17 ms·
> WeWork then used this cash to underprice competitors in the co-working space market, hoping to be able to profit later once it had a strong market position in
by legitster 7y ago
> WeWork then used this cash to underprice competitors in the co-working space market, hoping to be able to profit later once it had a strong market position in real estate subletting or ancillary businesses.
> This is of course Amazon’s model, which underpriced competitors in retail and eventually came to control the whole market.
This is wrong, wrong, wrong. The difference is Amazon saw what the marginal costs could be, and had a specific roadmap to drive investment into bringing them down. WeWork fundamentally has no way to drive down the margin on real estate in any meaningful way. Especially as a lessee.
> The goal of Son, and increasingly most large financiers in private equity and venture capital, is to find big markets and then dump capital into one player in such a market who can underprice until he becomes the dominant remaining actor. In this manner, financiers can help kill all competition, with the idea of profiting later on via the surviving monopoly.
A bold assumption with no citations. There are just as many counterfactuals to this strategy as there are examples. The scooter market is an especially bad - there is so much capital from so many companies - if you were trying to establish monopolies that would be a bad bet.
> Endless money-losing is a variant of counterfeiting, and counterfeiting has dangerous economic consequences. The subprime fiasco was one example.
The subprime crisis is completely unrelated! And if anything it was proof that money-making assets should be scrutinized more.
WeWork is a garbage, charlatan company. But don't misunderstand what is happening here.
- tlb 7y agoThere are two ways to get to positive margins: Either drive down costs (as Amazon did) or increase price. Part of WeWork's plan is presumably to increase prices once tenants are locked in. The big question is how much lock-in they can achieve. The lock-in is largely caused by employee loyalty. Employees who like beer and camaraderie in the evenings may be hard to persuade to move to a soulless office park. It's a micro version of the way a city gets lock-in. San Francisco office space costs 2-5x more than Sunnyvale, because employees will quit if you move your office from one to the other.
- wolco 7y agoWould 50-80% of employees quit if a company moved to Sunnyvale? Was that a serious fact?
- tlb 7y agoYes, something like that depending on the company and how committed employees are. It’s a horrible commute. But for many companies, even 10% of employees quitting is enough reason to stick with the expensive office space.
- BWStearns 7y ago> The subprime crisis is completely unrelated! And if anything it was proof that money-making assets should be scrutinized more. I think the connection here is that the assets themselves were money losing but they passed them off as safe assets despite knowing they weren't safe. If I make money by producing counterfeit bills and circulating them then it makes money. It's still counterfeiting. The underlying assumption that makes capitalism desirable is that you are (supposed to be) rewarded based on the value you put into the system. If there are ways to reliably create and dump value inflated assets and those ways are easier than actually producing value, then we shouldn't be surprised when that becomes a competitive business. Arguably this is what WeWork was trying to do by going public. I don't think anyone here who has followed WeWork over the past few years was itching to jump into day-1 buying even before the current iteration of the Neumann freak show began. Would any engineer here really have taken a stock heavy WeWork comp package in the past two years? On the other hand if you're a rando investor who just sees "oh Uber for office space!" you might line up to get fleeced.
- nradov 7y agoNo one seriously claims that IPO stock is a "safe asset". The prospectus is crystal clear about the high level of risk.
- VHRanger 7y agoThe CDO assets were money losing but in a much more obfuscated way. They acted like a bet where you make a dollar if you roll 1-19 on a d20, but lose $50 if you roll a 20. And because they had higher-than-sp500 returns, short sighted investors flocked to them. The one point where WeWork is similar to those CDOs is the stack of complexity used to obfuscate the fairly simple business financials
- BWStearns 7y agoAbsolutely true that a CDO is more obfuscated in terms of its actual structure. Pre-crash I don't pretend I would have spotted the risk (because my stats knowledge is meh on a good day). I would say though that WeWork's insistence that it's a "tech company" is an obfuscation at the social/marketing level. This appears to be working somewhat, as evidenced by the various "Is WeWork a tech company?" articles [0]. Even though this time the trick seems to have been caught early it doesn't make it different in nature, just in how well it worked. [0] https://stratechery.com/2019/what-is-a-tech-company/ https://stratechery.com/2019/what-is-a-tech-company/ https://hbr.org/2019/08/no-wework-isnt-a-tech-company-heres-why-that-matters https://hbr.org/2019/08/no-wework-isnt-a-tech-company-heres-... https://www.builtinnyc.com/2019/03/11/spotlight-working-at-wework-digital-tech https://www.builtinnyc.com/2019/03/11/spotlight-working-at-w... (had to find someone with a vested interest to provide an affirmative answer)
- helen___keller 7y ago> The subprime crisis is completely unrelated! And if anything it was proof that money-making assets should be scrutinized more. The subprime mortgage crisis is basically godwin's law for finance. Want to make something look awful? Compare it to CDOs or mortgage-backed securities.
- legitster 7y ago> The subprime mortgage crisis is basically godwin's law for finance. This is so spot on - I'm 100% going to steal this.
- throwaway744678 7y agoI get your point, but Ponzi would be an even better candidate, though.
- smsm42 7y agoPeople usually know what Ponzi is about so comparing unrelated things to it is going to be obviously wrong. But most people have very murky idea beyond "something in capitalism went bad" when talking about the subprime crisis, so any time anybody wants to criticize anything going bad in capitalism, they are free to grab this example with low(er) risk of being called out.
- throwaway744678 7y agoI was thinking of a Godwin equivalent for finance, which is narrower than capitalism as a whole. What I had in mind is that once you take several rounds of investments (especially from private individuals) and are not profitable, bad faith critics may try to picture you as some kind of Ponzi scheme (trying to repay early investors with late ones, etc.)
- smsm42 7y agoWell, the trick of Ponzi scheme is that it looks externally exactly like legit financial company - you get investments, you pay dividends, you attract more investments to finance growth - this is how many legit companies work. Without looking inside - whether or not the company has legit activity going on on the inside, whether currently profitable or not - it's impossible to know, externally it looks the same.
- _edo 7y ago> [Company] then used this cash to underprice competitors in [market], hoping to be able to profit later once it had a strong market position in [market]. This template appears to be one of the author's deepest understandings of capitalism. It wouldn't be so bad if I didn't look at his resume and realize he was Senior Policy Advisor and Budget Analyst on the Senate Budget Committee from Dec 2014 – Dec 2016. edit: also 2 years as a Senior Policy Advisor for a congressman
- legitster 7y agoYikes. There's an intelligent conversation to be had for sure about how large firms like SoftBank are intentionally playing the market and unsavvy investors. This isn't it.
- _edo 7y agoInteresting. I'm not sure I understand why one type of charlatan is more important than the other. If you want WeWork/SoftBank to be regulated, which a lot of people do, it's kind of important that the people doing the regulating understand what they're doing. (edit: If you think a comment is off-topic then just say so. There's no need to be so insulting.)
- polygotdomain 7y ago>Amazon saw what the marginal costs could be, and had a specific roadmap to drive investment into bringing them down. WeWork fundamentally has no way to drive down the margin on real estate in any meaningful way. Especially as a lessee. It absolutely has a way; hold landlords hostage. They've got another WeWork 4 blocks away. WeWork can walk, and leave landlords with a lot of space to lease and an expensive buildout to demo. It's quite likely that WeWork will use that as leverage to put pressure on landlords to negate rent bumps, add in a new concession, or just decrease their rent. Landlords will be in a tough spot because the option is to let the space go dark and collect nothing, or take a bit on the chin to have WeWork keep the lights on. WeWork has a lot of long term leases, so it doesn't take many concessions for them to get their rent far below market in the years at the end of their lease. WeWork is playing a game of arbitrage on two sides; it's about risk with the landlords and about time with the rest of the market. That's how they hope to money.
- throwaway744678 7y agoMy understanding is that WeWork has long term commitment with the landlords, and cannot walk out of it, thus canceling their leverage.
- polygotdomain 7y agoThe entity on the lease is a single SPE that is specific for that one lease. The landlords to not have the We corporation behind the lease itself. WeWork is fully aware of the possibility that their business model does not become as profitable as they've portrayed and left themselves the back door of getting out of leases. Landlords don't like it, but WeWork does not budge on this in negotiations.
- bluGill 7y agoI don't see how. WeWork would need to be a large player for this to work out. Landlords in office parks will rent to anyone. WeWork can threaten to walk, but the landlords can just offer the space they left to someone else - they might not supply beer, but rent is cheaper so you can bring your own and still save. Or they can offer beer if that is what customers demand. There is nothing WeWork is doing that a small Landlord cannot. Or at least nothing that I can see.
- janee 7y ago> with the idea of profiting later on via the surviving monopoly I don't understand...if you undercut your competitors so you're the sole survivor, I don't see how profiting is a obvious end result. When you return prices to market value wouldn't competitors just appear again. Is predatory pricing really such a bad thing, I'd assume the market would just corrects itself later?
- mrkurt 7y agoIt's more complicated than that. When you're the sole survivor, you have a lot of options. In Amazon's case, what they have is immense leverage over the whole supply chain. Amazon extracts higher margins from manufacturers, shipping, etc, etc. And they have enough influence that people pay them $80/year for the privilege of being a customer.
- perl4ever 7y agoIs Amazon really much more than an arbitrage on people's desire for "free shipping" at this point? The last time I wanted to buy something online, the price plus shipping elsewhere was noticeably cheaper than with free shipping on Amazon.
- cosmie 7y agoThe majority of shoppers do not actively price shop. If they do at all, they do so passively in the form of selecting a retailer based on perceived prices (i.e. they may not compare pricing between Target and Walmart on specific items, but they may choose to go to Walmart due to the perception of Target being more expensive). At this point, Amazon is riding on the momentum created from their previous habituation. They built up a (true) reputation for being incredibly cost competitive for the products they carried, and enabled minimally delayed gratification in the form of 2, 1, and same day shipping. Because of this, they became the retailer of first choice and people only went elsewhere if Amazon didn't have the product they wanted. Then they widened their inventory to items that weren't as capable of being efficiently shipped in individual units with last mile residential delivery. They also shifted more and more to holding less inventory on their own books and having third party sellers fill that void. And then had to start collecting taxes nationwide so they could more easily build out their distribution network without tax-related geographic constraints. All of which led to more and more price inflation. But Wikipedia says it best[1]: "New behaviours can become automatic through the process of habit formation. Old habits are hard to break and new habits are hard to form because the behavioural patterns which humans repeat become imprinted in neural pathways,[7] but it is possible to form new habits through repetition." As long as consumers default to Amazon, they'll never notice how uncompetitive some of their product pricing has become. And as long as Amazon's inventory keeps expanding and they get closer and closer to instant gratification from compressed delivery timelines, consumers will have little reason to look beyond Amazon and change their habits. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habit https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Habit
- resfirestar 7y ago>The difference is Amazon saw what the marginal costs could be, and had a specific roadmap to drive investment into bringing them down. WeWork fundamentally has no way to drive down the margin on real estate in any meaningful way. Especially as a lessee. That's what the article says: >At first, with companies like Walmart and Amazon, predatory pricing can seem smart. The entire retail sector might be decimated and communities across America might be harmed, but two day shipping is convenient and Walmart and Amazon do have positive cash flow. But increasingly with cheap capital and a narrow slice of financiers who want to copy the winners, there is a second or third generation of companies asking Wall Street to just ‘trust me.’ It's not that WeWork is the same as Amazon, it's that WeWork is symptomatic of a bubble caused by investors looking to copy Amazon's success without understanding why it succeeded.
- hef19898 7y agoTotally agree with the last pint, people completely tend to ignore the effort and attention to detail Amazon puts into executive and planning. That plus a very sound strategy. Also Amazon was profitable, even if just barely, for the most time while growing appr. 20% constantly. Not comparable to, say, WeWork from what I know. But it shows how powerful that narrative can be.
- streetcat1 7y agoThe only difference between wework and amazon is the way they finance their money-losing ventures. Wework does that via the private market, hence the game is up when it needs access to the public markets. Amazon does that via AWS. AWS is the money that fuels the eCommerce side. The game will be up when: 1) Kubernetes will move AWS customers back to on-prem, or at least turn clouds into a commodity. Amazon knows that and this is the reason for the push toward lockin (aka lambda / serverless). 2) Amazon will be divided into two companies.
- WalterBright 7y agoAWS did not become a product until Amazon had been around for several years.
- gumby 7y ago> > This is of course Amazon’s model, which underpriced competitors in retail and eventually came to control the whole market. > This is wrong, wrong, wrong. I agree with your analysis, that Stoller is wrong in this case (and I say this as a non-fan of Amazon) > > Endless money-losing is a variant of counterfeiting, and counterfeiting has dangerous economic consequences. The subprime fiasco was one example. > The subprime crisis is completely unrelated! Here I don't really agree with you. That whole subprime market collapse was not due to monopoly (the ostensible focus of Stoller's blog) but it was an excellent example of the phenomenon he was talking about: 1 - some people saw opportunity in subprime. 2 - they made very good returns on their relatively small and carefully chosen working set 3 - they therefore got gobs of cash to try to duplicate those returns. 4 - the gobs of cash and the early outsize returns caused many others to rush in as well, not just the many charlatans but also honest fools. 5 - All that money turned into a smoking hole in the ground that swallowed up people who had nothing to do with it. While the example is interesting, it is indeed irrelevant to the thrust of the article, serving more for the author to show off his cleverness. I look forward to his book but I hope his editor is able to apply some focus.
- CitizenKane 7y agoI hope this doesn't get entirely buried at this point, but I think you bring up something interesting with driving marginal costs down. Ostensibly both Uber and Lyft are doing the same thing, but with the item that will bring the marginal cost down being self-driving cars. They've both bet big in order to capture the market, because it's likely that whoever owns the market before that transition will own it afterwards as well. It does seem like there was probably more optimism that the technology would materialize sooner than it really has, but assuming it materializes some time in the near future it's likely that whatever company manages to hold onto the market until then will reap massive rewards. It's clearly a risky bet, but at least from my view doesn't seem like a pump and dump type of scheme.
- legitster 7y agoI'm not sure if there was any thought beyond "make it really big and figure out details later". It's certainly interesting. But I am doubtful about the self-driving cars being a factor. There are at least 4 companies developing the technology and there is really no indication that it will prove a barrier to entry at this point.
- spookthesunset 7y agoNot to pick nits, but gambling your business on self driving cars being just around the corner is nuts. They aren’t gonna happen for decades, if ever. We may well have teleportation before self driving cars because it turns out that solving teleportation is easier...
- dblotsky 7y agoHumans can drive cars, but not teleport. Driving cars is definitely easier.
- bluGill 7y agoToday, but if the ability to teleport (last I heard we can teleport a single particle half a meter - but not even an atom) gets the needed breakthroughs... If teleportation worked and was safe [insert other considerations that I don't know here] I'd teleport to work instead of hoping for a self driving car. Today it looks like the self driving care will be practical sooner, but who knows how the science and engineering will really advance.
- buboard 7y ago> WeWork fundamentally has no way to drive down the margin on real estate But they can make the spaces more popular and raise their prices (thats the added value they claim). Coworking at full capacity can be quite more profitable than any other RE investment
- nobiz 7y agoIn a remarkable coincidence, someone will post the exact same comment in 2039: >The difference is wework saw what the marginal costs could be, and had a specific roadmap to drive investment into bringing them down. FutureTechCo fundamentally has no way to drive down the margin on its business in any meaningful way. Especially without being the owners of their infrastructure. What I'm telling you is, how do you know what Wework's roadmap is? You don't.
- amiga_500 7y agoThis isn’t what the article said. He said companies that came after amazon. Yet hacker news upvotes this the most.
- lbatx 7y ago> There are just as many counterfactuals to this strategy as there are examples. The scooter market is an especially bad - there is so much capital from so many companies - if you were trying to establish monopolies that would be a bad bet. That's not a counterfactual. The fact that the strategy wasn't executed in this market, or was poorly executed, or was executed by too many people, doesn't mean it's not a strategy. It's just a strategy that is imperfect.
- 3xblah 7y ago"A bold assumption with no citations." https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/amazons-antitrust-paradox https://www.yalelawjournal.org/note/amazons-antitrust-parado... The author of the Yale LJ Note assumed that there is in fact a conscious desire on the part of investors to fund companies pursuing a growth over profit strategy. If her assumption is correct, then there is no precedent for this type of investor behaviour. That explains the lack of citations. Here are some quotes from the Note: "Ironically, the logic that is motivating investors - the idea that it is worth encouraging platforms to bleed money to establish a dominant position and capture the market, at which point these firms will be able to recoup those losses - maps on to the logic underpinning current predatory pricing doctrine. The main issue is how narrowly the law currently conceives of recoupment, which does not account for how Amazon can leverage its multiple lines of business." "One might dismiss this phenomenon as irrational investor exuberance. But another way to read it is at face value: the reason investors value Amazon and Uber so highly is because they believe these platforms will, eventually, generate huge returns." More quotes: "First, the economics of platform markets create incentives for a company to pursue growth over profits, a strategy that investors have rewarded. Under these conditions, predatory pricing becomes highly rational - even as existing doctrine treats it as irrational and therefore implausible." "Despite the company's history of thin returns, investors have zealously backed it: Amazon's shares trade at over 900 times diluted earnings, making it the most expensive stock in the Standard & Poor's 500.10 As one reporter marveled, "The company barely ekes out a profit, spends a fortune on expansion and free shipping and is famously opaque about its business operations. Yet investors . . . pour into the stock."11 " "Just as striking as Amazon's lack of interest in generating profit has been investors' willingness to back the company.195 With the exception of a few quarters in 2014, Amazon's shareholders have poured money in despite the company's penchant for losses. On a regular basis, Amazon would report losses, and its share price would soar.196 As one analyst told the New York Times, "Amazon's stock price doesn't seem to be correlated to its actual experience in any way."197" [Diapers example] "Through its purchase of Quidsi, Amazon eliminated a leading competitor in the online sale of baby products. Amazon achieved this by slashing prices and bleeding money,306 losses that its investors have given it a free pass to incur - and that a smaller and newer venture like Quidsi, by contrast, could not maintain." "Relatedly, Amazon's expansion into the delivery sector also raises questions about the Chicago School's limited conception of entry barriers. The company's capacity for losses - the permission it has won from investors to show negative profits - has been key in enabling Amazon to achieve outsized growth in delivery and logistics. Matching Amazon's network would require a rival to invest heavily and - in order to viably compete - offer free or otherwise below-cost shipping." "In interviews with reporters, venture capitalists say there is no appetite to fund firms looking to compete with Amazon on physical delivery.354 In this way, Amazon's ability to sustain losses creates an entry barrier for any firm that does not enjoy the same privilege." "Given that online platforms operate in markets where network effects and control over data solidify early dominance, a company looking to compete in these markets must seek to capture them. The most effective way is to chase market share and drive out one's rivals - even if doing so comes at the expense of short-term profits, since the best guarantee of long-term profits is immediate growth. Due to this dynamic, striving to maximize market share at the expense of one's rivals makes predation highly rational; indeed, it would be irrational for a business not to frontload losses in order to capture the market. Recognizing that enduring early losses while aggressively expanding can lock up a monopoly, investors seem willing to back this strategy." "In essence, investors have given Amazon a free pass to grow without any pressure to show profits. The firm has used this edge to expand wildly and dominate online commerce. The idea that investors are willing to fund predatory growth in winner-take-all markets also holds in the case of Uber." "Though this trend departs from the history on which I focus, my analysis stands given that I am interested in (1) the losses Amazon formerly undertook to establish dominant positions in certain sectors, (2) the investor backing and enthusiasm that Amazon consistently maintained despite these losses, and (3) whether these facts challenge the assumption - embedded in current doctrine - that losing money is only desirable (and hence rational) if followed by recoupment." "Amazon often flip-flops between showing profits and losses, depending on how aggressively it decides to plow money into big new business bets. Investors have granted the company much wider leeway to do so than other technology companies of its size often receive, because of its history of delivering outsize growth."
- deleted 7y ago[deleted]
- burtonator 7y agoIt's more like this "blitzscaling" system is sort of a ponzi scheme. Keep taking money from investor after investor until MAYBE you have a massive payday. BUT.. you haven't actually proven that it's viable business market.