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All Your Passwords Are Belong to FPGA
- libreverything 6y agoThis isn't going to crack 100-200 characters passwords so this article is pointless.
- imtringued 6y agoHow many passwords are that long?
- arpa 6y agoI'm lazy and trust the local experts. What should be used instead of bcrypt?
- lnsru 6y agoIn couple years that will be also no big problem to crack with enough cheap FPGAs from today. Think about Kintex-7 boards for couple hundred dollars from AliExpress.
- indigo945 6y agoSCrypt is specifically designed to be hard to crack using FPGAs. To achieve this, it relies on high memory requirements for calculation of the hash. Crypto-mining boards for traditional cryptocurrencies have no memory requirements, and therefore cannot be repurposed to calculate SCrypt. However, with the advent of cryptocurrencies that also rely on memory-inefficient hash algorithms in order to prevent people from using classic FPGA clusters to mine them professionally, this is likely to change, as now there is monetary incentive to develop FPGA boards with high amounts of memory. The situation is still less bad though.
- contingencies 6y agoMemory is really cheap, so I wouldn't base any decision on the current public market for these devices. You can definitely get an FPGA board custom designed, debugged and delivered within two weeks in China.
- indeyets 6y agoArgon2 is the obvious contender
- throw0101a 6y agoAs others have mentioned, scrypt and Argone2. For general overview, see: * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-kitten-password-stora...
- jzs 6y ago"Now might be a good time to change your password to something longer, or finally get onboard with 2FA." If it becomes trivial to crack the passwords, then we're really left one factor. Unless we replace the password factor with something else. Sqrl perhaps?
- arpa 6y agoClient certificates is also a thing.
- mschuster91 6y agoAnd they are an utter PITA to use, everywhere in the stack...
- ta17711771 6y agoWe could fix that..
- Nerada 6y agoCracking good (long) passwords is far from trivial (and mathematically should remain that way), the main problem is most users pick terrible passwords.
- amelius 6y agoThe problem: users don't want long passwords. (Though password managers can help a lot.)
- UncleEntity 6y agoOh, the irony... One of my banking apps has a 10 minute logout "feature" (which can't be disabled) that pretty much guarantees you need to have a crappy, easy to remember, password if you want to use it. Add on top of this a predilection for "2FA" (aka text message) every few times you log in and the thing is basically an unusable hot mess. (looking at you walmart moneycard)
- rohan1024 6y agoCan anyone tell me why we do not have a mechanism like SSH keys to authenticate to websites? Genuinely curious.
- tastroder 6y agoAs arpa mentioned in the other thread, client certificates are a thing. Outside of corporate infrastructure the implementation is somewhat painful though and OS/browser sides far from optimal in terms of user experience.
- indigo945 6y agoYes, and browser vendors have refused to enhance support for this. To be fair though, client certificates have some obvious downsides, before all that you only have them on the device where they have been created. Since most people use several devices (desktop/notebook/tablet/phone) throughout the day, you require some way to keep them in sync. Cloud services could solve this, but tend to be vendor-specific, and doing it by hand via sneakernet is painful. Then this same problem occurs all over again if a certificate is leaked, for example due to device theft, and the cert needs to be revoked and replaced. In summary, while browser and mobile OS vendors could cooperate to improve the situation with client certificates, as of now, there appears to be no interest from any party to do so, and unless it happens, it is not worth it to use client certificates at all.
- nybble41 6y ago> Since most people use several devices (desktop/notebook/tablet/phone) throughout the day, you require some way to keep them in sync. The obvious solution, rather than syncing the certificates, would be to allow more than one client certificate per account. Each device would have its own certificate. If one device is compromised you need only revoke that particular certificate; other devices could still access the account. To avoid the need to manually register multiple certificates for each account you could cross-sign the per-device certificates; i.e. if key A is registered, and key B is signed by key A, then key B can also be used to sign in, perhaps with a warning sent to the owner of the account about a login from a new device.
- walterbell 6y agoOn a positive note, iOS14 will enable website 2FA via WebAuthn & TouchID/FaceID. On a cleanup note, remember to check breach monitoring sites like https://haveibeenpwned.com/ https://haveibeenpwned.com/ and https://scatteredsecrets.com https://scatteredsecrets.com (creators of the FPGA-based cracking device).
- duck2 6y agoThe boards have 4x Spartan 6 LX150, the same part in Pano Logic G2.
- rini17 6y agoLooks like the setup can guess any 32bit bcrypt-ed secret in reasonable time. So just use passwords generated from 64-bit secret, and it's fine, no? Even xkcd's venerable 40-bit scheme is okay for now.
- e12e 6y agoSo for a random password picked from 72 character alphabet (capital/regular letters, 0-9, 10 punctuation chars) - 5 characters would be too short, but 6 might be safe? (log2(72^5) < 31, log2(72^7) ~ 37). To go past 64,you'd want 11 characters. Ed: and to take the pathological case of "classic" hashes, 50 billion guesses pr second - is (almost) equivalent to 36 bits of entropy pr second. If your password is 37 bits, on average it'll be found in one second - for certain in two. If you want to aim for, say a hundred years (today), that should be about 32 bits (Log2(100 * 365.25 * 24 * 3600). So 37+32 = 69 - which is about 12 random characters from an alphabet of 70, if my math is right. Do note: random characters. Still, a 50% to find in 100 years, 25% in 50, 12.5% in 25, 6.25% in 12.5... Still like 1 in a 100 passwords in just 3? years time. So if someone has millions of secure passwords [to crack ] ... You might want more entropy still [in the entire population] .
- njsubedi 6y ago> Now might be a good time to change your password to something longer, or finally get onboard with 2FA. That “or” should be “and” because a shorter password isn’t really useful even if you enable 2FA. I have seen websites that allow brute forcing TOTP tokens, so an on-site or low-latency attack could guess from 500k tokens (6 digit code with look-ahead time of 1 step) in 30 seconds, even if they change frequently. I think that it’s time everyone used a password manager to generate really really long passwords. I set all passwords to 64 characters or the maximum allowable characters. There’s are some stupid businesses (hello, banks!) who have weird password requirements, like “more than 7 but lesser than 10 characters”. In such cases you’re better off with randomly generated passwords than a pattern you can remember.
- tialaramex 6y agoOn the server side you can do WebAuthn and not care about conventional passwords. At that point you don't hold any secrets at all, you could actually publish the credentials you hold on file and there's only a modest impact on user privacy and no impact on credential security. > I set all passwords to 64 characters This makes no real sense, if they aren't chosen randomly then having 64 of them makes little difference and might make things worse. If they are chosen randomly then you only need a couple of dozen and you're fine.
- e12e 6y agoSomewhat uncharitable reading of gp (unless there was an edit): > I think that it’s time everyone used a password manager to generate really really long passwords. I set all passwords to 64 characters or the maximum allowable characters. So, it's not long or random, but rather long and random. That said, I'd advocate aiming for 96 to 128 bits of entropy - beyond that you just have a password that's tricky to type in, in cases where you cannot copy and paste (eg: boot password). So for large and small letter, numbers and a handful (10) of special characters, that comes to 21 random characters (Log2(72^21)~129).
- user5994461 6y ago>>> Each 4U FPGA cracker is capable of 2.1 million bcrypt hashes per second, while consuming just 585 watts. That's really not a lot considered the investment. A similar effort to crack SHA hashes would do trillions per second on CPU/GPU, or quadrillions per second on dedicated FPGA. It is a testament to bcrypt success that it is able to slow down an attack by 5 to 10 orders of magnitude. The lesson is unfortunately, that short passwords like 6 character long or common passwords in a top 1 million list can never be safe from cracking, no matter the algorithm.
- dredmorbius 6y agoIs there a table or chart of password crack rates vs cost over time, say, to the mid-to-late 1990s or before? When judging password (or other secret token) effectiveness, it's not just today's crack rate that matters, but 20-80 years in the future. Rates and costs are advancing / declining exponentially.
- cj 6y ago> capable of 2.1 million bcrypt hashes per second, Shouldn't this wildly depend on the bcrypt hash's work factor?
- tialaramex 6y agoYou are correct, and in the source post we find it assumes work factor 5 (32 iterations) whereas the same source says most web sites choose between 7 (128 iterations) and 14 (16384 iterations). This is apparently because "benchmarks" tend to choose 5. But since sites don't actually use that work factor you should modify your assumptions appropriately.
- throw0101a 6y agoTime to move to Argon2 and/or scrypt? * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-kitten-password-storage-00 https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-kitten-password-stora...
- dgellow 6y agoOr use bcrypt with a decent work factor, such as 10+.