it's overly sensitive to the device configuration. Plug in an extra mouse at boot and I'm locked out of BitLocker (it asks for the recovery key). That's too dangerous for my data, at least for my personal use. VeraCrypt works better in that aspect.
- tgsovlerkhgsel 5y agoBitLocker can be configured to be passphrase-only.
- exikyut 5y agoAfter taking a quick look at Mandos, I realized you might have some insight into how to solve something that's had me stumped for a while: How might I handle the situation where a given device has been stolen, attacked and returned, without my having observed it happening?